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Exploitation and Class Formation in the Inca State

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Résumé de l'article

Un trait caractéristique de la société inca était l'existence de conditions d'exploitation étendue, elles-mêmes le produit de nouvelles contradictions qui avaient émergé au fur et à mesure que la composition de la classe dominante changeait. La politique expansionniste de la classe dirigeante inca représentait une tentative de résolution de problèmes émanant d'une organisation interne fondée sur la parenté. Pour assurer le maintien de leur position dominante, les Incas avaient besoin des collatéraux du souverain, mais les prétentions au trône de ces derniers en faisaient des alliés peu fiables. Les chefs de l'état conquérant s'assurèrent leur fidélité en leur permettant d'extraire un surplus de travail des producteurs des régions centrales de l'empire, et conséquence de ceci, les souverains eux-mêmes se virent obligés de chercher des surplus additionnels en dirigeant leurs demandes vers des communautés et des états subjugués. Les nouvelles formes d'exploitation qui apparurent ont tout d'abord mis l'accent sur le contrôle d'autels locaux ou sur des alliances avec leurs porte-parole. Plus tard les éléments politiquement dominants ont attaché une plus grande valeur à la création d'alliances avec les autels puissants des régions récemment conquises. Plus tard encore, ils se sont approprié des terres, non seulement pour l'usage direct de la classe dirigeante inca, mais aussi pour en faire don aux chefs traditionnels de groupes ethniques ou à d'autres personnes qui contribuaient au bien-être de l'état inca et de sa classe dominante. Ces nouvelles alliances ont créé des conditions favorables à la formation de nouvelles classes sociales ne reproduisant en rien les formes antérieures de stratification sociale — que celles-ci aient été basées sur la parenté ou sur un système de classes.

Exploitation and Class Formation in the Inca State

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Inca society was characterized by conditions of expanded exploitation which were produced by new contradictions that emerged as the composition of the dominant class changed. The expansionist policies of the Inca ruling class were an attempt to resolve problems resulting from an internal organization based on kinship. The collateral kin of the ruler were necessary for maintaining the dominant position of the Incas, but their claims to the throne made them unreliable allies. Rulers of the conquest state assured their loyalty by allowing them to extract surplus labor from the direct producers in the core areas of the empire. Consequently, the rulers themselves were forced to seek additional surplus by displacing their demands onto subjugated communities and polities. The new forms of exploitation that emerged initially emphasized control of local shrines or alliances with their spokesmen. Later, the politically dominant elements emphasized the creation of alliances with powerful shrines in newly conquered areas. Still later, land was appropriated not only for the direct use of Inca ruling class but also as gifts to be given to traditional leaders of ethnic groups or to other individuals who promoted the well-being of the Inca state and its dominant class. The new alliances created the conditions for the formation of social classes, that were not identical with earlier forms of social stratification—regardless of whether they were based on kinship or class.

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Recent studies of the Inca state have considered changes in its economic structure (Godelier, 1977; Murra, 1980; Schaedel, 1978).¹ The authors discuss them in terms of the emergence of new institutions—new forms of extracting surplus—which they view as reflecting successive stages in the development of the state structure. While their discussions constitute a significant advance in our understanding of state formation in the Andes, they do not adequately deal with how and why these new relations of exploitation actually developed. G.E.M. de Ste. Croix (1981: 52) has observed that

... the most significant distinguishing feature of each social formation... is not so much *how the bulk of the labour of production is done*, as *how the dominant propertied classes*, controlling the conditions of production, *ensure the extraction of surplus*, which makes their own leisured existence possible.

This focuses attention less on the ways in which surplus labor was pumped out of the primary producers in Andean society, than on the questions of how and why the old relations of production were transformed and new relations of exploitation developed in the Inca state.

