Philosophers of Education Respond to the Dominance of Empiricism in Educational Research

Educational research is contested terrain, too often succumbing to narrow conceptions of what constitutes legitimate ways of knowing. However, most educational research methods textbooks and syllabi convey the notion that the only debate occurs within empirical research: the choice between qualitative, quantitative or mixed methods. This special issue responds to some of the most significant ways in which philosophy of education is marginalized: research methods courses, the textbooks often used in those courses, and the resulting dominance of the assumption that educational research means empirical research. Contributors from three continents and four countries show that philosophy of education can contribute to debates about the nature of educational research and how it can be made more rigorous and thoughtful. These essays illuminate how a more robust and substantial conception of educational research emerges when philosophy of education is included as a viable option. Many of these contributions arose in response to an inaugural preconference held at the Canadian Philosophy of Education Society conference in Toronto in spring 2023. Big thanks to the executive of the Canadian Philosophy of Education Society and to the many participants in that event. In “But What Should I Do in my Methodology Chapter? Promoting Philosophy as Legitimate Educational Research,” I argue that the dominant assumption that educational research means empirical research narrows the range of possibilities for educational research. I begin by exploring the problem of “tacit empiricism,” the assumption that educational research means empirical research, which I explore in several educational research methods textbooks and course syllabi. I then argue that there is a close link between one’s conception of education and the selection of the most appropriate method to study it; research method and conception of education align. I lament that the proliferation of qualitative methods has not translated into inclusion of philosophy as a legitimate way to do educational research. I critique the assumption of empirical studies that data gets us closer to what is “really going on” in schools, whereas philosophy is construed as second-order removed and a barrier between the researcher and the object of research. I respond to this problematic but prevalent notion by suggesting that theory actually helps bring us closer to “what is,” which leads into a discussion of what a philosophical method might look like. I suggest that the requirement that educational research have a practical impact, based on a limited notion of what counts as evidence, is a key reason why philosophy of education is marginalized. I then argue that it is important to rethink the word “research” itself so that it includes reading, writing and thinking, and conclude by suggesting practical ways in which philosophy of education can be promoted in the face of these challenges. In “With Friends Like These…: Research Methods and the Marginalization of Philosophy,” Deron Boyles considers how and why humanities research is excluded, co-opted, or othered in methods courses and methods course offerings for education research at an R1 institution. Boyles notes that concerns have also been raised by philosophers of education that philosophy is not taught or is rarely taught as a research method in colleges of education. He asks why humanities methods are rare in an R1 education research core and suggests a major cause is “scholarly turf wars” (p. 219) waged within the politics of inquiry. To that end, Boyles provides a brief overview of the history and politics of the methods wars, an explanation of a research core and the courses constituting it at Georgia State University, and a view from the outside looking in: peering over the qual and quant gate to see that philosophy …