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“The souls of the children... Give me strength”:

1980s Horror Movie Marketing and the Life and Death of the Brand

Boogeymen

Noel Mellor

Rooted in replicable concepts and bold visuals, horror cinema of the 1980s is as rich a vein for brand marketing case studies as you could hope to find. From the genre-inspired family blockbusters that set box office tills ringing to lower budget slashers that found a devoted fanbase on home video, established brand marketing techniques found fertile ground in the business of selling scary movies. And perhaps the best illustration of this is found in the “brand boogeymen” of the era, the easily identifiable franchise representatives that achieved unprecedented mass appeal while leaving an indelible mark on popular culture. This essay explores the importance of brand identity in the post-blockbuster age and how—coupled with high concepts, new film formats, and innovative merchandising approaches born of the 1970s—slasher movie villains found space to flourish. It pays particular attention to Freddy Krueger, the iconic antagonist at the heart of the *A Nightmare on Elm Street* series, whose trajectory as a marketable franchise asset seems intrinsically linked to the rise and fall of the 1980s “post slasher” (Hutchings 2004, 207) as it approached the end of the decade.

Freddy’s example, I will argue, shows how the right brand identity can give even the most detestable character the power to transcend genre, audience, and the medium for which they were originally intended, to become something more deeply entrenched in popular culture. The narrative elements of the films referenced here will be discussed in terms of their contribution to a wider brand identity or marketing strategy. However, I should note the films discussed are primarily considered not as *art*, but as *product*, just as they would be viewed by the professional marketing teams of their respective studios. Putting aside the question of art is essential in understanding how Freddy and his peers would be viewed in this context—as brand assets upon which franchises, spin-offs, and merchandising opportunities are built. In support of this, I will start by looking at the pivotal moment in cinema where *Star Wars* (1977) showed Hollywood that multiplatform, transmedia franchises were not only possible, but highly profitable. I will then discuss some examples I believe were born of this thinking and point to changes in how horror and villainy could then be sold *as a product* to a specific, younger demographic. With this context, I hope to illustrate how this translates to the various creative choices made to take full

advantage of Krueger's marketability as a product, with art often a secondary consideration in the process.

Brand Identity, High Concept, and Cultural Impact in the Post-*Star Wars* Age

Hollywood learned some important lessons during the 1970s when it came to thinking about film purely as product. Traditionally, film marketing had relied on creative assets like posters and theatrical trailers, but blockbusters like *Jaws* (1975) and *Star Wars* led to a broader, multidisciplinary approach that would become "staple practice" (Mingant, Tirtaine, and Augros 2015, 7). *Star Wars* in particular revealed new revenue streams in branded merchandise, with over \$100 million generated in toy sales alone by the end of 1978 on just 20 action figures (The Amsterdam Toy Museum n.d.). In addition to making *Star Wars* "the product" more profitable by keeping it in cinemas longer, merchandising also allowed *Star Wars* "the brand" to be kept warm until a sequel could arrive three years later. *The Empire Strikes Back* (1980) gave *Star Wars* a second chapter to build its *cinematic* story, but the process of world-making, which Henry Jenkins defines as "designing a fictional universe that will sustain franchise development" (2006, 335), started long before the sequel was ever seen. Toys and merchandise gave kids the chance to expand the story on their own through imaginative play, while Marvel's 1977 comic series and novels like 1978's *Splinter of the Mind's Eye* grew the mythology more definitively across other physical media, "expanding the microelements of the *Star Wars* film series into a transmedia macrosystem" (Freeman 2019, 23). Between 1977 and 2019, the franchise generated 11 live-action prequels, sequels, and spin-offs, as well as live-action and animated shows and specials for television. Having been purchased by Disney for \$4.05 billion in cash and stock in 2012, it is today one of the world's most profitable multimedia brands and regarded "one of the smartest acquisitions ever made in corporate America" (Whitten 2018). However, what's particularly interesting about *Star Wars* is how the role of those live-action films has changed. In 1977, the movie was *the product* and the merchandise part of a profitable marketing strategy. At the time of the Disney acquisition though, the franchise had earned over \$20 billion in merchandise compared to \$4.4 billion at the box office (Block 2012). For *The Force Awakens* (2015), the first live-action film under Disney, predicted ticket sales amounted to around \$2.4 billion, whereas over \$6.2 billion was anticipated in merchandise and video game sales (Palmeri 2015). With this in mind, one could argue the *Star Wars* films and shows that might once have been considered *the product*, are now in fact just part of a wider marketing

strategy designed to keep the brand alive and drive further demand for video games, toys, and other merchandise.

With any marketing strategy, establishing a successful brand identity starts with an exploration of audience perceptions, needs, and desires, contextualized by the rules and language of the market itself. For Mingant, Tirtaine, and Augros, film marketing begins with identifying primary and secondary target audiences and setting an identity that positions it “in relation to other films on the market and in audiences’ minds” (2015, 2). This hints towards the importance of genre, but also indicates how the interplay between audiences and the existing iconography of the marketplace becomes central to creating a definitive, resonant brand identity. In the case of *Star Wars*, Lucasfilm took a “continuity approach to transmedia branding” (Freeman 2019, 28) aligned with long-held rules of marketing that favour familiarity as “the familiar is normal and normal is trusted” (Godin 2018, 176). Through the consistent use of colour, fonts, logos, and imagery, *Star Wars* established a visual “brand book” that could be templated and translated to other media and merchandise outside the theatrical experience. This reflects the suggestion that, while brand identity is often boiled down to “some colours, some typefaces, a strapline or slogan, all topped off with a logo or symbol” (Olins 2010, 24), it is when brands take these assets and become “culturally oriented” (Godin 2018, 171) that they experience a more significant, lasting impact.