The new forms of exploitation were the product of attempts to resolve the internal contradictions within the Inca ruling class and between its members and the direct producers in Andean society. The attempts created the conditions for 'expanded exploitation' in which each successive generation of the Inca ruling class had to devise new ways for extracting surplus product from the communities and polities incorporated into the imperial state. However, they did not do this without considering how their predecessors had resolved the problem of acquiring the land and labor they needed to sustain themselves and the state. As Karl Marx (1968: 97) aptly noted

Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past.

An important expression of the internal contradictions within the Inca ruling class was the fact that competition, suspicions, and conflict—not cooperation, trust, and harmony—characterized the relations between the *panaqa*s, or royal corporations (Patterson, 1983). One idiom the Incas used for talking about these contradictions involved conflicts between princes or between rulers and their successors. This directs attention to the relationship between the formation of *panaqa*s, inheritance, and succession to the throne.

The *panaqa*s were corporate landholding

groups composed of brothers and sisters, who were descended from the same emperor (Sherbondy, 1977, 1982; Tom Zuidema and Billie Jean Isbell, personal communications). They were created by each emperor when he ascended to the throne or by his descendants when he died. According to the inheritance rules of Inca society, no emperor could inherit the property of his predecessor. The throne passed to one son, while the remainder of the property passed to the rest of his descendants. As a result, each emperor 'founded' a *panaqa* and acquired the land and servants to support his wives and their children. When he died, his sons and daughters used the property of their *panaqa* to support themselves and the mummy bundle of the founder and to maintain a cult in his honor (Cieza de León, 1967: 29-33, 154-155; Pizarro, 1944: 51-53; Rostworowski de Diez Canseco, 1960; Rowe, 1967: 60-61, 67-68; Sancho de la Hoz, 1938).

The inconsistency of the inheritance rules was especially apparent at times of succession. The real political power passed to one of the emperor's sons—all of whom, at least theoretically, had the same rights and could aspire equally to the royal tassel; however, the real wealth of the corporation—the lands and servants accumulated by the emperor—passed to his siblings and their descendants. Since the Inca wives of the emperor belonged to *panaqa*s that were different from the ones founded by their husbands, the various corporations seem to have supported the sons of kinswomen who were married to the emperor. They attempted to place on the throne a sister's son, whom they could influence through his mother. They believed he would pay special attention to promoting and protecting their interests. Since at least one emperor gave lands to his mother, it appears that the *panaqa*s' expectations regarding the behavior of their royal nephews were occasionally met.

The struggles between the *panaqa*s reflected the contradictions within the Inca ruling class. The corporations of the former emperors possessed varying amounts of wealth in the form of land and access to labor. The extent of their wealth was relatively fixed after the deaths of their founders. The new emperor lacked wealth but possessed political power which allowed him to appropriate both land and labor during his lifetime. As a result, the wealth of his corporation was not fixed during the period of his rule. One consequence was that the corporations formed after the expansion of the imperial state, unlike their predecessors, had opportunities to appropriate land and labor throughout the empire. The later *panaqa*s had more estates and greater access to labor than those

founded by the pre-conquest rulers. They had also devised new ways of extracting surplus product from the Andean peoples: establishing alliances with powerful non-Inca shrines in newly conquered areas, appropriating land and servants for the direct use of the ruling class or as gifts for individuals who promoted the well-being of the Inca state and its dominant class.

The expansion of the Inca state began during the reign of Viracocha 'Inka, who belonged to the Zukzu *panaqa* (Cieza de León, 1967: 128-155; Cobo, 1956: 107-109; Sarmiento de Gamboa, 1960: 228-235). Up to that time, the Incas took the lands of neighboring polities they conquered but did not place permanent garrisons or officials among them. Viracocha changed this pattern of raiding and plundering; he planned to establish permanent rule over conquered groups and to have them worship Teqzi Wiracocha over the sun and other gods (Cobo, 1956: 107-109). He was ably assisted by his father's brothers, Apo Mayta and Vicaquirao, who developed military tactics for ensuring the success of their campaigns. Their victory over the Ayarmarca in the southern part of the Cuzco Valley provided the model for subsequent campaigns. They first conquered lands in the upper part of the Urubamba Valley that lay behind the Ayarmarca territory and then attacked the Ayarmarca from two directions—one force coming from Cuzco and the other from the Urubamba Valley. This also made the Incas a political power in the Urubamba Valley, which is an important route between Cuzco and the Lake Titicaca Basin. As a result, they began to interfere in the affairs of polities in the northern part of the Lake Titicaca Basin.

