Résumés
Abstract
A moral theory T is esoteric if and only if T is true but there are some individuals who, by the lights of T itself, ought not to embrace T, where to embrace T is to believe T and rely upon it in practical deliberation. Some philosophers hold that esotericism is a strong, perhaps even decisive, reason to reject a moral theory. However, proponents of this objection have often supposed its force is obvious and have said little to articulate it. I defend a version of this objection—namely, that, in light of the strongly first-personal epistemology of benefit and burden, esoteric theories fail to justify the allocation of benefits and burdens to which moral agents would be subject under such theories. Because of the holistic nature of moral-theory justification, this conclusion in turn implies that the entirety of a moral theory must be open to public scrutiny in order for the theory to be justified. I conclude by answering several objections to my account of the esotericism objection.
Résumé
Une théorie morale T est ésotérique si et seulement si T est vraie, mais il y a des individus qui, à la lumière de T même, ne doivent pas embrasser T, où embrasser T signifie croire et s’appuyer sur lui dans des délibérations pratiques. Certains philosophes considèrent que l’ésotérisme est une raison forte, voire décisive, de rejeter une théorie morale. Cependant, les partisans de cette objection ont souvent supposé que sa force était évidente et ont peu parlé pour l’exprimer. Je défends une version de cette objection, à savoir que, à la lumière de la première épistémologie personnelle bienfaisante des avantages et des inconvénients, les théories ésotériques ne justifient pas l’allocation des avantages et des inconvénients aux agents moraux qui seraient assujettis à leurs théories. En raison de la nature holistique de la justification de la théorie morale, cette conclusion implique à son tour que l’ensemble d’une théorie morale doit être soumis à l’examen public afin que la théorie soit justifiée. Je termine en répondant à plusieurs objections à mon compte de l’objection ésotérique.
Parties annexes
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