Résumés
Résumé
L’objectif de cette recherche consiste à étudier la décision commerciale en termes de disponibilité du crédit prise par les banques marocaines face à des PME présentant des niveaux de risque différents dans le cadre d’une relation d’engagement. En utilisant des données contractuelles sur un échantillon de 512 PME, les tests Logit réalisés nous ont permis de conclure qu’un désengagement accéléré se produit pour les PME à haut risque, qui ont plus d’une banque partenaire et une durée de la relation d’engagement moins longue. La banque marocaine, en accordant des crédits à moyen et long terme à des PME à haut risque, préfère des solutions amicales en consolidant ses engagements ou en accordant des crédits de restructuration dans la perspective d’une évolution favorable du risque de cette catégorie de PME. Pour les PME à bas risque, la stratégie commerciale de la banque favorise le renouvellement avec augmentation des lignes de crédit, particulièrement lorsque la durée de la relation d’engagement est longue et le nombre de banques réduit à une seule banque ou à une banque principale. Plus la durée de la relation et la réciprocité de l’engagement sont élevées, plus la disponibilité du crédit augmente pour les PME avec ce profil de risque.
Mots-clés:
- Stratégie commerciale,
- Disponibilité du crédit,
- Relation d’engagement,
- Marché du crédit,
- PME
Abstract
The objective in this paper is to investigate the commercial strategies of credit availability that Moroccan banks adopt to deal with the different types of SMEs risk in a relationship lending. Based on contractual data from a sample of 512 SMEs, empirical tests using a logit model allowed us to conclude that accelerated disengagement is triggered for SMEs with higher risk, shorter duration of the relationship lending and those who have more than one partner bank. Moroccan banks prefer friendly solutions by consolidating all the credits or by granting medium – and long-term restructuring credit in the perspective of favorable risk evolution for this category of SMEs. However, for low-risk SMEs, banks’ commercial strategy varies from maintaining lines of credit to renewing and increasing these lines, especially when the duration of the relationship lending is long and the number of banks is reduced to a single bank or a main bank. The longer the duration of the lending relationship and the greater commitment reciprocity, the more credit availability is made for those low-risk SMEs.
Keywords:
- Business strategy,
- Credit availability,
- Relationship lending,
- Credit market,
- SMEs
Resumen
El objetivo principal de este artículo es investigar las estrategias comerciales de la disponibilidad de crédito que adoptan los bancos marroquíes para tratar los diferentes riesgos en una relación de préstamo a las PyME. A partir de los datos de los contractuales de una muestra de 512 PyME, las pruebas empíricas mediante un modelo logit nos permitieron concluir que la desvinculación acelerada se desencadena para las PyME con alto riesgo, menor duración de la relación de compromiso y más de un banco asociado. Los bancos marroquíes prefieren soluciones amistosas consolidando sus compromisos o concediendo créditos de reestructuración a medio y largo plazo en la perspectiva de una evolución favorable del riesgo para esta categoría de PyME. Sin embargo, en el caso de las PyME de bajo riesgo, la estrategia de los bancos varía desde el mantenimiento de las líneas de crédito hasta la renovación y el aumento de esas líneas, especialmente cuando la duración de la relación de préstamo es larga y el número de bancos se reduce a un solo banco o a un banco principal. Cuanto más larga sea la duración de la relación de préstamo y mayor sea la reciprocidad del compromiso, mayor será la disponibilidad de crédito.
Palabras clave:
- Estrategia comercial,
- Disponibilidad de crédito,
- Relación de préstamo,
- Mercado de credito,
- PyME
Parties annexes
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