About 1438, the Chancas—a polity whose lands lay immediately to the west—attacked the Incas. One effect of the Chanca invasion was to foment a civil war among the Incas. For some time, there had been palace intrigues in Cuzco over who would succeed Viracocha to the throne. The emperor chose one son as his heir-apparent, but the emperor's paternal uncles wanted to place the son of another of the ruler's wives on the throne. As the Chancas approached, Viracocha and 'Inka Urqon, the son he designated to succeed him, withdrew to a fortress near Calca. His uncles, Pachakuti 'Inka Yupanki who was their choice for their throne, and a few nobles remained in Cuzco to defend the city.

After inflicting heavy defeats on the Chancas, Pachakuti and his followers attempted to resolve the differences between themselves and Viracocha's faction. The negotiations failed, and Pachakuti proclaimed himself emperor, forming *Iñaqa panaqa*. At this point, there were two Inca

states—one in Cuzco, headed by Pachakuti, and the other in Calca, headed by his father. Consequently, the Cuzco leader had to deal simultaneously with two enemies: the Chancas and his father's forces. After establishing a truce with the Chancas, the Cuzco group encircled the Calca factions, thus preventing the possibility of an attack from two directions. Viracocha died about this time, and 'Inka Urqon was killed by his brother's followers.

Pachakuti resolved the differences between the two factions, and the Incas were once again united under a single ruler. When he came to power, Inca control had only been established over the Cuzco Valley, the neighboring valley of Anta, part of the Urubamba Valley, and the hills near Cuyo (Rowe, 1945). Pachakuti completed the conquest of the Urubamba Valley and then subjugated polities as far north as Cangallo and Vilcas and as far south as northern end of the Lake Titicaca Basin, incorporating them into the imperial state. He also seized the lands of villages in the Cuzco Basin and resettled their inhabitants further away from the capital city. He then undertook an extensive reclamation project in the valley, channeling the rivers and building agricultural terraces on the hills. The productivity of the basin was increased, and he divided the newly acquired agricultural lands among the *panaqa*s. He also devised a calendrical system and organized the *ceque* shrines in the Cuzco area,² creating a dozen new shrines in the process (Cobo, 1956: 169-186; Rowe, 1979: 10; Sherbondy, 1977, 1982: 18-22; Zuidema, ms.) Both were essential for agricultural production, since the distribution of water was linked with ceremonies performed on specific days at the shrines. As a result of the conquests and the reclamation project, the lands and estates of Pachakuti's corporation were concentrated around Cuzco (Betanzos, 1924: 131-153, 173-186; Cobo, 1956: 169-174; Rostrowski de Diez Canseco, 1966; Sarmiento de Gamboa, 1960: 235-238, 246-247; Zuidema, 1983, ms.), though it is possible that the group also had lands in the area between the capital and Lake Titicaca (Cobo, 1956: 86-88).

Pachakuti was also credited with rebuilding Cuzco and organizing the administrative and religious apparatus of the imperial state (Anonymous, 1906; Betanzos, 1924: 139-153, 173-177; Rowe, 1960; Sarmiento de Gamboa, 1960: 235-236). In the process, he rebuilt and endowed the Temple of the Sun and organized the system of Inca state shrines, alienating lands and assigning servants for their maintenance (Betanzos, 1924: 139-147; Sarmiento de Gamboa, 1960: 236-237).

