Résumés
Abstract
Recent evidence indicates that income and wealth inequality have been increasing, while the tax-transfer system has not responded. If anything, progressivity has decreased and capital income has become increasingly sheltered. Arguably, a significant amount of the increase in inequality reflects windfall gains or rents to various taxpayers, both individuals and firms. Recent proposals by the Mirrlees Review, drawing on lessons from optimal tax analysis, include some ways that the tax system can be reformed to tax windfall gains, albeit in a context limited by distribution-neutrality. We propose a tax reform agenda for Québec and Canada that can both improve efficiency and fairness. Our proposals contrast with those of the Québec Taxation Review Committee.
In our view, there is a strong case for taxing capital income as part of redistribution policy, in part because capital income includes unexpected gains, or rents, that accrue disproportionately to high-income persons. Our preferred treatment of capital income at the personal level would include the following. First, strict limits on tax sheltering should be maintained to ensure that some capital income is taxable for high-income persons. Contribution limits should be more generous for RRSPs than for TFSAs given that unexpected returns are taxed under the former but exempted under the latter. Second, capital gains on housing, above some lifetime exemption level, should be taxed. Third, a tax on large inheritances should be introduced to reduce the intergenerational transmission of wealth inequality and promote equality of opportunity.
At the corporate level, we recommend a fundamental change in the role that the system is meant to play. The current system, which is designed to serve as a withholding device for the personal tax by taxing shareholder income at source, should be replaced by a cash-flow tax system, or equivalently a rent-based corporate tax. This recommendation is motivated by the fact that the corporate tax on normal risk-adjusted return is largely shifted to labour given the high degree of international capital mobility. Moreover, the withholding role of the corporate tax has become unnecessary given that most capital income is now sheltered from the personal tax. Among the different cash-flow equivalent taxes available, the allowance for corporate equity tax would be the easiest to implement. It would simply involve adding a deduction for the cost of equity finance at the risk-free interest rate in addition to the deductions for interest and depreciation that currently exist. The adoption of a cash-flow equivalent tax would mitigate the disincentives for investment, innovation and growth that the current system imposes. As well, it would eliminate the incentive to finance investment by debt.
In addition, we argue that the integration of the personal and corporate income taxes has become largely unnecessary. Therefore, we recommend eliminating the dividend tax credit and the preferential treatment of capital gains. Doing so would also offset the revenue cost of adopting a rent-based corporate tax.
The same tax base should apply to incorporated and unincorporated businesses. The small business deduction should be maintained, given that it compensates for the imperfect refundability of tax losses for bankrupt firms. However, cumulative lifetime limits should be adopted so firms are not rewarded for staying small.
Increased income inequality calls for more progressivity of the tax system both at the top and bottom of the income distribution. This could be achieved by adding a new tax bracket for the top decile of taxpayers and making all tax credits refundable.
To maintain some harmonization, these reforms should ideally be adopted by both orders of government. However, several proposals could be adopted unilaterally by the Québec government with relatively little difficulty.
Résumé
Une vision alternative de réforme fiscale pour le Québec. – L’évidence empirique récente indique que les inégalités de revenu et de richesse ont augmenté sans être compensées par des changements au système d’imposition et de transferts aux particuliers. La progressivité du système fiscal est limitée et les abris fiscaux s’appliquant aux revenus du capital se sont accentués. Une partie importante des inégalités croissantes sont le résultat de rentes économiques à divers contribuables, particuliers ou entreprises. Le récent rapport Mirrlees, qui s’appuie sur l’état des connaissances en matière de fiscalité optimale, a proposé un certain nombre de réformes fiscales visant l’imposition des rentes, quoique dans un contexte de neutralité distributive. Nous proposons un programme de réformes fiscales pour le Québec et le Canada qui peut à la fois améliorer l’efficacité et l’équité. Plusieurs de nos propositions diffèrent de façon importante de celles de la Commission d’examen sur la fiscalité québécoise.
