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REVIEW / COMPTES RENDUS

Lachance, André, dir. *Les marginaux, les exclus et l'Autre au Canada aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles*. Montréal, Fides, 1996, 327 p.

CE RECUEIL prend sous la loupe une population peu connue et des plus hétéroclites. Dans l'introduction, André Lachance présente les dix groupes qui, chacun à sa façon, étaient susceptibles d'habiter les marges de l'ancienne société canadienne. Parmi les marginaux potentiels, voire les candidats à l'exclusion, il range les infirmes, les vieillards, les enfants trouvés, les malades mentaux, les criminels et les bourreaux. Reste «l'Autre», catégorie qui regroupe ici les Amérindiens non réduits en esclavage, les esclaves amérindiens et noirs, les étrangers d'origine non française et... les couples séparés. Parfois seuls, parfois en tandem, l'historien sherbrookois et cinq de ses anciens étudiants s'attachent à tracer une image composite de chaque groupe. Sont principalement mises à contribution les sources judiciaires, hospitalières et notariales, ainsi que les données du Répertoire de la population du Québec ancien (RPQA). Une fois les fichiers vidés, les auteurs cherchent à saisir les attitudes de la majorité envers le groupe qu'ils étudient. Il s'agit, écrit A. Lachance, d'un moyen de «dévoiler les profondeurs sociales» (p. 10): révéler, à travers le sort réservé aux marginaux, non seulement les craintes du plus grand nombre, mais aussi les tensions entre les autorités et le peuple de la colonie.

Ce programme, où l'on reconnaîtra les préoccupations et les sources de prédilection de Lachance, est réalisé de façon partielle dans ce volume fouillé mais quelque peu improvisé. Présentons d'abord certains acquis. À partir des registres de l'Hôpital Général, Yoland Bouchard brosse un tableau sombre des «enfants du roi» (enfants trouvés) dans le gouvernement de Montréal: arrivés très jeunes, ils sont généralement baptisés en ville (il semble difficile de statuer sur le lieu de naissance de la plupart d'entre eux) et connaissent un taux de mortalité effarant. Dans son chapitre consacré aux malades mentaux, Guy Boisclair soumet les dossiers d'internement et d'interdiction du XVIIIe siècle, déjà défrichés par André Cellard, à une analyse plus poussée. Comme Cellard, il constate un certain durcissement du discours des juges lors des interrogatoires. Reste à savoir si ce changement touche l'ensemble de la société, comme le pense l'auteur, ou s'il n'est pas le fait d'un juge ou deux seulement, réagissant peut-être à la distance sociale accrue les séparant d'interrogés dont l'origine rurale semble s'accentuer à la fin du siècle.

Dans sa contribution portant sur les étrangers, Hélène Grenier rappelle que les immigrants qui n'étaient de souche ni amérindienne (le terme «immigrant» prenant ici un sens particulier) ni française étaient tout de même plusieurs centaines à s'établir au Canada. A partir

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d'un échantillon de 467 cas bien documentés, l'auteure fait ressortir avec une précision inédite la grande hétérogénéité du groupe quant à l'origine géographique, aux conditions d'arrivée (la captivité, le service militaire...) et au milieu socioprofessionnel. Le chapitre de Lachance et Sylvie Savoie sur les Amérindiens se veut quant à lui un résumé d'études récentes. Ecrit sans trop d'habileté ethnohistorique, il a tout de même le mérite de présenter des chiffres précis sur le mariage finalement peu fréquent entre colons et autochtones.

Notons en passant que plusieurs de ces études livrent d'utiles précisions concernant la clientèle des hôpitaux généraux (en l'occurrence celui de Montréal). Il y a peu d'infirmes, comme le fait remarquer André Lachance dans le premier chapitre, mais d'autant plus de vieillards, souvent fort âgés. Daniel Léveillé et Lachance montrent que la moitié de ces derniers décéderont après un séjour de moins d'un an - tout comme la majorité des enfants trouvés. Nous savons qu'il y avait peu de place pour les malades mentaux dans les hôpitaux; ici, les calculs de G. Boisclair ouvrent la porte à une circulation accrue de ces infortunés en faisant état d'une baisse marquée au cours du siècle de la durée de l'internement et de la proportion d'internés qui finissent leurs jours à l'hôpital. La désinstitutionnalisation ne date peut-être pas d'hier...

Les quatre autres chapitres se basent pour l'essentiel sur des publications antérieures; sans doute auraient-ils pu céder la place à une solide mise au point sur les connaissances acquises. Dans trois d'entre eux, A. Lachance lui-même mène la plume. Il rappelle les principales conclusions de son étude sur le bourreau, le plus «exclu» de tous, avant de retravailler des données déjà présentées dans son livre *Crimes et criminels* (1984) et d'analyser celles de M. Trudel sur l'esclavage. Enfin, dans le dernier chapitre du livre, version plus étoffée d'un article paru en 1986, Sylvie Savoie étudie les demandes de séparation. Si l'analyse des attentes sociales envers mari et femme profite des révisions, la nouvelle note 43 remet quelque peu en question la supposition de base de ce chapitre. Les demandes de séparation sont-elles invariablement le fait de couples aux prises avec des difficultés matrimoniales? La note évoque le cas de gens en faillite qui utilisent la séparation de biens pour sauver ce qui peut l'être des créanciers. Dans plusieurs de ces cas, la séparation témoigne peut-être davantage de l'union des conjoints face à l'adversité que du contraire.

Voici donc un ouvrage qui a le mérite de regarder la société canadienne à partir d'une perspective inhabituelle. Malheureusement, il marque aussi plusieurs occasions manquées. La plus importante concerne la comparaison avec la métropole et les colonies voisines, qui n'est pas abordée de façon systématique. Trop souvent dans *Les marginaux...*, les études sur la France servent à combler les lacunes de la documentation canadienne. D'éventuelles spécificités coloniales s'en trouvent gommées; le directeur du recueil ne pousse pas très loin sa réflexion sur ce qu'il qualifie un peu rapidement de «société coloniale française traditionnelle d'Ancien Régime avec tout ce que cela implique» (p. 14), société à laquelle la différence serait « difficilement acceptable » (p. 26).

La seconde faiblesse, qui contribue à la première, réside dans un certain malaise devant les chiffres. Rares sont les auteurs qui se penchent sur l'incidence des phénomènes qu'ils étudient. Cette tendance s'explique compte tenu des sources peu loquaces, mais encore faut-il exploiter à fond ces précieuses informations quantitatives que certains auteurs ont mis beaucoup d'énergie à rassembler. Pour ne citer que deux exemples, Léveillé et Lachance constatent bien le vieillissement (forcément limité, tout de même) de la population coloniale, mais ne mettent pas en rapport ce nombre croissant de vieillards avec le nombre d'hospitalisés, ne serait-ce qu'à Montréal, et ne donnent pas les chiffres absolus qui auraient per-mis au lecteur de le faire à leur place. De la même manière, il n'y a pas moyen d'établir la fraction des enfants illégitimes qui deviennent enfants du roi. La marginalité ne constitue pas «un problème social grave» pour la société canadienne, note A. Lachance (p. 25, 285). Mais encore... Ce qui traduit une troisième difficulté, celle de conclure une étude mal conceptualisée au départ. A l'exception des étrangers, dont seulement les mieux intégrés ont finalement été étudiés, au moins une partie des membres des groupes ciblés au départ s'avèrent être des marginaux. Le choix de ces groupes et non d'autres, dans une société qui compte après tout bien des clivages et bien des «marges», mais où en revanche beaucoup de gens vulnérables sont «bien cachés au fond des logis familiaux» (p. 23), relève de l'arbitraire sinon de l'anachronisme. Et comme les groupes étudiés sont bien souvent eux-mêmes hiérarchisés, à l'image de la société englobante, n'aurait-il pas mieux valu commencer, et non conclure, par une réflexion sur la pauvreté et ses manifestations? Déplorons pour terminer une vision périmée de la socio-économie canadienne (losqu'il est question notamment d'autosuffisance familiale et de la donation entre vifs) et une mise en forme déficiente (maladresses dans la présentation des données, incohérences de l'argumentation). Bref, ce livre fournit bien des informations utiles sur un sujet important - en attendant un traitement plus approfondi et plus cohérent.

Thomas Wien,
Université de Montréal

Tamara Myers, Kate Boyer, Mary Anne Poutanen and Steven Watt, eds., *Power, Place and Identity: Historical Studies of Social and Legal Regulation in Quebec* (McGill University, Montréal History Group 1998)

ONE OF THE MOST VIBRANT characteristics of Canadian legal history is its marked attention to regionalism. Undoubtedly reflecting the country it depicts, legal history scholarship has emerged in bursts of energy from disparate geographical centres, with conferences and publications highlighting the Atlantic, British Columbia and the Yukon, the prairies, and the old "Northwest." This collection of essays emerges from a 1996 conference in Québec, which brought together some of the finest socio-legal history experts for that province. A bilingual collective of graduate students, research, and teaching historians housed at McGill, the Montréal History Group has evolved into an energized, dynamic, collaborative support group that appears to have inspired some of the most innovative and exciting work currently coming out of Québec. The Montréal History Group is a spectacular example of the successful creation of "scholarly community." All of us should be asking some probing and detailed questions of its members, so we might discern how to replicate this successful model.

What has this remarkable Group brought us in this collection? Donald Fyson probes the day-to-day operations of the lowest level of the judicial system to locate the class, ethnic, and gender influences affecting law in the ancien regime. Fyson's meticulous research into the vast minutiae of records of the justices of the peace between 1785 and 1830 unravels much of the collected wisdom of earlier scholars. He demonstrates that rural, Francophone habitants did not "boycott" the lower criminal courts and that factors of class and gender did not always play out as we might have surmised. Fyson finds that although the system was

not "class-neutral," members of the "popular classes" actively made use of the lower criminal courts. He also uses convincingly quantitative data to show that female victims of crime frequently sought legal protection from violent husbands, and that justices at the Quarter Sessions appear to have taken domestic violence surprisingly seriously.

Brian Young explores the role of the Volunteer Militia in early 19th-century Lower Canada, documenting their bloody and vengeful attacks upon rebellious patriots, strikers, and election mobs. Young evokes vivid images of John Samuel McCord, the epitome of Anglican British Tory respectability, who exploited his position as commander of a volunteer troop to expand his power and reputation. Young paints an extraordinary picture of McCord, selecting and outfitting his own troop of Volunteers, while touting written copies of the "Riot Act" safely tucked into his vest pocket. Young argues convincingly that the company, subsequently dubbed the "butchers of Montréal" by Denis-Benjamin Papineau, constituted a disciplined reminder of British presence, and helped to forge tenacious bonds of masculinity, "ethnic purity," and social class.

Bettina Bradbury's study of dower in mid-19th-century Quebec examines how an elite group of men from the Special Council of Lower Canada trampled upon the legal rights of widows, while expanding the powers of propertied males. She describes how British merchants deliberated "behind closed doors" to refashion the law of dower in 1841, castigating the legal doctrine as an outmoded form of "French chivalry," and "a feudal devil casting widows' mourning weeds" over the free exchange of land. Bradbury provides a fascinating discussion of the implications of this legal change, which left propertied men free to dispose of their land without hindrance, exercising patriarchal "benevolence" as they saw fit.

Peter Gossage explores the response of civil law to domestic conflict within "step-families" from 1841 to 1890 in Québec. His painstaking search of reported case files reveals several types of disputes: 1) struggles over custody of step-children; 2) litigation regarding obligations to provide financial support to dependent step-children or step-parents; and 3) disputes over inheritance. Gossage assesses the evidence from legal records against the widespread cultural archetypes of "wicked step-mothers," and concludes that although remarriage could exacerbate family frictions, by and large the legal disputes of step-families were not markedly distinct from those of biological families.

Mary Anne Poutanen's contribution is a superb study of early 19th-century prostitution, that uses richly-detailed legal records to provide glimpses into the lives of Montréal prostitutes. Poutanen captures their geographic distribution, their actual working conditions, and their daily interactions with clients and neighbours. She documents sexual trysts with soldiers, sailors, and immigrant labourers, who purchased a variety of services in fancy brothels in fashionable neighbourhoods, orchard meadows, unlicensed tippling houses, and the attics and cellars of uninhabitable, abandoned houses. In this fine article, Poutanen unearths historical detail that would put many historians into rapture.

Sarah Schmidt's study of turn-of-the-century Montréal parks, vagabonds, and "indiscrete" courting couples is equally evocative. Parks proliferated during this dynamic period, in response to the demands of environmental urban reformers, who sought to construct "natural" domestic sanctuaries for white, middle-class, and "deserving poor" families, as well as "respectable" mothers out strolling with children. Homeless "tramps," "lazy loafers," and "sexual delinquents" waiting for "pick ups," who "polluted" the parks with their "moral filth," were peremptorily dispatched, through vigilant enforcement of loitering laws if necessary.

Kate Boyer examines the "respectability" of female clerical workers at the Bank of Nova Scotia, Bank of Montreal, Sun Life Assurance Company, and the Montréal *Herald* between 1920 and 1930. Jobs in the expanding clerical sector were occupied by white, middle- and working-class women possessed of high school and secretarial training. Boyer describes how such women broke through traditionally-segregated employment patterns into the newly-established, mixed-sex working environments of downtown financial buildings. With astute attention to detail, Boyer documents the resulting cultural unease, and the careful negotiation of appearance, dress, and deportment that such cultural anxiety provoked.

Suzanne Morton has produced an intriguing study of gambling in the city of Montréal in the 1940s. Her research profiles the homosocial, masculinized culture of placing bets, playing cards, and rolling dice in the pool halls, barber shops, and tobacco stores of Canada's exotic "bit of Paris in North America." She profiles the (ineffective) legal restrictions on commercial gambling, an industry thought to gross over $100 million per year by the middle of the decade. Morton also describes how gambling could induce the crossing of many social boundaries, from class to ethnicity, language, and religion. The invariable exceptions, however, were the segregated Chinese gambling clubs, that bore the brunt of discriminatory policing and racially-specific legal crackdowns.

This is a first-class collection of papers, ambitious in scope, meticulous in execution, and beautifully edited by Myers, Boyer, Poutanen, and Watt. Someone should be watching over the Montréal History Group, showering it with funds, expanding its reach, and sending its members across the country to proselytize the rest of us into assembling similar, cooperative pools of talent.

Constance Backhouse
University of Western Ontario

Angus McLaren, *The Trials of Masculinity: Policing Sexual Boundaries, 1870-1930* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press 1997)

IN THIS IMPORTANT BOOK, Angus McLaren proves that the "hype" raised about masculinity in the late 1980s and early 1990s can produce a work of substantial historical scholarship. McLaren's deft skills as a historian make this book not only a valuable contribution to gender studies, but also a methodological guidebook for scholars in all disciplines who have wondered how to approach the subject of masculinity. The *Trials of Masculinity* demonstrates the need to treat masculinity as a historically changing concept which acquires meaning contextually through contests of inclusion and exclusion. In particular, McLaren looks to the worlds of late 19th and early 20th-century law and medicine to explore significant gender "trials" that shaped and defined the meanings of manliness.