What was significant about Pachakuti's reorganization of the administrative and religious apparatus of the state was that he effectively limited the ability of the Zukzu *panaqa* to accumulate further wealth. Coricancha, the Temple of the Sun in Cuzco, became the focus of the state religious cult, while Teqzi Wiracocha, the *wak'a*³ at Urcos, which was supported by Viracocha and Zukzu, was relegated to a less important position and was prevented from accumulating lands and servants in the newly conquered areas of the empire (Earls, 1976: 218-223; Rowe, 1960: 418-423; Zuidema, 1964: 166-168). In other words, the emperor had effectively, if only temporarily, curbed the power of his collateral relatives.

After a number of years, Pachakuti selected a son by Mama Anahuarque, a woman from Choco, as his heir-apparent. He subsequently changed his mind and nominated instead Topa 'Inka, the younger brother of his initial choice. Before ascending to the throne and founding the Qhapaq *panaqa*, Topa 'Inka co-reigned with his father. During this period, he conquered much of *chinchaysuyu*—the northern quarter of the empire. However, the relations between the two apparently deteriorated, as Pachakuti became concerned over the exploits of his son. He appointed two of his brothers from Zukzu *panaqa* to inspect conditions in the lands incorporated into the imperial state by his son. Later royal counsellors prevented one of Topa 'Inka's sons from taking lands north of Lake Titicaca, an area incorporated into the imperial state by Pachakuti. Topa 'Inka also killed an inspector for fomenting a rebellion among his servants; the man was his brother and, thus, a member of Pachakuti's corporation.

Topa 'Inka's presence in the Cuzco area seems to have been less pronounced than those of his collateral relatives, especially the ones in the Iñaqa corporations. His relationship with the *wak'as* of Cuzco was also very different from those of his father, his brother, and his son who succeeded him on the throne. Unlike them, he founded no new shrines in the *ceque* system, which suggests that his *panaqa* possessed less agricultural land in the Cuzco area than Iñaqa. In fact, even though his corporation had estates in the vicinity of Cuzco, the location of his palace in the city is still a matter of question (Rowe, 1967: 68-69). His relationship with the Cuzco *wak'as* was quite strained, since he was critical of them and on at least one occasion threatened to burn all of their possessions because they had failed to help him (Huaman Poma de Ayala, 1936: 261; Rowe, 1979: 10; Santa Cruz Pachakuti Yamqui, 1879: 283-284).

Topa 'Inka forged close relations with the shrines of powerful *wak'as*—like Pachacamac and Pariacaca—in *chinchaysuyu*; in return for their support, these shrines received land and servants (Dioses y Hombres, 1966: 131-135; Patterson, 1983; Rostworowski de Diez Canseco, 1980: 167-168). His corporation had a number of estates in those parts of the empire he conquered (Rostworowski de Diez Canseco, 1977: 177; Wachtel, 1982: 201, 218). While conquering in the Canete Valley, he had a new city built, which he called Cuzco; its organization was modelled after the Inca capital (Cieza de León, 1947: 422-423; 1967: 194-197).

There was a significant new element in Topa 'Inka's wealth and power. It was based in part on his relations with powerful shrines and polities located outside of Cuzco in the area that he had brought into the imperial state. He used these alliances in his ongoing struggle with his father's corporation and to extract surplus labor from polities outside of the Cuzco Basin. By cultivating alliances with the shrines and polities of *chinchaysuyu*, he was creating a class structure that crosscut traditional Andean social hierarchies, which were usually defined in terms of descent from a common ancestor or ethnicity. While weakening the power of his collateral relatives in the other *panaqas*, he was enhancing the ability of his allies to extract increasingly greater amounts of surplus product from the Andean peoples. Their interests became inextricably linked with those of Qhapaq, Topa 'Inka's corporation.