In the 1980s, Hollywood found new ways to couple brand identity with an understanding of market perceptions, to create products that were more profitable and culturally oriented than ever. “High concept” followed the idea that a “product should be summed up and sold in a single sentence” (Wyatt 1994, 19), applying this to film marketing strategies that could be much clearer from the outset. The approach truly proliferated in the 1980s, with studios enjoying the chance to “maximize marketability and, consequently, the economic potential at the box office” across a wide range of genres (15). This level of marketability would often be based on a range of factors that allowed a film to be easily packaged for an intended audience. This might include an existing or “pre-sold” premise (for example a remake, sequel, or adaptation), a perceived symbiosis between star and project (a pop performer starring in a musical), or concepts that tap into “a national trend or sentiment” (15). The one thing all these factors have in common, though, is that essential reliance on familiarity. To be excited by a remake, adaptation, or sequel, the audience must have some knowledge of the original text. To react positively to a casting choice, they must first be familiar with the star(s) in question. To associate the film with a popular trend or cultural sentiment, they must recognize its place within the conversation.



Figure 1. The newly branded Ghostbusters address the in-narrative audience through TV advertising (Reitman 1984)

Wyatt lists 81 films, 59 released in the 1980s, that are among “the most market-driven projects in Hollywood” and “narrated as much by their marketing as by their ostensible story” (1994, 19–20). Among them are several films, clearly rooted in horror, that use brand identity to play to a specific audience. In *Ghostbusters* (1984), the high concept of “a team of paranormal scientists prove the existence of ghosts and rid New York of a supernatural force possessing an apartment block” could easily read like adult-oriented horror. However, it is the brand identity that communicates its intentions as a family-friendly horror-comedy more clearly. In the film itself, one of the first actions its protagonists take is to invest in a brand identity based around a name (*Ghostbusters*—one word; a brand choice in itself), a logo (the now iconic “no ghosts” symbol), and a colour palette (red, white, and black; an extension of the logo) that can then be applied to other assets like their “Ecto-1” vehicle. Bringing the brand to life through TV advertising (complete with marketing script, call to action, and strapline “we’re ready to believe you!”), this even results directly in their first real customer, Dana Barrett. More importantly, that in-film activity brings *Ghostbusters* “the product” to life not just in the fictional world, but the real one as well—through direct and ubiquitous translation to games, clothing, stickers, cereal, story books, and more. Like *Star Wars*, *Ghostbusters* “the brand” endured too, with an animated series (*The Real Ghostbusters*, 1986–91), and movie sequels *Ghostbusters II* (1989), *Ghostbusters* (2016), *Ghostbusters: Afterlife* (2021), and *Ghostbusters: Frozen Empire* (2024)—each time keeping the brand alive for new merchandise and marketing partnership opportunities.

Unlike *Ghostbusters*, which had a wide demographic and an even wider range of available products, *The Lost Boys* (1987) took a more focused approach. Its high concept—“teen stars Corey Haim and Jason Patric defeat a gang of cool vampires terrorizing their new hometown”—provided the perfect opportunity to convert into a brand identity and merchandising campaign that would resonate with younger, MTV-viewing audiences—which it did very astutely through its poster art, soundtrack album, and associated music videos. Despite having arguably the ideal teen pin-up as its lead, Corey Haim found himself pushed to the back of the poster with the supporting cast. Instead, centre stage was reserved for the rock-star good looks of lesser-known leads Jason Patric and Kiefer Sutherland. Each star’s contrasting aesthetic—Patric’s Jim Morrison-like natural cool and Sutherland’s Billy Idol sneer—played to very different rock archetypes, but both would be familiar and attractive to teen audiences. For Wyatt, communicating that essential *look* informs an overall *style* that in turn can exemplify an even more alluring *lifestyle*. In this way, he argues, the high concept film can replicate the same kinds of feelings of aspiration that one would expect from more traditional consumer advertising (Wyatt 1994, 25). Unlike the film’s poster, the cover art for *The Lost Boys Original Motion Picture Soundtrack* featured no actors or images from the film, instead simply listing the *actual* rock stars it featured. By putting INXS, Echo & The Bunnymen, Roger Daltrey, and Lou Gramm right up front, this again emphasized the rock ‘n’ roll credentials of the film as linked to its brand identity, with associated clip-filled music videos able to sell the concept of “vampires for the MTV generation” on MTV. As a fully packaged product, *The Lost Boys* offered teen audiences the same irresistible deal Patric’s character Michael is given in the film itself, summed up in a 17-word tagline that identifies the demographic, acknowledges their desires, recognizes their fears, and is phrased as a call to action. “Sleep all day. Party all night. Never grow old. Never die. It’s fun to be a vampire.”

