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[Aller au sommaire du numéro](#)

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Résumé de l'article

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# Arabia versus Persia: Is This What the Arab Spring Ended with?

by

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## 1. Introduction

International economic, political, social and military disputes make it much more complex for marketers to go global. In fact, current global context, which includes civil wars, regime change, and military conflicts, presents a real challenge for international business (Nes et al., 2012). Globalization, competitiveness and technology have increased the varieties of products available in global markets, and thus, led more individuals all over the world to be more familiar with more foreign products and brands (Nijssen and Douglas, 2004). In addition to the diversity in culture, dynamic business environment adds to the complexity of going global (Wang and Heitmeyer, 2006). Researchers have paid good attention to how political actions, diplomatic crises, armed conflicts may impact demand for products sourced from offending countries (Nes et al., 2012). Global marketing managers from offending countries should carefully position their products with respect to local consumers' expectations (Parker et al., 2011).

Understanding consumers' buying behavior in times of financial crisis, political conflicts, military events and social unrest is vital to global marketers to develop

effective marketing strategies during such tough times (Good and Huddleston, 1995). Despite the fact that Arab Spring Uprisings have started as movements for more equity, democracy, transparency, and better quality of life, things have not ended up in the same domain. Ethnic, sectarian, historical and economic dispute between Saudi Arabia and Iran have changed the face of the Arab Spring to a more of sectarian war between Sunni-Shiite Muslims. The sectarian conflict between the two regional powers can be seen clearly in Syria, Bahrain, Iraq, and Yemen. Future uncertainty caused by the Arab Spring events adds to frustration of the young generation in Arab countries including Jordan. Indeed, the Arab Spring harmed the economies of Middle Eastern countries and that resulted in more poverty, unemployment, and insecurity within the whole Middle East (Al Ganideh and Good, 2015). The Arab Spring started as a young-people revolution for more dignity, freedom, democracy, and transparency in the whole Arab world (Ali, 2014). According to Helfont and Helfont (2012) the Arab Uprising reshaped and transformed international relations among the countries in the Middle East. In the beginning, the Arab Spring represented an attempt by young Arabs to improve their social and political systems by replacing dictatorships with democratic regimes. Nonetheless, sectarian dispute between Arab Sunni countries and Shaite Iran dominated the events of the Arab Spring (Guzansky and Berti, 2014).

Combining religion and politics is an issue that provokes continued debates in new Arab political systems (Ali, 2014). Rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran has motivated both countries to expand their regional influence and to establish regional domination (Guzansky and Berti, 2014). Long standing and historical ethnic, sectarian and religious conflicts between Arabs and Persians influenced their views towards each other.

Iran felt threatened by the growing power of Sunni Islamic parties and militias in countries such as Egypt, Syria, Libya and Tunisia (Helfont and Helfont, 2012). Through the current events of the Arab Uprising Iran seeks “to expand its regional influence and to establish regional hegemony, relies on both its historic partner, Hezbollah, as well as on the Alawite regime in Syria to support its foreign policy and (resistance) agenda” (Guzansky and Berti, 2014, p.137). Yet, the absence of a good model for Arab countries regarding how to develop a successful relationship between politics and religion in Arab Spring countries has made combining the two a very complex job for new democracies (Ali, 2014). Nonetheless, there is a dearth in academic research when it comes to studying economic and social consequences of the current Arab Spring events on Arabs and Persians. The current study aims to explore the economic and social implications of the Arab/Sunni-Persian/Shiite tension. More specifically, this paper examines feeling of animosity (if any) Sunni Arabs might hold toward Iran and whether such feelings of animosity will be translated into unwillingness to purchase products sourced from Iran. Furthermore, the study aims to examine the influence of demographics (age, gender, and income) and socio-physiological variables (nationalism, patriotism, and internationalism) on feelings of animosity (if any) Sunni Arabs hold toward Iran.

