Abstracts
Abstract
This study develops and tests a theoretical framework which suggests that the relationship between the level of multi-territory (or multi-point) contact and rivalry takes the form of an inverted U-shaped relationship. Drawing on a large sample of European airlines over the period 2001-2006, we provide empirical support for the inverted U-shaped relationship between multi-territory contact and rivalry as reflected by entries into and exits from the territory of a competitor. We conclude that competition between firms exhibits successive periods of rivalry and forbearance, possibly independently of time and institutional settings.
Keywords:
- Multimarket contacts,
- Competitive dynamics,
- European airline industry
Résumé
Cet article propose et teste un modèle théorique qui suggère que la relation entre le niveau de contact multi-territoires (ou multipoints) et la rivalité entre compagnies aériennes européennes se caractérise par une forme en U inversé. Utilisant un échantillon important de compagnies aériennes sur la période 2002-2006, nous offrons une confirmation empirique de la relation en U inversé entre contacts multi-territoires et rivalité mesurés par les entrées et sorties des territoires d’un concurrent. Nous en concluons que la concurrence entre compagnies aériennes suit des périodes de rivalité et de retenue, peut-être indépendamment de la période et du contexte institutionnel.
Mots-clés :
- Contacts multi-marchés,
- dynamique concurrentielle,
- industrie européenne du transport aérien
Resumen
Este estudio desarrolla y prueba un modelo teórico que sugiere que la relación entre el nivel de contacto multiterritorial (o multipuntos) y la rivalidad entre compañías aéreas europeas adopta la forma de una U invertida. Basándose en una amplia muestra de las compañías aéreas europeas durante el período 2001-2006, se proporciona una confirmación empírica de la relación en forma de U invertida entre contacto multiterritorial y rivalidad, como se refleja en las entradas y salidas del territorio de un competidor. Se concluye que la competencia entre las empresas muestra períodos sucesivos de la rivalidad y de reserva, quizás independientemente del período y del contexto institucional.
Palabras clave:
- Contactos multimercados,
- contactos multi-mercados dinámica competitiva,
- aerolínea europea,
- transporte aéreo europeo
Appendices
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