Résumés
Résumé
Perçu comme une des contraintes majeures au développement et à la croissance, l’accès au crédit bancaire demeure une question d’actualité dans la formulation des politiques de promotion et d’encadrement de la PME. En effet, non seulement la PME est souvent caractérisée par une certaine nébulosité dans sa gestion, mais elle est aussi parfois incapable de présenter des éléments de garantie exigés par les banques. Le capital social est de plus en plus évoqué comme un instrument à même de réduire les coûts de transaction des banques dans la surveillance de leurs clients et, par conséquent, devrait amoindrir les désavantages de l’asymétrie d’information. Ainsi, en se situant dans un environnement caractérisé par de fortes asymétries d’information à l’instar de l’Afrique, cette étude examine l’aptitude du capital social à faciliter l’accès au crédit bancaire de la PME camerounaise. Les tests empiriques effectués à partir du modèle Logit multinomial sur la base d’un échantillon de 413 PME, font ressortir un effet positif et significatif de l’indice du capital social sur l’octroi du crédit bancaire, quel que soit le terme. Globalement, l’aptitude du capital social à faciliter l’accès au crédit bancaire passe par la réduction du degré d’opacité de la PME aux yeux du banquier.
Mots-clés :
- Asymétrie d’information,
- Capital social,
- Financement bancaire,
- PME camerounaises
Abstract
Perceived as one of the main constraints to growth and development, access to credit remains an up to date issue in the design of policies aiming at the promotion and framing of SMEs. Often, SMEs are not only characterized by a flaw management process, sometimes they are incapable to provide-elements of collaterals fitting the requirements of banks. Social capital is more and more referred to as an instrument likely to reduce the transaction costs of banks in their monitoring process over their clients and, consequently it is seen as having a high potential of lessening the disadvantages associated to informational asymmetries. Therefore, building on a context of high information asymmetries, this study examines the aptitude of social capital to facilitate access to banking credit for Cameroonian SMEs. Based on a sample of 413 SMEs, a multinomial Logit model confirms a positive and significant effect of the index of social capital in the explanation of access to credit, irrespective of the term of the credit. Globally, the aptitude of social capital to ease the constraint of access to credit passes through the fact that, for the bankers, it serves as a factor that reduces the degree of opacity in the management of SMEs.
Keywords:
- Information asymmetric,
- Social capital,
- Bank financing,
- Cameroonian SMEs
Resumen
Percibida como una de las mayores coacciones al desarrollo y al crecimiento, el acceso al crédito bancario queda un asunto de actualidad en la formulación de las políticas de promoción y de encuadramiento de la pequeña y de media empresa (PyME). En efecto, no sólo la PyME es a menudo caracterizada por una cierta nebulosidad en su gestión, pero a veces es también incapaz presentar elementos de garantía exigidos por las bancas. El capital social es cada vez más presentado como un instrumento capaz de disminuir los costes de transacción de las bancas en la vigilancia de sus clientes y, por consiguiente, debería aminorar las desventajas situándose en un entorno caracterizado por fuertes asimetrías de información a ejemplo de África, este estudio examina la aptitud del capital social en facilitar el acceso al crédito bancario de la pequeña y de media empresa camerunesa. Las pruebas empíricas realizadas a partir del modelo Logit multinomial en la base de una muestra de 413 PyME, se destacan un efecto positivo y significativo del índice del capital social en el acceso al crédito bancario cual que sea el término. Globalmente, la aptitud del capital social en facilitar el acceso al crédito bancario pasa por la reducción del grado de opacidad de la PyME a la mirada del banquero.
Palabras clave:
- Asimetría de información,
- Capital social,
- Financiación bancaria,
- Pequeñas y medias empresas camerunesas
Parties annexes
Références
- Abeysekera, A. et Guthrieb, J. (2004). Human capital reporting in a developing nation. The British Accounting Review, 36(3), 251-268.
