Abstracts
Abstract
In surveys of Canadian military history, decisions on force design — which involves choosing between investments in different military technologies — are usually framed in the political criteria of sacrificing or preserving Canadian sovereignty. This article argues that Canadian strategic choice is not shaped by either politics or technology, but by the relationship between military technology and Canadian geography. The relationship between these factors provides a strategic context which then shapes the choices open to policy-makers. These contexts reflect two modes: those where there is a direct military threat to Canadian security and those where there is a relative one. The article employs three case studies, debates on Canadian naval policy (1887-1918), changing approaches to defence cooperation with the United States between 1918 and 1945, and debates on Canadian air defence in the early Cold War (1945-1959), to examine how decision-makers understood and acted on absolute threats and the technologies which underwrote them.
Keywords:
- Strategy,
- Ship-building,
- Air Defence,
- First World War,
- Cold War
Résumé
Dans les études sur l’histoire militaire du Canada, les décisions relatives à la conception des forces — qui impliquent de choisir entre des investissements dans différentes technologies militaires — sont généralement encadrées par le critère politique du sacrifice ou de la préservation de la souveraineté canadienne. Cet article soutient que le choix stratégique canadien n’est pas déterminé par la politique ou la technologie, mais par la relation entre la technologie militaire et la géographie canadienne. La relation entre ces facteurs fournit un contexte stratégique qui façonne ensuite les choix qui s’offrent aux décideurs politiques. Ces contextes reflètent deux modes : ceux où il existe une menace militaire directe pour la sécurité du Canada, et ceux où il existe une menace relative. L’article s’appuie sur trois études de cas, les débats sur la politique navale canadienne (1887-1918), l’évolution des approches de la coopération en matière de défense avec les États-Unis entre 1918 et 1945, et les débats sur la défense aérienne canadienne au début de la guerre froide (1945-1959), pour examiner comment les décideurs ont compris les menaces absolues et les technologies qui les sous-tendent, et comment ils ont agi en conséquence.
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Appendices
Acknowledgements
The author would like to express his gratitude for Dr. Matthew Wiseman for organising this special edition, the publication team at Scientia Canadensis for making it possible. This article grew out of my dissertation work, and I am indebted to my supervisors, Dr. Howard Coombs and Dr. Doug Delaney. I would also like to acknowledge the invaluable support on Sutherland’s work by Mr. Allan Sutherland, esq, and Mr. Paul Longtin. Finally, I am grateful to my colleagues the RMC History Department and the Centre for International and Defence Policy at Queen’s University, and the reviewers for their helpful discussions.
Biographical note
John Keess, CD, PhD is currently an Assistant Professor in the History Department at the Royal Military College of Canada and a Fellow at the Centre for International and Defence Policy at Queen’s University. His professional experience includes service with Second and Third Battalions, The Royal Canadian Regiment, 2 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group Headquarters, supporter experience in CANSOFCOM, and operational deployments to Afghanistan, the Middle East and Eastern Europe. His academic work centres on small-state strategy and Canadian Cold War history. He can be reached at john.keess@rmc.ca.