EN :

In this paper, I argue that the dominant assumption that educational research means empirical research narrows the range of possibilities for educational research. More specifically, research methods courses and textbooks exclude philosophy of education as a viable way of going about educational research, which limits what we can know about education by predetermining what counts as a legitimate way of doing educational research. My concern is that the assumption that educational research is limited to qualitative, quantitative, or mixed-methods research marginalizes other ways of knowing. I begin by exploring the problem of “tacit empiricism,” the assumption that educational research means empirical research, which I explore in several educational research methods textbooks and course syllabi. I then critique some underlying epistemological assumptions in empirical research, and lament that the proliferation of qualitative methods has not translated into the inclusion of philosophy as a legitimate way to do educational research. I suggest that the requirement that educational research have a practical “impact,” based on a limited notion of what counts as “evidence,” is a key reason why philosophy of education is marginalized. This leads to a consideration of the often-overlooked AERA “Standards for Reporting on Humanities-Oriented Research,” which can help promote philosophical research when it comes to evaluating submissions to educational journals or conferences. I then argue that it is important to rethink the word “research” itself so that it includes reading, writing and thinking. In conclusion, I suggest a few practical ways in which philosophy of education can be promoted in the face of these challenges.

EN :

This exploratory essay considers how and why humanities research is excluded, co-opted, or othered in methods courses and methods course offerings for education research at an R1 institution. While not generalizable (ironically?), concerns have also been raised by philosophers of education that philosophy is not taught or is rarely taught as a research method in colleges of education (Norris, 2021). As though there are only two kinds of research—quantitative and qualitative—this paper asks why humanities methods are rare in an R1 education research core. The short answer might point to numbers: there simply are not that many graduate students in history and philosophy of education. The longer answer, however, arguably involves scholarly turf wars waged within the politics of inquiry. This paper provides a brief overview of the history and politics of the methods wars, an explanation of a research core and the courses constituting it at Georgia State University, and a view from the outside looking in: peering over the qual and quant gate to see that philosophy is already there, but denied credibility, acknowledgement, and understanding.

EN :

In response to considerable critique of its rigour and relevance, the field of educational research has sought to prove its validity, both in terms of its scientific legitimacy and its relevance to policy and practice. One result of this has been a heightened concern with methodology, to the extent that a form of methodolatry has developed. In conjunction with wider changes in the governance of research, from disciplinary to thematic foci, educational research seems also prone to adisciplinarity. Critiques from philosophy of education of the privileging of gold-standard methodologies point to the empiricism that characterises the field and how this can overlook questions of value and meaning. It is arguably not the empiricism as such that is problematic, but its unmooring from the theoretical and the educational. The possibility of an anthropologically informed educational philosophy is explored as a way out of the impasse.

EN :

Philosophy of education’s relevance to schooling and value to society have always been contested within the field. When reading about the state of the field, one often gets the sense that philosophy of education is losing its cache, given the prevalence of data-oriented views about research. But the solution to this crisis is often difficult to identify. In this context, this essay investigates the prevalence of “golden years” thinking in the history of philosophy of education and what it would mean to think differently and go beyond this view. It explores how philosophy of education is framed as peripheral to mainstream educational research today and why students might not choose to study it. Then I examine precarity as a common discourse in history of the field. I scrutinize whether and how we are “in danger,” who “we” are, and the history of this imaginary. I conclude with reflections on moving on from these discourses in the future.

EN :

This paper suggests ways in which the profile of philosophical research in education could be raised, to demonstrate that it is legitimate and genuinely productive to engage in non-empirical research in education. I begin with some historical context for philosophical research in education, exploring the approach known as “conceptual analysis” as it was practiced some decades ago. I then identify four different ways of engaging in philosophical research in education today, namely, (1) a contemporary version of conceptual analysis, (2) a hermeneutic approach, (3) the philosophy of educational content, and (4) the philosophy of quantitative methodologies. I conclude by identifying three practical strategies for graduate students and researchers in the field, which touch on doctoral training, teacher education, and interdisciplinary or generalist research efforts in education.