Résumés
Résumé
Cet article étudie l’incidence des modalités de contrôle et le rôle des fonds de capital-investissement sur la croissance et la performance des PME françaises reprises par leurs dirigeants. Selon la théorie de l’agence, le rachat d’une entreprise par ses cadres dirigeants (REC) offre de nombreux avantages : nouvelles capacités de financement, réduction des coûts d’agence, amélioration de la performance opérationnelle. Ces effets positifs doivent cependant être nuancés au regard de la réduction des investissements et de l’augmentation des coûts de faillite. L’étude empirique est construite sur un modèle d’appariement par score de propension à partir d’un échantillon de 208 opérations de REC réalisées sur des PME françaises entre 2002 et 2012. Les résultats montrent que la croissance des PME reprises n’est pas plus élevée que celle des firmes comparables n’ayant fait l’objet d’un REC. Par ailleurs, si la croissance des PME reprises semble s’accélérer après le rachat, l’influence de la présence d’un fonds de capital-investissement dans ce processus n’apparaît pas significative.
Mots-clés:
- Management buyouts (MBO),
- Private equity,
- Croissance des PME,
- Performance,
- Endettement,
- Théorie de l’agence
Abstract
This article studies the evolution of growth and performance of non-listed French SMEs acquired through a Management Buy-Out (MBO) and the influence of Private Equity funds in this process. According to the agency theory, this type of acquisition can offer many benefits: new financing capacities, reduction of agency costs, improvement of operating efficiency. However, these positive effects must be counterbalanced by the reduction of investment and the increase of bankruptcy costs. The empirical study is built on a propensity score matching model from a sample of 208 MBOs carried out on French SMEs between 2002 and 2012. The results show that the growth and the performance of acquired SMEs is not faster nor stronger than the growth of matched companies. On the other hand, if the development of SMEs under MBO seems to accelerate after the buyout, the influence of PE funds does not appear significant in this process.
Keywords:
- Management buyouts (MBO),
- Private equity,
- Development of SMEs,
- Performance,
- Debt,
- Agency theory
Resumen
Este artículo estudia la evolución del crecimiento y los métodos de desarrollo de las PyME francesas en forma de Buy-Out de gestión (MBO). De acuerdo con la teoría de la agencia, la implementación de este tipo de acuerdo ofrece muchos beneficios a las empresas objetivo: nuevas capacidades de financiamiento, reducción de los costos de agencia, experiencia en el desarrollo de los fondos. Sin embargo, estos efectos positivos deben estar condicionados por la reducción de la inversión y el aumento de los costos de quiebra. El estudio empírico se basa en un modelo de coincidencia de puntaje de propensión de una muestra de 208 MBO llevadas a cabo en PyME francesas entre 2002 y 2012. Los resultados muestran que el crecimiento de las empresas objetivo no es más más alto que el de las empresas combinadas. Por otro lado, si el desarrollo de objetivos bajo MBO parece acelerarse después de la compra, el papel de los fondos de PE en este proceso no parece significativo.
Palabras clave:
- Management buyouts (MBO),
- Private equity,
- Desarrollo de negocios,
- Desempeño,
- Deuda,
- Teoría de agencia
Parties annexes
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