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FISH, FORTS AND FINANCE:
THE POLITICS OF FRENCH CONSTRUCTION
AT PLACENTIA, 1699-1710*

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National Museum of Man

Following English attacks on Placentia in 1690 and again in 1693, the French government decided that the annual fishing fleets from the Atlantic ports of France required at least one safe haven in Newfoundland. The minister of marine ordered new fortifications in stone and mortar at Placentia to replace the stockades and earthworks hurriedly erected after the raid of 1690. Had he been able to assign a strong naval force to the area, the existing fortifications, renewed whenever necessary and combined with Placentia's excellent natural defences, might have sufficed. The minister, however, had no such option. Despite the technical excellence which the navy had reached during his reign, Louis XIV refused to give priority to its reconstruction following severe losses in the war at sea. His long preoccupation with European continental hegemony took precedence over every other economic and military consideration.

Among France's colonial resources, the Newfoundland cod fishery vied for importance with Caribbean sugar, the slave trade, the fur trade and the Levant commerce of the Mediterranean ports. The merchants of ports like Granville, St. Malo, Nantes, Bayonne and St. Jean de Luz had been developing steady markets in the Catholic countries of southern Europe for a meat substitute that after preservation retained its flavour and texture better than other fish. It was vital to the prosperity of the French ports that they, rather than their aggressive English rivals, should continue to satisfy this high demand for fish that the produce of local seas could not meet. And it had become commonplace to assume that the fisheries provided the best type of "nursery for seamen" the navy might expect to find.

The small colony founded at Placentia in 1660 to establish French authority over part of the Newfoundland coast was almost entirely at the mercy of the annual fishing fleets for its survival, since government attempts to broaden its economic base and to control vital supplies from France were relatively unsuccessful. Placentia was by no means a useful base for all the metropolitan fishing vessels at all times. Many

of those engaged in the so-called “green” fishery (in which the catch was salted without being dried) tried to make two transatlantic voyages a year, without calls at the colonial capital. Some specialists in the “dry” fishery, such as the men of St. Malo who worked chiefly on the north coast of Newfoundland, preferred bases closer to their field of operations. The merchants who did send ships into Placentia exploited their monopoly of manufactures, of the labour supply and of agricultural produce by manipulating the market at the expense of the settlers.¹ During the War of the League of Augsburg the government experimented with exclusive supply contracts between the Crown and important merchants of Nantes, St. Malo, Granville and the Basque ports. The terms varied, but they had in common a monopoly of the supply of goods for the settlers at Placentia, in return for which the contractors undertook to pay the salaries of the officers and part of the garrison, to provide supplies and equipment for the fortifications, to raise and clothe some recruits, and to furnish, pay and feed a given number of men, including craftsmen, for work on the fortifications during the fishing season. The contract changed hands frequently because either the minister or the contractor became dissatisfied with the terms; and after the war ended in 1697 no merchant would agree to this kind of contract.²

The relative success of the French offensives during the last few years of the war tended to overshadow the slow progress of construction and the extent to which the government had been relying on the contractors for men and materials. Nevertheless, the aim of the minister continued to be permanent defences in masonry, in which French engineers excelled, and which had served France’s forces so well in Europe. Unfortunately for the success of the programme, the aim was not accompanied by decisiveness about the order of importance of various structures. Still less was it possible to raise the marine department’s place in the schedule of government priorities: at the close of the war, the annual expenditures for marine and colonies, which had varied during the war between 19.5 and 33.5 million *livres*, were reduced to 8.2 million. When Jérôme de Pontchartrain succeeded his father as minister of marine in 1699, he found his ministry so deprived of funds that he was forced to effect drastic economies everywhere.³ This was the origin of a decision to proceed with the construction at Placentia “little by little”,⁴ a method quite inappropriate to a climate where it was important to finish and to protect structures during the short building season, before the winter could take its toll.

