The “Ottawa Formula” and Transatlantic Relations Politics and Diplomacy of the “Two-Plus-Four” Negotiations

The decision to structure the international diplomacy for negotiating the external dimensions of German unification as a „Two-Plus-Four“ forum was reached in Ottawa at the sidelines of the first joint conference of NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries on the issue of “Open Skies”, i.e. the question of aerial observation, in February 1990. At the traditional “Deutschland breakfast” that preceded NATO conferences, Foreign Ministers Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Roland Dumas, James A. Baker, and Douglas Hurd agreed on the framework for future negotiations on Germany. Baker and Genscher then individually met with Soviet Foreign Ministers Shevardnadze. At the end of this conference, on February 13 the so-called “Ottawa formula” (Genscher/Gorbachev 1990) was announced to the press. It simply stated that the foreign ministers of the six countries had agreed that the foreign ministers of the FRG and the GDR would meet with the French, British, Soviet, and American foreign ministers “to discuss external aspects of the establishment of German unity, including the issues of security of the neighboring states.” And it was announced that “preliminary discussions at the official level will begin shortly” (Zelikow/Rice 1995: 193; see also Elbe 2010). After the Ottawa-formula was released to the press Canada, as well as the Netherlands, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Belgium, and Spain criticized the plan because their governments had not known that this forum was being created. Everybody felt somehow left out. The situation was particularly embarrassing for the Canadians, who were, after all, hosting the conference. “Most NATO partners felt steamrolled by the events” reported Frank Elbe who was present at the meeting in his function as Head of the Executive Staff of the Federal Foreign Minister’s Office (1988 to 1991). And Elbe continues that “the Canadian hosts complained that history had been made in their capital and they had not been informed in advance.” Robert Blackwill, the National Security Council official most closely involved with German unification, and also present at that historic Ottawa meeting quoted a Canadian who said: “We felt like a piano player on the ground floor of a whorehouse, who has some sort of idea of what is going on in the upper floors” (Elbe 2010: 39). Prime Minister Brian Mulroney described the Canadian role at this meeting as that of “friendly bystanders” (MacDonald 2010). Whereas Condoleezza Rice and Philip Zelikow claim that Prime Minister Mulroney was not very helpful at the meeting because he seconded Shevardnaze by indicating that “he (Mulroney) did not see how the EC could accommodate the weight of a united Germany” (Zelikow/Rice 1995: 192). Actually Brian Mulroney supported reunification but had some reservations. He was concerned “that unification for Germany appears to be fuelled not just by the legitimate desire of the two states to come together but by the total collapse of the economy of one state and the economic strength of another”. And he openly confronted West German Foreign Minister Genscher with his assessment that West Germany is “not really talking about a merger”, but that “this is a takeover” (McGrath/Milnes 2009: 41). Starting off with a reconstruction of the chain of events that finally led to the signing of the “Two-Plus-Four” Treaty on September 12, 1990 this article will discuss the diplomacy and politics of German unification by focusing especially on the international organizations and institutions that were primarily affected by it. This also allows talking about Canada’s role in the process, since Canada was a member of the United Nations, of NATO and of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). It is only in this indirect way that we can learn something about Canada’s strategic priorities, …