À notre avis, la taxation des revenus du capital demeure très pertinente. Elle constitue un complément aux politiques de redistribution, notamment parce que les revenus du capital incluent des rentes économiques bénéficiant de façon disproportionnée aux individus à revenus élevés. Au niveau de l’imposition des particuliers, nous privilégions un système de taxation des revenus du capital comportant les éléments suivants. Premièrement, les abris fiscaux tels que le régime enregistré d’épargne retraite (REER) et les comptes d’épargne libre d’impôts (CÉLI) devraient être limités de façon à s’assurer qu’une partie importante des revenus de capital des individus à revenus élevés soit imposable. Il est préférable que les plafonds de contribution soient plus généreux pour le REER que pour les CELI étant donné que les gains inattendus et les rentes économiques sont imposables dans le cadre du REER mais ne le sont pas dans le cadre des CELI. Deuxièmement, les gains en capital sur les résidences principales, au-delà d’une exonération cumulative maximale, devraient être imposables. Troisièmement, un impôt sur les successions, qui surpassent un seuil d’exonération relativement élevé, devrait être introduit de façon à réduire la transmission des inégalités de richesse entre générations et de favoriser l’égalité des opportunités.
Nous recommandons un changement fondamental au rôle joué par le système d’imposition des entreprises. À notre avis, le système actuel, qui agit principalement comme mécanisme de retenue à la source de façon à éviter que les actionnaires puissent reporter ultérieurement le paiement d’impôt sur les profits, devrait être remplacé par un impôt sur les flux monétaires des entreprises, ou de façon équivalente, un impôt sur les rentes économiques. Cette recommandation est notamment justifiée par le fait que l’incidence de l’impôt qui s’applique sur le rendement normal du capital ajusté pour le niveau de risque est supportée en grande partie par la main-d’oeuvre étant donné la forte mobilité internationale des capitaux. De plus, le mécanisme de retenue à la source que constitue le système d’imposition actuel n’est plus requis dans la mesure où une proportion élevée des revenus du capital bénéficie d’abris fiscaux. Plusieurs types d’impôts sur les flux monétaires des entreprises, ou sur les rentes économiques, sont équivalents. Parmi ceux-ci, le système qui consiste à accorder une déduction fiscale pour fonds propres au taux d’intérêt exempt de prime de risque, en plus des déductions pour paiements d’intérêts et pour amortissement, pourrait être mis en place sans difficulté. L’adoption d’un impôt sur les rentes économiques permettrait d’atténuer les effets dissuasifs du système actuel sur l’investissement, l’innovation et la croissance. L’incitation à financer les investissements par emprunts serait également éliminée.
De plus, nous croyons que les mesures d’intégration des systèmes d’imposition des particuliers et des entreprises ne sont plus nécessaires. Ainsi, nous recommandons l’abolition du crédit d’impôt pour dividendes et de la déduction pour gain en capital. Ces mesures permettront également de compenser l’effet de l’adoption d’une déduction fiscale pour fonds propres sur les revenus du gouvernement.
Les entreprises incorporées et non incorporées devraient être imposées de la même façon. La déduction pour petite entreprise devrait être maintenue. Elle permet notamment de compenser pour le traitement fiscal asymétrique des profits et des pertes, particulièrement dans le cas des entreprises qui déclarent faillite. Cependant, une limite cumulative à vie devrait être introduite, ce qui permettrait d’atténuer l’effet dissuasif sur la croissance des petites entreprises.
La croissance des inégalités justifie un niveau accru de progressivité dans le système d’imposition des particuliers, autant au bas qu’au haut de la distribution des revenus. Pour ce faire, nous proposons d’ajouter un palier d’imposition s’appliquant au décile supérieur des revenus et de rendre remboursables tous les crédits d’impôts.
Pour assurer l’harmonisation des systèmes d’imposition, il serait préférable que les réformes proposées soient adoptées par les deux ordres de gouvernement. Cependant, plusieurs d’entre elles pourraient aisément être mise en place unilatéralement par le gouvernement du Québec.
Parties annexes
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