Home Video and the Birth of the “Brand Boogeyman”

Warner Bros., the studio behind *The Lost Boys*, had tapped into an audience demographic to develop a brand identity that allowed its film product to become *market driven*, selling a piece of the rock ‘n’ roll vampire lifestyle to teenagers through their CD players and across MTV. Elsewhere in the market though, a new platform had emerged which was offering film product that same opportunity for direct audience communication. With VHS (and Betamax for a time), film had been given a new brand physicality, encased in plastic, shelf-friendly boxes adorned with colourful artwork,

enticing images, and thrilling copy. Home video gave what was once “an unapproachable medium, hovering in the distance on the silver screen” a never-before-seen level of tangibility for mainstream audiences (Klinger 2006, 57). Now films could be packaged and put on display alongside one another, to be compared and consumed at our leisure, like any other household object. With this new brand marketing real estate on offer to distributors, and in rental stores across the world, a war for attention raged that pushed creativity to the limit. Designs became increasingly bold and graphic, while colours, fonts, and taglines had to fight harder than ever to stand out from the crowd. Artists like Renato Cesaro (*Cameron’s Closet* [1987], *Ghost Chase* [1988]), Enzo Sciotti (*Neon Maniacs* [1986], *The Willies* [1990]) and Graham Humphreys (*The Evil Dead* [1982], *Night of the Creeps* [1987]), elevated low-budget genre films into products that were impossible to ignore. Suddenly a film like *Killbots* (1986), which performed poorly on its initial theatrical release, could be repackaged for home-video success. With a new title *Chopping Mall*, some elaborate artwork, and a set of compelling taglines (“where half off is just the beginning” and “where shopping can cost you an arm and a leg”) director Jim Wynorski cites this essential rebrand as the trigger for the film’s new, more profitable, and ultimately more enduring life on VHS and other later formats (Mellor 2013).

Home video was a natural extension of high-concept practice, with its innate ability to integrate with marketing for long-term profitability (Wyatt 1994, 81), reaping the rewards of more direct, physical access to target audiences. Prior to this, slasher films enjoyed immense success, but were still reviled for their “cheapness, crudeness and formulaic repetitiveness,” as well as an ostensible tendency towards debased violence and misogyny (Hutchings 2004, 193). Horror’s influence had been used carefully to market “respectable” blockbusters like *Jaws*, *Alien* (1979) and *The Terminator* (1984) in the past, but now any release could be overt about its stalk-and-slash content—even if it didn’t have any. The 1985 UK VHS release of *A Small Killing* (1981), for example, led with a shadowy figure brandishing a large knife beneath a title scrawled in blood and the tagline: “When you’re pushing drugs, the streets provide good cover... for murder.” The film was in fact a pretty harmless police procedural about an undercover cop who falls in love with a lady he meets on the streets, which had premiered as a “CBS Tuesday Night Movie” in the US four years earlier.



Figure 2. Faceless killers across UK home video releases for *Bloody Moon*, *Don't Go in the Woods... Alone!*, and *The Last Horror Film* (videocollector.co.uk)

Slasher iconography by this point had become a staple of home video, with VHS artwork for films like *Bloody Moon* (1980), *Don't Go in the Woods... Alone!* (1981) and *The Last Horror Film* (1982) among the many deploying bloody weapons/lettering and screaming women to illustrate their brand message. In many cases though, what was missing was the killer themselves, with a much greater focus placed on their weapon of choice. Movies like *The Texas Chainsaw Massacre* (1974), *Halloween* (1978) and *Friday the 13th* (1980) were well equipped to put greater emphasis on the characters behind the blade but had some work to do before their respective villains would become recognizable franchise assets. In the case of *The Texas Chainsaw Massacre*, it would be 12 years before the masked, chainsaw-wielding Leatherface returned for a sequel. Both *Halloween II* (1981) and *Friday the 13th Part 2* (1981) were quicker off the mark, but each faltered in establishing their villainous leads' core identity. Famously, the killer in *Friday the 13th* had been Jason Voorhees's mother wearing a burlap sack, Jason himself wouldn't put on the trademark hockey mask until the third film in the series. In *Halloween*, Michael Myers's look is in place from the outset, but having reinforced that identity in the sequel, he was then left out of *Halloween III: Season of the Witch* (1982) completely. Over time though, studios would come to understand the importance of their villains as a branded asset to be protected and, of course, exploited. For *Friday the 13th: The Final Chapter* (1984), this meant emphasizing the immortal, quasi-supernatural status of the character (Hutchings 2004, 207) while marketing the film as the demise of both the killer and the franchise, which of course, it wasn't. Having realized its error with *Season of the Witch*, no chances were taken with *Halloween 4: The Return of Michael Myers* (1988), with a title that set out exactly what audiences could

expect and Michael's mask front and centre on the poster. Even the tagline called back to the 1978 original, exclaiming: "Ten years ago HE changed the face of Halloween. Tonight, he's back." Likewise, the third entry in *The Texas Chainsaw Massacre* franchise, though it wouldn't arrive until 1990, leant on the iconography of its antagonist, by leading with *Leatherface* as the main title and offering a trailer that mythologized the character with a glistening chainsaw emerging Excalibur-like from a lake.




