Résumés
Résumé
Dans cet article, je défends la thèse qu’il ne peut pas y avoir de savoir intuitif sous la forme d’un état purement mental, car, contrairement aux états purement mentaux de connaissance, les intuitions rationnelles n’excluent pas la possibilité de la coexistence de connaissances aux contenus contradictoires. Je soutiens que cela trouve une double justification dans la non-factivité et la non-véridictivité des intuitions, et une explication dans l’idée que les intuitions sont des expériences d’« intellectual seemings ». Enfin, je soutiens que ces caractéristiques des intuitions pourraient constituer une difficulté pour la thèse évidentialiste et, par conséquent, pour la conception du savoir intutitif dans le cadre d’une théorie classique réformée de la connaissance.
Abstract
In this paper I argue that there cannot be intuitive knowledge if knowledge is conceived as a purely mental state. States of knowledge may not consist of rational intuitions because these do not, contrarily to purely mental states of knowledge, rule out the possibility of coexisting states of knowledge with contradictory contents. I defend the view that the justification for this incapacity lies in the non-factivity and the non-veridicity of intuitions. It is also argued that this non-factivity and non-veridicity of intuitions has its roots in the fact that intuitions are experiences of “intellectual seemings”. In the end, I consider the possibility that the non-factivity and non-veridicity of intuitions might constitute a problem for the thesis of evidentialism, thereby raising an issue for any conception of intuitive knowledge elaborated within the framework of a modified traditional conception of knowledge.
Parties annexes
Bibliographie
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