Between 1690 and 1694 several stockade defences and earthworks had been built, including Fort Louis (the lower fort) at the narrows of Placentia harbour, a four-gun battery across the narrows from the fort, and a redoubt on a hill known as the *Gaillardin*. These served as the fortifications during the construction of the "permanent" masonry defences. A masonry powder magazine inside Fort Louis, begun in 1692, was not finished until 1700. The stone redoubt on a hill overlooking the lower fort, begun in 1693, and serviceable by the following year, became Fort Royal, known to the British as the "castle". Work on it was reported almost finished in 1701, but in fact it was never fully completed. Nevertheless, because of its dominant position, Fort Royal remained the best of Placentia's defences. Orders were given in 1694 to reconstruct Fort Louis in masonry as soon as possible, but after considerable discussion in 1700 and 1701 about whether the fort's seaward face should be in stone or in wood, and a gale in November, 1702 which almost completely destroyed the temporary wooden fort, construction in masonry began only in 1708. Fort Louis was never finished.⁵

This chronicle of relative failure may be attributed to a number of causes. The ministry of marine set an impossible task for the officers of the colony. On the one hand, the fortifications were to be constructed as quickly as possible; on the other, the shortage of funds would permit them to be done only piecemeal. Labour and materials must be of a high quality; yet the funds provided, combined with the methods of recruiting labour and procuring materials, could scarcely guarantee it. Nor were the officers of the colony completely blameless. Joseph de Monic,⁶ commandant from 1697 to 1702, and Daniel Auger de Subercase,⁷ governor from 1702 to 1706, both used masons and carpenters on the public payroll to build, repair and improve their own residences and stores.⁸

Differences between officers of the colony usually stemmed from overlapping authority, aggravated by personality clashes. Jacques l'Hermitte,⁹ a former member of the engineer corps sent to Placentia in 1695 to double as town major and engineer, directed the construction work throughout the whole period. An excellent cartographer and surveyor, he was considered by the Court a good enough engineer for the Placentia fortifications, although he did not receive the salary supplement usually paid to engineers working in a full-time capacity.¹⁰ His technical and administrative training frequently put him in conflict with the pragmatic decisions of the governor or commandant, his immediate superior. For example, Pastour de Costebelle,¹¹ governor from

1706 to 1713, felt justified in "borrowing" funds from the fortifications account, in an emergency, to pay for legitimate services not related to construction. L'Hermitte, exercising his prerogative as engineer, declined on one occasion in 1708 to approve the bills for payment. The ministry ruled that such "borrowing" might occur in emergencies, only if every item were clearly explained and justified in a separate voucher signed by the engineer.¹² In general, however, l'Hermitte found the management of construction accounts at Placentia quite unsatisfactory. The engineer should have had detailed control over the expenditures of funds on the various elements of the fortifications, but he did not.¹³ There is nothing to show that l'Hermitte suspected the financial commissary, Durand de la Garenne, of gross neglect or even dishonesty in this regard, but he did complain of not being kept informed of the funds allocated for the works. La Garenne, according to a recent biographical note, left his accounts "in utter confusion".¹⁴ We can confirm that there are no statements of funds actually spent on fortifications, apart from a special audit prepared in 1719, some four years after the death of La Garenne. Along with a passing mention in the general correspondence of 1709, this provides the only indication of sums *spent*, as distinguished from the sums *authorized* each year for the fortifications.¹⁵

Nevertheless, the funds authorized should give some idea of the intent of policy. In 1699, in accordance with the decision to build a little at a time, the amount authorized was raised from 1000 to 4000 *livres*.¹⁶ This was increased in 1700 to 10,000 *livres*.¹⁷ Slow work progress and the urgencies of war resulted in a doubling of this figure in 1703.¹⁸ Thereafter, 20,000 *livres* were authorized each year until the cession of 1713, although work was suspended after 1710.

These figures have meaning only in a larger context. Construction, like other public activity, was financed by means of credit. The bills of the marine department were paid by the treasurers-general of marine, private financiers who had purchased their offices in the expectation of profit. They were personally responsible for meeting the department's legitimate obligations, while free to invest to their own advantage the contents of their *caisses*, including any royal funds deposited there. Most accounts were paid with the treasurers' notes, or by their agents drawing bills of exchange on them. When the contents of their *caisses* were insufficient to discharge these notes and bills of exchange, they had to borrow funds personally on the money market.¹⁹