Figure 3. Selected slasher franchises – Comparative domestic opening box office 1980–1990 (Mellor 2024)

The cyclical, repetitive nature of slasher movies made them ideal for home video, as did the way in which their producers were happy to embrace what audiences were responding to. Even in the earliest days of the slasher, writer Victor Miller recalls the conversation with director and producer Sean S. Cunningham that led to *Friday the 13th* being a direct attempt to rip off John Carpenter's *Halloween* (Farrands 2013, 08:12). Financially, that franchise peaked with its fourth entry in 1984 (Mellor 2024), the same year Hutchings points to a "definitive end of the 'serious' and 'mature' horror associated by some critics with the 1970s" (2004, 208). This period of "repetitious, lowest-common-denominator pandering to an unsophisticated and undemanding teenage audience" (208) is one Adam Rockoff agrees demonstrates serious creative decline. However, while the critical perspective of this time may be studios desperately attempting "to grab their own little piece of the rapidly deteriorating pie" (Rockoff 2016, 195), the financial perspective is much more positive (Mellor 2024). And with a fresh high concept and clear identity, a new brand boogeyman was about to explode into the culture that would redefine the genre for years to come.

The Freddy Trajectory: The Life and Death of a Brand Boogeyman

“We were really pushing the envelope of popular culture, because Freddy had become talk show fodder... he was everywhere.”

— Robert Englund (actor, Freddy Krueger)

In *Screams & Nightmares: The Films of Wes Craven* (2022), Brian J. Robb likens horror icon Freddy Krueger to “a virus that spread through the culture” (105), highlighting the \$10 million dollar profit the character earned New Line Cinema in merchandising and licensing in the US by the early 1990s. The character was nothing short of a phenomenon, becoming a cult figure after his first appearance in *A Nightmare on Elm Street*, before developing into a household name across five sequels (1985–91), a TV series (*Freddy’s Nightmares*, 1988–90), a quasi-reboot (*Wes Craven’s New Nightmare*, 1994), a spin-off (*Freddy vs. Jason*, 2003) and eventually a remake (*A Nightmare on Elm Street*, 2010). The true strength of the *Elm Street* franchise, though, was in its high-concept narrative and the ability of its killer to adapt to audience expectations within it. Brands that fail to properly refresh or even reinvent themselves in reaction to the market in this way risk irrelevance, which in turn makes the process essential “in order to occupy the same space in the minds of customers, the market and the world” (Olins 2003, 55). As the recognized key asset of the franchise, that change came quickly for Freddy Krueger. In the first film, the concept of “murderer with a bladed glove, burned alive by angry parents, returns to kill their children through dreams” is successfully established, but in *A Nightmare on Elm Street 2: Freddy’s Revenge* (1985), the decision was made to have Freddy spill out into the real world. On the face of it, this decision to abandon the limitations of the dream world and make the killer a “real world” threat makes sense, as it brings Freddy in line with other, commercially successful, brand boogeymen like Leatherface, Michael Myers, and Jason Voorhees. However, it arguably fails to recognize that other essential component of effective brand marketing, the unique selling point (USP). Freddy’s USP was the narrative flexibility afforded him by the dream world, and it was only when this was re-established in the third film that he could go beyond the confines of his own franchise to become an icon of popular culture—and, for a short time, take his brand boogeymen peers with him. Indeed, from Freddy’s birth in 1984 right through to his public execution in 1991, each of these characters would be redefined using the Freddy template, while taking advantage of the marketing opportunities his rapid rise to fame provided.

By the time *Freddy's Revenge* arrived in cinemas, it was becoming clear that the character was already deeply embedded in the public consciousness. While director Jack Sholder says he “felt no compunction to follow the template of the first film,” he admits it was already apparent that “Freddy was the franchise” (Farrands and Kash 2010, 47:06). In just two films, the character was being discussed in the same breath as many of his long-established peers, with genre magazines like *Fangoria* asking “Is Freddy Krueger the new Jason?” and discussing the character’s newfound “celebrity” (Shapiro 1985). According to then-director of licensing and promotion at New Line Kevin Benson, the decision to broaden Freddy’s appeal was a definitive turning point. “We decided that with *Nightmare 2* we should market Freddy as if he was a rock ‘n’ roll band. We did these great posters and then we did this trendy black t-shirt. Like rock bands have” (Robb 2022, 105). The merchandising didn’t stop there either, with masks, hats, jumpers, and plastic-bladed gloves excitedly claiming on the packaging to be “play-safe!” (Figure Realm n.d.),¹ as well as wristwatches, bubble gum, board games, comics, clocks, Elm Street signs, model kits, and more—all allowing fans a piece of horror’s newest brand boogeyman. The films themselves needed no traditional star power, as Freddy was who audiences were coming to see, but through marketing and merchandising, New Line Cinema was making every on-screen appearance, elaborate kill, and cheeky one-liner part of “a ritual for young audiences” (Robb 2022, 103). Freddy’s return to the parameters of the dream world in *A Nightmare on Elm Street 3: Dream Warriors* (1987) restored the USP, giving the studio freedom to make Freddy as culturally flexible as possible. For *Dream Warriors*, this meant kills could reflect societal concerns about teen suicide, self-harm, role playing games, and drug abuse.

