Lois et normes : les enseignements de l’économie comportementale

Fluet, Claude; Galbiati, Roberto

doi:https://doi.org/10.7202/1039876ar

Andreoni, J. (1995), « Warm-glow versus Cold-prickle: The effects of positive and negative framing on cooperation in experiments », Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110 : 1-21.

10.2307/2118508 Google Scholar

Andreoni, J. et B. D. Bernheim (2009), « Social Image and the 50-50 Norm », Econometrica, 77 : 1607-1636.

10.3982/ECTA7384 Google Scholar

Andreoni, J., E. Erard et J. Feinstein (1998), « Tax Compliance », Journal of Economic Literature, 36 : 1503-1575.

10.1007/s11238-013-9405-0 Google Scholar

Angelova, V., O. Armentier, G. Attanasi, Y. Hiriart (2013), « Relative Performance of Liability Rules: Experimental Evidence », Theory and Decision, DOI 10.1007/s11238-013-9405-0.

10.1007/s11238-013-9405-0 Google Scholar

Ariely, D., A. Bracha et S. Meier (2009), « Doing Good or Doing Well? Image Motivation and Monetary Incentives in Behaving Prosocially », American Economic Review, 99 : 544-555.

10.1257/aer.99.1.544 Google Scholar

Becker, G. S. (1968), « Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach », Journal of Political Economy, 76 : 169-217.

10.1086/259394 Google Scholar

Bénabou, R. et J. Tirole (2006), « Incentives and Prosocial Behavior », American Economic Review, 96 : 1652-1678.

10.1257/aer.96.5.1652 Google Scholar

Bénabou, R. et J. Tirole (2011), « Laws and Norms », NBER Working Paper 17579.

10.1257/aer.90.1.166 Google Scholar

Bochet, O., T. Page et L. Putterman (2006), « Communication and Punishment in Voluntary Contribution Experiments », Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 60 : 11-26.

10.1016/j.jebo.2003.06.006 Google Scholar

Bohnet, I. et R. Cooter (2003), « Expressive Law: Framing or Equilibrium Selection », Working Paper Series 03-046, John F. Kennedy School of Government.

10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.06.002 Google Scholar

Bolton, G. et A. Ockenfels (2000), « ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity and Competition », The American Economic Review, 90 : 166-193.

10.1257/aer.90.1.166 Google Scholar

Bowles, S. et S. Polanía (2012), « Economic Incentives and Social Preferences: Substitutes or Complements? » Journal of Economic Literature, 50 : 368-425.

10.1257/jel.50.2.368 Google Scholar

Buckley, E. et R. Croson (2006), « Income and wealth heterogeneity in the voluntary provision of linear public goods », Journal of Public Economics, 90 : 935-955.

10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.06.002 Google Scholar

Carpenter, J. P. (2007), « The demand for punishment », Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 62 : 522-542.

10.1016/j.jebo.2005.05.004 Google Scholar

Carpenter, J. P. et P. H. Matthews (2012), « Norm enforcement: Anger, indignation or reciprocity », Journal of the European Economic Association, 10 : 555-572.

10.1111/j.1542-4774.2011.01059.x Google Scholar

Chan, K. S., S. Mestelman, R. Moir R. et R. A. Muller (1999), « Heterogeneity and the voluntary provision of public goods », Experimental Economics, 2 : 5-30.

10.1007/s10683-010-9257-1 Google Scholar

Charness, G. et M. Dufwenberg (2006), « Promises and Partnership Tests », Econometrica, 74 : 1579-1601.

10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00719.x Google Scholar

Charness, G. et M. Dufwenberg (2010), « Bare Promises: An experiment », Economics Letters, 107 : 281-283.

10.1016/j.econlet.2010.02.009 Google Scholar

Charness, G. et M. Rabin (2002), « Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests », Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117 : 817-869.

10.1162/003355302760193904 Google Scholar

Chaudhuri, A. (2011), « Sustaining Cooperation in Laboratory Public Goods Experiments: A Selective Survey of the Literature », Experimental Economics, 14 : 47-83.

10.1007/s10683-010-9257-1 Google Scholar

Chaudhuri, A., S. Graziano et P. Maitra (2006), « Social Learning and Norms in a Public Goods Experiment with Intergenerational Advice », Review of Economic Studies, 73 : 357-380.