## **2. Theoretical Background**

### **2.1 Arabs and Persians in the Shadow of the Arab Spring: Then and Now**

The Arab Spring events that started in Tunisia in January 2011 shocked the globe, scared non-democratic countries all over the world, including the Middle East and North Africa countries, and reminded the world of the revolutions of 1848 which looked, somehow, similar to the Arab Uprisings (Weyland, 2012). Arab Spring revolutions were fueled by extreme poverty and high unemployment rate of young, educated people which led to tremendous economic injustice for young Arabs who felt little hope for social and economic mobility (Malik and Awadallah, 2013). According to Costello et al. (2015), Arab uprising protests engulfed the Arab World due to the absence of economic justice and political opportunities for young Arab generations. The economic failure for Arab Spring countries could be attributed to the weak trade relationships between the Arab countries, the high dependence on public sector, the absence of a vibrant private sector, the dangerous dearth of manufacturing, and the clear failure of both of the education system and the economic structure (Malik and Awadallah, 2013). The big gap between young Arabs' socioeconomic aspirations and real life, redistribution of income and wealth and high degree of authoritarianism of political economies pushed them out to streets to ask for regime change (Rougie, 2016). In addition, the sharp price increases in basic commodities and growing economic inequality also contributed to the Arab Spring (Costello et al., 2015). In fact, Arab education systems do not match Arab economic needs, resulting in cause many young Arabs' chances to getting jobs minimal. Young Arabs are not only unemployed, but also unemployable due to the failing of education systems (Malik and Awadallah, 2013). Many segments of the poor Arabs played central parts in Arab Uprisings and the natural connection between poor Arabs and religion (Islam) paved the way for Islamic parties to dominate the Arab Spring events ( Bayat, 2015). Furthermore, Arab countries' system suffered a failing social contract between governments and governed" (Parasiliti, 2003, p. 152).

Since Iran's Islamic Revolution in 1979, its connections with militant Muslim organizations were used "as evidence of its interfering in their internal affairs and of fomenting instability. This in turn has enabled them to justify a policy of pressuring Iran and of isolating it diplomatically" (Hunter, 1988, p.730). Despite the fact that Islamic unity was one of the main principles of the Iranian Islamic revolution ethnicity, sectarianism and Arab-Persian competition motivated Islamic Republic opponents to manipulate Iran's image all over the World, including Islamic countries (Hunter, 1988). Recently, according to Chomsky (2006), Iran's interference in Iraq and in East of Saudi Arabia has triggered problems between the Islamic Republic and the Arab Countries, including Saudi Arabia. Also, ambitions to control most of the world oil was not something that the U.S. government fancied. Iran is the only Islamic Shiite country where the majority of Iranians adhere to Twelver Shiism, thus, Shiism is the country's official religion (Hunter, 1988). The strong appeal by Iranians to Shiites' symbols has been used as a propaganda of Sunni Arab countries toward Iran (Hunter, 1988). The historical alliance between the Lebanese Twelver Shiites and Syrian Alawis regime has not only contributed to the rise of the political and military power of the Shiite community but also to the decline of the Sunni-Shiite relationship and the increase of the Sectarian dispute between the Arabs and Iran (AbuKhalil, 1990). Iraq-Iran war contributed to the Arab-Iranian dispute,

particularly as Saddam Hussein presented himself and his country during the eight year war as the defenders of the Arab nation (Parasiliti, 2003).

There is a dearth of research about the influence of sectarianism on politics within the Middle Eastern and North African countries, where sectarianism seems to shape the current Arab Spring events particularly with the escalating disputes between Sunni Arab countries led by Saudi Arabia and Iran. The differences between the two regional power regarding the Arab Spring events in Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, and Iraq has dominated the Arab Spring Uprisings debates. The relationship between sectarianism and American politics received good attention from political science and religious studies who debated about the decline in sectarianism in societies (i.e. Evans, 2006; Bruce, 2000; Hunter, 1991; Steensland et al., 2000; O'Toole, 1976). According to Evans (2006, p. 195) "Theory in the sociology of religion suggests that a prerequisite for cooperative coalitions among religious groups on political matters is a decline in sectarianism."

