Abstracts
Résumé
La théorie de l’agence est le modèle dominant permettant de préconiser des modalités de résolution du problème d’agence relatif à la séparation entre les propriétaires et les dirigeants. Cependant, un modèle alternatif a été proposé, la théorie de l’intendance (stewardship theory) fondée sur des hypothèses comportementales différentes. Ces hypothèses comportementales pourraient être valides dans certains contextes culturels. Le projet de cet article est donc d’analyser l’influence du cadre culturel sur les mécanismes de gouvernance, en prenant l’exemple des décisions d’investissement en R&D (Recherche et Développement), dans deux contextes culturels différents. Nos résultats empiriques dans le secteur des nouvelles technologies de l’information et de la communication montrent que la théorie de l’agence est pertinente pour comprendre la gouvernance dans un contexte de culture individualiste comme en France, tandis que la théorie de l’intendance (stewardship theory) est plutôt adaptée à une culture « communautaire » comme à Taiwan.
Mots-clés :
- Conseil d’Administration,
- R&D,
- France,
- Taiwan
Abstract
For many years, agency theory has been the dominant theory in the field of governance studies. An alternative model, the “stewardship theory”, was recently proposed based upon different behavioural hypotheses. These hypotheses may be true in certain cultural contexts. This paper intends to examine the impact of control mechanisms on the decisions of R&D (Research and Development) investment within the IT (Information and Technology) industry in two different national cultures. Our empirical results indicate that agency theory is pertinent in an individualistic culture such as in France while stewardship theory is rather appropriate in a collectivist culture such as in Taiwan.
Keywords:
- Board,
- R&D,
- France,
- Taiwan
Resumen
Desde hace muchos años la “agency theory” ha sido la teoría dominante en el campo de los estudios de gobierno corporativo. Recientemente, se ha propuesto un modelo alternativo basado en diferentes hipótesis comportamentales llamado el « stewardship theory ». Las hipótesis comportamentales pueden resultar validas en ciertos contextos culturales. Este articulo pretende examinar el impacto de los mecanismos de control sobre las decisiones de inversión en I+D (Investigación y Desarrollo) en la industria de Información y Tecnología en el contexto de dos culturas diferentes. Nuestros resultados empíricos revelan que el modelo « agency theory » es pertinente en culturas individualistas tales como la francesa mientras que el modelo « stewardship theory » se adapta mejor a culturas « comunitarias » tales como la taiwanesa.
Palabras clave:
- El Consejo,
- I + D (Investigación y Desarrollo),
- francesa,
- taiwanesa
Appendices
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