Résumés
Abstract
Multinational companies avoid taxes through sophisticated tax optimization techniques, also known as aggressive tax planning (ATP). This paper serves two purposes: to understand these techniques and to analyze the factors that thwart efforts against ATP by taking the European Union (EU) as a case study. We use an analytic approach based on literature survey. We explain different ATP activities at micro and macro levels. We find that the EU has remained ineffective against tax avoidance due to the lack of legal competences and political will. Finally, we make some recommendations in the current functioning framework of the EU.
Keywords:
- Corporate tax optimization strategies,
- aggressive tax planning,
- tax avoidance,
- European Union policies
Résumé
Les sociétés multinationales évitent les impôts grâce à des techniques d’optimisation sophistiquées appelées également planification fiscale agressive (ATP). Cet article a deux objectifs: comprendre ces techniques et analyser les facteurs qui entravent les efforts contre l’ATP en prenant l’Union européenne (UE) comme étude de cas. Nous utilisons une approche analytique basée sur une étude de la littérature. Nous expliquons les différentes techniques ATP aux niveaux micro et macroéconomique. Nous constatons que l’UE est restée inefficace contre l’évasion fiscale en raison du manque de compétences juridiques et de volonté politique. Enfin, nous faisons quelques recommandations dans le cadre du fonctionnement actuel de l’UE.
Mots-clés :
- Stratégies d’optimisation fiscale des entreprises,
- planification fiscale agressive,
- évitement fiscale,
- politiques de l’Union européenne
Resumen
Las corporaciones multinacionales evitan los impuestos con la ayuda de técnicas sofisticadas de optimización llamadas también planificación fiscal agresiva (ATP). Este articulo tiene dos propósitos: comprender estas técnicas y analizar los factores que frustran los esfuerzos de la Unión Europea (UE) contra ATP como un estudio de caso. Utilizamos un enfoque analítico basado en revisiones bibliográficas. Explicamos diferentes tácticas de ATP a nivel micro y macro. Encontramos que la UE ha permanecido ineficaz contra la evasión fiscal debido a la falta de competencias legales y voluntad política. Finalmente, hacemos algunas recomendaciones en el marco actual de funcionamiento de la UE.
Palabras clave:
- Estrategias de optimización fiscal,
- des entreprises,
- planificación fiscal agresiva,
- evasión de impuestos,
- políticas de la Unión Europea
Parties annexes
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