¹ As seen on the packaging for the “Freddy’s Glove” action toy by Marty Toy, 1984. See <https://www.figurerealm.com/actionfigure?action=actionfigure&id=80644&figure=freddysglove>




Figure 4. Krueger as the rock star host of *Freddy's Nightmares* (Wiederhorn 1988)

For *A Nightmare on Elm Street 4: The Dream Master* (1988), the most successful sequel in the franchise, New Line hired director Renny Harlin. According to executive producer Sara Risher, Harlin not only met the brief of being “young, hot, up-and-coming... cheap” (Farrands and Kash 2010, 01:45:46), he also “totally understood the youth culture” (01:48:37). The move was unsettling for Freddy actor Robert Englund at first, until he realized while watching the footage that “Ahh, this is the *MTV nightmare*” (01:58:06). From a domestic opening weekend of \$1.2 million on the first film, the franchise had peaked with *The Dream Master* at \$12.8 million (“Franchise: Nightmare on Elm Street” n.d.). By 1988, Freddy had eclipsed his peers, and in October that crossed over from movies to television. *Freddy's Nightmares* ran for two seasons across 44 episodes and was based around short horror tales which, like *Friday the 13th: The Series*, which came a year earlier, had nothing to do with the films themselves, beyond having Krueger as its host and occasional interloper. In each bookended section of the show, Krueger would introduce the story, then offer a sometimes comedic, sometimes cautionary take on the fate of its characters. Most importantly though, he was now being invited into people’s living rooms, speaking directly to them, and encouraging feelings of complicity in the murderous chaos.

Freddy's success and apparent omnipotence was having a ripple effect for the rest of the brand boogeymen. In the same year as *The Dream Master*, *Friday the 13th Part VII: The New Blood* and *Halloween 4: The Return of Michael Myers* enjoyed successful opening weekends that improved on previous franchise entries (Mellor 2024). 1998 was also the year a new member was added to the family in Chucky, a murderous talking doll possessed by the soul of a serial killer. Chucky's debut in *Child's Play* (1988) took over \$6.5 million on its first weekend ("Child's Play" n.d.) and was followed by a slew of late 80s "mini monster" movies that featured violent, malevolent—or at very least extremely mischievous—characters keen to squeeze into a *Gremlins*-sized gap in the home-video market. Unlike the Spielberg-produced film, which had been subject to public outcry in the US due to what was seen as an inappropriate PG rating (Metz 2019), these films made use of a new PG-13 classification. First applied to *Red Dawn* in 1984, the new PG-13 rating opened the door for the likes of *Ghoulies* (1984), *Critters* (1986), *Troll* (1986), and their respective sequels to seek out teen audiences. These movies tread a fine line between horror and comedy, and the rating they courted to target younger viewers would eventually lend itself to the chaos-fueled violence of *Gremlins 2: The New Batch* (1990). The *Elm Street* series, with its gorier and increasingly more explicit kills, could never hope for a PG-13, but the introduction of the rating signaled a change in attitudes that New Line Cinema would happily take advantage of in marketing Freddy to that demographic.

With each *Elm Street* sequel, more merchandising aimed squarely at teenagers and, eventually, children came along. The character may have started as a threat to kids, but he quickly became "fully conversant with contemporary youth culture" (Hutchings 1996, 97), often referring to the concerns of this audience (e.g., drug use, video games, rock music, television) in his quips and kills. In addition to speaking their language, Freddy was also singing on the album *Freddy's Greatest Hits* (1987) and rapping on The Fat Boys' single "Are You Ready for Freddy" (1988), as well as appearing in music videos like Dokken's "Dream Warriors" (1986). Even in an unofficial capacity, he was being heavily referenced everywhere including in DJ Jazzy Jeff & The Fresh Prince's "A Nightmare on My Street" (1988). Like *The Lost Boys*, Freddy was irresistible to the MTV generation, which then fed back into his film persona and increasingly ludicrous marketing and merchandising. Released to coincide with *A Nightmare on Elm Street 5: The Dream Child* (1989), the now infamous 18-inch "Talking Freddy Doll" released by Matchbox in 1989 was arguably the height of the frenzy and, depending on which way you look at it, either a marketing nightmare or dream come true. According to the packaging, the doll was for kids "aged 8 and up," encouraging them to pull the string to hear "a special message just