Yet government expenditures had doubled during a period of economic stagnation in France (1689-1697). Subsequent attempts to

increase crown revenues, or to pay current expenses by means of inflated currency, were not very successful.²⁰ Although military expenditures trebled between 1701 and 1714,²¹ the marine department's share averaged only about 14 or 15%; and the marine department's share of *all* government expenditures hovered about 8 or 9%.²² Nevertheless, the figures pertaining to funds authorized from 1701 to 1710 for the Placentia fortifications represent, on the average, some 35% of all the funds authorized for the colony. Comparable figures for Acadia and Canada are some 26% and 8% respectively.²³ This suggests a measure of priority among the three colonies for the fortifications of Placentia — and by implication for the protection of the Newfoundland fishery — provided we make due allowance for Placentia's exposure to English naval strength and for its tiny population.

A significant portion of the funds authorized each year was spent in France on materials and supplies, while labour was paid for at Placentia. Almost the total allocation of 10,000 *livres* for 1700 was absorbed by purchases in the French ports, leaving the colony in the unenviable state of not being able to pay its workers.²⁴ In 1701, after complaints, 6000 were allowed for supplies and the remaining 4000 assigned to the colony.²⁵ In 1707, 9100 of the 20,000 *livres* were credited to the King's stores at Rochefort, 3000 allocated to purchases there from private suppliers, and the remainder left for Placentia.²⁶ In 1708, 3200 were spent at Rochefort and the remaining 15,800 allocated to Placentia.²⁷ The shortage of expenditure statements makes it impossible to measure how many of these credits actually reached the colony. Costebelle implies that no funds for the fortifications arrived from 1706 to 1709,²⁸ but this is far from certain. In 1707, in fact, the allocation was overspent by 7053 *livres*.²⁹ During 1709, about 6350 *livres* were spent in the colony:³⁰ presumably, some 13,650 were used up in France for materials and supplies. In 1710, expenditures exceeded funds provided by 26,240 *livres*,³¹ but the debit could have been applied later against the 20,000 *livres* authorized for each of the three years 1711, 1712 and 1713, when apparently no work was done. However, the case of Durand de la Garenne makes one wonder how much of that money was actually spent on the fortifications.

Whether it pertained to funds, material or labour, the administrative problem of supply was the key to the success or failure of the construction programme. As Pastour de Costebelle summarized the situation after assuming the governorship of the colony in 1706,

lorsqu'on a eu de la chaux on a manqué de pierre et d'ouvriers; présentement que nous avons des ouvriers et de la pierre, nous manquons d'argent et de chaux . . .³²

And thus it continued until work was suspended.

Labour had to be recruited in France, since Placentia had practically none, and Canada had none to spare. In addition to unskilled workers, the colony required such members of the building trades as stonemasons, stonecutters, brickmakers, tilers, sawyers, carpenters, joiners and limeburners. Stonecutters, who could double as stonemasons, were in greatest demand, with stonemasons in second place. In the western ports of France, where recruiting took place, there seems to have been neither a marked shortage of craftsmen nor a significant surplus; but the men were reluctant to go abroad, particularly to colonies such as Placentia, which was isolated; where the climate was said to be uninviting; and where the cost of living was notoriously high. Data on wages, both in France and at Placentia, are extremely scarce, but Goubert suggests that masons in France at this time might expect, at the most, 30 *sols* a day, or about 37 *livres*, 10 *sols* a month, presumably without board.³³ What little evidence we have of wages paid at Placentia indicates that the rate for stonecutters and masons ranged from 20 to 50 *livres* a month, plus food, depending on the qualifications of the individual. In 1704, two carpenters and one mason were paid 40 apiece, while another mason received 45.³⁴ In 1708, among a group of ten stonecutters and masons from the Basque ports, one was paid 50 *livres*, three received 40, one 35, three others 30 and two of them 20 *livres*. Rations were valued at 18 *sols*, 3 *deniers* a day.³⁵ The same year, six men of the same trades from St. Malo demanded 45 *livres* a month, plus board, as their price for working at Placentia.³⁶ In 1700, it was suggested that masons could be recruited at Bordeaux and Bayonne at a rate of 20 to 25 *livres* for each month worked at Placentia plus rations for the whole year.³⁷ These figures are far from conclusive, but they do not suggest that skilled workers might hope to make quick gains from either seasonal or year-round employment on the fortifications of Placentia.