## **2.2 Ethnic Conflicts**

According to, Hewitt (1977, p. 151), "...ethnic group is one whose members differ from members of other groups with regard to one or more ascriptive characteristics (race, language, or religion) and whose members typically feel solidarity with other members of their group and different from members of other groups." Ethnicity is a cultural phenomenon which can be defined as a collective identity and solidarity whereby individuals perceive themselves as a one group sharing the same physical features such as skin, color, and racial characteristics (Amanolahi, 2005). Religion and language are two of the most important factors that shape ethnic identity (Amanolahi, 2005). Even though multiculturalism existed for thousands of years, pre-modern societies' conflicts were not viewed as mainly ethnic (Riggs, 1998). Through the history, rivalry between rulers and tribes were understood in non-ethnic terms and even slavery was not related to ethnic identity and slaves mainly called more humane treatment (Riggs, 1998).

Ethnic violence is defined as violence between groups drawn from different ethnic communities or violence over any issue that affects the situation of one ethnic community relative to the other (Hewitt, 1977). Earlier, Bates (1993) connected ethnic conflicts to competing over scarce resources and concluded favoritism of own ethnic group when it comes to allocation of resources. According to Sadowski (1998), most ethnic conflicts are related to either religious or tribal rivalries and such conflicts are much more savage and genocidal than traditional wars (Sadowski, 1998). Esteban and Ray (2011) developed a religious/ethnic model where social intolerance and discrimination against out-group could be the response for ethnic activism and violence. Ethnic conflicts are less likely to occur in developed and more economically globalized countries (Sadowski, 1998). Fanaticism increases ethnic violence and makes it harder to be eliminated (Sadowski, 1998).

Generally, there is a strong linkage between political competition and ethnic identification as ethnic identities could be used as a tool to access political power (Eifert et al., 2010). Rival ethnicities can compete politically, economically or militarily to achieve their own interests (Caselli and Coleman, 2013). Patrimonialism and political familism could explain many of ethnic and religious conflicts all over the world including Arab countries where patrimonialism and

political familism are blamed for the backwardness of most Arab countries and their lacks of democracy and human rights (Joseph, 2011). Religious and ethnic minorities have suffered from systematic discrimination in Middle Eastern countries such as Iran and Sudan (Lybarger, 2007).

Many scholars studied the recent global ethnic conflicts in Rwanda, Sri Lanka, Lebanon, Bosnia and Kosovo to understand what led to such horrific ethnic conflicts which took millions of people's lives (i.e. Hewitt, 1977; Maynes, 1993; Riggs, 1998; Khosla, 1999; Swee, 2014; Sadowski, 1998). Martin (1999) linked ethnic conflicts to countries that share long border and to areas where poverty is high and resources are scarce. Earlier, Hewitt (1977) indicated that brutality associated with ethnic conflict differs between societies, such as Lebanon where ethnic conflict had taken lives and in other societies, such as Switzerland where conflict diminished with years". According to Swee (2014), Bosnia was a very ethnically diverse former Yugoslav republic and interethnic relations, over years, between Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats were harmonious under the Yugoslav regime which enforced its people to be only nationally-centered. Nonetheless, ethnic violence spread all over the country during the Bosnian War in 1992 where about 100,000 people had been killed (Swee, 2014). According to Caselli and Coleman (2013), ethnicity's salience differs based on both time and place. For example, ethnicity's salience is not constant over the time as communities give priority to ethnic identities from time to time and sometimes ethnicity is given no importance at all (Caselli and Coleman, 2013). A high level of ethnic diversity increases the risk of civil war while ethnic homogeneity decreases the risk of ethnic conflict. And interestingly the risk of ethnic conflict is low when societies are either very homogenous or very diverse (Tangerås and Lagerlöf, 2009). Ethnic conflicts have not increased in the post-cold war period due to the global power intervention. On the contrary, over one-half of ethnic conflicts happened due to regional power interventions (Khosla, 1999). Against this background, Riggs (1998) has maintained that international interventions may increase ethnic conflicts, whereas multiculturalism and current modernization might decrease inter-group tension, civil wars, ethnic nationalism, and genocide.

The connection between ethnic feelings and the concept of ethnocentrism is solid as ethnocentrism is conceived as a sociological concept and a philosophy that clarifies the relationships between in-group and out-group (Adorno et al., 1950; Hammond and Axelrod, 2006; Shimp, 2004; Sumner, 1906). Earlier in 1906, Sumner (1906, p. 13) conceptualized ethnocentrism as "View of things in which one's own group is the center of everything, and all others are scaled and rated with reference to it; each group nourishes its own pride and vanity, boasts itself superior, exalts its own divinities, and looks with contempt on outsiders." The concept of ethnocentrism entails strong in-group sentiments besides strong out-group sentiments as out groups are perceived as inferior and in-groups are perceived as superior (Chang and Ritter, 1976; Navarrete and Fessler, 2006; Shimp, 1984).