for you!” (“Matchbox Nightmare on Elm Street” n.d.). Predictably perhaps, it quickly caught the ire of groups like the American Family Association which began a campaign to have it removed from shelves, with the organization’s executive director Rev. Donald E. Wildmon calling the toy “the product of a sick mind.” He added that for a major toy manufacturer like Matchbox to actively promote the doll was “tragic,” urging a boycott not just of the doll, but the stores that stocked it and any other Matchbox toys (The Associated Press 1989). However, the controversy surrounding the Freddy doll would be nothing compared to what lay in store for Chucky. In 1992, following the tragic murder of two-year-old James Bulger at the hands of two ten-year-old boys, a link was suggested between the crime and the film *Child’s Play 3* (1991) by a senior Metropolitan Police Officer. While the subsequent investigation proved no such connection, the story was enough to reignite the video nasties debate that had dominated the news cycle following the arrival of home video in the UK (Kirby 1993). The artwork for *Child’s Play 3*, which featured a close-up of the sneering face of Chucky, was splattered across tabloid newspapers and on November 26, 1993, *The Sun* encouraged readers “for the sake of ALL our kids... BURN YOUR VIDEO NASTY” over an image of flaming VHS copies of the film (Pharo). The supporting story told of a “video chain boss” who had taken it upon himself to destroy £10,000 worth of tapes “linked to the James Bulger murder” and announced a campaign to get readers to find and burn copies themselves (Pharo 1993). As brand ambassador for the *Elm Street* franchise, Freddy had been at the forefront of late 1980s cultural explosion for the slasher subgenre, but by the early 1990s, Chucky was just as quickly becoming the poster child for its demise.

Regardless of Chucky’s shifting profile, box-office takings for Freddy’s fifth outing, *The Dream Child*, suggested “the appeal of Freddy had already passed its peak” (Robb 2022, 132) and it was decided the next film, *Freddy’s Dead: The Final Nightmare* (1991) would be the last outing for the character... for a while at least. When it came to marketing the film, New Line seemed comfortably reliant on the iconography it had created for its brand boogeyman, with a teaser poster that didn’t even mention the film’s title. Instead, the artwork simply read “BORN November 2, 1984, DIES September 13, 1991” and featured Freddy’s trademark red-and-green sweater, brown fedora, and bladed glove in a crumpled heap on the ground. However, as confident as this poster was in its own brand identity, there was an air of desperation about the tagline “They saved the best...for last,” as well as the broader marketing gimmick being used to drag audiences in for one last time. If it wasn’t enough that the teaser poster directly referenced the death of The Wicked Witch of The West in *The Wizard of Oz* (1939), the film itself would use technology rooted in the past. In the 1950s, 3D enjoyed

notable popularity through films like *House of Wax* (1953) and *Creature from The Black Lagoon* (1954), pointing to a relationship that “downscale” genres had with technologies that allowed them to “upscale” themselves (Heffernan 2004, 24). According to *Freddy’s Dead* director Rachel Talalay, despite initial scepticism about using 3D, “marketing was into it and it was a big deal for selling it internationally” (Robb 2022, 135). *Freddy’s Dead* closed the first chapter on the *Elm Street* franchise with an opening weekend of over \$12.9 million (“Franchise: Nightmare on Elm Street” n.d.), which the studio saw as “very respectable for the last in a decade-old horror series” (Robb 2022, 135).

Life After Death: *New Nightmare*, Same Great Taste

Of course, New Line wouldn’t leave a brand like Freddy on the shelf for long, particularly with proof that—through some smart marketing—there was still potential to wring “very respectable” box office returns out of him. Just three years later, audiences would discover the monster they welcomed into their lives and homes had no intention of leaving. In fact, he might just be about to use his brand status to establish a presence in their world that was more menacing—and more literal—than ever before.

According to Haig, there are obvious parallels to be drawn between successful brands and religious cults. Such shared characteristics include a level of faith that “ideally leads to life-long devotion” and iconic figures that “are brands themselves with a market value most companies can only dream of” (Haig 2006, 2). However, managing such characteristics within a brand identity isn’t always easy, particularly when things aren’t going well. In these moments of panic, brands “act like teenagers” through severe visual reinvention or a change in direction that allows them to stand out among their peers. However, the brands who desire long-term success know consistency is key, and deviations from the formula come with risk (226). One of the most famous blunders in brand marketing history came for Coca-Cola in 1985 when, under market pressure from its fierce rival Pepsi, it decided to relaunch itself with a revised recipe. Branded “New Coke,” the move contradicted decades of campaign messaging. “If you tell the world you have the ‘real thing’ you cannot then come up with a ‘new real thing’.” To borrow the comparison of marketing guru Al Ries it’s “like introducing a New God” (Haig 2011, 12). It was a misstep in consistency that former Pepsi CEO Roger Enrico referred to as a “nightmare” for Coca-Cola bosses, but one which taught them they were merely “caretakers” of the brand (13).



Figure 5. Promotional posters teasing Freddy’s death, resurrection, and reinvention (New Line Cinema 1991; 1994; 2010)

If Freddy Krueger was going to be successfully resurrected following his very public demise in *Freddy’s Dead*, it would be a test of faith for consumers. The ingredients that made him a successful brand boogeyman would need to be present but balanced with something “new.” The sweater, the hat, the glove, and Robert Englund himself were onboard, ensuring brand consistency, and the perfect “caretaker” was installed in his original creator Wes Craven. However, *Wes Craven’s New Nightmare* (1994) might have easily become *Wes Craven’s New Coke* had it not found good reason for Freddy’s return—which it did through an inversion of what *Ghostbusters* did a decade earlier. Where *Ghostbusters* constructed a brand to connect a fictional narrative with real-world audiences through marketing, merchandise, music, and other media, *New Nightmare* suggested a real-world manifestation of Krueger *born* from such consumption—a brand no longer created *for us*, but *by us*. Having become truly “culturally oriented” by the 1990s, *New Nightmare* even suggested it was the post-1984 version of the character—which had strayed from Craven’s original recipe over six sequels and a TV show—that represented the “New Coke” of the franchise. The director had already been open about his disdain for how New Line Cinema had commercialized Freddy and saw *New Nightmare* as an opportunity to “rescue his creation from crass self-parody and to revitalize the meditation on dreams, the unconscious, and the nature of reality” (Benson-Allot 2015, 76). Playing himself in the film, Craven addressed the point directly, suggesting audience familiarity with the diluted, more marketable version of Freddy is what ultimately killed the franchise. “When the story dies... the evil is set free” (1994, 01:02:32).

