EN:

In this paper, I reflect on the changing role of higher education by focusing on the case of online education. I consider the promise of online education as a means to mitigate educational inequalities. Based on the available empirical evidence, I argue that this promise is unlikely to be fulfilled because online education is not well-suited to develop the social and emotional skills needed by students from low-income and minority backgrounds for social mobility. Nonetheless, the changing social, political, and economic role of the university should lead us to revise the classical vision of the university’s aims. I argue that the aim of the university should be sensitive to its new social, political, and economic role without falling prey to coarse pragmatism. This third approach delicately navigates the middle-ground between idealism and pragmatism.

EN:

This article explores the meeting of two approaches towards philosophy and education: the philosophy for children (P4C) approach advocated by Lipman and others, and Schmid’s (2000) philosophical concept of Lebenskunst (the art of living). Schmid explores the concept of the beautiful or good life by asking what is necessary for each individual to be able to develop their own art of living and which aspects of life are significant when shaping a good and beautiful life. One aspect of Schmid’s theory is the practical application of philosophy through the notions of Bildung, (self-) refection, prudence and practical wisdom, as well as the requirement for each individual to take responsibility for actively shaping their life as an artwork. In this sense, each person is the artist responsible for living their own beautiful life. We argue that there are some useful parallels between Schmid’s concept of the art of living and P4C, such as the ideal of a holistic philosophy that is “lived”. The pragmatic approach of P4C focuses on the embodied learner who practices critical, caring and creative thinking. Both P4C and Schmid’s theory are reminiscent of the Aristotelian notion of practical wisdom (phronesis), which allows for an approach to an education for life that prepares (young) students to develop their own art of living. We also critically discuss tensions arising between these two concepts.

EN:

This article seeks to re-introduce Dr. Maria Montessori’s educational philosophy, which has been absent from modern philosophy of education literature. It describes and analyzes crucial aspects of her epistemology, as best known through her Method. Discussed are the need for early education, the development of the senses, and the exercise of choice by the students. Concept formation is also shown to be an important part of Montessori’s philosophy of instruction. This article concludes with a brief resolution of the “is–ought” objection as framed by Scheffler that might be waged against Montessori’s approach.

EN:

The concept of empathy has gained appeal in many educational initiatives in recent years, notably in the charitable sector, yet conceptual confusions endure and the challenges associated with educating for empathy tend not to receive the attention they deserve. This article strives to help clarify the concept of empathy for educative purposes by examining one such challenge—conceived as "narrow empathetic scope"—drawing on central ideas from neo-Aristotelian virtue theory. The article explores the ways in which moral imagination, as a precursor to empathy, may be uniquely able to assist with the cultivation of practical wisdom in children since it enables them to visualize contexts they have not yet encountered and broaden the moral lens through which they approach and assess their lived experience. The article will also present the Philosophy for Children model as an effective pedagogical method for cultivating the virtue of empathy through morally imaginative dialogue.

EN:

I argue that the crisis of identity Catholic schools are experiencing in the 21st century also presents an opportunity for a rediscovery and expanded conversation, both within and beyond the confines of the institutional Church, of what it means to exist separately from the mainstream without restricting internal diversity.  I begin by presenting salient historical, theological, and sociological features Catholicism and Catholic Education during and since the Second Vatican Council (1962-5) to establish the context and substance of its modern identity crisis.  I then provide a review of current controversies within Catholic schools to demonstrate how they are symptomatic of this crisis, but also potential catalysts for exploring new options. The next section argues both for the merits of recognizing multiple Catholic identities, and imagining the Catholic school as an institution that assembles and coordinates them.  I propose that the fact of multiple Catholic identities should be interpreted as differences in kind, rather than by their degree of difference from a narrowly constructed idea of Catholicism.  I also propose that the intersection of these identities at school should be encouraged as a way of nurturing both students’ own identities and their ability to encounter religious difference within their own tradition and community.  The conclusion demonstrates how in practice this model presents a promising means of possibly deepening individual and institutional religious identit(y/ies) in today’s world, and for responding to controversial issues that arise within Catholic schools.

EN:

Philosopher Lauren Bialystok argues that some of the ideas within Ontario’s Catholic trustees’ document entitled ‘Respecting Difference’ fail to respect homosexual Catholic schoolchildren. I argue that Bialystok’s argument is unsuccessful because she begs at least three questions.

EN:

Environmental activists and critics are often accused of being hypocrites by the oil industry.  The accusation unfurls from the view that the activists’ protests and actions contradict their espoused beliefs.  By presenting a simple thought experiment involving two alleged hypocrites, I discuss ways in which critics of environmental activists misapply the charge of hypocrisy, having neglected the contexts that determine the degree to which one is able to align one’s lived actions with one’s professed values.

EN:

How concerned should we be about the state and status of philosophy of education? To this familiar worry, I maintain that there is no need to worry. In this essay, I try to secure this conclusion, not by shoring up the authority and identity of the discipline, but by asking the fundamental question: Who is and should be the audience for philosophers of education, and what does philosophy of education owe to whom? I argue that to be worthy of that name, philosophy of education ought to have educational significance and continue being philosophical, requiring the discipline to serve the interests of all the three audiences—other philosophers of education, non-philosophical educators, and non-educational philosophers. Through a close analysis of several important scholarly materials concerning the range, quality and relevance of philosophy of education, I urge that working out its disciplinary nature in a broad context of philosophy makes the discipline capable of fulfilling that promise.