The decades preceding and following 1900 witnessed tremendous challenges to accepted standards of gender relations. Suffragists and early feminists forced changes to electoral systems while middle- and working-class women's pursuit of waged labour and commercial enjoyment altered gendered notions of public and private spaces. The attendant efforts to regulate women's behaviour by social reformers and the backlash by conservative anti-suffragists are well known to historians. But McLaren tells us that attempts to regulate unruly women often worked through intermediaries who were themselves disciplined. For example, the campaign to re-institute flogging as a form of corporal punishment in Britain usually targeted male sexual deviants. Pederasts, perverts, vagrants, and procurers were the individuals most likely to face the lash while other criminals escaped corporal punishment. Given that conservatives were flogging's strongest backers, claims that the lash was meant to protect women are questionable. It is unlikely that these men would protect women who, upon venturing into the public sphere, encountered roughness and violence. McLaren suggests a more plausible agenda. While they may have been motivated in part by protective paternalism, he argues that flogging's supporters were primarily concerned with the establishment and protection of standards of acceptable manhood. In a period of massive threats to gender relations, middle- and upper-class men sought to establish their own acceptable status by casting out masculine "others." Looking beyond the flogging campaigns, McLaren finds that attempts to rid manhood of unwanted types infused many fields including law, medicine, literature, politics, and popular culture. What follows in the book is a thematically organized discussion of the political, cultural, and oftentimes, extremely personal consequences of these battles in the areas of law and medicine.

For example, in the area of the law, McLaren questions the gendered implications of turn-of-the-century French bigamy law. Bigamy trials allowed women and children an incredibly active role in legal proceedings — a role that seemed to challenge patriarchy — but "in reality," McLaren claims, "upper-class men, who controlled the judicial system, were employing the law against lower-class males." While some women may have benefitted, the "criminal code was employed ... not so much to speak to the needs of such women but rather to bring the lower classes within the pale of the law, to impose on them the moral standards of their social superiors." (70) In this way, bigamy law not only protected men's power within the patriarchal family, it also worked to define family practice in middle-class terms.

In other legal discourses, masculinity united men of different classes. In the polarized legal arena, disputes between plaintiffs or the crown and defendants could hinge on questions of manhood. To be deemed a cad, a fill, or a gentleman was to assume a distinct position before the law. McLaren takes us far from London and Paris, to early 20th-century British Columbia, where many men charged with murder cast themselves in a cloak of idealized manhood: out of these trials we see that such a man was supposed to be a hard worker and a fair fighter who neither sought out, nor fled from, violence. The legal question of manliness came up most often in cases of honour such as murders resulting from allegedly unwanted homosexual advances or from discovered adulterous liaisons. Those murderers who successfully cast themselves in a manly image gained not only the sympathy of judge and jury but, sometimes, an acquittal.

Criminal juries were not alone in assuming that violence was a vital part of normal masculinity; throughout the late 19th and early 20th-century medical and scientific authorities created categories of non-men, of sexual misfits who did not meet proscribed standards of forceful male gender and sexuality. Their names are familiar to us today: transvestite, exhibitionist, sadist, and weakling (or neurasthenic). Although not expressly dealt with in the book, the homosexual could also be placed on this list. McLaren argues that the emergence of these medical "types" in the late 19th-century was not accidental and was linked to deep cultural tensions in the industrializing west. Each emerged from attempts by "learned" and "objective" observers to explain apparently irrational behaviour. McLaren's reading of this "medicalization of male sexual deviancy" (134) unmasks the cultural underpinnings of the era's positivist thought. In particular, it reveals the enormous importance of the notion that the sexes were "opposite" — that if one was not masculine one was necessarily feminine.

Of the examples McLaren gives us, the case of transvestism uniquely illustrates the melange of cultural, scientific, and prejudicial elements in the period's medical discourse. On the one hand, female cross-dressing made sense. A woman could gain status and social range if mistaken for a man. But the case of a man taking on women's clothing baffled and worried early 20th-century observers. A rational man should not have taken on women's trappings. Moreover, by showcasing the slippery slope between sex and gender, transvestism provided evidence for the social construction of gender roles, evidence that many experts were unprepared to accept. In response, the medical establishment and much of the public treated transvestism as, at worst, repulsive and, at best, "sick." McLaren argues that the late 19th and early 20th-century medicalization of transvestism shows that "the authorities had succeeded in turning apparent violations of sex and gender roles to the purposes of reinforcing heterosexual order. Such cases, far from shaking the public out of its social complacency, reinforced suspicions of any straying from the hegemonic model of masculinity." (231) In establishing scientific discourse that claimed to know transvestism (as well as exhibitionism, sadism, and homosexuality), medical authorities defused the cultural and political challenges of many behaviours that transgressed gender and sexual norms. As in the case of the law, physicians and scientists worked under the assumption "that there was one essential form of masculinity .... What they did not realize themselves is that the model of masculinity that they took as given was one that they were actually helping to construct." (238)

Some will want to criticize McLaren's geographical eclecticism. As he himself admits, the book refuses to treat "strong national traditions" exclusively. Certainly, the reviewer's task is made difficult by this varied terrain: Englishmen of the 1880s may have been Victorians but can we refer to Frenchwomen or Italians in the same way? Yet, *The Trials of Masculinity* is ultimately satisfying because of its broad approach. There are similarities between gender relations in turn-of-the-century Britain, France, and North America. And McLaren masterfully draws out these similarities without losing the integrity of the moment, let alone the nation.

Chris Dummitt
Simon Fraser University

Craig Heron, ed., *The Workers' Revolt in Canada, 1917-1925* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1998)

UNLIKE MOST EDITED VOLUMES, Craig Heron's *The Workers' Revolt in Canada, 1917-1925* has a tightly woven argument and mostly unified methodology. The nine chapters by as many different authors argue convincingly that the Winnipeg General Strike of 1919 was not an isolated incident. The book demonstrates that Canadian workers and their families participated in a nationwide social upheaval in the country at the end of World War I, albeit one differentiated by region, ethnicity, gender, and industry. Utilizing regional history, the authors of the individual chapters agree that Canada's working class engaged in a genuine challenge to authority and capitalist relations of production. Strengthened by the Great War's full employment, from the Maritimes to British Columbia, Canadians crossed traditional gender and ethnic divides to organize and strike for a better life. Their defeat in the depression the 1920s shaped Canadian politics thereafter by removing a radical voice from the public sphere.

Heron's thoughtful introduction argues that the end of World War I and the coming to power of the Bolsheviks in Russia led to "a dramatic convergence of working-class discontent, militancy, and socialism ... on an international scale." (3) The book then attempts to show that Canada was not an exception but rather participated in that worldwide labor revolt. Heron argues that Canadian historians have mistakenly focused on the 1919 Winnipeg general strike as the unique Canadian response to world-wide events, whereas there occurred, according to the book's various authors, a nationwide working-class uprising that threatened to bring socialism and workers' power to the forefront in Canadian society.

In the opening chapter, Heron and Siemiatycki contend that World War I, "the Great War," virtually created the workers' rebellion. It made workers "free from the haunting fear of unemployment and bottomless poverty ...." (19) At the same time, it brought the state into the economy in an unprecedented fashion through wartime regulation, while also pulling workers into the state through calls for patriotism and sacrifice. The combination proved explosive when many workers felt that the rich were not sharing their sacrifices, leading to an upsurge in workplace actions. The rest of the chapters develop this argument through the provinces.

Ian McKay and Suzanne Morton show that the Maritimes do not fit the stereotype of "an unchanging, innately conservative" society. Instead, a worker rebellion developed there that followed the general pattern in Canada — a complex labour movement divided by ethnicity, gender, and labourite vs. Socialist ideologies, with early success towards the end of the war, followed by defeat when wartime production ceased and workers later confronted unemployment and strong employer and state resistance. In the chapter on Québec, Geoffrey Ewen argues that "workers wanted greater influence in politics, more control over the shop floor, and a new relationship with the economic and political elites." (88) However, the "labour revolt in Quebec, as elsewhere, was ultimately unsuccessful, a failure attributable to employer intransigence, high levels of unemployment during the depression of the 1920s, and profound divisions with Quebec's working class." (132)

James Naylor's chapter on southern Ontario follows the general argument of the book but does an excellent job of showing the political importance of ethnicity, particularly with regard to Jewish and non-Anglo workers and the unionist vs. electoral politics that came to divide the labour movement. Naylor joined with Tom Mitchell on the chapter about the prairies, "In the Eye of the Storm." They debate a historiography that has limited the workers' revolt to "merely seeking basic collective bargaining rights," claiming that the Winnipeg general strike "triggered a historic reformation of both social relations and the Canadian state." (176)

Allen Seager and David Roth tackle British Columbia in the chapter that makes the strongest use of quantitative data in the volume. They define the relevant social groups through numerical data, inadvertently pointing to a weakness in the previous chapters, where numbers could strengthen the overall argument. The use of data on the growth of female employment and importance of immigrant labour in BC is exceptional. The authors contend that the defeat of the general strike in BC led to a collapse of left-wing leadership in the labour movement, in a region where the Industrial Workers of the World and other militant groups had once been active. This fits Heron's conclusion, where he notes that the most permanent legacy of the failed labour revolt was the hardening of ideological divisions within the Canadian labour movement, and the inability of most workers to dream of once again challenging capitalist relations of production.

The *Workers' Revolt in Canada, 1917-1925* is methodologically the old labour history —with its emphasis on unions, the state, and strikes — with a mixture of some new labour history —identity, women, minorities — that doesn't fit too well. Curiously, the old labour history in the book is strong with one critical exception. This is a book about a class challenge to authority, one that failed politically and therefore disappeared from much Canadian history. Labour historians of the old school came to use quantitative data in powerful ways to show class and its importance. More numbers would help this volume. In this sense, only Seager and Roth fully take advantage of the old labour history's institutional strengths, including quantitative data.

Meanwhile, only Naylor utilizes the new labour history as something other than an appendage. Heron's book is strong on class while much of the new labour history has subordinated class to "identities." It is refreshing to find a group of scholars consistent in their use of class. Nonetheless, whatever the deficiencies of the new histories, they have expanded the meaning of politics to include culture, an argument that would strengthen this volume. Still, the uniformity of argument and method that cuts across the chapters is quite impressive.

The question becomes, however, is it convincing? In one sense, it is. The book persuasively argues that there indeed took place in Canada a workers' revolt that in some sense went beyond immediate goals to challenge fundamental aspects of class relations in the country. On the other hand, without more quantitative and institutional data, it is hard to judge the extent to which the revolt impacted the larger society. Ultimately, the book is strongest where it is weakest: the old labour history's use of institutions. It would help to understand the degree to which institutions — unions, political parties, strike movements — came from cultural changes and created cultural changes. To what degree did the workers' revolt in Canada permanently affect thought and language? Was the political defeat of the 1920s also a cultural defeat? If workers do not take over the state, is defeat permanent? The book implicitly raises these questions but lacks the methodology to answer them.

On the larger question of Canada's labour revolt at the end of World War I, Heron and his co-authors have made a striking contribution to a growing literature that demonstrates that the social and economic changes of the late 19th century, culminating in the dramatic events of "the Great War," did generate a challenge to authority among the working classes around the world. In this sense, the Russian Revolution was only the outstanding example. Heron's volume demonstrates that in North America (Canada, the US, and Mexico), the working class challenge to authority ultimately did change the social relations of production in each country, although in unique national, regional, and industry-wide patterns. Although this is most obvious in Mexico, with its new labour codes that dated from the 1917 revolution, it is also true in the US and Canada, with their later expansion of the franchise, welfare state provisions, and sometimes progressive labour laws. Heron's heroes did not win their revolt, but the book's conclusion about labour's defeat is based on the still viable methods of an older methodology. Perhaps the defeat was not quite so pervasive as these authors would admit.

The use of regional, national, and world history, the insistent focus on class, the scholarly integration of secondary and primary sources, and the ability to use institutions to understand the creation of national political culture make this volume an important contribution to Canadian and North American labour history.

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J.E. Rea, *T.A. Crerar: A Political Biography* (Montréal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press 1997)

THIS IS A REASONABLY GOOD and long-overdue biography of an important farm leader and political figure. Thomas Alexander ("T.A.") Crerar was president of the Grain Growers' Grain Company and its successor, the United Grain Growers, from 1907 to 1929. He entered the Union government as minister of agriculture in 1917, but left the cabinet in protest over the 1919 budget. He soon headed the newly formed federal agrarian Progressive party which won 65 seats in the 1921 election, shattering the two-party system and resulting in the first minority government. He resigned as party leader in 1922, and entered King's cabinet in 1929, shortly before the Liberal defeat in 1930. As King's minister of mines and resources starting in 1935, a member of perhaps the strongest cabinet in Canadian history, Crerar contributed to mining and northern development, and played a significant role in the Cabinet War Committee. He was a senator from 1945 to 1966.

Aptly described as a "Gladstonian liberal," (256) Crerar promoted low tariffs and the virtues of self-reliance, hard work, and voluntary co-operation. He believed in the justice of the free market, and disliked most forms of state intervention, including price fixing and compulsory marketing of grain, except as emergency measures. Though an early supporter of budgetary deficits to fight the Depression, he argued that governments must balance their budgets in the long run. While endorsing progressive taxation and some social programs, he opposed the principle of universality, maintaining that governments should not give money to those not needing it. After World War II, he warned of the dangers of government debt, bureaucratic power, and a culture of dependence brought on by social security.

Using Crerar's personal papers as his main source, Rea very effectively explores many aspects of Canadian political history from Crerar's perspective, including the farm movement, the conscription crises of both World Wars, the nationalization of railways, imperialism and the growth of Canadian nationalism, foreign affairs, federal-provincial and French-English relations, the emergence of the welfare state, political partisanism, tensions within the Liberal party, and many specific issues such as Canada's failure to aid Jewish refugees fleeing Nazism, although he says very little about women.

To some extent, Rea succeeds in showing that Crerar's contributions as a public figure have not been fully appreciated. At the same time, he tends to be an apologist of his subject, though less so than most biographers of Canadian agrarian leaders. While making some negative judgements about Crerar, he sides with Crerar on most issues. He appears to favour the United Grain Growers (Crerar's company) over the Saskatchewan Co-operative Elevator company and the wheat pools, and more or less shares Crerar's critical views of J.J. Morrison, a United Farmers of Ontario leader, and Henry Wise Wood, president of the United Farmers of Alberta (UFA). He accuses Wood of evading responsibility because he declined to run for public office, seems to agree with Crerar that Wood's views on "class" political action and group government were a grave "danger," (72) and apparently accepts Crerar's argument that the Progressive party disintegrated partly because Wood, Morrison, and others felt the party should only represent farmers. Rea fails, like Crerar, to explain why agrarian politics was most successful in Alberta where Wood's ideas held sway. The UFA government and many UFA MPs held power until 1935, but outside Alberta, where Crerar's notion generally prevailed that Progressivism must create a reformed Liberal party by "broadening out" to include all occupational groups, the agrarian political movement was in serious decline by 1925.

Moreover, it is questionable whether Crerar's objection to balance of power politics as advocated by some Progressives, especially UFA members, was sound. The former Progressives who joined the Liberals in the 1920s likely could have done more for farmers had they remained independent and worked as a bloc with the other Progressives to force the government to pass beneficial legislation.

Rea's sympathies sometimes prevent him from explaining inconsistencies in Crerar. There is little consideration of why Crerar, as a former leader of the Progressive party which sought to end patronage and abolish or reform the Senate, involved himself as a Liberal cabinet minister in patronage appointments and yearned for a Senate seat — which he got in 1945 and held for two decades.

In focusing on Crerar's perspective, Rea sometimes overestimates, like many biographers of agrarian figures, the influence and significance of Crerar and others like him, and, in so doing, views the farm movement from the "top down," as if the leadership pulled the movement's strings. He overstates the importance of Crerar's speeches at political rallies for subsequent victories; conveys the erroneous impression that Crerar largely created the Farmers' Platform; and greatly exaggerates the power of Henry Wise Wood over the UFA, asserting that he had tight control over the organization. In fact, the Farmers' Platform was essentially a summary of rank and file demands, and UFA delegate democracy ensured that Wood was under the membership's rein, at least before 1922; he did not control the resolutions passed at the 1920 UFA convention, as Rea contends. Rea, in short, fails to recognize that the early agrarian movement, particularly in Alberta, was a grassroots movement; it was not orchestrated by a few "great men." One reason Crerar resigned as leader of the Progressive party was his frustration over not being able to assert party discipline; many Progressive MPs felt more responsible to their constituents than to their party.