New Nightmare “the product” seemed to target teenage fans of the first film who were now parents themselves, with its final girl Nancy returning as real-life actress and middle-aged mother Heather Langenkamp. However, a decade on, Nancy/Heather had very different concerns including her career, family, and anxieties around the effects of screen violence. In this world, audience familiarity, fondness, and appetite for her on-screen aggressor threatened the very real suburban life she had built for herself. However, none of this was communicated via *New Nightmare* “the brand,” which concerned itself more with Freddy’s newer, meaner look, and the fact that it was Craven who had, literally it seems, dreamed up a way for him to return. “In order for the movie to continue, it was dependent on me having more nightmares. Well, fortunately... I did,” he explained in an interview bolted on to the beginning of the film’s first trailer (Rotten Tomatoes Classic Trailers 2020). Unfortunately, *New Nightmare* was a box-office disappointment and remains the lowest earner of the series (“Franchise: Nightmare on Elm Street” n.d.). Craven would go on to explore his own meta-anxieties more successfully across four *Scream* films (1996–2011), which featured a new brand boogeyman in “Ghostface” that helped reinvigorate teen horror as a genre. Films like *I Know What You Did Last Summer* (1997), *Urban Legend* (1998), *Dead Man’s Curve* (1998), *Cherry Falls* (1999) and *Final Destination* (2000) played with the “rules” of the genre and allowed dormant properties to be resurrected in their image. *Halloween H20: 20 Years Later* (1998), *Bride of Chucky* (1998), *Jason X* (2002), and *The Texas Chainsaw Massacre* (2003) may have been “generally derided by fans” but they were financially successful (Turnoc 2019, 242). They also set the stage for 2003’s long-promised *Freddy Vs Jason*, a somehow inevitable silver screen smackdown that went into marketing overdrive ahead of its release. Audiences were encouraged to pick a side and “place [their] bets,” with a campaign that culminated in a live weigh-in featuring the two characters at Bally’s Hotel in Las Vegas. Reviews for the film were mixed, with *Variety* calling it “more marketing concept than aesthetic” (Klein 2003), but *Freddy vs. Jason* was a big hit with its target audience, with 65% of viewers estimated to be 25 and under (Munoz 2003). In addition to a chart-topping \$36.4 million opening weekend, *Freddy Vs Jason* would become the most profitable of any *Nightmare* or *Friday* film (“Franchise: Nightmare on Elm Street” n.d.), proving two brand boogeymen were, commercially at least, better than one.

Despite the success of *Freddy Vs Jason*, and rumours of a sequel featuring Ash from *The Evil Dead* (1981), it would be seven years before audiences saw Krueger on the big screen again. The 2010 *A Nightmare on Elm Street* reboot once more brought Freddy’s visual brand assets, but this time via a new actor, Jackie Earle Haley. The film was a darker, more serious take on the story, which leant much into Freddy’s backstory as a child

molester—something featured in Craven’s original script but dropped during filming (Kingsley 2013). In his analysis, Kyle Christensen points to scenes that accentuate these moments, and how they differ across the theatrical ending, and an alternate ending included as an extra on the 2010 Blu-ray release. The alternate ending implies a greater level of female agency for the final girl Nancy in how she confronts and defeats her childhood abuser. Christensen highlights how such “extra texts” can complement or contradict a film and are dependent on audiences choosing to access them (2016, 39–43). In the same way, those who experienced the extratextual marketing content that existed ahead of the film’s release would be given a pretty accurate translation of what to expect. The posters put the hat, glove, and sweater up front, but the images were soaked in shadows and blood-red hues. The taglines “Welcome to your new nightmare,” “He knows where you sleep,” and “Never sleep again” were familiar, but more menacing in this murky new context. The first trailer dedicated its first 30 seconds to Krueger being hunted down and burned alive and closed with the grim warning, “Don’t fall asleep.” The message was clear: this was a serious film for serious horror fans, with a version of Freddy that was darker in aesthetic and purpose. Save for a couple of adult-oriented collectible figures (NECA 2011) and a new prop replica glove (Barton 2010), there were no talking toys, and certainly no branded lunchboxes, records, or rap video appearances. And, while critically the film was received poorly, it was the second most profitable in the franchise (“Franchise: Nightmare on Elm Street” n.d.), suggesting either a marketing approach that was clear and well-constructed, or a brand identity so strong it would succeed regardless.