- Africapractice (2005). Access to finance : profiles of african MSEs (document de travail préparé par Jetro, Londres). Récupéré le 11 mai 2014 sur le site : http://www.proparco.fr/lang/en/Accueil_PROPARCO/Publications-Proparco/secteur-prive-et-developpement/Resources/issue-12-resources.
- Apilado, V. et Millington, J. (1992). Restrictive loan covenants and risk adjustment, in small business lending. Journal of Small Business Management, 30(1), 38-48.
- Atanasova, C.V. et Wilson, N. (2004). Disequilibrium in the UK corporate loan market. Journal of Banking and Finance, 28(3), 595-614.
- Audet, J., St-Pierre, J. et Pham, T.H.V. (2009, mai). La vulnérabilité des TPE et des PME dans un environnement mondialisé. 11e Journées scientifiques du Réseau entrepreneuriat. Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières, Canada.
- Banque mondiale (2006). Making finance work for Africa. Washington, Banque mondiale.
- Banque mondiale et la Société financière internationale (2009, 2010). Doing business : comparaison des réglementations dans 181 pays, 6e édition. Washington, D.C., États-Unis.
- Behr, P. et Güttler, A. (2007). Credit risk assessment and relationship lending : an empirical analysis of german small and medium-sized enterprises. Journal of Small Business Management, 45(2), 194-214.
- Berger, A., Klapper, L.F. et Udell, G.F. (2001). The ability of banks to lend to informationally opaque small business. Journal of Banking and Finance, 25(12), 2127-2167.
- Berger, A. et Udell, G.F. (1995). Relationship lending and lines of credit in small firm finance. Journal of business, 68(3), 351-381.
- Berger, A. et Udell, G.F. (1998). The economics of small business finance : the roles of private equity and debt markets in the financial growth cycle. Journal of Banking and Finance, 22(8), 613-673.
- Besanko, D. et Thakor, A.V. (1987). Collateral and rationing : sorting equilibria in monopolistic and competitive credit markets. International Economic Review, 28(3), 671-689.
- Besley, T. et Coate, S. (1995). Group lending, repayment incentives and social collateral. Journal of Development Economics, 46(1), 1-18.
- Bester, H. (1985). Screening vs rationing in credit markets with imperfect information. American Economic Review, 75(4), 850-855.
- Bhappu, A.D. (2000). The japanese family : an institutional logic for japanese corporate networks and japanese management. Academy of Management Review, 25(2), 409-415.
- Bhattacharya, S. et Chiesa, G. (1995). Proprietary information, financial intermediation and research incentives. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 4(4), 328-357.
- Biggs, T., Raturi, M. et Srivastava, P. (2002). Ethnic networks and access to credit : evidence from the manufacturing sector in Kenya. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 49(4), 473-486.
- Biggs, T. et Shah, M.K. (2006). African small and medium enterprises, networks, and manufacturing performance. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, (3855). Washington, D.C., États-Unis, Banque mondiale.
- Bjørnskov, C. (2006). The multiple facets of social capital. European Journal of Political Economy, 22(1), 22-40.
- Boot, A. (2000). Relationship banking : what do we know ? Journal of Financial Intermediation, 9(1), 7-25.
- Boot, A., Thakor, A.W. et Udell, G.F. (1991). Secured lending and default risk : equilibrium analysis, policy implications and empirical results. Economic Journal, 101(406), 458-472.
- Bourdieu, P. (1980). Le capital social. Notes provisoires. Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, 31(31), 2-3.
- Bourdieu, P., Boltanski, L. et De Saint-Martin, M. (1973). Les stratégies de reconversion. Social Science Information, 12(5), 61-113.
- Brasseur, M. (2008). Le rôle des stéréotypes dans le management de la diversité culturelle : cas de l’Afrique. Revue des sciences de gestion, 2(230), 61-67.
