Abstracts
Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of family control on domestic and international acquisition’s payment. This effect is important to understand since it will underpin all the future financial flexibility of the merged firms in a context of accelerating international market integration. We find that the percentage of cash payment in acquisitions is positively associated with family voting rights, but we highlight that family wedge is negatively associated with cash payment, which indicates the important role of control-enhancing mechanisms. Dilution risk is crucial at an intermediate level of control, since this relationship is nonlinear. Moreover, we show that both unused debt capacity and the increase in debt capacity are used by family firms to finance the relevant deals, but that these firms become overleveraged after merging, losing some financial flexibility in exchange for equity control purposes.
Keywords:
- Acquisitions,
- method of payment,
- family firms,
- leverage target,
- firm misevaluation
Résumé
On étudie l’impact d’un contrôle de type familial sur les moyens de paiement choisis lors d’acquisitions réalisées au niveau domestique et international. Cette décision sous-tend le niveau de flexibilité financière dont disposera ultérieurement la firme. Nos résultats montrent que le pourcentage du paiement réalisé à l’aide de liquidités augmente avec le niveau des droits de vote possédés par la famille, mais que la possession d’un «wedge» a l’effet inverse. Le risque de dilution joue un rôle crucial à des niveaux intermédiaires de contrôle. Enfin, les firmes familiales utilisent leur capacité d’endettement disponible pour financer ces opérations, mais deviennent surendettées après.
Mots-clés :
- Acquisitions,
- méthode de paiement,
- firmes familiales,
- ratio cible d’endettement,
- erreur d’évaluation de la firme
Resumen
Estudiamos el impacto de un control de tipo familiar de los medios de pago elegidos en los casos de adquisiciones locales e internacionales. Esta decisión se encuentra en la base del nivel de flexibilidad financiera de la se dispondrá la firma ulteriormente. Nuestros resultados muestran que el porcentaje de pago efectuado por medio de liquidez aumenta con el nivel de los derechos de voto que posee la familia, pero que la posesión de un «wedge» tiene el efecto inverso. El riesgo de dilución tiene un papel preponderante en los niveles intermedios de control. Por último, las firmas familiares utilizan la capacidad de endeudamiento de la que disponen para financiar estas operaciones, exponiéndose a un sobreendeudamiento.
Palabras clave:
- Adquisiciones,
- método de pago,
- firmas familiares,
- radio de endeudamiento,
- error de evaluación de la firma
Appendices
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