10.1111/j.1467-937X.2006.0379.x Google Scholar

Cherry, T. L., S. Kroll et J. Shogren (2005), « The impact of endowment heterogeneity and origin on public good contributions: Evidence from the lab », Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 57 : 357-365.

10.1016/j.jebo.2003.11.010 Google Scholar

Cooter, R. (1998), « Expressive Law and Economics », Journal of Legal Studies, 27 : 585-608.

10.1086/468036 Google Scholar

Croson, R. et M. Marks (2001), « The Effect of Recommended Contributions in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods », Economic Inquiry, 39 : 238-249.

10.1111/j.1465-7295.2001.tb00063.x Google Scholar

Dal Bó, E. et P. Dal Bó (2014), « Do the Right Thing: The Effect of Moral Suasion on Cooperation », Journal of Public Economics, 117 : 28-38.

10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.05.002 Google Scholar

Dal Bó, P., A. Foster et L. Putterman (2010), « Institutions and Behavior: Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Democracy », American Economic Review, 100 : 2205-2229.

10.1257/aer.100.5.2205 Google Scholar

Daughety, A. et J. Reinganum (2010), « Public Good, Social Pressure and the Choice Between Privacy and Publicity », American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2 : 191-222.

10.1257/mic.2.2.191 Google Scholar

Deffains, B. et C. Fluet (2013), « Legal Liability when Individuals Have Moral Concerns », Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 29 : 930-955.

10.1093/jleo/ews002 Google Scholar

Deffains, B. et C. Fluet (2014), « Social Norms and Legal Design: Strict Liability versus Fault-Based Offences », document de travail.

10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00644.x Google Scholar

Diamond, P. (2002), « Integrating Punishment and Efficiency Concerns in Punitive Damages for Reckless Disregard of Risks to Others », Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 18 :117-139.

10.1093/jleo/18.1.117 Google Scholar

Drago, F., R. Galbiati et P. Vertova (2009), « The Deterrent Effects of Prison: Evidence from a Natural Experiment », Journal of Political Economy, 117 : 257-280.

10.1086/599286 Google Scholar

Durkheim, E. [1893] (2004), De la division du travail social, Presses Universitaires de France.

10.1038/415137a Google Scholar

Eber, N. (2006), Le dilemme du prisonnier, Éd. La Découverte.

10.1016/S1090-5138(04)00005-4 Google Scholar

Ellickson, R. (1998), « Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms », Journal of Legal Studies, 27 : 537-552.

10.1086/468033 Google Scholar

Ellingsen, T. et M. Johannesson (2004), « Promises, Threats and Fairness », Economic Journal, 114 : 397-420.

10.1111/j.1468-0297.2004.00214.x Google Scholar

Falk A., E. Fehr et U. Fischbacher (2005), « Driving Forces behind informal sanctions », Econometrica, 73 : 2017-2030.

10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00644.x Google Scholar

Falk, A. et U. Fischbacher (2006), « A Theory of Reciprocity », Games and Economic Behavior, 54 : 293-315.

10.1016/j.geb.2005.03.001 Google Scholar

Fehr, E. et S. Gächter (2000), « Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments », American Economic Review, 90 : 980-994.

10.1257/aer.90.4.980 Google Scholar

Fehr, E. et S. Gächter (2002), « Altruistic Punishment in Humans », Nature, 415 : 137-140.

10.1038/415137a Google Scholar

Fehr, E. et U. Fischbacher (2004), « Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms », Evolution and Human Behavior, 25 : 63-87.

10.1016/S1090-5138(04)00005-4 Google Scholar

Fehr, E. et K. Schmidt (1999), « A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation », Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114 : 817-868.

10.1162/003355399556151 Google Scholar

Feld, L. et R. Tyran (2002), « Tax Evasion and Voting: An Experimental Analysis », Kyklos, 55 : 197-221.

10.1111/1467-6435.00183 Google Scholar

Fischbacher, U. et S. Gächter (2010), « Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Goods », American Economic Review, 100 : 541-556.

10.1257/aer.100.1.541 Google Scholar

Fischbacher, U., S. Gächter et E. Fehr (2001), « Are People Conditionally Cooperative? Evidence from a Public Goods Experiment », Economics Letters, 71 : 397-404.

10.1016/S0165-1765(01)00394-9 Google Scholar

Funk, P. (2007), « Is there an Expressive Function of Law? An Empirical Analysis of Voting Laws with Symbolic Fines », American Law and Economics Review, 9 : 135-159.

