Résumés
Abstract
The global weakness of collective bargaining and state regulation has spawned growing interest in employment protection though private governance. However, scepticism about the efficacy of unsupervised codes of conduct has triggered debate about external discipline through state regulation. This article seeks to contribute to debates about the processes that shape the nexus between private governance and state regulation.
It is based on an empirical study of Australian harvest workers who formally benefit from state regulation of pay and occupational health and safety (OHS). However, industry changes have undercut standards. Product market pressures from supermarkets squeeze growers’ capacity to pay. Also, the labour market is increasingly supplied by vulnerable Asian temporary migrants (including undocumented workers), often supplied to growers by unscrupulous temporary work agencies. While pay and OHS practices vary, many harvest workers are exploited. Nor is private governance (which extends to horticulture through the codes of conduct of supermarkets and peak temporary work agency bodies) effective. All codes draw their standards from minimum legal employment conditions, and all possess loopholes allowing breaches to escape attention and rectification.
In 2015, media and political attention fell on the working conditions of temporary migrants in horticulture. Government inquiries found evidence of exploitation, but were divided over solutions. Progressive politicians (influenced by unions) favoured stronger state enforcement powers and temporary work agency licensing. Conservative politicians (influenced by business lobbies) claimed these steps would fail, and favoured the status quo. Political reform therefore stalled.
This study illustrates the importance of political processes in shaping the nexus between state regulation and private governance. In this case, a political stalemate leaves both regulation and governance deficient. Lacking protection from either source, harvest workers remain exposed to exploitative employment conditions.
Keywords:
- supply chain regulation,
- codes of conduct,
- temporary work agencies,
- temporary migrant workers,
- horticulture
Résumé
Dans une économie globalisée, la faiblesse de la négociation collective et de la régulation étatique a suscité un intérêt croissant envers la protection de l’emploi par le biais de la gouvernance privée. Toutefois, le scepticisme au sujet de l’efficacité de codes de conduite privés n’est pas sans soulever des questions au sujet de la discipline externe provenant de la régulation étatique. Cet article se veut une contribution aux débats entourant les processus qui façonnent les liens étroits entre la gouvernance privée et la réglementation de l’État.
Il prend appui sur une recherche empirique menée auprès de travailleurs agricoles qui, formellement, devraient bénéficier de la régulation étatique en matière de salaire, ainsi que de santé et sécurité au travail(SST). Toutefois, des changements survenus dans les normes de l’industrie ont miné les normes existantes. Les pressions exercées par les supermarchés sur le marché des produits ont réduit la capacité de payer des producteurs. Également, le marché du travail australien est de plus en plus envahi par une main-d’oeuvre migrante asiatique temporaire (incluant des travailleurs sans papier), souvent référée aux producteurs par des agences de placement temporaire sans scrupules. Bien que les pratiques en matière de salaire et de SST soient variables, de nombreux travailleurs agricoles sont victimes d’exploitation. De plus, la gouvernance privée (qui s’étend à l’horticulture à travers les codes de conduite des supermarchés et de d’autres types d’agences de placement en période de pointes) ne s’avère pas efficace. Tous ces codes établissent leurs normes à partir des conditions légales minimales d’emploi, et tous comportent des échappatoires qui permettent d’échapper à l’attention, les infractions demeurant impunies.
En 2015, l’attention médiatique et politique s’est portée sur les conditions de travail des travailleurs migrants temporaires. Des enquêtes gouvernementales ont fait ressortir la présence d’exploitation, sans toutefois donner lieu à des solutions partagées. Des politiciens progressistes (influencés par les syndicats) se sont déclarés en faveur d’un renforcement du pouvoir de l’État et d’un meilleur encadrement des agences de placement temporaire. Cependant, des politiciens conservateurs (influencés par les lobbies d’affaires) ont soutenu que cette approche était vouée à l’échec, préférant le statu quo. En conséquence, toute tentative de réforme politique est demeurée au point mort.
Cette étude illustre l’importance des processus politiques qui façonnent le lien étroit entre la régulation étatique et la gouvernance privée. Dans le cas présent, l’impasse politique qui subsiste rend tant la réglementation que la gouvernance déficiente. Sans protection de l’une et de l’autre, les travailleurs agricoles demeurent sujets à de l’exploitation et à des conditions de travail difficiles.
Mots-clés:
- supervision des activités,
- chaînes d’approvisionnements,
- codes de conduite,
- agence de placement temporaire,
- travailleurs migrants temporaires,
- horticulture
Resumen
En una economía globalizada, la debilidad de la negociación colectiva y de la regulación estatal ha suscitado un interés creciente en la protección del empleo a través de la gobernanza privada. Sin embargo, el escepticismo sobre la eficacia de los códigos de conducta sin supervisión que parecen entrar en conflicto con la disciplina externa asociada a la regulación estatal. Este artículo pretende contribuir al debate sobre los procesos que configuran las conexiones entre gobernanza privada y regulación estatal.
Se basa en un estudio empírico sobre los trabajadores australianos de la cosecha que benefician formalmente de la reglamentación estatal sobre la remuneración y la salud y seguridad ocupacional (SSO). Sin embargo, los cambios en la industria han socavado la aplicación de las normas. Las presiones ejercidas por los supermercados sobre el mercado de productos han reducido la capacidad de pago de los cultivadores. De otro lado, el mercado de trabajo australiano está cada vez más invadido por una mano de obra temporal migrante proveniente de Asia (incluyendo los trabajadores indocumentados), que es referida a los productores por las agencias de empleo temporal sin escrúpulos. A pesar que las prácticas en materia de salario y de SSO son variables, numerosos trabajadores agrícolas son víctimas de explotación. Además, la gobernanza privada (que se extiende a la horticultura a través de los códigos de conducta de los supermercados y de las agencias de empleo temporal durante los periodos de punta) no parece ser eficaz. Todos los códigos establecen sus normas a partir de condiciones legales mínimas de empleo y todos ellos contienen escapatorias que permiten dejar las infracciones en la penumbra y sin penalidad.
En 2015, la atención mediática y política se focalizó en las condiciones de trabajo de los trabajadores migrantes temporales. Las encuestas gubernamentales hicieron resaltar la presencia de explotación, sin dar lugar a soluciones compartidas. Políticos progresistas (influenciados por los sindicatos) se declararon en favor de un reforzamiento del poder del Estado y de un mejor encuadramiento de las agencias de empleo temporal. Sin embargo, los políticos conservadores (influenciados por los lobbies empresariales) afirmaron que este enfoque estaba dirigido al fracaso, prefiriendo el statu quo. Por consecuencia, la reforma política se estancó.
Este estudio ilustra la importancia de los procesos políticos en la modulación de los vínculos estrechos entre la regulación estatal y la gobernanza privada. En el caso presente, un impase político que subsiste mantiene deficiente tanto la regulación como la gobernanza. Sin protección de una y de la otra, los trabajadores agrícolas siguen siendo sujetos a explotación y a condiciones de trabajo difíciles.
Palabras claves:
- regulación de la cadena de suministro,
- códigos de conducta,
- agencias de trabajo temporal,
- trabajadores migrantes temporales,
- horticultura
Parties annexes
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