Topa 'Inka died unexpectedly, and he may, in fact, have been killed by the members of Iñaqa *panaqa*. His death sparked a struggle over succession to the throne. He originally favored the succession of Wayna Qhapaq—the son of his sister and principal wife, who came from Iñaqa, and the favorite grandson of Pachakuti. Shortly before his death, Topa 'Inka changed his mind and named Qhapaq Wari—the son of another wife—as his heir. Qhapaq Wari's mother and her kinsmen plotted to put him on the throne, but their plans were discovered and suppressed by the Iñaqa supporters of Wayna Qhapaq. The leader of the faction supporting Wayna Qhapaq was Waman 'Achachi—the brother of the deceased emperor and his wife, a member of Iñaqa, and the governor of *chinchaysuyu*. Qhapaq Wari was banished to Chinchero, where the dead emperor had a palace, and his mother was killed as a witch and rebel (Cabello Valboa, 1951: 353-360; Sarmiento de Gamboa, 1960: 258-259).

The new emperor ascended to the throne at a young age. Consequently, a regent was named to tutor him in the ways of government, until he was

old enough to rule in his own name. The regent was Walpaya—a provincial governor, the sons of Pachakuti's brother, and a member of Zukzu *panaqa*. Walpaya, however, tried to assert the claims of his own son to the throne and was killed by Waman 'Achachi. At that point, Wayna Qhapaq took charge of the government, married his sister, Mama Cusi Rimay, and presumably formed the Tumipampa *panaqa*.

Wayna Qhapaq extended the empire by conquering the mountainous country of Chachapoyas in northern Peru and the northern most part of Ecuador (Salomon, 1978: 202-316). He spent much of his time in Ecuador at Tumipampas where he was born, administering the imperial state suppressing revolts (Murra, 1978). He appropriated lands in areas conquered by his father, creating estates for his *panaqa*, granting estates to individuals or using them to raise revenues for the state (Rostworowski de Diez Canseco, 1977: 177; Wachtel, 1982: 216, 218). He seized the lands of polities in the Cochabamba Valley, Bolivia, deporting their residents and replacing them with outsiders, members of other ethnic groups, who were permanently resettled or who worked for given periods of time on the newly acquired state lands (Wachtel, 1982: 213, 217). The crops grown on these lands were used to support a professionalized army, whose members were full-time soldiers recruited from the newly conquered polities in the north (Murra, 1980: 158-159, 174; Wachtel, 1982: 217). He assigned lands to his mother who was from Iñaqa, to one of his sons, and to leaders of the conquered polities (Wachtel, 1982: 218). Like his father, he built a new Cuzco—this one at Tumipampas (Salomon, 1978: 248-249).

The new ways of raising revenue devised by Wayna Qhapaq represented a departure from the procedures established by his predecessors. They involved the state management of lands appropriated from conquered polities, the beginnings of private landholdings, and the emergence of conditions of personal servitude to the state (Murra, 1980: 153-190). The new forms of extracting surplus expanded the role of the state apparatus to include the supervision of production on state-controlled lands. They also created an emerging class of full-time retainers, separated from their ethnic groups and dependent on the state for ensuring the conditions of their reproduction. While grants of land and servants to individual *kurakas*, the leaders of ethnic groups, or to his secondary wives may have insulated them from the traditional claims of their kinsmen, they obligated them to the emperor, creating ties of dependence

similar to those found in feudal or tributary social formations (Espinoza Soriano, 1976: 254, 259, 262). These grants may also have diminished or removed the obligations of the direct producers toward their traditional leaders. By granting lands to the traditional leaders of polities in *chin-chaysuyu*, he may have been trying to undercut the strength of the alliances between the shrines and his father's *panaqa*, thus opening up the possibility of a new balance of forces between disparate factions in these groups.