- Carol-Anne Ho, S. et Mitchell, W. (2003). International comparative analysis of the association between board structure and the efficiency of value added by a firm from its physical capital and intellectual capital resources. The International Journal of Accounting, 38(4), 465-491.
- Chan, Y.S. et Thakor, A.V. (1987). Collateral and competitive equilibrium with moral hazard and private information. Journal of Finance, 42(2), 345-363.
- Cheng, S. et ScottLong, J. (2007). Testing for IIA in the multinomial Logit model. Sociological Methods and Research, 35(4), 538-600.
- Chou, K. (2006). Three simple models of social capital and economic growth. Journal of Socio-Economics, 35(5), 889-912.
- Coleman, J. (1990). Foundation of social theory. Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press.
- Correia, L.F., Amaral, H.F. et Louvet, P. (2009, mai). Un indice de gouvernance pour les entreprises au Brésil. 5e Colloque de l’IFBAE. Grenoble, France.
- Darrough, M.N. et Stoughton, N.M. (1986). Moral hazard and adverse selection : the question of financial structure. Journal ofFinance, 41(2), 501-513.
- Degryse, H. et Van Cayseele, P. (2000). Relationship lending within a bank-based system : evidence from european small business data. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 9(1), 90-109.
- Devereux, J. et Fishe, R. (1993). Economic analysis of group lending programs in developing countries. Developing Economies, 31(1), 102-121.
- Diamond, D.W. (1984). Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring. Review of Economic Studies, 51(2), 393-414.
- Duan, H., Han, X. et Yang, H. (2009). An analyses of causes for SMEs financing difficulty. International Journal of Business and Management, 4(6), 74-75.
- Fafchamps, M. (1999). Ethnicity and credit in African manufacturing. Journal of Development Economics, 61(1), 205-235.
- Fama, E. (1985). What’s different about banks ? Journal of Monetary Economics, 15(1), 29-40.
- Fama, E. et Jensen, M. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law Economics, 26(2), 301-325.
- Ferray, M. (1999). Confiance et accumulation de capital social dans la régulation des activités de crédit. Revue française de sociologie, 40(3), 559-586.
- Fonds monétaire international (2004). Republic of Mozambique : financial system stability assessment including report on the observance of standards and codes on the following topics : banking supervision, payment systems, and anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (IMF country report 04/52). Washington, D.C., États-Unis, FMI.
- Fukuyama, F. (1995). Trust : the social values and the creation of prosperity. New York, The Free Press.
- Granovetter, M. (1973). The strength of weak ties. American Journal of Sociology, 78(3), 1360-1380.
- Greenbaum, S.I., Kanatas, G. et Venezia, I. (1989). Equilibrium loan price under the bankclient relationship. Journal of Banking and Finance, 13(2), 221-235.
- Guiso, L., Sapienza, P. et Zingales, L. (2004). The role of social capital in financial development. American Economic Review, 94(3), 526-556.
- Hans-Joachim, G. (2003). Transaction costs in finance and inventory research. International Journal Production Economics, 81-82(11), 341-350.
- Haubrich, J.G. (1989). Financial intermediation, delegated monitoring and long term relationships. Journal of Banking and Finance, 13(1), 9-20.
- Hausman, J. et McFadden, D. (1984). Specification tests for the multinomial Logit model. Econometrica, 52(5), 1219-1240.
- Hwang, P. (2006). Asset specificity and the fear of exploitation. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 60(3), 423-438.
- Jensen, M.C. et Meckling, W.H. (1976). Theory of the firm : managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 163-182.
- Kalay, A. (1980). Signaling information content and the reluctance to cut dividends. Journal of Financial and Quantitative analysis, 15(4), 855-869.
- Kamdem, E. et Fouda Ongodo, M. (2004, octobre). Faits et méfaits de l’ethnicité dans les pratiques managériales au Cameroun. Dans les Actes du Colloque international organisé par la CIDEGEF et le CEMADIMO. Beyrouth, Liban.