Hutchinson and Smith (1996, p.5) indicated that "Ethnocentrism is often used in social psychology on an individual or interpersonal level as a synonym for disdain of the stranger. But it can also have a collective historical referent, as the sense of uniqueness, centrality, and virtue of an ethnies in its relations with other ethnicities".

Ethnocentric tendencies lead individuals to conceive their own ethnic group as the center of the universe, and it entails wide range of anti-group behaviors towards

other ethnicities (Levine and Campbell, 1972). Adorno et al. (1950) argued that ethnocentrism is an ideological system to distinguish between in-groups (individuals belong to and identify with) and out-groups (antithetical to the in-groups where individuals do not express sense of belonging to) whereby individuals blindly reject out-groups' individuals, cultures and values. Levine and Campbell (1972) understood the concept of ethnocentrism as a parallel concept to egocentrist ideology as it scales one's own group cultural values to other groups' cultural values and ideologies. The concept of ethnocentrism could give a good understanding of how animosities might arise between different nations and ethnicities.

### **2.3 Animosity**

Animosity is a strong emotion coming up due to previous or ongoing military, political, or economic events (Ang et al., 2004; Klein et al., 1998; Lee et al., 2003). Feelings of animosity towards other nations can be seen as an outcome of a territorial dispute such as India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir area (Riefler and Diamantopoulos, 2007); previous military event or war such as China-Japan dispute as a result of The Second Sino-Japanese War (Klein et al., 1998); diplomatic dispute such as Australia-France dispute as a result of 1995–96 French nuclear tests (Ettenson and Klein, 2005); feelings of economic animosity which grow as a results of feelings of economic dominance or control such as Asian countries and the U.S.A during the 1997 Asian financial crisis (Ang et al., 2004). Religious animosity, results from lack of respect and understanding of other people's beliefs, feelings of animosity between different Lebanese groups is a good example for such type of animosity (Kisirwani, 1980). Ethnic animosity results from holding negative feelings towards other ethnicities and the Greek-Turks ethnic conflict is a good example in this case (Nakos and Hajidimitriou, 2007). Feelings of animosity can exist even within the same country, and such feelings could be a result of long standing local ethnic dispute (the case of former Yugoslavia), local religious clash (the case of Muslims and Christians in Lebanon), linguistic based-dispute (the case of Belgium), dispute over independence (the case of Catalonia-Spain), feelings of animosity toward immigrants (German nationalist and immigrants) (i.e. Connolly, 2013; Kisirwani, 1980; Moufakkir, 2014; Pilet, 2005; Nakos and Hajidimitriou, 2007; Dauncey and Morrey, 2008; Peñaloza, 1995). Feelings of animosity can be either a stable or situational animosity whereas stable animosity is related to emotions arising towards an “enemy” country due to historical long-standing conflict, and situational animosity refers to feelings of animosity which results due to a current circumstance. Nonetheless, animosity toward a particular offender country cannot easily be eliminated (Fong et al., 2013). Reputation and trust have a central role in decreasing individuals' negative emotions, such as animosity, toward offending countries (Jiménez and San Martín, 2010).

Researchers in sociology, business and political science have applied the concept of animosity to consumer behavior to better understand why individuals buy or do not buy products sourced from an “enemy” country (Moufakkir, 2014). Animosity towards a current or former enemy influences willingness to buy products sourced from that country (Klein et al., 1998; Parker et al., 2011). Research studied extensively the relationship between animosity and willingness to purchase products sourced from an offending country (Klein et al., 1998; Nijssen and Dauglas, 2004; Ang et al., 2004; Ettenson and Klein, 2005). A number of researchers confirmed the relationship between feelings of animosity and product ownership (i.e.