Although he focuses on Crerar's perspective, Rea does not fully explore Crerar's intellectual development. There is brief mention of his Scots inheritance and rural Manitoba background as reasons for his liberalism, and some discussion of his business experience. Rea pays more attention to the influence of the "Sanhedrin," a group of close friends — including John Dafoe of the *Manitoba Free Press*; A.B. Hudson, a Liberal Manitoba attorney general and MP; and Frank Fowler, manager of the Grain Exchange Clearing House, with whom Crerar regularly discussed issues. Yet Rea says practically nothing about Crerar's opinions on religion and how they may have shaped his outlook.

At the same time, he briefly discusses Crerar's ideas about, and relation to, labour. We read that the *Labor News* criticized Crerar for entering the Union government; that, during World War I, Crerar hoped to attract labour to a general political movement, but later doubted there could be any permanent alliance between farmers and workers; that he tried to have the Social Democratic party excluded from Ottawa's ban on "subversive" organizations; that he disapproved of the Winnipeg General Strike while conceding that much of the discontent behind it was valid; that R.H. Cobb, assistant grand chief of the Brotherhood of Railway Engineers, endorsed Crerar as a political candidate in 1929-30, although the Labor Party fielded a candidate against him in the 1930 election; that Crerar refused to accede to Ontario Premier Mitchell Hepburn's demand that American union organizers be deported that, during World War II, Crerar opposed any exceptions to the government's wage control policy, yet agreed to include collective bargaining rights in a labour code while stipulating that neither a union nor an employer should be able to break a contract between them without penalty.

Rea's chronological organization is generally clear, although it occasionally results in unnecessary repetition. The discussion in the last chapter of Crerar's reminiscences about the coming of family allowances should have been incorporated into the section in the wartime chapter on this subject. But despite its shortcomings, *T.A. Crerar: A Political Life* is a well-researched and workmanlike, if somewhat uninspiring, analysis of a "prominent Canadian politician."

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Richard A. Rajala, *Clearcutting the Pacific Rain Forest: Production, Science and Regulation* (Vancouver: UBC Press 1998)

THE AIM OF THIS HISTORY is to trace "both the technological and managerial structures of forest exploitation and the role of government in regulating the conduct of large corporations." (xix) The author notes that this amounts to a history of clearcutting from 1880 to 1965 because that was the primary method of harvesting following the mechanization of logging. The geographical range includes Oregon, Washington, and British Columbia, and the forests under study consist of the dwindling Douglas fir stands on both sides of the border.

The book is divided into two sections, a shorter one providing a neo-Marxist analysis of labour practices and technology in the industry; the other, of forestry practices and environmental concerns. The common theme is exploitation of labour and nature. Clearcutting was a method not only of decimating the forest cover, but also of reducing labour costs and keeping labour under control.

The book's strength lies in the detailed examination of technological change and managerial practices in the first section. While descriptions of technology have been provided in numerous other sources, Rajala provides a much more detailed and more analytical view than has generally been given. The automation of logging and milling took place after 1965, but similar interests were at stake in both mechanization and automation. The combination of industrial expansion and reduction of labour input per cubic metre cut was already evident in the pre-1965 period. The process sped up after 1965, where reductions in labour intensity increased dramatically despite the massive increase in capacity of sawmills and pulpmills and consequently of logging volumes.

His treatment of managerial practices is useful, if predictable. He describes logging as a "factory" process, showing how both the development of technology and the organization of work in the woods was modeled on the assembly line in manufacturing industries. Harry Braverman's analysis of scientific management, and the principle enunciated by Frederick W. Taylor (Taylorism) provide the basis for managing the factory regime. Beyond these, there was the development of professional forestry, that is, an academic discipline devoted to enabling large forest companies to increase their wealth and control workers more effectively. Rajala discusses the relationship between timber capital and universities in this process.

Forest administration in Canada and the United States differed because of the differences in extent of public ownership and the role of federal and local (state or provincial) governments. In the United States, federal authorities had considerably more influence. Provincial control of forestry in Canada blocked the development of any national policies. But while the jurisdictions differed, and the federal agencies in the United States apparently provided somewhat more leadership for regulation on environmental grounds, ultimately the two regions were equally devastated by the assault on the forest. Even during the 1930s, to which Rajala devotes a chapter, the factory regime managed to stay intact while a "market-driven version of selective logging" was incorporated.

From 1940 to 1965, says Rajala, the industry gained more control and rejected environmental improvements in its methods. Curiously, he seems to accept at face value the "sustained-yield" model of forest management in BC criticizing the industry and government for failing to enforce it rather than recognizing that it was weak to begin with.

Probably because of his focus on the Douglas fir as a lumber resource, he fails to pay attention to the vast growth of the pulp and paper industry during the post-war period, and in relation to this, the exploitation of hemlock, some spruce, and later, lodgepole pine as industrial fibre sources. These "new" sources of timber altered both the calculations of how much wood there was in the Pacific region, and the meaning of "sustained yield." Moreover, the emergence of the pulp industry in BC's interior regions opened up a whole new forest resource for exploitation. Expansion of the industry to this region began before 1965. The rush to take advantage of the vast resources there reduced concerns for regenerating remaining stands at the coast.

However, Rajala's detailed study of the issues as understood by Chief Justice Sloan, and the influences to which he was subject in his writing of the Sloan Commission reports in the mid-1940s and mid-1950s is a very useful contribution to historical scholarship. Rajala rightly recognizes these reports, and the beliefs and practices of the period in which they were written, as pivotal to the expansion of the industry after that time.

One senses that Rajala is more knowledgeable about the struggles in the US context than in the Canadian one. This might be because the literature is more abundant and a critical literature began to emerge earlier. However, there are some significant gaps in his awareness of scholarship and journalistic accounts in British Columbia over the past three decades, and a curious reliance at some stages on writers who wrote about the Atlantic and Ontario regions rather than BC.

The focus is on logging, and that is enough for one study, but one hopes that a further study might focus on sawmills and pulpmills where the factory model was more complete than in the woods. As it is, this book would have been strengthened by more attention to the lumber and pulp establishments in relation to logging.

On balance, I found this book to be a useful reference work, especially on technological change and government legislation from 1930s to the 1960s. It does what few others have attempted: it combines a critique of clearcutting with an analysis of labour practices. A weakness which might not disturb others who prefer depictions that are "clean and clear" is, to my mind, the failure to recognize that often the actors in this drama had no idea what the devil they were doing. They were embedded in an epoch and its version of progress. Forestry and engineering schools were established on that version. Environmentalism as a cause existed, to be sure, but not yet as a widespread movement. All along the Pacific coast the economy depended on the export of semi-processed wood products. It is only two decades or so since alternative economic options freed an educated population to earn its keep elsewhere, and that made way for urban demands for the liberation of the forest from the feller-bunchers and high-lead logging. This contextualizing makes the picture messier, and somewhat softens the image of the bad guys who clearcut, managed, and administered the clearcutting regime. But our understanding of history, in my view requires acknowledgment of the context as well as of the evils of the time.

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Peter Warrian, *Hard Bargain: Transforming Public Sector Labour-Management Relations* (Toronto: McGilligan Books 1996)

IN *HARD BARGAIN*, Peter Warrian argues that the broad Canadian public sector must abandon the American inspired adversarial model of labour relations and, following the lead of the private sector, institute a more market adhering, "post-Wagnerist" model more appropriate to the current reign of neo-liberalism. For its part, public sector labour should foreswear its untenable job-control unionism for a more collaborative and, consequently, employment securing relationship with public sector employers. This attitudinal shift would facilitate the introduction into the public realm of many of the workplace innovations currently in vogue among private sector collective bargaining practicioners across Canada, thereby reducing the incentive for government to privatize its labour intensive activities.

Warrian's argument in support of this reform proposal is unconvincing on the basis of both the evidence provided and manner of its presentation. Before discussing the merits of the argument, I will comment briefly on the style of its presentation. Of the three core case studies in the volume — Ontario health care, Toronto social services, and Ontario Hydro — only the last occupies a substantial portion of its respective chapter. Even in this case, there is little critical analysis of the data presented therein. Indeed, much of the space in this already thin volume is taken up by "boxed" snapshots of public sector practices in other countries. However, without any accompanying commentary, their relevance to the encompassing argument remains unclear. The best part of the volume is near the end of the concluding chapter where Warrian lays out his post-Wagnerist reform proposals for his target audience, the then-current Ontario government of Mike Harris (168-71). Yet, the force of even this penultimate part is undermined by the preceding weak attempt at rallying scholarly support for his strategic plan.

As for the argument itself, first off, it is puzzling why Warrian sees Wagnerism as the primary obstacle to the creation of better collective relations in the public sector. As he shows in Chapter five, many collective bargaining partnerships in the Canadian private sector have established more collaborative relational structures during the last few decades. Furthermore, the author has firsthand knowledge of this type of meso-level corporatist experimentation from his tenure as executive director during the 1980s of the joint union-employer managed Canadian Steel Trade and Employment Congress. He should be well aware that such relational innovations have been implemented without there having been any major changes in the encompassing Wagner-inspired labour relations regulatory regime. More to the point, rather than impeding producer group collaboration, the "power resources" garnered by labour from this and other Fordist era institutional structures undoubtedly helped push hesitant employers into such joint policy-making forums.

Secondly, as Warrian acknowledges in his conclusion, "the other prospective partners —employers and government [in the public sector] — have to want to play the game." (168) However, he also points out there is little indication that either is interested in maintaining a significant role for the state in service provisioning beyond that of property protection, let alone in cultivating harmonious collective bargaining practices in what remains. Certainly the domestic avatars of Thatcherism held up as portents of the new public sector regime throughout the volume — Harris in Ontario and Klein in Alberta — have shown little interest in cooperating with organized labour. Warrian's advice to public sector unions to abandon their traditional defensive posture and be more accommodative of the drive to marketize the public sector would leave the more radical sections of the New Right even less constrained in their ongoing crusade to both dismantle the welfare state and eviscerate organized labour.

Finally, the overall weakness in the argument of *Hard Bargain* is derivative of its primary premise: that the changes in the public sector described therein, and the relational reforms which Warrian prescribes, are primarily impelled by long-term global economic factors rather than political ones. (27-8, 49-50, 165-8) The purported debt-deficit crisis in public finances means that there is no alternative to his new model. However, while they may disagree on the prescription, scholarly analysts from across the political spectrum are in agreement that the exhaustion of American-style Fordism-Keynsesianism was due to the failure of policy-makers to address inter-related political and economic problems in a timely manner. Similarly, the application of neoliberal nostrums to treat the symptoms of the ensuing crisis was politically-ideologically driven. Yet, Warrian's preoccupation with the public sector policies of Thatcherist Britain and New Zealand, and Alberta and Ontario, and his cursory treatment of more labour friendly public sector reforms undertaken by other provincial administrations elsewhere in Canada, (61) indicates Warrian's steadfast belief in TINA (There Is No Alternative).

Warrian's advice to organized labour to foreswear resistance and to gracefully adapt to whatever the state-as-employer chooses to do with the public sector is dangerous for both labour and the public. It also demonstrates a surprising ignorance of the labour movement's successful use of both its economic and its political power in the past to effect the amelioration of the more negative affects of market competition. A critical episode of this struggle was labour's role in the design, elaboration, and institutionalization of Wagnerism in the wake of the crisis of the 1930s. By substituting autonomous, sector-wide industrial unions for the captive company unions then extant, interplant/-firm competition on the back of labour was foreclosed, labour was guaranteed a share of the benefits from increases in productivity, and an expansive public-sector/welfare state was given a solid political-economic foundation. Leaving aside any discussion of its relative merits, it seems unclear how public sector employers could be forced to institute Warrian's "new approach" to labour-management relations (169-70) without labour exercising the political and economic muscle which it garnered in large part from Wagnerism.

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Nicholas DeMaria Harney, *Eh, Paesan!: Being Italian in Toronto* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1998)

EH, PAESAN! is a welcome addition to the growing body of literature dealing with various social, cultural, and historical aspects of Canada's post-World War II Italian "community." It is also a welcome addition to recent works that attempt to examine local phenomena within the broader context of global issues and movements. Nicholas D. Harney examines "the relationship between the transnational movement of people, ideas, products ... and the creation of ethnic identity and ethnic community" among Italian Canadians in the greater Toronto area. More specifically, he begins from the position that ethnic identity and ethnic community are not concrete, fixed categories that can be understood in terms of simple criteria, and then proceeds to examine a number of processes involved in the social construction of Italianness.

Toronto, however, is a large urban centre populated by close to 500,000 Italian Canadians. The thought of examining the social construction of Italianness within a population of this size is mind-boggling — especially when one considers the competing loyalties, and sometimes tensions, that exist among people who were born in or trace their ancestry to different regions of Italy. To his credit, Harney is able to accomplish this goal by establishing specific parameters for the study. He focuses on a number of Italian-Canadian voluntary associations and institutions, and examines the role they play as key sites in the continuous process of fashioning and refashioning Italianness. As part of this discussion, he explores the links these formal structures have developed with local, provincial, national, and transnational institutions and governments; and, how these links contribute to the construction of ethnicity.

In Chapters 4 and 6, for instance, Harney concentrates on ethnocultural organizations such as the Columbus Centre, Villa Charities, and Centro Scuola. He examines how these organizations attempt to serve certain needs within the Italian-Canadian "community" (including the promotion of Italian language and culture); provide a bridge between the "community" and the general public; and, contribute to the creation of a public image of Italian Canadians as a unified force or entity within Toronto. Chapters five, seven, and eight, in contrast, focus on associations that promote an ethnic identity based more on Italian regional and hometown loyalties. My reading of *Eh, Paesan!* is that Italianness is not something static, but rather something that, at least in part, comes out of people's involvement with the various processes and tensions taking place within and between these formal structures. Ethnic identity, as Harney demonstrates, is a complex phenomenon; its meaning is ambiguous, variable, and often involves competing interests.

In terms of style, Harney makes use of two techniques which allow him to include himself in the writing and give the presentation a sense of immediacy. The first involves use of the notion of journey as a metaphor for discussing movement within the social space that constitutes the "community;" and movement towards arriving at an understanding of Italianness. The second technique involves incorporating fieldnotes into the main text. This technique gives the reader an insight into Harney's personal journey (including the various bumps and sharp turns he encountered along the way) through the anthropological fieldwork experience. These techniques enhance the readability of the text, and give substance and life to some of the processes Harney addresses.

Eh, Paesan! is the type of book that will appeal to both academics and the general public. It would make a useful addition to reading lists of courses dealing with ethnicity and ethnic identity, the immigration experience, ethnic diasporas, urban anthropology, voluntary associations, and a variety of other topics. Scholars in labour studies will find the final chapter, "Italianità for the Canadian-Born," of particular interest. The chapter explores how generational differences in conceptions of work and gender are contributing to a change in the meaning of Italianness in Toronto (and by implication elsewhere).

The only substantial critique I have of the book is that it concentrates too extensively on the interrelationship between ethnocultural organizations and ethnic identity. Italian Canadians construct and express Italianness in many different sociocultural sites and spaces. The book's "Afterword" makes it clear that Nicholas Harney realizes this and, I suspect, that he will travel through these spaces in the near future.

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Mary Louise Adams, *The Trouble With Normal: Postwar Youth and the Making of Heterosexuality* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1997)

HISTORIES OF THE UNITED STATES provide a familiar story of the post-World War II period. In this story, the family developed into a nuclear unit appropriate to the nuclear age, youth became a category for anxious analysis, and psychology set individuals onto collision courses with their inner selves. Until now, this story has stopped at the 49th parallel. In *The Trouble with Normal*, Mary Louise Adams attempts to show how the process spread northwards during the 1940s and 1950s, so that what was "normal" in the United States became a conceptual tool for social and moral regulation in postwar Canada as well.