Wayna Qhapaq's unexpected death promoted another crisis over succession. His principal wife, who came from Qhapaq *panaqa*, had no sons; however, his secondary wives had borne sons, and there were several candidates for the throne. The most prominent were Ninan Kuyuchi, 'Ataw Wallpa whose mother was from Iñaqa, and Washkar whose mother came from Qhapaq. Ninan Kuyuchi died shortly after his father. Washkar was named to succeed his father in a somewhat unorthodox manner; the priest of the Sun cult, who apparently belonged to Iñaqa, followed the emperor's (his brother?) wishes and did not perform the required rituals to determine the suitability of the successor. Two members of the Iñaqa corporation accompanied Washkar's mother and the body of the dead emperor as they journeyed to Cuzco to enshrine the body and to inform Washkar that he was the new ruler.

Washkar was furious that 'Ataw Wallpa, his rival, was left in the north with the army, wives, and insignias of the dead emperor. He killed the two members of Iñaqa who arrived with his mother; this infuriated the members of that corporation, and they allied themselves with 'Ataw Wallpa. Washkar then sent a messenger who came from Qhapaq *panaqa* to the north, demanding the immediate return of their father's wives and insignias. When the messenger seized them, 'Ataw Wallpa killed him. This antagonized the members of Qhapaq. This insult completed the breach between the two rivals, and a civil war ensued with 'Ataw Wallpa being supported by his kinsmen in Iñaqa and Washkar by his kinsmen in Qhapaq and by Pachacamac, the powerful *wak'a* on the central Peruvian coast. Washkar then offended the other *panaqa* by threatening to seize their lands in Cuzco, and they aligned themselves with 'Ataw Wallpa's faction.

At this point, Washkar controlled the southern part of the empire, while 'Ataw Wallpa controlled Ecuador and the northern parts of Peru. Washkar captured his brother in a battle at Tumipampas; however, 'Ataw Wallpa escaped and rallied his forces. He drove his brother out of the Tumi-

pampas area and devastated the fields of the Cañari for supporting his rival. 'Ataw Wallpa's armies moved southward and captured Washkar in a battle near Cuzco in April, 1532. 'Ataw Wallpa then sought to destroy his enemies in Cuzco. He burned the mummy bundle of Topa 'Inka which was venerated by the members of Qhapaq and the shrine where it was kept. He killed the spokesman of the shrine, the members of Qhapaq *panaqa*, and Washkar's children, pregnant wives, and servants. Washkar and his mother were forced to witness the executions. After it was over, his mother turned to him and said that he had behaved badly by being so cruel and ill-treating the messengers sent by 'Ataw Wallpa. Shortly afterwards, the Spaniards captured and imprisoned 'Ataw Wallpa at Cajamarca; however, his power was scarcely diminished, and he ordered the execution of Washkar from his prison cell.

During the civil war between Washkar and 'Ataw Wallpa, both granted lands and servants to individual children (Salomon, 1978: 243-244). Washkar is alleged to have sired eighty children during an eight-year period (Murua, 1964: 69), which might provide some indication of the amount of land and labor appropriated by the two rivals. In other words, both were behaving in the manner of their father; both granted lands and servants to individuals to reward and promote loyalty, which presumably would ensure the conditions required for the reproduction of the dominant class. This did not change dramatically in the decades immediately following the Spanish invasion, for the major transformation of Andean society did not begin until the 1560s (Spalding, 1970, 1973, 1982: 324-328; 1984: 72-167).

Summary and Conclusions

The conditions of expanded exploitation which emerged in the Inca state were, in part, a product of new contradictions that appeared in the dominant class as its composition changed. The expansionist policies of the Inca ruling class were an attempt to resolve problems resulting from an internal organization based on kinship. The collateral kin of the ruler were necessary for maintaining the position of the Incas as distinctive and dominant; however, their claims to the throne made them unreliable allies. Consequently, the Inca ruler sought to assure their loyalty by allowing them to extract surplus from the direct producers in the core areas of the empire. There, expansion was a necessary but not sufficient condition for political stability within the Inca ruling class. As a result, the Inca

rulers sought to acquire additional surplus by displacing their demands onto subjugated communities. They appropriated portions of community lands, surplus product, and labor. The expansionist policies of the state involved persuasion, the creation of alliances, co-optation, intimidation, the threat of force, and violence.

