Résumés
Abstract
This paper seeks to answer two questions: 1- To what extent are negotiators in collective bargaining influenced by different types of external information? 2- How can differences in the influence of external information between negotiators be explained by the characteristics of the negotiators and bargaining units? A standardized questionnaire measuring self-reported influences of different types of external information was developed and administered to a representative sample of union and firm negotiators in the Netherlands. In total, 123 negotiators participated in the survey. Four types of external information were investigated: 1- economic information; 2- information on organizational power; 3- institutional information; and 4- information spillovers. Descriptive analyses show that economic information, particularly when referring to the sector level, was very influential, as was institutional information on national and sectoral collective agreement developments. Information reflecting organizational power, e.g. militancy, carried less weight, while information on other bargaining events, i.e. spillover, was also very important. From extant theory, empirical findings and common assumptions in labour relations literature, the paper developed and tested a number of hypotheses concerning the influence of external information. It was found that the influence of spillovers increased with the proximity of their source. Union negotiators were generally more influenced by external information than firm negotiators. There was some evidence that influence increased with experience, but this effect was rather modest. Evidence that negotiators in sector bargaining were less affected by the economic environment than negotiators in company bargaining was weak, but they were found to be less influenced by spillovers and international collective agreement developments.
Keywords:
- collective bargaining,
- negotiators,
- information,
- survey,
- spillover
Résumé
Cet article cherche à répondre à deux questions : 1- dans quelle mesure les personnes négociant une convention collective sont-elles influencées par divers types d’information externe; et 2- comment les différences d’influence de l’information externe entre les personnes négociatrices peuvent être expliquées par les caractéristiques de ces personnes et les unités de négociation. Un questionnaire standardisé cherchant à mesurer les influences auto-déclarées de divers types d’information externe a été développé et administré à un échantillon représentatif de négociateurs et négociatrices de syndicats et d’employeurs dans les Pays-Bas. Au total, 123 négociateurs ont participé à l’enquête.
Quatre types d’information externe ont été étudiés : 1- information de nature économique; 2- information relative au pouvoir organisationnel; 3- information de nature institutionnelle; et 4 information relative aux effets de débordement des négociations. Les analyses descriptives montrent que l’information de nature économique, particulièrement au niveau sectoriel, s’avère très influente, tout comme l’information de nature institutionnelle portant sur les développements nationaux et sectoriels des conventions collectives. L’information reflétant le pouvoir organisationnel, tel le militantisme, aurait moins de poids, alors que l’information concernant d’autres aspects liés à la négociation — par exemple, l’effet de débordement —, s’avère très important.
Selon la théorie existante provenant de résultats de recherches empiriques et d’hypothèses couramment admises dans la littérature des relations de travail, cet article développe et vérifie un certain nombre d’hypothèses concernant l’influence de l’information externe. Il s’avère que l’influence des effets de débordement s’accroit à mesure qu’on se rapproche de leur source. De plus, les négociateurs syndicaux sont généralement davantage influencés par l’information externe que leurs vis-à-vis patronaux. Il appert aussi que l’influence s’accroît avec l’expérience, bien que cet effet demeure modeste. L’idée que les personnes négociant au niveau sectoriel sont moins influencées par l’environnement économique que celles négociant au niveau de l’entreprise n’est pas vraiment accréditée par les résultats. Dans cette enquête, il ressort qu’elles sont moins influencées par les effets de débordement et par les développements de convention collective au niveau international.
Mots-clés:
- négociation collective,
- négociateurs,
- information,
- enquête,
- retombées
Resumen
Este artículo pretende responder dos preguntas: 1- ¿Hasta qué punto los negociadores de la convención colectiva son influenciados por los diferentes tipos de información externa? 2- ¿Las diferencias en la manera cómo la información externa influencia los negociadores pueden ser explicadas por las características de dichos negociadores y de las unidades de negociación? Un cuestionario estandarizado fue elaborado con medidas auto-reportadas de la influencia de los diferentes tipos de información externa. El instrumento fue administrado a una muestra representativa de negociadores sindicales y patronales en los Países Bajos, obteniendo la participaron de un total de 123 negociadores. Cuatro tipos de información externa fueron investigados: 1- la información económica; 2- la información sobre el poder organizacional; 3- la información institucional; y 4- las externalidades de la información. Los análisis descriptivos que la información económica, particularmente aquellas que conciernen el sector, fueron muy influentes, mientras que la información institucional influenció el desarrollo de la negociación a nivel nacional y sectorial. La información sobre el poder organizacional, por ejemplo, el militantismo, tuvo un peso menos importante, mientras que la información sobre otros aspectos de la negociación, tales que las externalidades, fue también muy importante. A partir de la teoría, los resultados empíricos y los postulados comunes en la literatura sobre relaciones laborales, el artículo desarrolló y verificó algunas hipótesis sobre la influencia de la información externa. Fue corroborado que la influencia de las externalidades aumenta con la proximidad de la fuente. Los negociadores sindicales fueron en general más influenciados por la información externa que los negociadores patronales. Los resultados sugieren que la influencia se incrementa con la experiencia pero este efecto fue más bien modesto. Fue también débil el resultado indicando que los negociadores de nivel sectorial fueron menos afectados por el contexto económico que los negociadores de nivel empresarial. Pero la evidencia fue sólida en el sentido que los negociadores de nivel sectorial fueron menos influenciados por las externalidades y el desarrollo de la negociación colectiva internacional.
Palabras claves:
- negociación colectiva,
- negociadores,
- información,
- encuesta,
- externalidades
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Parties annexes
Remerciements
The authors acknowledge financial support from the Conflict and Security program of the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO), grant #432-08-022 and from the Nijmegen School of Management, Radboud University, the Netherlands.
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