Klein et al., 1998; Klein, 2002; Bahae, and Pisani, 2009; Nes et al., 2012; Shoham et al., 2006). Demographics were found to predict feelings of animosity (Al Ganideh and Elahee, 2014; Al Ganideh, 2008; Bahae and Pisani, 2009). Feelings of animosity influences consumers purchase decisions independently of product judgments (Klein, 2002; Klein et al., 1998). Individuals with high animosity feelings toward a specific country may realize that its products are high quality products. Generally, consumers do not denigrate the quality of products of the country they do not like and animosity influences consumers purchase decisions independently of product judgments (Klein, 2002; Klein et al., 1998)

Indeed, the U.S.A and Japan have dominated the animosity literature as offender countries. Animosity researchers focused mainly on exploring feelings of animosity towards these two countries due to their past military and economic history. The U.S.A. has been examined as an offender country in many studies (i.e. Ishii, 2009; Parker et al., 2011; Little et al., 2009; Bahae and Pisani, 2009; Nes et al., 2012; Al Ganideh and Elahee, 2014). Many researchers have explored animosity toward Japan (i.e. Klein et al., 1998; Shin, 2001; Klein, 2002; Ang et al., 2004; Leong et al., 2008). Germany has been employed as an offender country by a number of researchers (i.e. Nijssen and Dauglas, 2004). France also has been used as an offender country (i.e. Ettenson and Klein, 2005; Chan et al., 2010). Events such as World War II, Asian economic crisis, and historical ethnic events have dominated animosity literature as events that arise animosity (i.e. Klein et al., 1998; Shin, 2001; Klein, 2002; Nijssen and Dauglas, 2004; Ang et al., 2004; Smith and Qianpin, 2010; Ang et al., 2004; Kesic et al., 2005; Leong et al., 2008).

Nationalism, patriotism and internationalism were found to have a direct effect on animosity, which in turn predicts purchase behavior and willingness to buy products sourced from aggressor country (Shoham et al., 2006; Ishii, 2009; Guido et al., 2010). Nationalism is commitment and readiness to sacrifice for the nation bolstered by animosity toward other ethnic groups (Druckman, 1994). Generally, nationalists score high on love of country and also score high on hostility towards foreigners and other nations (Kosterman and Feshbach, 1989). Nationalistic individuals express more aggressive feelings toward other ethnic groups and countries than are less nationalistic individuals (Druckman, 1994). "Nationalism stresses the cultural similarity of its adherents and, by implication, it draws boundaries vis-à-vis others, who thereby become outsiders" (Eriksen, 1996, p.30). Nationalism has significant effects on attitudes towards other countries and towards purchasing local and global products (Rawwas et al., 1996). Nationalism offers a form of representation for the joining of state, territoriality and culture (Friedland, 2001, p.138). Individuals differ in their level of national attitude (Dekker et al., 2003). Nationalism focuses on national superiority and on downward comparisons to other nations (Lee et al., 2003). Patriotism refers to "Loyalty to the civic group to which one belongs by birth or the other group bond. It is a sentiment of fellowship and cooperation in all hopes, works, and suffering of the group" (Sumner, 1906, p.15). Patriotism is a solid commitment and ready determination to sacrifice for the nation (Druckman, 1994). Patriotism is related to level of love and pride in one's nation and the degree of attachment and commitment to one's own country (Lee et al., 2003). High patriotic feelings influence individuals' economic behavior and motivate them to buy only products made in their countries and to avoid purchasing foreign products (Balabanis et al., 2001). Internationalism reflects "Interest in gaining knowledge about international affairs and other countries and nations"



(Sampson and Smith, 1957, p.99). In fact, internationalism refers to “emotional support for international sharing and welfare, and empathy for the people of other countries’ (Lee et al., 2003, p.492). Internationalism entails preference for international support, cooperation and unity (Karasawa, 2002). Overall, internationalists may score low in hostility (Kosterman and Feshbach, 1989).

This study contributes to knowledge by exploring the Arabs’ feelings of animosity towards Iran in the shadow of the Arab Spring. In addition, it explores which segments of Arabs express higher animosity towards Iran and how feelings of animosity Arab express towards Iran differs based on their nationalistic or internationalist feelings.