The central argument from which Adams develops her discussion is that "the prolonging of childhood was one of the distinctive markers of the postwar world, a signal that grown-up worries could be kept at bay for a good part of life." (51) This is a provocative thesis. While the association between adolescence and sexuality had created concern over the transitional period from "child" to "adult" since at least Rousseau, the idea that this period might be — somehow — indefinitely protracted raises questions. Implicit in this notion is the idea that youth culture in this period was qualitatively different from that which had gone before, and further that it would eventually become a defining feature of North American democracy. The young no longer represented the vitality and military power of the nation, as they had done in the past, but instead signified democracy itself, that eternally youthful experiment. With such signifying responsibilities thrust rather suddenly on their shoulders, the youth of the nation were required to meet certain standards, and it is the imposition of these standards which Adams addresses in her book.

In order to address the process by which these standards became normative, Adams uses Foucault to analyze the dominant discourses in Canadian society during the postwar period. The study is based on sources which range from general magazines and newspapers, such as the *Globe and Mail* and *Chatelaine*, to Toronto Board of Education minutes and sex education manuals, and her main focus is on the construction of a particular kind of heterosexuality as the lynch-pin of democratic values. She weaves the sources together to show how all contributed to an underlying project — the production of a normal heterosexual. In thematic chapters Adams deals with the postwar moral panic over delinquency, informal sex advice for teens, obscenity trials over imported US comics and pulp fiction, and formal sex education in schools. The last is a particularly strong chapter, tracing the development of formal sex instruction from the venereal disease scares during the war, to subsequent high moral tales on how to become a productive family member. Taken together, her analyses demonstrate that the problem of producing and policing "normality" was part of the social discourse at every level, including the federal. It might not be possible to legislate "normality" into existence, but it was possible to create and foster a climate of abnormal intolerance.

For Adams, postwar Canadian society was structured around a fragile and embattled heterosexuality, attacked on every side by Communists, homosexuals (which amounted to the same thing), unpopular girls, and lurid paperback covers. Her project developed from a desire to see how far the (average?) lesbian or gay man "had to travel through mainstream discourses to identify themselves as homosexual in the postwar period." Consequently, the book is "less about the sexual margins to which homosexuality was relegated than it is about the sexual centre that gave those margins their shape." (4) It may be wishful thinking, but my reading of Foucault suggests that it is the margins which give the centre its shape. A unified, "normal" heterosexuality is exactly the sort of centre whose characteristics and boundaries can only make sense in relation to everything which is not "normal." By focusing on dominant discourses, Adams omits any discussion of the other actors in the structural framework which made "normal" normal. Consequently, that much of the anxiety around normality centred on the failure of working-class youth to meet middle-class standards "almost goes without saying," while the rest of Canada, including Québec, Black Canadians, immigrants, Native Canadians, Jews, even lesbians and gays are strangely absent from this analysis of the ideology which made all of them "different" in some way. (56)

These omissions develop, at least in part, from the way Adams approaches her discourse analysis. She relies heavily on a Foucauldian notion of surveillance — she argues for example that delinquency was constructed in the minds of adults and educators as a category which justified adult scrutiny of youth. However, the concept which Foucault develops of the carceral — in which people are systematically categorized according to graded notions of deviance, and from which no-one can escape — would have been a more appropriate application of his theories.

Adams also assumes that the discourses she identifies were indeed the dominant ones. It is certainly true that the records of Ontario Provincial Services, Courts, City Departments, the Toronto Board of Education, and Royal and Youth Commissions provide paper and sometimes celluloid trails around the offices of power, even if Adams is not careful to establish how widespread these discourses really were. For example, she uses still footage from an educational film which her text suggests was only ever shown behind closed doors to a timid school board; and I disagree with her claim that Toronto defined national concerns during this period. There were other discourses in circulation at this time which may have been equally, if not more, powerful than the official Ontario ones. In addition to the regional concerns of the other provinces, families, religions, cultural traditions, and eventually television all created discourses against which public institutions and the print media defined their positions. It may not be possible to measure which meanings held most sway in a particular part of the country at a particular time, but I doubt very much that the Toronto Board of Education held a position of national discursive dominance.

There was something about the post-war period which was different from preceding eras, but I am not sure that the narrow focus of this book captures what it was. Adams does illustrate the many different levels at which the pressure on youth to be normal operated. But by not discussing the effects of these discourses — institutionalized girls, suicides among young gay men and Native Canadians, exploited Black Canadians and immigrants, for example — Adams represents the discourses around normality as both monolithic and at the same time without impact. The trouble with "normal" was that it both destroyed people's lives, and helped, paradoxically, to foster the resistance movements which blossomed in the 1960s. The trouble with this book is that Adams forgets both these facts.

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Colleen Fuller, *Caring For Profit: How Corporations Are Taking Over Canada's Health Care System* (Vancouver: New Star 1998)

SINCE 1984, the Canada Health Act has served as a brake on the privatization of health care with its insistence on universal and equal access to health-care services. But the Act has been undermined by massive cuts to health-care budgets and is now under direct attack by those who want to replace government funding with private investment in health-care.

Caring for Profit exposes the corporate players and their allies in medicine and government who are pushing to open Canada's health-care system to market forces. This book is full of valuable but little-known information that opponents of medicare do not want us to know. For that reason alone it should be widely read and discussed.

The major weakness of *Caring For Profit* is that the conclusion does not match the power of the author's findings. When it comes to a discussion of solutions, the book seems to disintegrate, a problem which currently characterizes our movement as a whole. Nonetheless, the importance of labour to the fight for public health shines through.

The first three chapters chronicle the development of Canada's "hybrid" medicare system, a tax-based public insurance system that purchases health services primarily from the private sector. From the very beginning, the fight over medicare in Canada was based on class interests.

Trade unions demanded a system of "sickness insurance" to provide medical care and wage replacement for workers injured on the job, and farmers banded together to organize rural health services. But businessmen, employers, and physicians were committed to a free-enterprise, profit-based model. While not explicitly stated, the author's research reveals that Canada's model of health care has been, and continues to be, shaped by the struggle between these two classes.

The author points out that in the mid-1950s, over half the Canadian population had medical insurance, but those with the highest incomes obtained the lion's share of health-care services even though people with the lowest incomes experienced the most illness. The logical solution was a government-funded health-care system. However, doctors and private insurers decried this proposal as "state medicine and socialism." (40)

In 1962, Saskatchewan doctors struck for 23 days against the province's proposal for "a complete transfer of medicare expenditures from the private to the public sector." (42) Despite majority support for public health care, the social-democratic government of Tommy Douglas conceded to the demands of business. The Medical Care Commission, which was created to publically administer the health-care system, was reduced to a collection and payment agency. But there were also some important gains. Saskatchewan residents could no longer be denied access to medical services because of a pre-existing illness or inability to pay.

In an especially revealing section, the author relates how the federal government set up a Royal Commission on Health Services to stymie the growing demand for a public health-care system. The Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) submitted a written brief to this Commission stating that,

> We favour a system of public health care that will be universal in application and comprehensive in coverage. We favour a system that will present no economic barrier between the service and those who need it. We are opposed to any provision which will require some people to submit themselves to a means test in order to obtain service. We look to a system of health care that will be regarded as a public service and not as an insurance mechanism. (55)

The CLC and other popular organizations wanted a comprehensive public health service that provided preventative services, drugs, dental services, home care, and financial support for the disabled. Physicians would be on salary and there would be no user fees. The entire system would be fully financed by a progressive income tax policy including an "upward revision in corporation tax." (56)

However, the final report of the commission included no cost estimates of a public service model, nor did the commissioners even contemplate the possibility of excluding the private sector. The public service model was flatly rejected as "a system in which all providers of health services are functionaries under the control of the state," which was, not coincidentally, the objection of the Canadian Medical Association (CMA). The commission recommended instead a publicly-financed health insurance system, to be delivered and administered by the private sector "free of government control or domination." (57)

The author reports that after national medicare was established in 1966, Canadian health insurers sought markets elsewhere. By the mid-1990s, over 43 per cent of premium income earned by Canadian insurers originated outside the country, with several of the largest companies collecting between 50 and 80 per cent of their total premium income from the United States.

Just six years after medicare was established, the federal government began to reduce the funds it contributed to the provinces for health and social services. Private insurers crowded into the breach created by government cuts. Between

1975 and 1997, private spending in health care increased from 24 to 30 per cent. Currently, over 140 life and health insurance companies operate in Canada, employing more than 65,000 people. The author attributes health-care cuts to continued political pressure from medicare's opponents. But there is also an important economic factor, which she does not discuss.

The return of cyclical recessions after the long post-war boom has caused governments to sacrifice health and social programs to boost the profits of corporations. Cuts to health care in Canada began after the first post-war recession in 1974. The next recession of the early 1980s resulted in the lost of $30 billion to health care under the Mulroney Conservatives and the third recession of the early 1990s prompted another $6.5 billion cut under the Chrétien Liberals. Current policy calls for a complete cessation of federal cash transfers to the provinces by the year 2000, which will end the ability of the federal government to determine health policy.

Fuller tells us that the major impediment to the expansion of the private sector in Canadian health care is the sense of entitlement that Canadians have regarding their right to health care. She argues that such sentiment is entirely reasonable considering that almost every health dollar flows from the hands of ordinary Canadians. (Corporations contributed about 52 per cent of tax revenues in the 1950s. Today they provide only 9 per cent.) At the same time, her research shows that corporations feel entitled to make a profit and governments defend their right to do so. But the author does not examine the implications of this irreconcilable conflict between the classes over the provision of health care.

The author documents how government is actively divesting itself of the means to provide public health services and working overtime to support private corporations eager to take over those functions. Medical services are being removed from public health plans and deductibles for prescription drugs are being increased. Publically financed institutions, such as Ontario Blue Cross, are being sold to the private sector, and insurance company executives are being appointed to the boards of hospitals.

Fuller quotes Industry Canada, "'Promoting Canadian companies as global health-keepers is the main objective driving the strategies and plans' of the government for the medical devices pharmaceutical and health-services sector." (99) In 1994, the Ontario government's Health Industries Committee concluded, "To have the effective launching pad it needs, the health industries sector must expand its share of its own home market. Steps must be taken to ensure that, as in other countries, the domestic market supports the development of globally competitive companies." (101) But the author warns that the human cost of such policies is high. In the province of Alberta, where the privatization of health care is most advanced, infant mortality rates have risen to 10.6 deaths per 1000 live births, compared to a national average of 6.3.

In a chilling section, Fuller discusses the health industry's campaign to defeat the movement for a single-payer health system in the United States, a campaign which was aided by several influential Canadians including Michael Walker of the Vancouver-based Fraser Institute. Fuller comments, "Americans were warned that socialized medicine denied basic human rights, in particular the sacred right to jump to the head of the queue if one had the requisite cash and class privilege." (135)

The author concludes, "In the US, the growth of managed care was in large part the result of a war waged by insurance companies to seize control of the health-care system from physicians, who acted as gate-keepers." (137) By the end of 1997, the takeover of non-profit health-care organizations by for-profit companies represented the largest transfer of charitable assets in US history. Meanwhile, the number of uninsured Americans climbed to 43 million.

Fuller notes that the Fraser Institute has also been instrumental in promoting the myth of a financial crisis in Canadian medicare, a crisis which, according to the Institute, can be solved only by the private sector. However, the biggest single health-cost increase has been pharmaceuticals, which are manufactured in the private sector. From 1987 to 1996, the cost of prescription drugs in Canada rose 93 per cent.

The author warns that the system of workers' compensation is central to the expansion plans of private health and insurance companies in Canada. Because workers' compensation is exempt from the Canada Health Act, it is the window through which a for-profit, health-care industry can be established in Canada.

In 1993, the bill for workers injured on the job in Canada reached $7.5 billion, mostly paid by employers. Instead of reducing work loads, overtime and job stress, employers began to invest in absence and disability management programs. Private medical companies sprang up to offer employers rapid health-care services and faster returns to work. In both Canada and the United States (where between 1985 and 1993 workers' compensation costs rose more than 75 per cent a year) insurers and rehabilitation companies have joined forces to reduce the cost of workplace accidents, but not to reduce the rising rate of workplace injuries.

In chapter after chapter, *Caring For Profit* rips off the mask of "health-care reform," exposes the lie of "restructuring,"and soundly condemns the corporate greed that is driving the privatization of health care. But the book ends with a whimper, failing to provide "the means for Canadians to take action to reclaim and improve their health care system." (xii) The final chapter is strangely titled, "Conclusion: Educating Canada," despite the fact that most Canadians already oppose profit-making in health care and stubbornly cling to the concept of health care as a right. *Caring For Profit* does expose the deceptions of government and business which are conspiring to circumvent the wishes of the majority. But this knowledge, in and of itself, is not a solution. And re-stating the demand for a publically-funded and publically-administered health-care system does not tell us how this can be achieved.

Fuller instructs that, "Canadians can learn a few things from corporations to reach their own goals in health care." (278) But this is bad advice. Ordinary people cannot achieve their goals in the same way that corporations do. We have neither the time nor the money, nor the ears of the politicians. Different classes have different strengths, which the author describes but does not seem to understand. The final three paragraphs, entitled "Solutions" offers nothing that can stand against the determination of government and business to privatize health care. Yet, the solution can be gleaned from the body of the book.

Unionized workers have played a key role in the development and preservation of medicare in Canada. Fuller informs us that in 1970 the Québec government rejected the publicly-financed, private-enterprise model and embarked on a plan "to provide health services as part of a broad social benefits system that included a comprehensive range of public services, from medical care to social assistance." (68) While the author points out the uniqueness of the Québec plan, no explanation is given. The fact that Canadian working class struggles of the 1960s reached their height in the Québec general strike of 1972 is not even mentioned, let alone credited for the most advanced system of public health care in North America.

Fuller does recognize that Canadian hospitals have become a battleground between hospital administrators facing budget cuts and unionized hospital workers who are fighting against the contracting-out of hospital information systems, housekeeping, food, laboratory services, and equipment maintenance. But she does not seem to understand the significance of this battle. Through their efforts to protect their jobs, incomes, and working conditions, unionized hospital workers are holding back the full-scale privatization of Canada's hospitals. That is why their struggle must be made central to our fight to defend medicare.

Without an understanding of the pivotal role of labour in the shaping of Canadian medicare, the differences between health-care systems in the United States and Canada can be attributed only to questionable concepts of national character.

Organized labour in both countries has the muscle to stop governments and corporations, but labour must be convinced to use its power by activists who do not shrink from accusations that unions want to run the country. *Caring For Profit* demonstrates that we would be better off if they did.

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David Blane, Eric Brunner and Richard Wilkinson, eds., *Health and Social Organization: Towards a Health Policy for the 21st Century* (London: Routledge 1996)

IF THERE HAS EVER BEEN a time for clarity on health policy it is now. Dramatic cuts in health-care spending, accompanied by government insistence that such measures are necessary to modernize the health-care system, have resulted in widespread anxiety regarding the future of Canadian medicare. The strength of *Health and Social Organization: Towards a Health Policy for the 21st Century* is that it shatters "common sense" myths regarding the factors which influence health. The weakness of this book is that it ignores political reality: social policy is determined more by what is expedient than by what is true.

The stated purpose of the book is "to provide policy-makers and the public at large with a scientific understanding of the social, economic and cultural determinants of a nation's health status." (xv) The first chapter examines more than 50 years of public health policy in Britain, Canada, the United States, and a number of other countries. This history shows that the post-war expansion of the welfare state, which provided health and social services to all regardless of means, was accompanied by a narrowing of the difference between mortality rates at the top and bottom of the social hierarchy.

In the 1950s, despite a multitude of studies showing the improvement in health and life expectancy resulting from expanded social services and improving material conditions, the focus of health policy began to shift from reducing social inequality to the modification of individual behaviours, thereby reinforcing the assumption that post-war reforms had eliminated the structural or class basis of disease.