Conclusion

Long after Freddy Krueger was declared dead in 1991, his legacy has endured across a variety of media and his name is still familiar to millions. Across animation, his image, or interpretations of it, has been used across multiple episodes of *The Simpsons*, *Family Guy*, *Robot Chicken*, and *Rick and Morty*. In 2018, the character appeared as a very small cameo in *Ready Player One* but got a much higher profile return in a Halloween episode of *The Goldbergs* which saw Englund return to the role. Having popped up in 1989 and 1990 on the Commodore 64 and Nintendo Entertainment System, he has featured in video games like *Mortal Kombat* (2011), *Mortal Kombat X* (2015), and *Dead by Daylight* (2017). All these appearances, coupled with ongoing rumours and demands for a downloadable *Fortnite* skin (Hocking 2022), show an unwavering appetite, even today, for a character who could just as easily have disappeared after one film. Having compromised the ending of *A Nightmare*

on *Elm Street* out of loyalty to producer Bob Shaye (Rockoff 2016, 202), in a way that made it more open to sequels, Craven steered clear of “New Coke” Freddy until the opportunity came to restore what he saw as his original recipe. But in the meantime, Shaye and New Line Cinema took Krueger’s status as a “marketable commodity” (Robb 2022, 102) to unprecedented new heights.

From *Freddy’s Revenge* through to the 2010 reboot, Craven’s original brand identity for Freddy has remained intact. However, the decisions made for the character along the way have largely been made by Shaye and New Line Cinema and, while only possible because of Freddy’s cultural impact, have been undoubtedly commercially motivated. Bringing Freddy into the “real world” of his peers in *Freddy’s Revenge* before restoring his paranormal USP in *Dream Warriors* shows an initial level of narrative flexibility that allowed the franchise to respond to audience needs. Installing Renny Harlin as the director who could deliver “the *MTV nightmare*” seems like a similar move but is also informed by Shaye’s desire to have “a big guy, [who] probably has a lot of energy and [who] could work really hard 24 hours a day for six weeks to get the film ready” (Farrands and Kash 2010, 01:47:04). In addition to the merchandising explosion around *The Dream Master*, the 44-episode *Freddy’s Nightmares* TV series was another decision based on profit and exposure, rather than creative merit. In fact, Shaye himself admits “by the tenth one they were pretty miserable. And I stopped paying attention” (02:16:23). Even the decision to kill Krueger in glorious 3D, then quickly resurrect him a few years later with a new look, seems almost entirely built around ways in which a story could be *sold* rather than *told*. “I’m a little frightened by what Wes may have tapped into,” says a straight-faced Shaye in the *New Nightmare* trailer. “I frankly felt that it was over when we did the last... the *Final Nightmare*” (Rotten Tomatoes Classic Trailers 2020).

New Line Cinema’s approach to the *Elm Street* franchise has from the outset been heavily informed by smart, traditional marketing tactics. This might be in the way the films, as a product and a brand, identified their audience and tapped into their desires by speaking “the language in which they think” (Higgins 1965, 93). It might also be in the way the films have utilized visual familiarity with audiences to establish trust (Godin 2018, 176), and gone beyond colours, typefaces, slogans, and logos (Olins 2010, 24) to create something that permeates the culture or even changes it (Godin 2018, 23). By packaging the films this way, both in how they are marketed but also in the more literal physical sense thanks to opportunities around home video and merchandising, New Line took an original high concept and created a sense of advocacy, ownership even, among horror fans. By embracing the prevalence and immediacy of home video (Klinger 2006, 136), studios like New Line could push branded villains to younger audiences, creating

immediately identifiable anti-heroes that would transcend cinema and become “culturally oriented.” And it was the impeccable brand identity of Freddy Krueger, burned skin, red-and-green sweater, crumpled fedora, and bladed glove, that led this revolution.

On his journey across the first six *Nightmare* films, Freddy shifted from a being shadowy, largely off-screen threat, to the centre-stage cinematic monster that dominated the genre, carrying his band of brand boogeymen brothers along on the coattails of his success. This ability to resonate with audiences wasn’t necessarily built into the first *Nightmare*, but achieved through “a considerable amount of revision, elaboration and addition” (Hutchings 1996, 95). Unlike the mute slashers of the early 1980s, Krueger relished the sound of his own voice and represented the new wisecracking monster formula of the post-slasher era. In addition to lending his voice to his own controversial talking doll, he gave space for a new one in Chucky who was brought to life in much of his own image. An actual piece of murderous merchandise with a hunger for child homicide and sardonic humour, Chucky completed the brand boogeyman family and carried the torch forward for a few years, but never quite crossed over into the culture in the same way as his unlikely father figure. As Freddy “sliced through the teenagers of Elm Street,” he took an immovable position within the iconography of American cinema akin to “the dark side of Dorothy’s slippers and Chaplin’s cane” (Rockoff 2002, 153). But as brand representative of the *A Nightmare on Elm Street* franchise, he straddled 1980s popular culture like a twisted, and arguably less terrifying, Ronald McDonald. Unlike Michael, Jason, Leatherface, and Chucky, Freddy Krueger has not appeared on film since 2010, yet few would fail to recognize his face, sweater, and glove, or think of him when passing the “Elm Street” of their own neighbourhood. That kind of brand recognition is rare—and not something that stays dead for very long.

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