### **3. Methodology**

Jordan is a suitable context for the current investigation as the country, compared to other Arab countries, enjoyed good stability (Helfont and Helfont, 2012). Jordan is an excellent representative of other Arab countries in terms of ethnicity as almost all Jordanians are Arabs and Sunni Muslims. The current investigation aims to study one of central aspects regarding the Arab Spring current events; Arab-Iranian relationships from the perspective of normal Arab people.

#### **3.1 Measures**

Data were collected from Jordanian nationals in the two largest cities in the country, namely Amman (the capital of the country) and Irbid (the largest northern city) over a period of four weeks in June 2014. Surveys were collected from shopping malls from the two cities. A female facilitator (senior undergraduate business student) advised shoppers at food courts at these malls if they would like to participate in the study. Data were collected from subjects who agreed to participate. The total number of usable surveys was 108 out of 121 collected surveys. The used measures for the current study were translated into Arabic language by two researchers (PhD holders) who are fluent in English and Arabic in focus group style meetings. Indeed, the researchers discussed and translated the items one by one. The final version of the survey is the one that the researchers agreed on. The subjects were asked questions regarding to their gender, age, income, education, and geographic location.

##### *Feeling of Animosity*

To measure Jordanians’ feelings of animosity toward Iran, four items (5-point Likert scale) were used (i.e. I feel angry toward Iran). The scale was developed originally by Klein et al. (1998).

##### *Willingness to purchase products*

Four items (5-point Likert scale) used and modified by Klein et al. (1998) originally from Wood and Darling (1993) (i.e, I would feel guilty if I bought an Iranian product) were used. The higher the score, the more unwilling the subject was to purchase products from a country.

### *Nationalism*

Five items (5-point Likert scale) adopted from Kosterman and Feshbach (1989) were used to measure Jordanians' level of nationalism (i.e. the first duty of every young Jordanian is to honour the national Jordanian history and heritage).

### *Patriotism*

Jordanians' patriotism level was measured using five items (5-point Likert scale) developed originally by Kosterman and Feshbach (1989). (i.e. I love my country).

### *Internationalism*

To measure Jordanians' internationalism, subjects were asked to answer five items (5-point Likert scale) adopted from Kosterman and Feshbach (1989) (i.e. the alleviation of poverty in other countries is their problem, not ours).

## **3.2 Participants**

Approximately 65.7% of the subjects were males. Regarding the age of respondents, about 60% of them were between 18 and 25 years of age, 13.0% of the subjects were between the age of 26 and 35, and 14.8% were between the age of 36 and 46. Only 5% of the subjects were above the age of 46. The majority of the respondents (53.7%) were residents of Amman city, while 40.7% of them were residents of northern Irbid city. About 85% of the subjects hold a bachelor degree and almost 10% had a high school certificate. The results showed that 12.0% of the subjects had household monthly incomes less than 350 JD (US\$ 490), 42.6 % of them had household monthly income between 350–800 JD (US\$ 490–1120), 16.7% household incomes of subjects were between 800–1200 JD (US\$1120–1680), and only 16.7% incomes of them were more than 1200JD (US\$ 1680).

## **4. Data Analysis and Conclusions**

This study examined feeling of hostility (if any) Sunni Arab Jordanians hold toward Iran. In addition, it explored the influence that feelings of animosity (if any) might have on Jordanians' willingness to purchase products made in Iran. Moreover, the study aimed to examine the influence of demographics (gender, age, income) and socio-physiological variables (nationalism, patriotism and internationalism) on feelings of animosity Jordanians hold toward Iran. Table 1 shows the correlation of the used measures in the study. It is clear that Cronbach's alphas for the five scales were above 0.68 which suggested a reasonably good reliability and consistent with previously reported coefficients about these scales.

**Table 1. Correlation matrix of the used measures**

| Measure                                     | $\alpha$ | 1      | 2      | 3      | 4      | 5    |
|---|----------|--------|--------|--------|--------|------|
| 1. Animosity towards Iran                   | 0.96     | 1.00   |        |        |        |      |
| 2. Willingness to purchase Iranian Products | 0.84     | 0.76** | 1.00   |        |        |      |
| 3. Nationalism                              | 0.68     | 0.07   | 0.03   | 1.00   |        |      |
| 4. Patriotism                               | 0.93     | 0.17   | 0.14   | 0.58** | 1.00   |      |
| 5. Internationalism                         | 0.88     | -0.24* | -0.23* | 0.29** | 0.29** | 1.00 |

\*  $P < 0.05$  (2-tailed).