- Kim, M., Surroca, J. et Tribó, J.A. (2008). The effect of social capital on financial capital. Récupéré le 11 mai 2014 sur le site : http://ssrn.com/abstract=1343863.
- Kobou, G., Ngoa Tabi, H. et Moungou Mbenda, S.P. (2010). L’efficacité du financement des micros et petites entreprises dans la lutte contre la pauvreté au Cameroun. Économie Appliquée, 63(1), 135-162.
- Kolenikov, S. et Angeles, G. (2004, octobre). The use of discrete data in PCA : theory, simulations, and applications to socioeconomic indices (working paper). University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, États-Unis.
- Krishnakumar, J. et Nagar, A.L. (2008). On exact statistical properties of multidimensional indices based on principal components, factor analysis, MIMIC and structural equation models. Social Indicators Research, 86(3), 481-496.
- Kuang-Hsun, S., Yen-Tzu, L., Charlotte, J. et Binshan, L. (2010). The indicators of human capital for financial institutions. Expert Systems with Applications, 37(2), 1503-1509.
- Lehmannn, E. et Neuberger, D. (2001). Do lending relationships matter ? : evidence from bank survey data in Germany. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 45(4), 339-359.
- Leland, H. et Pyle, D. (1977). Informational asymetries, financial structure, and financial intermediation. Journal of Finance, 32(2), 371-384.
- Levratto, N. (1990). Le financement des PME par les banques : contraintes des firmes et limites de la coopération. Revue internationale PME, 3(2), 192-213.
- Levratto, N., Barthelemy, S., Delhom, M., Filippi, J.B. et Maherault, L. (2002). Conditions de l’élaboration d’une base de données qualitatives sur les entreprises aux fins d’une intermédiation informationnelle : réponse à la consultation du secrétariat d’État aux PME, au commerce, à l’artisanat, aux professions libérales et à la consommation. Paris, Ministère de l’Économie, des Finances et de l’Industrie.
- Longhofer, S.D. et Santos, J.A. (2000). The importance of bank seniority for relationship lending. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 9(1), 57-89.
- McFadden, D. (1968). The revealed preferences of a government bureaucracy, economic growth project (technical report no 17). Berkeley, Californie, États-Unis, University of California.
- McFadden, D. (1987). Regression based specification tests for the multinomial Logit model. Journal of Econometrics, 34(1-2), 63-82.
- McKillop, D.G. et Hutchinson, R.W. (1994). Small businesses and bank financing. Applied Financial Economics, 4(1), 69-73.
- Minpmeesa (2009, janvier). Étude sur la formulation du plan directeur (M/P) pour le développement des petites et moyennes entreprises en République du Cameroun (rapport final). Japon, Agence japonaise de coopération internationale.
- Montgomery, M., Terry, J. et Syed, F. (2005). What kind of capital do you need to start a business : financial or human ? Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 45(1), 103-122.
- Myers, S. (1984). The capital structure puzzle. Journal of Finance, 39(3), 575-592.
- Nagar, A.L. et Basu, S.R. (2002). Weighting socio-economic indicators of human development : a latent variable approach. Dans A. Ullah, A. Wan et A. Chaturvedi (dir.), Handbook of appliedeconometrics and statistical inference (p. 609-642). New York, Marcel Dekker.
- Nahapiet, J. et Ghoshal, S. (1998). Social capital, intellectual capital, and the organizational advantage. Academy of Management Review, 23(2), 242-266.
- Nugent, J.B. (1993). Between state, market and households : a neoinstitutional analyses of local organizations and institutions. World Development, 21(4), 623-631.
- Omenguele, R.G. et Mazra, M. (2012). The determinants of trade credit demand : an empirical study from cameroonian firms. International Journal of Business and Management, 7(17), 43-59.
- Ongena, S. et Smith, D. (2000). What determines the number of bank relationships ? Crosscountry evidence. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 9(1), 26-56.