10.1093/aler/ahm002 Google Scholar

Funk, P. (2010), « Social Incentives and Voter Turnout: Theory and Evidence », Journal of the European Economic Association, 8 : 1077-1103.

10.1111/j.1542-4774.2010.tb00548.x Google Scholar

Gächter, S., B. Herrmann et C. Thöni (2010), « Culture and Cooperation », Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 365 : 2651-2661.

10.1098/rstb.2010.0135 Google Scholar

Galbiati, R. et P. Vertova (2008), « Obligations and Cooperative Behavior in Public Good Games », Games and Economics Behavior, 64 : 146-170.

10.1016/j.geb.2007.09.004 Google Scholar

Galbiati, R. et P. Vertova (2014), « How Laws Affect Behavior: Obligations, Incentives and Cooperative Behavior », International Review of Law and Economics, 38 : 48-57.

10.1016/j.irle.2014.03.001 Google Scholar

Glaeser, E., B. Sacerdote et J. A. Scheinkman (1996), « Crime and Social Interaction », Quarterly Journal of Economic, 111 : 507-548.

10.2307/2946686 Google Scholar

Guiso, L., P. Sapienza et L. Zingales (2014), « Long Term Persistence », NBER working paper no 14278.

10.1111/j.1467-9779.2011.01515.x Google Scholar

Harel, A. et A. Klement (2007), « The Economics of Stigma: Why More Detection of Crime May Result in Less Stigmatization », Journal of Legal Studies, 36 : 355-378.

10.1086/511893 Google Scholar

Hay, J. R. et A. Shleifer (1998), « Private Enforcement of Public Law: A Theory of Legal Reform », American Economic Review, 33 : 797-805.

10.1257/000282803321455359 Google Scholar

Hopfensitz, A.et E. Reuben (2009), « The Importance of Emotions for the Effectiveness of Social Punishment », Economic Journal, 119 : 1534-1559.

10.2307/1073827 Google Scholar

Isaac, R. M. et J. M. Walker (1988), « Communication and Free-Riding Behavior: The Voluntary Contribution Mechanism », Economic Inquiry, 26 : 585-608.

10.1111/j.1465-7295.1988.tb01519.x Google Scholar

Jacquemet, N., L. Luchini, J. F. Shogren et A. Zylbersztejn (2014), « Coordination with Communication Under Oath », document de travail.

10.1007/s10683-007-9171-3 Google Scholar

Joffily, M., D. Masclet, C. Noussair et M. C. Villeval (2014), « Emotions, Sanctions and cooperation », Southern Economic Journal, 80 : 102-128.

10.4284/0038-4038-2012.067 Google Scholar

Kahan, D. (1997), « Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence », Virginia Law Review, 83 : 349-395.

10.2307/1073780 Google Scholar

Kahan, D. (1998), « Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime », Journal of Legal Studies, 27 : 609-622.

10.1086/468037 Google Scholar

Keser, C. et F. van Winden (2000). « Conditional cooperation and voluntary contributions to public goods », Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 102 : 23-39.

10.1111/1467-9442.00182 Google Scholar

Kohlberg, E. et J. F. Mertens (1986), « On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria », Econometrica, 54 : 1003-1038.

10.2307/1912320 Google Scholar

Kube, S. et C. Traxler (2011), « The Interaction of Legal and Social Norm Enforcement, » Journal of Public Economic Theory, 13 : 639-660.

10.1111/j.1467-9779.2011.01515.x Google Scholar

Langlais, E., Y. Gabuthy et N. Jacquemet (2009), « Analyse économique de la criminalité », in B. Deffains et E. Langlais (éds), Analyse économique du droit, De Boeck.

10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198253631.001.0001 Google Scholar

Markussen, T., L. Putterman et J.-R. Tyran (2014), « Self-Organization for Collective Action : An Experimental Study of Voting on Sanction Regimes », Review of Economic Studies, 81 : 301-324.

10.1093/restud/rdt022 Google Scholar

Masclet, D., C. Noussair, S. Tucker et M. C. Villeval (2003), « Monetary and Nonmonetary Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism, » American Economic Review, 93 : 366-380.

10.1257/000282803321455359 Google Scholar

McAdams, R. (2000), « A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law », Virginia Law Review, 86 : 1649-1728.