In any event, it was primarily seasonal workers that were required. During the winter, timber could be hewn, stone cut, materials stockpiled and mortar prepared — but little else. On its meagre budget, the colony could not afford the year-round wages of many skilled craftsmen.

The materials required for the construction of the fortifications and other buildings included fieldstone, gathered locally and used for

most parts of the walls; freestone, cut to correct shapes and dimensions for frames, corners and other fine work; lime, to be mixed with sand for mortar; plaster, lumber, brick and tile. All these materials had to be procured and transported, where necessary, to the site. They also had to be moved around the site — in boats, or by men and animals.

Freestone was imported from France — usually from the valley of the Charente behind Rochefort — or from Canada; or was quarried near Placentia. One variety of Newfoundland stone was found to be extremely hard: so difficult to fashion that either the stonemasons' tools were in constant need of repair or else the engineer would stop using it entirely. A more suitable type was found in 1703.³⁸ The lime used in the mortar was made by baking limestone in a kiln and slaking the resulting quicklime. The slaked lime might be brought to the site, or limestone could be heated in a kiln at the site. There were three main sources of supply: Newfoundland, Canada and western France. The properties of the French stone were known, so most of that brought to Placentia provided good lime; by and large, the same could be said of that sent from Quebec. The Newfoundland stone was largely unknown: the engineer and his craftsmen had to experiment with it; they found some varieties produced satisfactory lime, but others tried were probably not limestone at all, because they reacted differently to intense heat.³⁹

The Court was willing to provide the necessary manpower and materials, but took no initiative in doing so: proposals had to come from the colony. Craftsmen could be recruited into the *Troupes de la Marine*, where they would be subject to military discipline, but paid wages for the months they worked at their trades. Alternatively, they might be recruited as civilians, seasonally or the year round. The Court might bring workers, materials, animals and equipment to Placentia on its own ships, or arrange to have them brought out on merchant vessels at the merchants' or at the King's expense. It could recruit civilian workers, or expect the merchants to recruit them. It could pay their wages and provide their rations, or it could make the merchants responsible, at least for the wages. It might provide building materials, such as limestone, or it might expect the merchants to provide them. Several of these solutions were tried, separately or in combination with one another. There are no discernible criteria for the decisions taken, except expediency, economy and an expressed desire to finish construction quickly.

Whenever the Court attempted to place responsibility on the owners of metropolitan fishing vessels for some form of contribution to the fortifications of Placentia, it invoked their own interest in having a secure base where they could take refuge from storms and enemies. "Vous pouvez les assurer," wrote Pontchartrain in 1700 of the merchants of St. Malo who had raised difficulties about carrying limestone as ballast on their ships, "que je n'ay nulle intention de leur faire de la peine et qu'au contraire je ne cherche qu'a leur faire plaisir et a leur pouvoir etablir des retraites certaines pour le temps de la guerre . . ."40 Since 1694, the Court had been trying to persuade shipowners to recruit civilian craftsmen for Placentia, to be sent there with some of the building materials they would have to use. Recruiting was so closely associated in the administrators' minds with the supply of materials, especially limestone, that the Court could decree in 1697 that the following season each of the Basque fishing vessels must carry either one mason or four barrels of quicklime.⁴¹

Regardless of the logic of that equation, it is clear that the marine department sought from the merchants who benefited from the Newfoundland fishery a significant contribution to the construction of the fortifications. It preferred goods and services to tax or excise revenue,⁴² since the former directly affected the building programme, whereas the latter might easily become lost in the morass of state finance. Theoretically the agents of the minister of marine could obtain obedience by threatening to withhold the annual permits authorizing the departure of ships for Newfoundland.⁴³ In practice, the balance of power was more precarious than that. At one moment, the Court would exert strong pressure on the merchants to conform to its policies; at another, it would draw back out of fear they might abandon the fishery for less burdensome areas of investment. And from Placentia itself, officials urged the minister to take a firm line with the merchants, whose threats, they said, were purely rhetorical, since the Newfoundland trade was too much to their advantage to be given up for less reliable areas.⁴⁴