The new forms of exploitation that emerged as a result of the contradictions within the Inca ruling class initially emphasized control of local shrines or alliances with their spokesmen. Later, the politically dominant elements emphasized the creation of alliances with powerful shrines in newly conquered areas. Even later, land was appropriated not only for the direct use of the Inca ruling class, but also as gifts to be given to traditional leaders of ethnic groups or other individuals who promoted the well-being of the Inca state and its dominant class. The alliances forged across ethnic boundaries and the gifts of land and servants to non-Inca shrines and individuals cross-cut Andean social hierarchies which were traditionally defined in terms of descent from a common ancestor, separate creation, or nationality. The new alliances created the conditions for the emergence of social classes, that were not identical with the earlier forms of stratification, whether based on kinship or class.

To discuss the development of the Inca state as an excrecence on the growth of civil society (Marx, 1972: 329) or strictly in terms of the appearance of social classes and private property (Engels, 1972: 171-192, 206-237) provides only the barest account of how that particular state actually developed and was transformed during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The development of the Inca state also involved the successive recombination of old elements which were transformed and given new meanings in the emerging social contexts created by imperial expansion, succession to the throne, and revolts in provincial areas. Old institutions—like the *mit'a* labor obligations of individuals to their community or the class structure of Andean society based on complexly interrelated hierarchies of *panaqas*, ethnic nobilities, and commoners—were reworked; labor was no longer appropriated only by the community, for the state also had access to the labor power of the direct producers. The alliances created and maintained by different factions of the Inca ruling class with non-Inca groups, shrines, and individuals created new conditions for the real appropriation of surplus and for undermining the ideologically defined class structure with its emphasis on descent. Rituals and mythology, the social cement which bound the members of Andean communities to each other and

held groups together, were also reworked and given new meanings which supported new forms of extortion. The transformation of the Inca state involved archaism—the deliberate attempt to promote an illusion of the continuity of old institutions and practices in a new context. Particularly appropriate in this regard is Marx's (1968: 97) observation that

And just when they seem engaged in... creating something that has never yet existed,... they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service and borrow from them the names, battle cries and costumes in order to present the new scene... in this time-honoured disguise and this borrowed language.

Consequently, any analysis of the formation of the Inca state must also consider how the Inca ruling class won and maintained hegemony or consent of the majority of the Andean peoples. The state created and maintained political alliances by continually reworking the class structure. While the alliances clearly involved grants of land and servants and permission to extract surplus from core areas of the state, they also entailed continual attempts to transform the culture—the art, language, ideology, mythology, and rituals— of both allied and opposing groups in order to link their interests with those of the state. Hence, the state was held together by the activities of people in various institutions, polities, and communities who were part of the dominant coalition and who created, shared, and maintained the ideology of the state. Crises developed within the dominant coalition as the state expanded and redefined, increasingly restrictive class relations began to emerge. The alliances between groups within the dominant coalition were often fragile, especially at times of succession or when the rates of extortion were too high and the subjugated peoples rebelled against the Inca state.⁴

NOTES

1. This paper was presented at the annual meeting of the CESCE (Canadian Ethnological Society/Société canadienne d'ethnologie), Montreal, May, 1984. It was prompted by an invitation from Irene Silverblatt to contribute to a symposium on transformations in political economy. It has profited from the insights and constructive criticisms of Irene Silverblatt, Christine Gailey, Billie Jean Isbell, John V. Murra, Tom Zuidema, John Hyslop, Peter Rigby, and Peter Gran.

2. The *ceques* were a series of lines that radiated from Coricancha, the Temple of the Sun in Cuzco. Shrines were located on or assigned to each *ceque* (Rowe, 1979: 2-4).

3. The Inca term *wak'a* refers to a deity, shrine (holy place), or sacred object.

4. The issue of how ideological hegemony and consent were established and maintained is discussed in more detail in Patterson, (n.d.).

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