\*\*  $P < 0.01$  level (2-tailed).

Table 2 shows that almost half of Jordanians express negative feeling toward Iran and will not forgive it for its role in the Arab Spring current events. Approximately 40% of subjects do not like to see Iran wins in sports competition and feel angry towards their Muslim neighboring country. Less than a third of Jordanians avoid purchasing Iranian products and will never buy a product made in Iran.

**Table 2. Jordanians’ animosity toward Iran and willingness to purchase Iranian products**

| Item   | Mean | SD   | Agree | Neutral | Disagree |
|--|------|------|-------|---------|----------|
| I dislike Iran   | 3.45 | 1.37 | 48.2% | 27.8%   | 22.3%    |
| I do not like to see Iranian teams winning in sports competition | 3.30 | 1.38 | 37.9% | 37.0%   | 23.1%    |
| I feel angry toward the Iranians                                 | 3.42 | 1.32 | 40.8% | 38.0%   | 19.4%    |
| I will never forgive Iran for its role in the Arab Spring        | 3.58 | 1.31 | 49.1% | 32.4%   | 16.7%    |
| I would feel guilty if I bought an Iranian product               | 3.06 | 1.31 | 29.7% | 38.0%   | 29.6%    |
| When possible, I avoid buying Iranian products                   | 3.09 | 1.35 | 30.5% | 36.1%   | 30.5%    |
| Whenever available, I would prefer to buy products made in Iran  | 3.46 | 1.20 | 15.7% | 38.0%   | 44.4%    |
| I would never buy an Iranian product                             | 2.92 | 1.30 | 26.0% | 36.1%   | 36.1%    |

A hierarchal regression technique was used to explore the joint influence of Jordanians’ nationalism, patriotism, and internationalism levels on their feelings of animosity toward Iran over and above that accounted for by the demographic variables namely, age, gender and income. In this statistical technique, predictors were entered in two blocks with demographics entered first to provide a baseline for the model and then nationalism, patriotism, and internationalism were entered in the second block. The two models proved to be statistically significant based on the results of ANOVA test. The results (Table 3) show that demographic variables explain 12.4% of Jordanians’ animosity toward Iran and the addition of nationalism, patriotism, and internationalism increases  $R^2$  by 11.6%. Internationalism has the strongest statistically significant influence on Jordanians’ feelings of animosity toward Iran with  $\beta = -0.34$ . Jordanians’ with high internationalism feelings showed less feelings of animosity toward Iran. Age was the second strongest predictor for animosity Jordanians hold toward Iran with  $\beta = 0.28$ . The older the Jordanians, the more feelings of animosity they showed towards Iran. Income, gender, nationalism,

and patriotism do not seem to influence feelings of animosity Jordanians express towards Iran.

**Table 3. Regression on feelings of animosity toward Iran**

| Predictors       | $\beta$ | Sig.   |
|------------------|---------|--------|
| Age              | 0.28    | 0.01** |
| Gender           | -0.10   | 0.33   |
| Income           | -0.18   | 0.06   |
| Nationalism      | 0.11    | 0.33   |
| Patriotism       | 0.07    | 0.52   |
| Internationalism | -0.34   | 0.00** |

Model 1 (Demographics):  $F=4.25$ ,  $p=0.007$  where \*, and \*\* represent statistical significance at 0.05, and 0.01 respectively.  $R^2=0.124$ ,  $\Delta R^2=0.095$ .

Model 2 (Demographics, nationalism, patriotism, and internationalism):  $F=4.57$ ,  $p=0.000$  where \* and \*\* represent statistical significance at 0.05, and 0.01 respectively.

Regarding the influence of Jordanians' feelings of animosity toward Iran on their (un)willingness to purchase products sourced from Iran, the results showed that animosity toward Iran has statistically significant influence on (un)willingness to purchase its products with  $F=143.00$  and  $p=0.000$ . Feelings of animosity explains 58% of Jordanians' (un)willingness to purchase Iranian products with  $\beta= 0.68$ ;  $\text{sig}=0.000$ .