From 1699 to about 1704, marine department officials from St. Jean de Luz to Granville were recruiting men of the building trades for military service at Placentia, without abandoning their efforts to have civilians recruited by the merchants. They met with only partial success. In 1700, after promising that all 29 recruits that year would be craftsmen, the metropolitan authorities could find only eight, of whom one was a stonecutter and four were masons.⁴⁵ As the war increased competition for military recruits,⁴⁶ the Court emphasized various

schemes for engaging civilians. One method was to hire them at Bayonne and Bordeaux at a rate of 20 to 25 *livres* for each month worked, retaining them at Placentia for two years and providing them with rations all year round. Like soldiers, they would be on hand throughout the whole construction season and not only from the arrival of the first ships to the departure of the last.⁴⁷

During the next few years, the disadvantage of having to feed and clothe these men for twelve months when they practised their trades for only six or seven, tended to outweigh the advantages. In 1705, the Court decided that the *armateurs* must hire the workers for the season as crew members, pay their wages, provide their upkeep, deliver them early to Placentia, and pick them up late for the return voyage. Each *terreneuvier* out of St. Malo, Granville, Nantes and Bayonne with a capacity exceeding 2500 quintals of cod, was to carry a mason in her crew.⁴⁸

The similar and related question of procuring building materials had its own peculiarities. Until some type of local limestone proved satisfactory, either lime or the stone had to be imported. Quantities of stone sent from Quebec as ballast were rarely large enough to satisfy Placentia's needs,⁴⁹ so the French ports remained the chief source of supply. Limestone, of course, was a bulky type of cargo, whereas quicklime was considered dangerous to handle,⁵⁰ and slaked lime was said after a long transatlantic voyage to have lost its utility for making mortar.⁵¹ Consequently, while significant quantities of lime were shipped in the last two forms,⁵² most shipments were made in limestone. Owners of the *terreneuviers* raised two main objections: their usual ballast was salt, of which they could never have enough for the preservation of the catch, so it was reduced by the amount of lime or limestone they had to carry for the fortifications; and many of their vessels, as we have seen, did not normally go to Placentia, so it was a waste of their time to call at that port.⁵³ (In 1701, as if to prove it, their ships deposited so much limestone in various outports that a year later, when it was finally brought to Placentia after much effort, there was enough for the new season's work.)⁵⁴ Since both of these objections seemed valid, the minister of marine tried to take them into account. The limestone was to be procured and loaded first in order not to obstruct the loading of salt; if it was not, the captains could leave whenever they wished.⁵⁵ Only ships visiting the south coast of Newfoundland would be expected to deliver limestone to Placentia.

Completing the fortifications became more urgent as the war continued year after year, taking its toll of the Newfoundland fishery.⁵⁶ The merchants, unconvinced perhaps of the value of stone fortifications to restoring trade, stiffened their resistance to official pressure. Some were prepared to bear the cost of passage, upkeep and wages for craftsmen, if port officials recruited them.⁵⁷ Others thought only a certain number of ships should be obliged to sign them on.⁵⁸ A foreman from Placentia, recruiting in Bayonne in 1708, claimed the shipowners there tried to bribe him into saying he could find no men: in fact, he found fifty.⁵⁹ And in spite of a voluminous annual correspondence between the colony, the Court and the ports, the shipments of lime failed to end the chronic shortages. By 1708 the minister had abandoned his attempts at persuasion in favour of penalties: ships would not be permitted to leave their home ports for the fishing grounds unless they had loaded their quotas of limestone or were carrying craftsmen;⁶⁰ furthermore, heavy fines would be imposed on them for disobedience after warnings.⁶¹ The evidence suggests that some of these fines were imposed,⁶² but it is far from conclusive on the extent of the penalties. Coercion, short of commandeering merchant ships and crews, was not the answer to the problem of supply, for to prevent a ship from leaving its home port was to deprive Placentia of the food supplies it desperately needed.⁶³ Food shortages, due largely to English naval action, but partly to monopolistic practices, plagued the colony from 1701 to 1713.