"As a recipe for health, the dos and don'ts of personal behaviour have a strong resonance with traditional morality: against drinking and smoking, in favour of sexual fidelity, and against sloth and gluttony." (7)

During the 1970s, several studies tried to quantify the health gains resulting from changing behaviours which had been identified as hazardous to health. But the results were disappointing. The 361,662-strong Multiple Risk Factor Intervention Trial in the United States found that sustained behavioural change was difficult to achieve, even among highly-motivated, high-risk individuals. However, the moralistic doctrine that individuals should be held responsible for their health problems continues to be promoted, perhaps because it so conveniently obscures the damaging effects of class inequality.

The social protest movements of the 1960s renewed interest in the influence of social factors on health, along with the recognition of poverty in the midst of post-war affluence. The growth of social programs had reduced the scale of absolute poverty, but the effects of relative poverty remained substantial.

The first Whitehall study in Britain, which began in the late 1960s, found that both mortality risk and the prevalence of health-damaging behaviours increased from the top to the bottom grades of the civil service hierarchy and were not accounted for by grade differences in smoking, blood pressure, obesity, or exercise. Both the first and second Whitehall studies discovered that those near the top of the gradient (where there is no poverty) have worse health than those at the top, and the gradient continues all the way down.

Throughout the 1970s, research into the damaging effects of class differences on health flourished. The Black Report on *Health Inequalities*, published in 1980, summarized this knowledge. Widening occupational differences in mortality were documented in Britain and in France. These differences could not be accounted for by individual behaviours or specifically occupational hazards. In the United States, it was discovered that the bulk of the health differences between black and white Americans was rooted in social and economic factors. (49)

To assess the proportion of health problems due to individual factors, Leonard Syme in chapter two discusses coronary artery disease, which has been extensively studied for over 50 years. Researchers agree that cigarette smoking, high blood pressure, and high serum cholesterol are risk factors for this illness, and other factors have been implicated, including obesity, physical inactivity, diabetes, blood fat levels and clotting factors, stress, and various hormone factors. However, even when all of these risk factors are considered together, they account for only about 40 per cent of all coronary artery disease. (21) What is causing the remaining 60 per cent?

In chapter five, Alvin Tarlov argues that social conditions exert the dominant influence on health. Contrary to those who search for a genetic basis for ill-health, Tarlov states that, "genes as a determinant of health account for 1-5 per cent of the total disease burden of man." (74) Access to medical care also seems to be a minor factor.

The factors which most influence the health gradient, for virtually all disease, are: having control over your work, having work that stimulates your creativity, having freedom from economic insecurity, having education and a higher standard of general living conditions, being appreciated for your contributions and having social support. "The chronic, persistent, inescapable dissonance between what a person would like to do or become and what seems accomplishable triggers biological signals that are antecedent of chronic disease development." (85)

In chapter three, Mildred Baxter cites a study by Cannon *et al.* in 1994 which found differences in survival from breast cancer based on socioeconomic deprivation that were unexplained by the type or malignancy of the tumour. If these class differences could be eliminated, more lives would be saved than the number expected to be saved from the national breast cancer screening project. For example, in the west of Scotland, 336 lives per year could be saved by breast screening programs, but if social deprivation were eliminated, 475 lives would be saved. (37)

Baxter concludes that medicine is "unable to alter socioeconomic disadvantage, and equally unable, on the whole and despite an increasing involvement in health promotion, to change lifestyles. Thus it is little wonder that medicine may resign itself to treating whatever comes before it, defining socioeconomic differences as outside its sphere of influence." (32)

By the 1980s, the income gap between the high-paid and the low-paid was rapidly widening. Increasing social polarity has been accompanied by expanding *inequalities in health, higher death rates* for the lower strata, and the re-emergence of tuberculosis in the poorest sections of the most developed nations. Advanced countries like Britain show up to fourfold differences in mortality rates between social classes. And these health differences are increasing despite a rise in general productivity and economic growth.

Having shown that excess mortality inevitably accompanies class inequality, one would expect the authors to launch into a discussion of how to eliminate the scourge of class divisions from society. Alas, no. Throughout the remainder of the book various esteemed authors accumulate more evidence to prove what has been already proven.

In chapter fifteen, Eric Brunner suggests, "The case for remedial action to reduce the burden of preventable ill health can be strengthened if the biological pathways connecting low social status with specific diseases are understood." (272) But it is questionable to what extent policy-makers are interested in reducing the extent of preventable death and disease, however well documented, when such measures tend to interfere with the accumulation of capital.

What policy-makers would be delighted to know is how to reduce the health gradient (and health-care costs) without eliminating the class structure on which they are based. This goal is most clearly stated in chapter thirteen. In the one chapter devoted to work and health, Michael Marmot and Amanada Feeney argue, "A major reason for exploring the links between social status and ill health is the search for ways to break the chain linking them. Work is potentially an important link in the chain binding social status to ill health that can potentially be modified without necessarily changing the fundamental nature of social stratification." (236)

Unfortunately for reform-minded researchers, but no surprise to any Marxist, this task proves to be a Gordian knot. The *same social factors* which produce illness for populations produce lavish wealth for those at the top of society. Those who search for a magic formula that will preserve the material basis of alienation, exploitation, and oppression, while eliminating its deleterious effect on human health are, at best, not living in the real world and, at worst, obstructing improvements in human health in order to advance their research careers.

As Brunner observes, social phenomena require social explanations. Social problems also require social solutions. However, funds are diminishing for research in social health or for social measures to improve health. Social solutions for illness, such as improved living and working conditions, are not profitable. On the contrary, they eat into profits. Even more problematic is the political risk of exposing the excess mortality which represents the health cost of capitalism. On the other hand, the alteration of individual human chemistry, physiology, psychology, and behaviour is quite profitable for the growing number of industries that specialize in a adapting human beings to unhealthy social conditions.

The general argument of this book, that national investment in human health pays economic dividends in the long run, is true in the abstract. However, the chaotic nature of capitalist competition means that long-term interests are regularly sacrificed to short-term gain.

Nor is there any direct relation between increased investment in human health and increased economic growth. In a rational society there might be, but not under capitalism. Currently most developed nations are reducing their investment in health, education, and social welfare, despite continued economic growth. Because current levels of economic *growth are considered insufficient for* successful competition, government policies are accelerating the transfer of wealth from the have-nots to the have-lots. As the recent Canadian publication *The Growing Gap* documents, such policies increase social inequality and therefore worsen population health.

In nations that are experiencing severe economic crisis, the dramatic declines in working-class living standards and profound uncertainty about the future are proving to be a pathogenic combination. Between 1989 and 1993, death rates rose dramatically in Eastern Europe. (99) In Asia, Latin America, and the former Soviet Union, we can expect that death, disease, and starvation will follow the economic crises developing there.

As long as economic growth occurs at the expense of the working class and economic crises are paid for by the working class, health gradients must widen unless workers are successful in winning for themselves a larger proportion of the wealth that they produce. However, the working class exists for the authors of this book only as object, never as subject. In their view, social policy-makers determine the existence and degree of social inequality. The working class sickens and dies, but never resists, demands, or transforms society.

With the working class excluded as the agent of social change, the authors of this volume can offer only moral arguments to policy-makers whose duty is to maintain and promote an immoral system. In unquestioning acceptance of the prime directive of capitalism — accumulate, accumulate — Fraser Mustard argues that, "the dominant task will be how to sustain stable social environments (social capital) with diminished resources." (310) Since this book was published, however, Canadians have experienced an unprecedented dismantling of public health, education, and welfare systems despite continued economic growth. Resources have diminished only for the working class. They have multiplied for the rich.

All the research linking high-quality nurturing of children with improved intellectual and behavioural performance is being thrown out the window. In province after province, working-class children are being deprived of quality daycare, early education, nutritious food, affordable housing, employed parents, and access to health care and social services. In the face of such lean and mean policies, further research is not needed; social opposition is.

In 1844, Frederick Engels wrote *The Condition of The Working Class in England*, in which he documented the unnecessary death and disease generated by capitalism. Engels argued that the most effective way to prevent disease and premature death was to abolish class divisions. Since then researchers, such as the authors represented in the present volume, have accumulated another 155 years of scientific evidence to prove the pathogenesis of class inequality. Despite the strength of the information it presents, and the important political questions that it raises, *Health and Social Organization* lacks the political clarity of Engels' ground-breaking work. As a guided tour through the field of social health, *Health and Social Organization* is a valuable resource. But, unlike Engels' work, it offers no way forward.

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Kenneth Lapides, *Marx's Wage Theory in Historical Perspective: Its Origins, Development, and Interpretation* (Westport: Praeger Publishers 1998)

WAGE DETERMINATION in capitalist economies has been an area of theoretical inquiry and heated debate amongst economists ever since their first attempts to systematically comprehend the character of this particular form of social organization. The debates have by no means been resolved, and the theoretical stance of an economist on wages, with the attendant implications for employment, economic well-being, and social justice, will arguably suffice to position that economist in the broader theoretical and political spectrum. Kenneth Lapides's book addresses itself to Marx's wage theory, and, as a measure of its success, it both enhances our understanding of the core elements of Marx's economic theory, and facilitates the appropriate situating of Marx in the pantheon of economic theorists.

Lapides's approach involves a careful chronological examination of the evolution of wage theory from its emergence in the earliest days of political economy to the 1860s. As a result, five of the twelve chapters of the book are devoted to the presentation and discussion of the work of Marx's predecessors. Knowledge of these earlier developments enable us to more readily identify what in fact is actually new in Marx, but of greater significance for our understanding of Marx is the appreciation of the extent to which he utilized the various contributions of his predecessors in the formation of his own theory. This, the extant materials of political economy, almost all of which Marx had read and written extensive notes about, in effect comprises the intellectual means of production used by Marx as he fashioned his distinctive economics. A considerable body of literature already exists which acknowledges Marx's respect for the pioneering work done by Adam Smith and David Ricardo in the development of the central element of classical political economy, the labour theory of value. Lapides ably covers this ground from the particular vantage point of the theory of wages, but his research goes beyond the standard treatment to argue that a number of lesser-known writers also made positive contributions that were instrumental in shaping Marx's thought. For example, George Ramsay in 1836 noted not only that labour supply depended on the number of working hours and the number of working days as well as the size of the population, but that the rise in fixed capital induced capitalists to strive to increase the length and number of these working days. These insights subsequently become important for Marx in his analysis of the labour process and production of surplus value. Another important influence was Richard Jones, who argued in 1831 that capitalism is a historically specific form of economic organization and that, as a result, the so-called laws of political economy may be historically contingent rather than eternal and immutable. This argument was an important component of Marx's critique of Ricardo. In particular, Marx praised Jones for his recognition that the economic structure of a society depends on the form of labour.

Lapides argues that much of the theoretical discussion about wages in the first half of the 19th century is directly connected to the theory and criticism of the Wage-Fund Doctrine. This doctrine "pretended that the sum of capital earmarked or "destined" for wage payments at any one time was a fixed amount, incapable of expansion."(56) A fixed sum implied that if any workers received higher wages, other workers would necessarily receive less, so that demands for higher wages for workers could not benefit the working class as a whole. "It was the principle ideological weapon in the arsenal of capital in its disputes with labor over the level of wages."(56) Critics of the wage-fund were numerous, and by the 1860s the wage-fund doctrine had slipped into disrepute. Marx had of course contributed to this critique, but, as Lapides points out, Marx sought not only to refute this doctrine, but also "to provide a completely new framework for analyzing wage phenomena."(5) Lapides rounds out his discussion of the early literature on wage theory with a chapter on the early radical and social critics of political economy.

The primary and secondary literature on the early contributors to and critics of political economy is enormous and continues to grow. Students of the history of economic thought will be appreciative of Lapides's thematic presentation of these early contributions to the development and critique of the theory of wages, and

Lapides's scholarship is evident in the impressive range of primary materials and sources that he has adduced here.

The chronological approach is retained as Lapides moves through Marx's writings. Lapides's argues that Marx's wage theory develops gradually and only really reaches its full and complete form in Marx's mature writings, of which *Capital* is the best example. For Marx, wages are but the phenomenal form which obscures the underlying relationship between capital and labour. Intrinsic to that relationship is the process by which capital buys labour power which it then consumes in order to produce surplus value. A discussion of wages and wage determination which fails to fully perceive the distinction between labour and labour power, and the production of surplus value is, for Marx, inherently flawed. In addition to this fundamental core, Lapides shows how Marx's theory of wages is inextricably tied to the dynamics of capital accumulation. The accumulation of capital and its continual transformation of the conditions of production has, as one of its manifestations, the existence and uneven growth of a reserve army. The size and composition of this reserve army exerts an important influence on wages. For Marx, this reserve army is conceptually distinct from the Malthusian notion of "population." The laws governing the size of the surplus population in Marx's theory are not at all commensurate with the determinants of the population in the theoretical framework of Malthus and Ricardo, despite the apparent conflation by many of Marx with Ricardo and Malthus on this issue.

Lapides argues that numerous misinterpretations of Marx can be attributed to the unfortunate tendency to rely on Marx's earlier writings, rather than viewing these writings as evidence of the development of Marx's thought. Both friends and foes of Marx have fallen into this trap. The "Increasing Misery" debate, which has roots extending back to Malthus, William Godwin and the report of Sir Frederic Eden, is a particularly enduring instance of this sort of misrepresentation. The central issue of the debate is whether Marx's wage theory implies a long run reduction of wages to what is essentially a minimal subsistence level. Lapides shows that this is not in fact an element of Marx's wage theory, but he goes on to investigate the reasons why and conditions in which these other interpretations took hold and gained currency. Lapides guides us through some of this debate as it raged in the decades immediately following Marx's death, and he discusses the participation in this debate of such prominent individuals as Frederick Engels, Eduard Bernstein, G. Plekhanov, and Rosa Luxemburg.

Overall, the benefits of Lapides's chronological approach are substantive and thus more than enough to justify this mode of presentation and exegesis, but some costs are evident. In particular, the sequential examination of numerous writers on the theory of wages unavoidably results in some overlap and repetition since there is considerable common ground among various contributors. The problem also arises in discussing Marx's output as well. As a result, the thematic development of certain aspects of wage theory is not as sharply drawn as it would have been if the material had been organized explicitly along thematic or conceptual lines. The discussion of population theory, for example, can be found in a number of different sections throughout the book, but in various places its intrusion does not involve a further advancement or critique of this aspect of the wage question, and other than the chronological link, it at times seems disconnected with much of the other material in the chapter.

In choosing to emphasize the historical origins and development of Marx's wage theory, Lapides does not attempt to cover the wage issue as it appears in the modern secondary literature on Marxian economic theory. Contemporary research has identified a number of important issues which have immediate theoretical relevance. One such issue is the role and effect of unpaid household labour on the value of labour power. In his textual analysis of *Capital*, Lapides refers to Marx's comment that the transformation of the workplace through the introduction of machinery and new technology can result in every family member being hurled onto the labour market. The result, for Marx, is a devaluation of the value of labour power. Lapides (191) makes a parenthetical note to the effect that Marx's analysis suggests that he views women's unpaid labour in the home as a component of the value of labour power. Lapides, however, does not pursue the issue any further, and the interested reader may well wonder where to go from here. A footnote introducing the reader to the relevant literature would be welcome. Another contemporary issue concerns the existence and significance of a "social wage," i.e., that portion of the workers' consumption bundle that is provided by the state. Health, education, and social insurance would be three prominent components of the social wage. Lapides gives no indication as to how these elements might be integrated into Marx's wage theory. Arguably this question, as well as that of unpaid domestic labour, would carry the inquiry beyond the scope of the book. Lapides's concern is Marx's wage theory, not Marxian wage theory, but some indication of the issues and debates animating research in the latter field would help inform the reader of the connection between Marx and contemporary economic research.