Overall, this study agrees with earlier finds related to animosity literature that feelings of animosity influence willingness to purchase products from an "offender" or "enemy" country. In fact, the results of this study are in line with the results of the pioneering study conducted by Klein et al. (1998) who found that consumers' feelings of animosity toward offender country influence negatively their willingness to purchase products sourced from that country. Likewise, the results confirm the results of Parker et al. (2011) who proved feelings of animosity have direct influence on individuals' willingness to purchase products made in an "aggressor" country. Also, the results agree previous studies regarding the positive correlation between feelings of animosity and willingness to purchase products sourced from an aggressor country (i.e. Bahae and Pisani, 2009; Nes et al., 2012). Nonetheless, the results disagree with the conclusion of Al Ganideh and Elahee (2014) who found no influence of Anti-Americanism on Jordanians' willingness to purchase products made in the U.S.A.

The current results agree with Shoham et al. (2006) that internationalism has significant influence on willingness to purchase products from an "offending" country and disagree with what the researchers found regarding the influence of nationalism on feelings of animosity. Also, the result agrees with Kosterman and Feshbach (1989) who concluded that internationalists score low in hostility. The results of this study conclude that patriotism has no influence on feelings of animosity Jordanians' express toward Iran. This result contradicts what Ishii (2009) found that patriotism is positively correlated with animosity.

The current study found that older Jordanians express higher level of animosity toward Iran than their younger counterparts. This result diverges from the findings of Nijssen and Dauglas (2004) who concluded that in Netherlands, one of the most internationally oriented countries all over the world, young individuals express highest level of hostility toward Germany and its products knowing that Netherlands suffered much during the Second World War. Moreover, this study disagrees with Bahae and Pisani (2009) finding that age is significantly and negatively correlated with consumer animosity. The result also does not agree with Furia and Lucas (2008) who indicated that young Arabs are more hostile to the West than older generations. Alternatively, the current results are in line with Parker et al. (2011) who concluded that young Chinese expressed the lowest animosity towards the U.S.A. The current study disagrees with Bahae and Pisani (2009) who concluded that women are significantly more likely to hold higher consumer animosity levels than men. Nonetheless, the result agrees Bahae and Pisani (2009) that income classes are not significantly related to consumer animosity.

Feelings of animosity Jordanians express toward Iran should not be ignored by neither Iranian global marketers nor by Arab local marketers. Nonetheless, international Iranian marketers who target Arab countries should realize that Arab Spring implications might influence negatively the chances of selling their products in Arab markets. On the other hand, Arab marketers who compete Iranians should build on this issue and highlight the Iranian country-of-origin of their competitors and their products. It is vital for Iranian international marketers who target Arab countries to be aware of the importance of modification of their marketing and communications strategies in way that decrease the influence of animosity Jordanians expressed toward Iran. A possible approach to overcome feelings of animosity Arab consumers showed toward Iran could be by focusing more on internationalism connections to their products and not to highlight its Iranian country-of-origin. Moreover, any promotional campaign should produce a better outcome by targeting young consumers as they showed less feelings of animosity toward Iran than their older counterparts did. Using marketing communications that focus on national Jordanian or Arabian or Islamic symbols might encourage locals to be more positive towards products sourced from Iran. Indeed, advertising can be used to boost or reduce the influence of consumer animosity on willingness to purchase products originating from an offender country. International Iranian marketers are much recommended to develop marketing communications that suit consumer sentiments in Jordan. The main focus of Iranian marketing managers should be on moving away from their product's country-of-origin but highlighting more on product quality.

Overall, the results of this research may not be generalizable to all individuals in Jordan and other Arab countries as the study uses a convenience sample and a relatively small sample size. Future research needs to be extended to other categories in Jordanian society and other Arab countries, particularly to rich Arab Gulf States. One interesting addition could be the duplication of this research objectives from Iraqi perspective. Iraq seems to be a suitable context for exploring the main notion of this research. Examining feelings of animosity (if any) in Iraq's three main areas (Kurdistan- north of Iraq; Sunni provinces north and center of the country; and the Shiite provinces in the south and center in Iraq) will be interesting and will inform researchers and politicians about how Arabs, Kurds, Sunni, and Shiite perceive Iran and its policies.

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