As long as the problem of supply remained unsolved, Placentia's existence was precarious. Merchants who had profited from their investment in the French cod fishery became gradually less willing to assume responsibility for vital supplies, building materials and labour for the fortifications, except on their own terms. Those terms were presumably related directly to the degree of the risk involved, a risk that increased steadily as the King declined to accept the English naval challenge. Although subsequently, after the founding of *Ile Royale*, investment returned in strength to the fishery, during the War of the Spanish Succession it gave evidence of a marked falling-off. The motives of the investors, moreover, varied according to their regional interests in France, a factor which made some of them react less favourably than others at given times to government emphasis on the urgency of the construction programme. This was one reason for the government's vacillation between persuasion and attempted coercion. It took no steps to commandeer the merchantmen in the hope of ensuring the flow of supplies itself: Placentia and the fisheries, for all their import-

ance, did not loom quite large enough in the policy of the Court to justify the expense and to provoke further political alienation. Yet, over a ten-year period, when the treasury was very low, the government apparently dissipated about 200,000 livres repairing each summer the damage that winter gales, waves and frost had inflicted upon the previous summer's attempts to construct stone fortifications. In the face of signs that this policy was futile, the ministry maintained it as a gesture of confidence that the French fishery would survive. It was a form of state investment — however misplaced — in that survival. As it happened, the fishery did survive: and went on to a new period of greatness under the aegis of Louisbourg on Ile Royale.

In several respects, the problems faced in constructing the fortifications and public buildings of Louisbourg were those of Placentia writ large: funds diverted for other purposes, disagreement over cost-accounting procedures, the quest for suitable methods of recruiting and employing labour, the search for suitable building materials, the struggle against a climate unfriendly to European construction techniques, political vacillation at Court; and, within the colony, overlapping authority and the incompatibility of certain personalities. To this limited extent at least, the construction of Placentia heralded the construction at Louisbourg.

NOTES

The following abbreviations have been used in the notes:

A.N. Archives Nationales, Archives de France, Paris.

C.S.P., *A.W.I.* — Great Britain, H.M.S.O., *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and West Indies*. 44 vols. published London: 1860-.

D.C.B. Hayne, D.M. and A. Vachon (eds.), *Dictionary of Canadian Biography*, Vol. II. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, and Québec: Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 1969.

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¹ Humphreys, John, *Plaisance: Problems of settlement at this Newfoundland outpost of New France, 1660-1690*. Ottawa: National Museums of Canada, 1970. *passim*.

² La Morandiere, Charles de *La pêche française de la morue dans l'Amérique septentrionale*. 3 vols., Paris: G. P. Maisonneuve et Larose, 1963, 1966. I, pp. 461-470.

³ Neuville, D. (ed.), *Etat sommaire des archives de la marine antérieures à la révolution*. Paris: 1898. Série E. Comptabilité. Notice préliminaire, pp. 611-612.