This valuable book should be read not only by those with an interest in the history of economic thought. Considerable benefits will be reaped by Marxist theorists through the contribution that Lapides makes in regards to the articulation of Marx's wage theory. More generally, economists may be reminded that economic theory is not neutral with respect to the political and ideological struggles that are still being waged. Marx was acutely aware of this, and, as Lapides shows, it informed and shaped his research. Today, at a time when unions are under attack, when living standards are held to be uncompetitive and unsustainable, when poverty and joblessness are increasingly explained in terms of the failings and poor choices of the individuals involved, and when concepts of a natural rate of unemployment have wide acceptance at even the highest levels of the economics profession, a critical re-examination of economic theory, and the role of wages and profits in that theory, still has much to offer.

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Michael Forman, *Nationalism and the International Labor Movement: The Idea of the Nation in Socialist and Anarchist Theory* (University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press 1998)

THE LIMITED POPULAR APPEAL of socialism, the relentlessly globalizing logics of neo-liberal capitalism, and the resurgence of right-wing nationalist movements in the 1980s and 1990s marks the point of departure for this stimulating book. Taking aim at the politico-theoretical claims of "postmodernist thinkers," (181) the praxis of the new social movements and "identity-driven politics," (1) and their charge that Marxism failed to take nationalism seriously, Michael Forman examines the concerted attempts to address the national question within the socialist and labour movement traditions of the First, Second, and Third Internationals. The result is a work of critical exegesis and intellectual history that seeks to identify the nationalist digressions of the socialist theoretical tradition and to reclaim its "Enlightenment" aspects — especially its embrace of republican citizenship, international solidarity, and "cosmopolitan right" — as part of a renewed socialist project for the present.

The theorists of the International Working Men's Association (or First International), according to Forman, approached the national question from the perspectives of radical democracy and international labour solidarity. In his "*Revolutionary Catechism*" of 1866, the anarchist Bakunin attempted to combine working-class solidarity with respect for national differences in his plan for a "universal people's federation" created "from the bottom up." (31) An associative order grounded in the local commune and ascending upward — via geographically dispersed, regional and country-wide coordinating institutions — toward a weak federal state, this framework would accord all persons, communities, and nations the right to self-determination, including the right to join or to secede from any group, community, or nation. Yet Bakunin's federalist vision, Forman argues, was subverted by residual "metaphysical" assumptions about historic nations as organic cultural or ethnic communities — revealed in his overt Pan-Slavism, "Germanophobia," and anti-semitism — and thus provided no guarantees that the rights of weaker nationalities would be respected in the absence of any strong central authority. This contradiction was resolved in the work of Marx, who established a clear distinction between nations and states, and defined the former in terms of common citizenship (i.e., participation in a polity) rather than ascriptive and putatively essential factors such as culture, language, and ethnicity. While emphasizing the global expansion of capitalism as the necessary pre-condition for the emergence of an international working class, Marx insisted on the importance of the republican state in securing civil and political liberties necessary for workers' self-mobilization and on the need to seek international progressive alliances between different national communities to advance the cause of socialism. For this reason, he defended various independence movements (e.g., the Polish and Irish), since he identified their cause with republicanism and opposition to the forces of reaction. Far from ignoring nationalism, Marx attempted to enlist it in the cause of proletarian emancipation by reestablishing the "links between republicanism, democracy, and internationalism" (47) central to the tradition of 1789.

If Bakunin and Marx were concerned about working-class solidarity across national-state boundaries, Second International theorists, especially in the Habsburg and Russian empires, were especially preoccupied with the problem of labour organization within multi-national states. Lenin, drawing on the work of Marx and Karl Kautsky in particular, viewed the nationality question in pragmatic, organizational terms. While he endorsed the right of nationalities to self-determination in principle, he did not advocate support for the claims of every national group seeking its own territorial state, since some nationalist causes ran counter to proletarian interests. At the same time, Lenin insisted on the unitary composition of the vanguard workers's party as the representative of all proletarians, regardless of nationality. After the October Revolution, this contradiction was apparent in Lenin's willingness to concede important domains of cultural and administrative autonomy to the diverse ethno-national groups in the emergent single-party Soviet state. In response, Rosa Luxemburg offered an "uncompromising internationalism" (93) that rejected any recognition of national rights in principle. While Luxemburg acknowledged the force of nationality as the product of a common language and culture, she opposed nationalist movements on the grounds that they represented the class interests of the bourgeoisie. To adopt in principle the right of self-determination for nations and to allow for the constitutional and juridical instantiation of nationhood, Luxemburg maintained, was to give in to "hollow, petty-bourgeois phraseology and humbug" to the detriment of democratic aims and institutions and to risk creating a situation in which some nationalities would dominate others. Luxemburg's failure, however, fully to appreciate the cultural determinants — especially the national idiom — of much working-class consciousness, was redressed in the important, and still lesser-known, work of the Austro-Marxist Otto Bauer. In an effort to avoid reductive readings of nationality, which either stressed the timeless essence of nations or dismissed them as forms of bourgeois mystification, Bauer proposed a view of the nation as a "relative community of character," a historically-evolved "community of fate" (*Schicksalgemeinschaft*) whose shared sense of national belonging was rooted in specific structures of communication and interaction and in the lived experience of its members. Accordingly, Bauer called for a broadly-based federalism as the organizing principle for the Austrian Social Democratic Party and the post-imperial state, which acknowledged the force and legitimacy of nationality: he proposed the eventual creation of a new kind of "federal republic" that would distinguish between the nation and the state, but would recognize the self-determination of nations in the form of autonomous cultural and political (but not territorial) units, with their own representative institutions.

According to Forman, the linkages between socialism, the expansion of democracy, and international and transnational class solidarity shared by all of these early theorists were severed in the writings of Stalin and Gramsci during the period of the Third International. In the wake of the Bolshevik Revolution, civil war and allied intervention in Russia, and the dissipation of revolutionary hopes in the western capitalist countries after the First World War, Stalin replaced Lenin's pragmatic, conditional support for national self-determination with a policy that emphasized the strategic centrality of nation-building to the spread of socialist revolution. His effort to build "socialism in one country" turned socialism into an undemocratic plan for state-directed economic modernization and an "ideological tool" (138) for his international diplomacy, as he manipulated appeals to international class solidarity to serve Soviet power-political interests. In a different way, according to Forman, Gramsci's theoretical writings also emphasized nation-building at the expense of democracy and international class solidarity. Thus, Gramsci's insistence on the role of culture in the elaboration of class relations of hegemony in Italy led him to stress the importance of constructing a counter-hegemonic, working-class ideological project on the terrain of the "national-popular." This attempt to instrumentalize culture in the interests of the working class substituted "national unity" for capitalism as the crucial precondition for socialism and turned the "politics of social transformation" into the "politics of nation and state building." (159) The depressing logic of this nationalizing ambition, Forman argues, was realized in various national liberation Marxisms after 1945, especially in areas of the "Third World" where socialism has been transformed into an anti-colonialist program of nation-building and state-directed industrial development that has abandoned all commitments to democracy and internationalism.

It is precisely this turn to nationalism that Forman rejects in his call for a reinvigorated socialism. In a wide-ranging critique that homogenizes a staggering variety of political ideas and movements — its apparently unified target is a combination of Stalin's power politics, Gramsci's cultural theory, recent forms of essentializing right-wing nationalism, identity politics, and "postmodernism" — Forman argues for a return to the ideals of 1789, the "Enlightenment," and Kant's notion of cosmopolitan right in particular. He stresses the unavoidable imperatives of "generalizable interests" (175) in the form of democratic rights, institutions, and practices and of international commitments to the mutual respect between peoples in any attempt to create a renewed working-class, socialist internationalism that would work to bring equality and democratic accountability to the present-day world of global capitalism.

Unfortunately, Forman's all too brief engagement with recent cultural theory, his neglect of the accumulating social histories of the European Left, and his history-of-ideas approach lead him to a universalizing, normative critique that assumes all forms of national identification are the same. This tendency obscures crucial moments of left-wing ascendancy and possibility, when socialists and communists attempted to articulate a socialist project *with* the cause of the nation (e.g., most dramatically in the period of anti-fascist unity in Europe from 1943-1947). And it leads to questionable linkages: e.g., between aggressively exclusionary forms of Serbian or Croatian nationalism, on the one hand, and unspecified (left) social movements and version of "identity politics," on the other; or between eastern European protest in 1989 and the universal discourse of rights embodied in the "Enlightenment," which obscures the radical democratic, democratic socialist, or "social movement" politics of many eastern European dissidents. In addition, Forman's emphasis on formal constitutional and state structures, the rule of law, and working through existing international institutions (including the World Bank), coupled with his lack of interest in theorizing a more thoroughgoing grass-roots or participatory democracy, seems to ignore the deficits of earlier reform socialism (e.g., post-World War I German and Austrian Social Democracy) — that is, it simultaneously neglects popular aspirations and surrenders crucial domains of the global economy to the logic of capital. Finally, Forman takes little notice of the profound changes in the global economy, 20th century social relations and cultural forms, and the system of nation-states since the days of the First and Second Internationals. In light of the latter, can a renewed socialist project really rest on a more or less direct return to the ideas of 1789?

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John J. Kulczycki, *The Polish Coal Miners' Union and the German Labor Movement in the Ruhr, 1902-1934: National and Social Solidarity* (Oxford: Berg 1995)

FROM 1902 TO 1934, the German *Ruhrgebiet* was home to a trade union exclusively devoted to organizing the regions's Polish mineworkers, the *Zjednoczenie Zawodowe Polskie* (ZZP). Traditionally, German historiography has classified the ZZP as a Polish nationalist association and not as a class-based union. In this study, John J. Kulczycki shows that, up to the end of World War I, the ZZP successfully combined its national with its class appeal. Soon coming to represent a clear majority of Polish nationals working the Ruhr mines, the ongoing refusal by German historians to consider the ZZP as a bona fide working class movement appears even more incomprehensible when realizing that Polish miners generally constituted at least one quarter of all Ruhr miners during those years (reaching a high point of 37.9 per cent in 1908) and that their unionization rate often surpassed that of their German colleagues.

By origin and self-understanding a Christian trade union, the ZZP differed from its German Christian counterpart, the *Gewerkverein*, not only by the absence of any loyalty declaration "to the Kaiser and the Reich" in its statutes but more significantly also in its refusal to sanction class collaboration as a guiding principle or to explicitly self-limit their members's right to strike. Indeed, the rapid growth of the ZZP was largely due to its bold and effective defence of its constituency, including militant participation in the 1905 Ruhr miners's strike, an action "that exceeded in size and importance any previous strike on the European continent." (45) If it played a role in the Polish community in the Ruhr that went beyond that of a trade union and if it promoted itself as a Polish organization, this stemmed above all from the minority status of the Poles in the Ruhr and the discrimination they suffered in their relations with the Prussian authorities and, to a lesser degree, with German trade unions. (96) It managed to bridge both national and class interests "by expressing and supporting the class grievances of the miners at the same time as it identified with the cultural characteristics that differentiated the Polish speaking miners from the native worker." (63) Doing so, the ZZP shied away neither from confrontation with German nationalism nor from opposition to non-working class Poles.

When in 1908 the German Reichstag passed legislation mandating that all public meetings were to be held in German, the ZZP resorted to all sorts of creative subterfuges to express its total outrage at this severe restriction of its freedom of speech. Instead of live speeches, meetings were held where no one spoke but phonographs played recorded speeches. The union also held "silent meetings," where no sounds were uttered but duplicated speeches were passed around and resolutions were voted on silently with notes written on a blackboard. Conversely, when the conservative Polish Reichstag delegation voted in favour of laws detrimental to the ZZP working class constituency, the ZZP did not hesitate publicly to condemn "their" spokespersons. The ZZP likewise did not shy away from exposing exploitative conditions on agricultural estates in the Polish province of Prussia, thus publicly embarrassing a number of "Polish patriots."

To be sure, the existence of the ZZP as a Polish union on German soil did lead to a number of decisions clashing with either its national mission or its class appeal. The ZZP thus consistently refused to advocate the nationalization of *Ruhrgebiet* mines for fear of the German state thus using these newly acquired resources to the detriment of the Polish cause back east. On the other hand, attempting to avoid identification of the ZZP as primarily a Polish nationalist organization, in November 1918 the ZZP co-signed a joint declaration of the employer-based Mine Association and all four miners' unions warning against the possible breakaway of Germany's Polish possessions. Yet, by and large, prior to the rebirth of an independent Poland, "the ZZP put Polish national solidarity at the service of the labour movement in the Ruhr." (249)

The qualitative leap of the ZZP from an organization combining class and national appeal towards a group consciously choosing Polish nationalism over working class solidarity occurred with the recreation of a Polish state. "The ZZP, which before the war had worked in social solidarity with the other miners' unions, lost its way after the war as it gave priority to the interests of the Polish state even when they did not coincide with those of its own members." (249) In addition, many of the ZZP's most experienced leaders abandoned the Ruhr and returned to Poland, taking up important political and administrative posts, as their leadership skills were direly needed back home. This geographic reorientation was partially prepared by the ZZP's traditional emphasis on and desire for trade union work in Prussia's Polish province over and above work in the *Ruhrgebiet* alone.

Starting in 1904 the ZZP began organizing work in Poznania. By 1909 the ZZP fused with two pre-existing Polish unions in Poznania and Upper Silesia though dominating the other groups and imposing the ZZP's name on the new organization. Kulczycki rightfully draws attention to this anomalous case of a Polish working-class organization founded in emigration significantly affecting public life in its homeland. When the ZZP held its first congress in independent Poland in October 1921, only 5 out of 130 delegates came from the Ruhr.

Compounding this reorientation of ZZP work was the desire of many Poles living in the Ruhr to return to their native lands after independence, though here their desire to return soon began to clash with the Polish state's inability to cope with large numbers of would-be returnees. The decreased desire of both *Ruhrgebiet* Poles and the ZZP leadership to consider its future within the confines of the Ruhr led to a marked disengagement of Polish emigrants from the affairs of what they now regarded as their temporary homeland at best. Anti-Polish riots in the *Ruhrgebiet*, coming in the wake of the Polish uprisings in Upper Silesia, upped the ante. When some Polish Ruhr residents aided the French during the latter's occupation of the Ruhr in 1923, the crisis point had been reached. Unwanted in Germany, frequently unable to return to Poland, many Polish miners migrated to France. "Following the occupation of the Ruhr and the lockout of May 1924, neither the Polish coal miners nor their unions played a role of any significance in the labour movement in the Ruhr region." (201) In subsequent years, the *Ruhrgebiet* ZZP remained a faint shadow of its former self. In 1932 its staff consisted of a grand total of one officer and one typist. Apparently somehow managing to survive Nazi *Gleichschaltung*, the ZZP office in Bochum closed its doors forever on 1 July 1934.

John J. Kulczycki has managed to throw light on an important set of factors complicating the emergence and the successful functioning of trade unions from their origins until today: the interplay of nation and class. That the ZZP managed to combine this seemingly contradictory ideological burden in the closing years of the Kaiserreich is an important insight with consequences reaching far beyond the region of the Ruhr and the Age of Empire. That the ZZP subsequently collapsed under the conjunctural constraints of Polish independence and German-Polish antagonisms is wholly unsurprising. (Interestingly, it is in his depiction of the terminal decline of the ZZP after 1918 that the author's clarity of argumentation occasionally weakens). Equally significant is Kulczycki's elevation of the long-neglected Polish labour movement in the Ruhr to centre stage.

