Résumés
Résumé
Pour faire un diagnostic différentiel qui distingue entre les croyances obsessionnelles et celles du trouble délirant (TD), un aspect crucial à évaluer est l’intensité avec laquelle cette conviction est maintenue, allant du doute dans le trouble obsessionnel-compulsif (TOC) à la certitude dans le TD. En effet, les personnes ayant un TD semblent se fier davantage à leur imagination parce qu’elles ne peuvent pas faire confiance aux autres ou à la réalité. Dans le TOC, les personnes croient que leurs doutes imaginaires sont de réelles probabilités, de sorte qu’elles ne peuvent prendre le risque que ces probabilités surviennent réellement. Dans les deux cas, le problème n’est pas la distorsion perceptuelle, mais le remplacement de la réalité par une histoire imaginée et perçue comme possible, même jusqu’à être réelle. Pélissier et O’Connor (2002) ont démontré que les personnes ayant un TOC montrent un style de raisonnement inductif particulier en comparaison de celui des groupes contrôles. Ainsi, l’exploration du raisonnement inductif dans le cas des personnes qui ont un TD permettrait peut-être de raffiner notre compréhension de la pensée délirante, et d’améliorer éventuellement les stratégies de la thérapie cognitive pour le TD. Il est recommandé que les études futures sur le TD essaient de mieux comprendre le raisonnement inductif ainsi que le rôle de l’imagination prédisposant au développement des délires.
Abstract
Differential diagnosis between obsessive beliefs in obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) and delusions in delusional disorder (DD) requires distinguishing the strength of conviction with which the person holds these beliefs, that is : a dimension stretching from doubt to certainty. Effectively, individuals with DD seem to rely much more on their imagination since they cannot trust others or reality. In OCD, people believe that their imaginary doubts are real probabilities and they cannot take the risk that these possibilities occur in reality. In both cases, the problem is not perceptual distortion but the replacement of reality by an imaginary story perceived as possible or even real. Pelissier and O’Connor (2002) have demonstrated that people with OCD show a particular inductive reasoning style when compared to control groups. Hence, exploration of inductive reasoning in the cases of people with DD could possibly enrich our comprehension of delusional thinking and further improve our strategies in cognitive therapy. It is recommended that future studies on DD concentrate on further understanding of inductive reasoning and the role of imagination predisposing the development of delusions.
Resumen
Para realizar un diagnóstico diferencial que distinga entre las creencias obsesivas y aquellas del trastorno delirante (TD), es crucial evaluar la intensidad con la que esta convicción se mantiene, yendo de la duda en el trastorno obsesivocompulsivo (TOC) a la certeza en el TD. De hecho, las personas con un TD parecen fiarse más de su imaginación porque no pueden confiar en los demás o en la realidad. En el TOC, las personas creen que sus dudas imaginarias son probabilidades reales, de manera que no pueden tomar el riesgo de que estas probabilidades ocurran realmente. En ambos casos, el problema no es la distorsión de la percepción, sino el reemplazo de la realidad por una historia imaginaria y percibida como posible, incluso hasta que llega a ser real. Pélissier y O’Connor (2002) demostraron que las personas que sufren de TOC muestran un estilo de razonamiento inductivo particular, en comparación con el de los grupos de control. De esta manera, la exploración del razonamiento inductivo en los casos de las personas que sufren de un TD permitiría tal vez afinar nuestra comprensión del pensamiento delirante y mejorar eventualmente las estrategias de la terapia cognitiva para el TD. Se recomienda que los estudios futuros sobre el TD intenten comprender mejor el razonamiento inductivo, así como el papel de la imaginación que predispone al desarrollo de los delirios.
Resumo
Para fazer um diagnóstico diferencial que distingue as crenças obsessivas das crenças do transtorno delirante (TD), um aspecto crucial a avaliar é a intensidade com a qual esta convicção é mantida, indo da dúvida no transtorno obsessivo-compulsivo (TOC) à certeza no TD. De fato, as pessoas que sofrem de TD parecem acreditar mais em sua imaginação, visto que não podem confiar nos outros ou na realidade. No TOC, as pessoas crêem que suas dúvidas imaginárias são reais probabilidades, de maneira que elas não podem arriscar que estas probabilidades aconteçam realmente. Nos dois casos, o problema não é a distorção percepcional, mas a substituição da realidade por uma história imaginada e vista como possível, mesmo até real. Pélissier e O’Connor (2002) demonstraram que as pessoas que sofrem de TOC apresentam um estilo de raciocínio indutivo particular em comparação com o dos grupos de controle. Assim, a exploração do raciocínio indutivo, no caso das pessoas que sofrem de TD, permitiria talvez especificar nossa compreensão do pensamento delirante, e melhorar eventualmente as estratégias da terapia cognitiva para o TD. Recomenda-se que os estudos futuros sobre o TD busquem melhor compreender o raciocínio indutivo, assim como o papel da imaginação que predispõe ao desenvolvimento dos delírios.
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