- ⁴ *A. N., Colonies*, B, 20, f.172v.
- ⁵ Proulx, Jean-Pierre, "Histoire militaire de Plaisance, une étude sur les fortifications françaises." Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Ottawa, 1968, pp. 80-153.
- ⁶ *D.C.B.*, II, p. 482.
- ⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 35-39.
- ⁸ *A.N., Colonies*, C¹¹C, 3, ff. 192-215, 145-151v; 5, ff. 26-28.
- ⁹ *D.C.B.*, II, pp. 433-435.
- ¹⁰ *A.N., Colonies*, C¹¹C, 5, ff. 234-244v.
- ¹¹ *D.C.B.*, II, pp. 509-513.
- ¹² *A.N., Colonies*, B, 30, ff. 326-327v.
- ¹³ *Ibid.*, C¹¹C, 5, ff. 234-244v.
- ¹⁴ *D.C.B.*, II, pp. 214-215.
- ¹⁵ *A.N., Colonies*, F¹A, 21, f. 20.
- ¹⁶ *Ibid.*, C¹¹C, 2, ff. 201-203.
- ¹⁷ *Ibid.*, B, 22, f. 34.
- ¹⁸ *Ibid.*, B, 23, f. 301.
- ¹⁹ In 1707, credit was said to have collapsed at Placentia because the Treasurers-General defaulted on bills of exchange. *Ibid.*, C¹¹C, 5, ff. 273-276. Legohérel, H., *Les Trésoriers généraux de la Marine (1517-1788)*. Paris: Editions Cujas, 1965, pp. 251-257. J. F. Bosher, "Government and private interests in New France" in *Canadian Public Administration*, X (1967), pp. 244-257. Braudel, F. et Ernest Labrousse, *Histoire économique et sociale de la France*. T.2, 1660-1789. Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1970, p. 273.
- ²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 269-275.
- ²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 270.
- ²² Legohérel, *op. cit.*, pp. 179-183.
- ²³ See *A.N., Colonies*, C¹¹A, 113, ff. 41, 43, 44, 57, 64v-65, 79v., 82, 93. 145, 200-203, 205, 212, 220, 269; F¹A, 10-18.
- ²⁴ *Ibid.*, C¹¹C, 3, ff. 12-15v. All but 1500 livres.
- ²⁵ *Ibid.*, B, 22, f. 155v.
- ²⁶ *Ibid.*, C¹¹C, 5, ff. 302-305.
- ²⁷ *Ibid.*, C¹¹C, 6, ff. 156-158.
- ²⁸ *Ibid.*, C¹¹C, 6, ff. 209-218v.
- ²⁹ *Ibid.*, F¹A, 21, f. 20.
- ³⁰ *Ibid.*, B, 32, ff. 432-434v.
- ³¹ *Ibid.*, F¹A, 21, f. 20.
- ³² *Ibid.*, C¹¹C, 5, ff. 30-70v.
- ³³ Braudel & Labrousse, *op. cit.*, pp. 671-672.
- ³⁴ *A.N., Colonies*, F¹A, 11, ff. 243-245v.
- ³⁵ *Ibid.*, C¹¹C, f. 147. Cf. wages authorized for Louisiana in 1707, ranging from 30 to 40 livres a month for skilled workers. F¹A, 14, f. 59.
- ³⁶ *A.N., Marine* B³, 157, f. 146.
- ³⁷ *A.N., Colonies*, C¹¹C, 3, ff. 43-52v.
- ³⁸ *Ibid.*, C¹¹C, 4, ff. 25-51.
- ³⁹ *Ibid.*, C¹¹C, 2, ff. 256-259.
- ⁴⁰ *A.N., Marine*, B³, 146, ff. 138v.-140.
- ⁴¹ *Ibid.*, B², 124, ff. 245-246.
- ⁴² It turned down a proposal to levy a special labour tax on the *terreneu-viers*. *A.N., Colonies*, C¹¹C, 2, ff. 226-232.
- ⁴³ *A.N., Marine*, B³, 108, ff. 142-145.
- ⁴⁴ *A.N., Colonies*, C¹¹C, 5, ff. 118-155.

- 45 *Ibid.*, C¹¹C, 3, ff. 12-15.
- 46 *A.N. Colonies*, B, 22, f. 220.
- 47 *Ibid.*, C¹¹C, 3, ff. 39-52v.; *Marine*, B², 153, ff. 442-443v.
- 48 *A.N., Colonies*, C¹¹C, 4, ff. 111-133v.; B, 27, f. 114.
- 49 *Ibid.*, C¹¹C, 3, ff. 43-52v.
- 50 *Ibid.*, B, 29, 141.
- 51 *A.N., Marine*, B², 131, f. 345.
- 52 In 1698, an English observer saw 200 hogsheads of lime that had been brought from France in fishing vessels. *C.S.P., A.W.I.*, vol. XVI (1697-98), #990, pp. 552-553.
- 53 *A.N., Marine*, B³, 101, ff. 397-399v.
- 54 *A.N., Colonies*, C¹¹C, 3, ff. 238-240v.
- 55 *A.N., Marine*, B², 146, ff. 222-246.
- 56 Delumeau, J., *Le Mouvement du port de St-Malo, 1681-1720*. Paris, 1966, pp. 272-273. La Morandière, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 577-578.
- 57 *A.N., Marine*, B³, 146, ff. 49-54v.
- 58 *Ibid.*, B², 196, ff. 1037v.-1038.
- 59 *A.N., Colonies*, C¹¹C, 6, ff. 47-72v.
- 60 *A.N., Marine*, B³, 145, ff. 55-58.
- 61 *A.N., Colonies*, B, 29, f. 425v.
- 62 *Ibid.*, B, 30, f. 242; C¹¹C, 6, ff. 222-227v.
- 63 *A.N., Marine*, B³, 169, ff. 46-49v.