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Don Kalb, *Expanding Class: Power and Everyday Politics in Industrial Communities: The Netherlands, 1850-1950* (Durham and London: Duke University Press 1997)

DURING THE FIRST HALF of the 20th century, socialism and modern unionism were much weaker in the Netherlands than in other industrialized countries and the level of industrial protest was lower than elsewhere. This has usually been explained by pointing to the late and geographically scattered character of industrialization in the Netherlands and to the firm grip of the churches upon the working classes. Protestant and Roman Catholic labour unions, sports clubs, and youth organizations were successfully set up to keep the people in the fold of the church and away from class-based organizations and radical politics. In addition, the rural background of industrial workers and paternalist policies of large entrepreneurs like Philips have been offered as explanations. Dissatisfied with such interpretations, Don Kalb has taken a fresh look at the literature on the social history of the province of North Brabant, which from the 1890s experienced intensive industrialization without producing a working class movement prepared to fight for the rights of the workers. His reading has included, besides secondary material, printed sources, such as newspapers and reports of government agencies, but very little new archival material. Clearly, the objective of the book is not so much historical exploration, but reinterpretation. He illustrates his account with interviews with former workers in the Eindhoven area that are delightfully rendered and analyzed.

This is a very ambitious book: Kalb claims that his type of analysis "will decisively change the terms of the debate about class and class formation in the modern world." (262) Let us examine this methodology first (the reader is advised to read the first four pages of the epilogue for a succinct account rather than the tortuous arguments and often vague formulations in chapter one). Kalb rejects both the economic reductionism inherent in much class analysis and the "culturalist" approach, which tends to treat discourse and ideology almost separate from social and economic realities. He also criticizes the tendency, especially in Marxist works, to consider one type of development as inherent in capitalism, while deviations from this pattern need specific, *ad hoc* explanations. He argues that capitalist development takes many different "paths," creating different types of human interaction and occasioning different world views and ways of dealing with life. Rejecting every kind of reductionism, Kalb wants to "embrace complexity," (17) which means "trying to account for how dimensions of economy, family, civic life, space, and urbanism can all become entwined in the making of a particular regional path of capitalist industrialization and development." (260) This is best done, he argues, by "thick description" and analysis of all these particular relationships, discarding "abstract and timeless definitions and determinations." (23) He should not be taken for a mere empiricist, however: the data should be fitted into a structured whole. (261) And the concepts he uses for constructing these frameworks, especially the "expanded" notion of class, are, it is implied, of his own invention. This procedure does not sound very revolutionary. It is essentially the anthropologist's method of immersing oneself in a community, observing attentively all its activities, including seemingly trivial ones, and then trying to detect a hidden structure. A well-known objection is that the structures thus found had already been in the anthropologist's knapsack when he set off to study the natives.

The value of the "definitions and determinations" that Kalb rejects is not that they fully account for historical reality, but that they help us in bringing some order by looking at history from an admittedly limited perspective. I believe that Kalb's "expanded" concept of class is too vague to perform this function; significantly, in the last chapter he drops the whole concept as a tool to explain the experiences of workers in Brabant, in favour of notions of gender and generation. Kalb's method does have one great advantage: it has led him to describe in considerable detail and with great gusto the experiences of workers in two industrial regions in the Netherlands and to come up with interesting explanations.

As a consequence of the small size of the Dutch domestic market and the political tradition of free trade, Dutch industry was largely dependent on a very fluctuating international market. Proto-industrial production therefore appeared in areas such as Brabant, where labour was readily available and cheap. The wives and daughters of shoemakers, subject of the first part of the book, were an important part of the work force, since they took very low wages and could easily be laid off when the market was down. The appearance of steam-driven factories after 1900 led to increased competition, to which proto-industrial entrepreneurs reacted by lowering the wages of home workers, introducing a truck system and so on. These forms of exploitation were attacked by the new shoemakers's unions, which were started by skilled industrial workers together with the local clergy and supported by the larger entrepreneurs. It succeeded, at least in part, in organizing exploited home-workers (but hardly in changing their drinking and other traditional habits, as Kalb shows in an interesting chapter about the "civilizing mission" of the union). This coalition of church, industrialists, and "labour aristocrats" broke down when further mechanization and de-skilling lessened the dependence of industrialists upon skilled workers. Some of these workers became small entrepreneurs themselves, thanks to the appearance of small and relatively cheap motors and machines.

This is an interesting interpretation, especially where it brings out the decisive role of women and the conflict between the factory and the proto-industrial sectors of shoemaking. But it ignores some well-established facts, such as the fear of socialism as a motivating force among the clergy and entrepreneurs and the long-standing campaign of the Roman Catholic leadership for small-scale mechanization as a means to counter tendencies of industrial concentration and class formation. The alleged opposition between "petit vicaires" who helped build up the union and the higher clergy who opposed it is not demonstrated, and one wonders why the bishop should have supported the lower clergy against the higher. (47, 67) The relatively good relations which Kalb claims existed between workers and factory owners until the great strike of 1910 (49) is contradicted by a very similar strike (also starting with the women walking out) in 1903. It is also a pity that Kalb has not more closely edited the two chapters devoted to this subject, which are based upon earlier articles, and which now contain many repetitions, while explanations sometimes appear at the wrong places.

This problem does not appear in the well-constructed second part of the book, which is devoted to the working people in the "electrical boomtown" Eindhoven, home of the Philips firm. The path industrial development took in Eindhoven differed from that in the shoemaking area in that it meant the creation of a large factory and the growth of an industrial city, but as elsewhere in Brabant, industrial protest hardly occurred. Again, female labour and the family relationships this involves form the core of Kalb's explanation. Because light bulb production was a labour intensive industry, Philips could continue the traditional practice of employing young women for very low wages. Families could survive industrial downturns and unemployment, because their income never depended on the job of one wage-earner. Daughters constituted a reserve of labour for the employer as well as the only means of working-class families to improve their incomes. The firm could therefore trust the families to teach their daughters discipline and deference (Kalb calls this "flexible familism"). The severe strain this put upon young girls is brought out in moving detail in the interviews Kalb presents. He also shows the consequences it had for the building of working-class houses and urban planning in Eindhoven. During the 1920s this system seemed to break down. The "radio boom" created a demand for labour which local daughters could not supply. Young workers from elsewhere, who escaped the traditional family socialization, invaded the Eindhoven region and local authorities and Philips managers complained of the breakdown of discipline. Philips responded by importing families from elsewhere. The daughters of these families took the places of many young "undisciplined" adults and enabled the firm to respond flexibly to the downturns of the 1930s and forestalling labour unrest. Kalb's book has given well-known explanations of workers's attitudes and behaviour in terms of paternalism and rural background much more content.

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Philip J. Deloria, *Playing Indian* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press 1998)

AT LEAST once every baseball or football season in the United States there is some controversy about the use of Native American nomenclature and symbols by professional sports teams. What the critics who object to the use of terms like "Indians," "Braves," or "Redskins" in team titles, or the so-called Tomahawk Chop that Atlanta baseball fans use to urge their Braves on, probably do not know is that this form of cultural appropriation has a long and interesting, if not necessarily distinguished, history. In the unlikely event that journalists or activists want to uncover that history, they should turn to Philip Deloria's *Playing Indian*.

The study, a revision of Deloria's 1994 doctoral dissertation for Yale, begins with the 1773 Boston Tea Party, a seminal event in the fabrication of an American tradition of adopting and adapting the guise of the Indian for political and social purposes. That the political opponents of the excise tax who dumped British tea in Boston harbour mostly dressed as Indians Deloria explains as more than a device to escape identification by the authorities. Playing Indian in colonial Boston was a way of putting on a North American identity, one that served to differentiate the insurgents from the now-detested British who were attempting to tax them against their will. Playing Indian in this context was a means of setting the political boundaries between emerging colony and insensitive metropole, a method for distancing Americans from and defining them against Britain. "As English became a them for colonists," Deloria notes, "Indians became an us." (22) However, as was often to be the case, colonial Americans were ambivalent about the people whose dress and rituals they used in this way. Even as they appropriated things Indian, Americans were uneasy about the Indian identity, shying away from "the exterior savage" while embracing "the interior American." (37) Since colonial Americans had for many decades been busy stealing the lands and taking the lives of those same Indians, the ambivalence was hardly surprising. And this ambivalence was never fully resolved over the following two centuries by Americans playing Indian.

Deloria traces the shifts and redefinitions of the American self that the descendants of the revolution engaged in with five chapters that take the reader from fraternal and political organizations such as Tammany clubs to Boy Scouts and Camp Fire girls in the early 20th century to bandana-wearing counterculture rebels of the 1960s and Shirley Maclaine's tribe of New Agers (with New Agers, it's the "age" part that counts!) in the 1980s and 1990s. Along the way there are some striking shifts in emphasis displayed by the non-Natives who were playing Indian. For example, in the period following the Revolution, when the fledgling United States was busy dominating and dispossessing First Nations, there was much less emphasis on the militant qualities of Aboriginal peoples and more on their supposed affinities to those classic republicans, the Greeks and Romans. There was also a tendency in the political and fraternal clubs to downplay Tammany, a white American version of an Indian chief, and advance the cause of Columbus and Columbia as public symbols of the new state. In the post-War of 1812 period the Society of Red Men, and later the Improved Order of Red Men, offered conviviality and mutual support to workers made increasingly vulnerable and marginal by the advancing market economy of the US.

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries the Indian served as a talisman and reassurance to those disturbed by the advance of modernity and its discontents. First, in the exterior/savage Indian literary figures found elements of antimodernism that were reassuring and welcome. This literary phase also initiated a new trend in playing Indian, for writers who became interested in Native Americans turned to ethnography, the study and description of life ways and material culture of groups such as the Iroquois, in search of authentic, natural qualities. This process created for the first time a need to deal with real, living Indians as informants, a process that, ironically, began to bring the Native American into Indian play.

With the emergence of youth organizations and hobby groups focused on Native Americans in the period down to the middle of the 20th century, differences over militarism, gender, and class developed. The American scouting movement split over the issue of emphasizing American patriotism or Indian woodlore, with the Boy Scouts of America branch stressing the former and naturalist Ernest Thompson Seton's Woodcraft Indians and the Camp Fire Girls with which he was also associated focusing on the latter. With the emergence of the girls's movement gender constructions became important. "If camping and boy scouting were about restoring masculinity to postfrontier city boys, Camp Fire was about reaffirming female difference in terms of domesticity and service." (113) No female chiefs or fur traders here. The hobbyists — those who dressed as authentically Native as they could and who learned Aboriginal songs and dances — who became prominent after World War II were primarily male and middle class. As with 19th-century literary figures who looked to ethnography for authentic information, hobbyists considered contact with real Indians essential. This led to more interaction with and even respect for actual Native culture than had previously figured in Indian playing: "hobby also displayed a degree of mutuality that can only be described as new." (150)

From the 1960s to the 1990s, from hippies to the geriatric Deadheads and New Agers, the mainly white, middle-class people who were now playing Indian showed much less respect for Native ways. Most of them adopted Indian artifacts or practices, wrenching them out of context and insensitively using them for their own, often self-absorbed purposes. Of the 1960s headbands Deloria notes, "That headband might mean Geronimo, but it also meant Che Guevara and Stokeley Carmichael." (164) And in the case of New Agers, Deloria dismisses most of them as people who act as though they believe that "one can engage in social struggles by working on oneself." (177) The analysis concludes with two sobering points about how two centuries of Indian players had, like the New Agers who are the endpoint of the trajectory originating in the Boston Tea Party, exploited more than played Indian. In contrast to tribal societies, which were cohesive, communal, and consensual, Indian players typified American individualism and selfishness. "The idea that one could make a self-identity through an anarchic approach to meaning has been a cherished American possession from the nation's earliest moments, and it has frequently been played out in Indian costume." (184) Second, while Indian players sometimes contributed in a minor fashion by valorizing Native sources and exemplars, over all they took far more than they received: "Playing Indian, then, reflects one final paradox. The self-defining pairing of American truth with American freedom rests on the ability to wield power against Indians-social, military, economic, and political-while simultaneously drawing power from them." (191)

For a revised dissertation, *Playing Indian* is based on an impressive amount of research. As well as extensive research in substantive secondary accounts, archival sources, and even a bit of oral history, Deloria has grounded his analysis in a wide and thoughtful reading of the theoretical literature. Early chapters, for example, owe much to E.P. Thompson and N.Z. Davis, while the sections about response to modernity are acknowledged to be influenced by Jackson Lears. Similarly, the usual suspects of postmodernist theory — Foucault and Lyotard, for example — are lined up in the endnotes. To all these sources, impressive both in their breadth and depth, Deloria has given an intelligent and sensitive reading, emerging from it as the master, rather than the servant, of theory and the effective deployer of empirical evidence.

To readers of *Labour/Le Travail* however, *Playing Indian* might seem timid in its treatment of class as a category of analysis. The increasingly plebeian quality of fraternal clubs using Native symbolism in the National period, the identification of post-1945 critiques of American high modernism with people of the "white middle class," (131) and fairly banal generalizations about members of the 1960s counterculture and later New Agers constitute virtually the totality of the class analysis. Obviously, there is room for more. For example, Deloria says nothing about what patrician New Englanders of the late 19th century such as Francis Parkman and Henry Adams — critics of market-oriented, modernist America if ever there were two — had to say about Aboriginal people in relation to a changing society.

If Deloria is to be criticised for underpowered class analysis, in fairness he should be praised for introducing something novel to scholarly understanding of the interplay of Native Americans and national identity. The significance of Indian role-playing in Boston harbour in 1773 or in the hobbyist movement of the mid-20th century has hardly escaped academic notice. What is new and important about Deloria's work is that he also includes among his research questions curiosity about "How have Indian people reacted to Europeans doing bad imitations of native dress, language, and custom?"(8) In tracing the interaction of small numbers of Native American Indian players from 19th -century ethnographers to late-20th century New Agers, Deloria points out that Indians found a degree of validation in the non-Native American society and limited economic opportunities in dealing with Indian players. He rightly argues that his relationship was characterized by mutuality rather than equality, but his book is novel in providing a degree of insight into how some Native Americans perceived and reacted to non-Natives "doing bad imitations" of them and their ancestors.

Philip Deloria's *Playing Indian* is an interesting, informative, and thought-provoking examination of a long tradition of Americans' appropriation of aspects of Native culture in pursuit of their own psychological and social aspirations. One wonders if that aging 1960s rebel, Jane Fonda, has any sense that she is merely the latest in a long line of white-skinned Indian players when she and her husband, Ted Turner, do the Tomahawk Chop at a game featuring Ted's team, the Atlanta Braves?

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Karen A. Shapiro, *The New South Rebellion: The Battle against Convict Labor in the Tennessee Coalfields, 1871-1896* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press 1998)

KAREN SHAPIRO provides a sophisticated and multilayered analysis of the rise and fall of the convict lease system in Tennessee during the genesis of industrialization in the south. She argues that miners' struggles against convict labour in Tennessee's coalfields reflected attitudes, ideologies, and actions that were rooted in the new south. The new south, in turn, was a product of antebellum history that divided this state into Union and Confederate sides, republican ideology, Jacksonian democracy, and racial hierarchy. Throughout the narrative Shapiro aptly draws on the tension between old and new to highlight multiple themes including region, colonialism, urbanization, class consciousness, agency, and militancy.

Shapiro's story begins with an assessment of Tennessee's coalfields to show the connections between structure and rebellion. She nicely depicts the relationship between economic development and geologic phenomena that affected this exploitative mineral industry. In particular, the state had two dominant coalfields, one in mid-Tennessee which was dependent on a single coal seam and one in east Tennessee that had multiple veins. These distinct characteristics shaped the industry's growth. One large company, Tennessee Coal, Iron, and Railroad Company (TCIR) dominated the mid-Tennessee fields while multiple companies, dependent on landholding enterprises, developed east Tennessee's shafts. While economic structures and geologic realities affected distinct development, similarities marked the state's coal communities. Unlike mining regions in West Virginia, parts of Pennsylvania and Illinois, and most of the West, Tennessee did not house company towns. A relatively high homeownership rate, social and religious organization, union support, and multiple leisure outlets indicate that these were rooted and fairly independent communities. The region's demography was also unique. During the period 1880-1900, Tennessee's foreign-born mining population went from 25 per cent to almost zero. (27) In light of her argument about tempered militancy, this is an interesting statistic. Shapiro remarks upon it in a footnote but does not develop the argument. This is an extremely important discovery and her point could have been stronger were she to have compared Tennessee to the studies on Pennsylvania and Illinois by Victor Green, John H.M. Laslett, and Herbert Gutman respectively. Nonetheless, Shapiro's description in this section works well to prove that the battle over the convict lease system was structural and ideological.