- Pettit, R.R. et Singer, R.F. (1985). Small business finance : a research agenda. Financial Management, 14(3), 47-60.
- Putnam, R.D. (1993). Making democracy work : civic traditions in modern Italy. Princeton, Princeton University Press.
- Putnam, R.D. (1995). Bowling alone : America’s declining social capital. Journal of Democracy, 6(1), 65-78.
- Rajan, R.G. (1992). Insiders and outsiders : the choice between informed and arm’s length debt. Journal of Finance, 47(4), 1367-1400.
- Rajan, R.G. et Zingales, L. (1995). What do we know about capital structure ? Some evidence from international data. Journal of Finance, 50(5), 1421-1460.
- Ross, S. (1977). The determinants of financial structure : the incentive signaling approach. Bell Journal of Economics, 5(1), 23-40.
- Sacerdoti, E. (2009). Crédit et secteur privé en Afrique : évolution et enjeux. La revue de Proparco, (1), 9-13.
- Sharma, M. et Zeller, M. (1997). Repayment performance in group-based credit programs in Bangladesh : an empirical analysis. World Development, 25(10), 1731-1742.
- Sharpe, S. (1990). Asymmetric information, bank lending, and implicits contracts : a stylized model of customer relationships. Journal of Finance, 45(4), 1069-1086.
- Simon, N. (2007). La confiance dans tous ses états. Revue française de gestion, 33(175), 83-94.
- Steijvers, T. (2008). Existence of credit rationing for SMEs in the belgian corporate bank loan market (working paper). Récupéré le 11 mai 2014 sur le site du Social Science Research Network (SSRN) : http://ssrn.com/abstract=495162.
- Stiglitz, J. (1990). Peer monitoring and credit markets. World Bank Economic Review, 4(3), 351-366.
- Stiglitz, J. et Weiss, A. (1981). Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information. American Economic Review, 71(3), 393-410.
- St-Pierre, J. (1999). La gestion financière des PME. Théories et pratiques. Québec, Presses de l’Université du Québec.
- St-Pierre, J. et Bahri, M. (2011). The determinants of risk premium : the case of bank lines of credit granted to SMEs. Journal of Developmental Entrepreneurship, 16(4), 459-476.
- Theil, H. (1969). A multinomial extension of the linear Logit model. International Economic Review, 10(3), 251-259.
- Tyler, B., Mayank, R. et Pradeep, S. (2002). Ethnic networks and access to credit : evidence from the manufacturing sector in Kenya. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 49(4), 473-486.
- Uzzi, B. (1997). Social structure and competition in inter-firm networks : the paradox of Embeddedness. Administration Science Quarterly, 42(1), 35-67.
- Uzzi, B. (1999). Embeddedness in the making of financial capital : how social relations and networks benefit firms seeking financing. American Sociological Review, 64(4), 481-505.
- Wamba, H. et Tchamanbé-Djine, L. (2002). Information financière et politique d’offre de crédit bancaire aux PME : cas du Cameroun. Revue internationalePME, 15(1), 87-114.
- Weinstein, D.E. et Yafeh, Y. (1998). On the costs of a bank-centered financial system : evidence from the changing main bank relations in Japan. The Journal of Finance, 53(2), 635-672.
- Williamson, O.E. (1985). The economic institutions of capitalism : firms, markets and relational contracting. New York, The Free Press.
- Woolcock, M. (1999, avril). Social capital : the state of the nation (rapport présenté à un séminaire multidisciplinaire sur social capital : global and local perspectives). Helsinki, Finlande.
- Wu, W. et Choi, W.L. (2004). Transaction cost, social capital and firm’s synergy creation in chinese business networks : an integrative approach. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 21(3), 325-343.
- Zambaldi, F., Aranha, F., Lopes, H. et Politi,R. (2011). Credit granting to small firms : a Brazilian case. Journal of Business Research, 30(3), 309-315.