10.2307/1073827 Google Scholar

McAdams, R. et J. Nadler (2005), « Testing the focal point theory of legal compliance: the effect of a third-party expression in an experimental hawk/dove game », Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 2 : 87-123.

10.1111/j.1740-1461.2005.00032.x Google Scholar

McAdams, R. H. et E. B. Rasmusen (2007), « Norms in Law and Economics », in Polinsky, M. et S. Shavell (éds), Handbook of Law and Economics, Vol. 1, North Holland, p. 1573-1618.

10.1086/511896 Google Scholar

Nikiforakis, N. et H. Normann (2008), « A comparative statics analysis of punishment in public good experiments », Experimental Economics, 11 : 358-369.

10.1007/s10683-007-9171-3 Google Scholar

Nyborg, K. (2003), « The Impact of Public Policy on Social and Moral Norms: Some Examples », Journal of Consumer Policy, 26 : 259-277.

10.1023/A:1025622223207 Google Scholar

Nyborg, K. et M. Rege (2003), « On Social Norms: The Evolution of Considerate Smoking Behavior », Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 52 : 323-340.

10.1016/S0167-2681(03)00031-3 Google Scholar

Ostrom, E. (2000), « Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms », Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14 : 137-158.

10.1257/jep.14.3.137 Google Scholar

Ostrom, E., J. M. Walker et R. Gardner (1992), « Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance is Possible », American Political Science Review, 86 : 404-417.

10.2307/1964229 Google Scholar

Polinsky, M. et S. Shavell (2000), « The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law », Journal of Economic Literature, 38 : 45-76.

10.1257/jel.38.1.45 Google Scholar

Polinsky, M. et S. Shavell (2007), « The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law », in A.M. Polinsky et S. Shavell (éds), Handbook of Law and Economics, Vol. 1, Amsterdam, North Holland, chap. 6.

Google Scholar

Posner, E. (2000a), Law and Social Norms, Harvard, Harvard University Press.

10.3917/dec.eber.2006.01 Google Scholar

Posner, E. (2000b), « Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance », Virginia Law Review, 86 : 1781-1819.

10.2307/1073829 Google Scholar

Rabin, M. (1993), « Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory », American Economic Review, 83 : 1281-1302.

Google Scholar

Raz, J. (1980), The Concept of a Legal System, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198253631.001.0001 Google Scholar

Rege, M. et K. Telle (2004), « The Impact of Social Approval and Framing on Cooperation in Public Good Situations », Journal of Public Economics, 88 : 1625-1644.

10.1016/S0047-2727(03)00021-5 Google Scholar

Riedel, N. et H. Schildberg-Hörisch (2013), « Asymmetric Obligations », Journal of Economic Psychology, 35 : 67-80.

10.1016/j.joep.2012.12.003 Google Scholar

Shavell, S. (1997), « The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and Social Motive to Use the Legal System », Journal of Legal Studies, 26 : 575-612.

10.1086/468008 Google Scholar

Sunstein, C. R. (1996), « On the Expressive Function of Law », University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 144 : 2021-2053.

10.2307/3312647 Google Scholar

Tyler, T. (1990), Why People Obey the Law, Yale University Press, Yale.

Google Scholar

Tyran, J. R.et L. Feld (2006), « Achieving Compliance when Legal Sanctions are Non-Deterrent », Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 108 : 135-156.

Google Scholar

Vanberg, C. (2008), « Why Do People Keep Their Promises? An Experimental Test of Two Explanations », Econometrica, 76 : 467-1480.

Google Scholar

Villeval, M.-C. (2012), « Contributions aux biens publics et préférences sociales : apports récents de l’économie comportementale », Revue économique, 3 : 389-420.

10.1111/j.1467-9442.2006.00444.x Google Scholar

Wilson, J. Q. et G. L. Kelling (1982), « Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety », The Atlantic, 249(3) : 29–38.

10.3982/ECTA7673 Google Scholar

Zasu, Y. (2007), « Sanctions by Social Norms and the Law: Substitutes or Complements? » Journal of Legal Studies, 36 : 379-396.

10.1086/511896 Google Scholar

Zizzo, D. (2010), « Experimenter Demand Effects in Economic Experiments », Experimental Economics, 13 : 75-98.

10.1007/s10683-009-9230-z Google Scholar