In his recent paper, Carr (2023) relies on an oddly limiting account of moral education based on behavioural discipline, and the narrative force of fictional novels and other stories, while launching an attack on the emphasis on role modelling as a deliberate educational strategy. He suggests that although role modelling might be inevitable throughout the course of moral education and human life, it could only be considered an auxiliary phenomenon rather than a reliable educational method. Carr is concerned about the possibility of indoctrination, the difficulty in generalizing the method across different students, and potential risks involving imperfect or negative models. Carr’s conceptualization of role modelling views professionals, for example, teachers or ministers, as responsible for taking on a modelling role concerning those they serve. While this may be the case, it is not the only source of role models. Parents, peers, friends, and fictional characters are all possible sources of role models (Annas, 2008; Kristjánsson, 2007, 2020; Sanderse, 2012; Sherman, 1987) that are not acknowledged by Carr. We see no reason to accept such a narrow conception of role modelling as the one suggested by Carr, but even if we did, an aspect of greater concern is his juxtaposition of an agent’s free personal choice with what he claims to be the “deliberate shaping, manipulation or coercion” (Carr, 2023, p. 71) involved in role modelling. As evidence of this understanding of role modelling, Carr discusses schools and their emphasis on discipline and rule-following. However, this conception of role modelling is neither theoretically sound nor supported by empirical evidence. Role modelling can include numerous expressions of an independent agency, from the recognition that growth is necessary, to the choice of the suitable role model, to a conception of what counts as a suitable role model, to an ongoing critical evaluation of the role model and their contribution to the agent’s education (Athanassoulis, 2022). Carr views role modelling as divorced from a normative perspective. Nevertheless, we have no reason to agree with him – the very choice to engage in modelling a particular person is normative. In addition, recent research has pointed to the importance of autonomy and self-cultivation within moral education employing exemplars. Sanderse (revised and resubmitted) argues that teachers need to focus on helping students identify and learn from their moral role models rather than demanding that they emulate them. Researchers interested in moral role modelling are aware of the idea that the mechanism of moral role modelling should focus on students’ self-cultivation instead of passive reception and imitation of presented moral values and behaviours. In addition, the appropriate ultimate goal of moral education via role modelling, from the perspective of researchers, is the promotion of autonomy and self-identity, not indoctrination or unidirectional instillation of values and beliefs. Furthermore, from a methodological perspective, we can also refer to previous research underscoring the use of autonomous instructional methods, not indoctrination, in moral role modelling. A recent empirical study by Han and Graham (2023) supports the idea that autonomy-supported aspects should be considered in moral education via moral role modelling. In the study, they synthesized data collected from previous exemplar intervention studies. They found that motivational and behavioural outcomes – that is, emulating presented exemplary behaviour – were maximized when presented exemplars were perceived as relatable and attainable, and when autonomy-supporting instructional methods, such as discussion and crafting, were used. They connected this to the self-determination theory that underscores support for autonomy, competence, and relatedness in education for promoting intrinsic, rather than extrinsic, motivation in the long run. Han and Graham (2023) demonstrate that students’ sense of autonomy should be supported …
Parties annexes
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