Shapiro argues convincingly that Tennessee's attachment to the convict lease was tied directly to economic circumstances in the post-bellum south. Tennessee was strapped by debt and new companies sought to compete for markets at the same time that they were battling high freight rates. In other words, the state needed to save on prison costs and new industrialists required cheap labour. In her chapter, "Measures of Southern Justice," Shapiro combines her analysis of colonialism and urbanization to describe the realities of convict lease. Prison populations rose sharply after the Civil War and urban African-American men were the bulk of the inmates during this period. In addition, the authors' use of the Petitions for Executve Pardons adds the much needed voices of African-American women and men to the history of convict labour. She carries their voices into her depiction of convicts' overt and covert attacks on the system. Coal companies which used convict labour soon discovered that there were "indirect costs" which boded ill for capital growth. (72) Unlike free labour, convicts could not be laid-off during slack seasons. In addition, because coal mining during this period still required skilled labour, companies combined free and prison workers in their mines. Ultimately, they were trying to balance what they viewed as the problem of labour militancy and cost. Here Shapiro's work would have benefited by more information on the relationship between free and convict labour in the mines. One might assume that there were many opportunities for the two groups to work together since most of the convicts had little experience in the mines and therefore had to labour under skilled workmen. How did this shape the rebellion? In what ways did it entrench racial ideology and ideals about workers' rights?

Like the convicts themselves, free miners in the Knights of Labor and the United Mine Workers of America attacked the lease system from its inception. They were joined by other unions and middle class reformers as well. The first battles against the system were political. Workers petitioned lawmakers and had an impact on the rhetoric of Democrat and Republican elected officials alike.

Such lobbying efforts, however, had little effect on actual practice, Shapiro argues. (75) By the early 1890s, miners were looking for new methods to change the system. In July 1891, east Tennessee mine managers locked out miners who refused to work with company checkweighmen and replaced them with convict labour. In response, the miners combined political savvy with direct action. Relying on the support of the new governor, who had come to power on the Farmers' Alliance ticket, the miners marched to the prison and released the convicts. They then notified the governor of their action. His response was less empowering than enlightening. During the summer and fall of that year, miners learned that reliance on seemingly sympathetic political leaders was not sufficient. Between July 1891 and August 1892, east Tennessee and mid-Tennessee miners used direct action tactics four times to rid the state of their nemesis, the convict lease system. The combination strategy, Shapiro explains, was a product of their American identity which combined a belief in republican ideology, the right of property ownership, belief in the current system of govenment, and "the frontier tradition of justice." (111)

Who won? Shapiro traces the evolution of the miners' rebellion along with her parallel analysis of the relations between the state and capital. She notes that, unlike other late-19th century labour strife, the government of Tennessee and the state's coal companies were uneasy allies. (195) Moreover, while not conceding victory, each was disenchanted with the convict lease *status quo*. In the end, it was economic circumstances (divulged by the miners themselves) which caused the demise of the convict lease in Tennessee. By 1896, the system was dead. It was replaced, however, with something that was equally reprehensible to free labour — a state owned mine worked by prisoners. As Shapiro concludes, for miners here, "the promise of southern industrialization [and the new south] remained very much unfulfilled." (247)

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Julia Grant, *Raising Baby by the Book: The Education of American Mothers* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1998).

JULIA GRANT TACKLES an especially tough historical subject: experts' advice to American mothers on how best to rear children and (this is the hard part) an analysis of how mothers actually implemented the numerous edicts handed down to them over the years. Jay Mechling pointed out many years ago that the ubiquitous child-rearing-advice books and magazines in the United States never have been reliable indicators of parental behaviour. Historians should be careful, Mechling warned, books and magazines rarely even hit at what mothers actually did with all those suggestions. ("Advice to Historians on Advice to Mothers," *Journal of Social History* 9 (1975), 44-63). Did mothers embrace professional advice? Did they reject it? Did they follow a recommendation only when it suited a particular circumstance? Or did some mothers use select bits of advice because it fit their unique motherly inclination anyway? Grant answers these questions using numerous sources — including the minutes of assorted child study groups, the papers of the American Association of University Women, and letters from mothers to pediatrician Benjamin Spock — and the answers, she argues, are yes, yes, yes, and yes.

It is likely a blessing for American children that the relationship between mothers and child-care professionals has been such an ambivalent one, for expert guidance has tended to veer between extremes. Grant contends that early childhood development theories have alternated between the Rousseauian concept of respecting children's "innate nature" and the Lockean concept of forcing children to suppress their child-like behaviours and fit into the adult world.

G. Stanley Hall, a central figure in the history of child psychology, exemplified the former theory. Hall urged parents not to interfere with their children's "natural" development. In the 1920s, the philosophy of behaviourist John Watson replaced Hall's. Watson warned mothers not to kiss or hug or rock their children lest those children become demanding monsters. Although many mothers apparently embraced Watson, others did not. Two women at different child-study meetings in the 1920s demonstrated the opposing ends of the spectrum. One, who worked for the Cornell child-study clubs, reported indignantly that a woman "ruined [the] meeting by insisting on giving her ideas about kindness to children, which were thoroughly sentimental and selfish .... Her main idea was that if a baby cried it needed picking up, that it was lonely!" (142) Another mother, at a meeting of the Oakfield Home Bureau Child Study Club in New York, told the women attending her meeting, "Some babies need that human contact and the comfort of the adult's presence." (141-2)

Gentler child-rearing experts eventually counteracted Watson's harshness. By the early 1940s, Arnold Gesell, Louise Bates Ames, and France Ilg pitched a child-centered approach to child rearing. Gesell's concept of age-appropriate behaviours, in particular, heavily influenced mothers and pediatricians (and continues to do so). Gesell, Ames, and Ilg downplayed parents's role in their children's development, contending that mothers merely needed to educate themselves about the assorted behaviours they would encounter as their children aged and to accept those behaviours with equanimity. While John Watson's child required vigorous taming and Arnold Gesell's child could be equally unruly (although taming was out), Benjamin Spock's child of the 1950s was considerate. "Your baby is born to be a reasonable, friendly human being," Spock told mothers. "If you treat him nicely, he won't take advantage of you." (223)

A pattern emerges. The gospel of one generation of cocksure experts often became anathema to the next. Even the experts, if they lived long enough to see their advice-writ-in-stone overturned, were sheepish about their former dogma. Grant quotes Alice Hamilton, a Chicago physician who cared for immigrant women and their babies at Hull House. Hamilton declared in retrospect, "Those Italian women knew what a baby needed far better than my Ann Arbor professor did." Her patients' mothers staunchly ignored her advice on infant feeding and, Hamilton recalled years later, those stubborn women turned out to be right — at least according to the subsequent round of infant-feeding experts. Hamilton, fortunately, did not have to feel guilty about disseminating misinformation. As she noted years later, "my teachings had no effect." (84)

Historical trends, Grant points out, have always shaped the number and tone of child-rearing prescriptions. Eras known for a vast array of advice and dogmatic child-rearing practices invariably are characterized by "uncertainty and anxiety about the survival of particular forms of civilization." Thus, she argues that her study of the education of mothers "can tell us much about our most pressing cultural concerns and how those concerns have been articulated in the dialogues between mothers and experts." (5) For example, as middle-class, largely Protestant reformers attempted to acculturate immigrants in the late 19th century, educators used child-rearing advice manuals and articles to undermine immigrants' traditional parenting practices. Likewise in the 1920s, when tensions arose between parents and children as the education levels of children exceeded their parents', Watson's theories appeared. Behaviourism, Grant also argues, may have stemmed from discomfort with the intimacy generated by the significantly smaller families of the 1920s. The coming of World War II finally discredited Watson. As American social scientists postulated that authoritarian German child-rearing practices precipitated the rise of fascism, they deemed Watson's behaviourist tactics pathological.

In general, poor and working-class mothers reacted to expert advice differently than middle-class mothers. Women of means tended to embrace expert advice while poorer women were more likely to ignore it or ask their mothers and grandmothers for aid and guidance. As the leader of one settlement house study group said in 1929, it seems "almost ridiculous to talk about sleeping habits to a woman who hasn't even a crib for her baby to sleep in." (88) Rural mothers tended to be similarly uninterested in child-rearing advice. Grant points out that in the traditional farm family children worked alongside their parents all day and consequently the entire, exhausted family went to bed simultaneously each evening. It was likely, she argues, that the increasing segregation of children from adults in the urban family created the "sleeping problems" that became the focal point of so many child-rearing theories.

The first half of Grant's book, describing the institutions and anxieties that fueled education for mothers, is often tedious. Her last three chapters, where she uses mothers' voices to describe the reactions to child-rearing prescriptions, are lively and absorbing. She likely used mothers' voices sparingly because she did not have many of them. She chose — wisely — not to interview mothers. She argues that women's memories of their experience as mothers tend to be either self-serving or distorted by the contemporary image of the adults that their children became. But she might have overcome this problem by using women's diaries, which are often detailed and eloquent on infant and child care. This would have enlivened the first half of the book and brought the reader into women's homes throughout the narrative, where all that child development theory was being practiced, rejected, or used selectively.

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Carlotta R. Anderson, *All-American Anarchist: Joseph A. Labadie and the Labor Movement* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press 1998)

IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE to live with the labour reform milieu of the 1880-1920 years and not cross paths with Jo Labadie. Active, at one time or another, in the Socialist Labor Party and the American Federation of Labor, the Greenback movement and the struggle for the eight-hour day, the printers' union and the overlapping anarchist circles of Gilded Age America, Labadie wrote endlessly for the working-class and radical press, his "cranky notions" a touchstone of radicalism, his poems, often privately published, a recording of the sentiment and politics of protest. Few were the major figures of trade unionism and radicalism, from Terence V. Powderly to Samuel Gompers, that Labadie did not work with or challenge, and at different points in his long years of activism he often ended up in vigorous opposition to those who had once been allies and friends. He was not so much cantankerous as resolutely principled, albeit in ways that others often took exception to.

Labadie was also an advertisement for the politics of "identity," yet he managed, nevertheless, to embrace an unerringly class-based radicalism. A flamboyant and amiably social personality, Labadie was a product of the 19th-century frontier, growing up in the backwoods of Michigan, where his camping, hunting, and fishing with native peoples, as well as hints of aboriginal ancestry and a native godmother, solidified his proud identification with the country's first nations, a politics of sensitivity that extended to his sense of self-designation as "Ojibway Joe." With a mixed blood ancestry reaching back to 17th-century French settlers, his family tree firmly planted on both sides of the United States/Canadian border, Labadie was a truly "American" radical: "I am no dam foreign 'Arnikist'," he once snorted, "I'm on my native heath." (29) As if to accentuate his centredness in mainstream America, Labadie married a thoroughly conventional and resolutely Catholic woman, his cousin Sophie Elizabeth Archambeau. She proved a loving and devoted wife, smiling silently as house guests routinely denounced the oppressions of church and state, avoiding any involvement in Jo's campaigns, but clearing the path for his activism and rigorously saving every publication Labadie subscribed to or wrote for, accumulating correspondence, scrapbooks of Jo's career as a labour radical, and other reform ephemera, all the while caring for the household and its three children, one of whom arrived late in middle age, as well as an infirm and demanding mother. The massive cache of material accumulated by Jo and preserved by Sophie, stored in the attic of the Labadie's Detroit home for decades, would later become the core of the Labadie Collection at the University of Michigan, a celebrated and unrivalled source for researchers in radicalism that was almost lost, notwithstanding the interested interventions of Richard T. Ely and John R. Commons, due to the political apathy of the times and institutional neglect. A man of dreams and idiosyncratic style, a gentle revolutionary whose private reserve seemed to contrast with his often inflammatory public pronouncements, Labadie embraced the contradictions of his life and times and managed, through his deep commitment to individual freedom, to remain a radical into his old age, militant in his oppositions to the structures and institutions of oppression and exploitation.

For all of his attachment to rural roots, Labadie was destined to spend much of his life in the industrialized city, an environment he understood to be physically unhealthy, socially destructive, and physically draining. A printer by trade, Labadie saw Detroit expand from a small midwestern town to a thriving capitalist metropolis, dominated by factories and later by the monopolizing power of the automobile corporations and their assembly-line productions. His work was sporadic, and he was eventually driven from his craft and forced to work for the city's water commission, but the continuity in his life, aside from his family, was always his politics of working class radicalism, which evolved within the boundaries of the left, passing from early 1870s socialism to individualist anarchism, where Labadie differentiated himself from the collectivist "terror of the deed" associated with Johann Most.

Anderson's biography is an account of the heady turbulent times in which Labadie's politics moved. It is an invaluable orchestration of the ups and downs of the radical workers' movement in Gilded Age America and into the 20th century, told through the correspondence and conventions, personalities and parties, fights, factions, and friendships, that were in their collective complexity the swirling tides that engulfed Labadie and many others. Keeping afloat in this troubled sea was no mean feat, and it perhaps partly explains Labadie's later 20th-century verse, where his rebellious inclinations found outlet less in polemic and more in a poetics of sensitive humanitarianism. First galvanized by the promise of the Knights of Labor, Labadie saw his hopes for a brotherhood of man dashed on the shoals of an opportunist leadership and the immense backlash following in the wake of the Haymarket bombing. An entire universe, a movement culture of promise and possibility, crumbled in this moment of reaction and retreat, and Labadie never quite recovered. He found a particular peace in the narrowing of trade unionism's craft essence, and Labadie's individualist anarchism, hostile to compulsions driven by both capital and the state, found an ironic congruence with Gompers' trade union voluntarism, equally antagonistic to the regulatory zeal of governing authorities, be they economic or political.

A short review cannot do justice to either Labadie or this impressive and highly useful biography. Readers will benefit from Anderson's thorough canvassing of Labadie's life and those interested in the pivotal players in radicalism and working-class circles will find that anecdotes and insights relating to figures such as Powderly, Gompers, Tom Barry, Eugene Debs, and Emma Goldman abound in the pages of this book. As a critical chapter in the neglected history of American anarchism, Labadie's life extends greatly our appreciation of the tension between communitarianism and individualism, as well as enriching our understanding of the movement, its leaders, their writings, and the contentious political differences that fractured anarchism's divergent strategies and tactics. Once again, but in heightened relief, we are reminded of the pivotal place of the Knights of Labor and the Haymarket repression of 1886 in the making and unmaking of American working-class possibility. Labadie's amassing of an unrivalled collection of working class and radical publications and periodicals, and its troubling archival history, in which materials were lost and dispersed, but eventually also saved, is a significant narrative of documentary preservation. It reminds all of us who work in such records of the necessity of vigilance in this area, personified in this case by the efforts of Agnes Inglis, a woman pushed to radicalism by the writings of Emma Goldman. Finally, like many dissidents, alienated from their capitalist surroundings, Labadie sought out a range of personal, often health-related panaceas, pursued in his efforts to establish a utopian community, Bubbling Waters, as well as diet fads that included the "no breakfast plan." There is food for everyone's thought in this book.

Labadie deserved this treatment. We will all benefit from it. The author, Carlotta R. Anderson, is Labadie's granddaughter. In researching and writing this biography, Anderson confronted directly her grandfather's sense, late in his life, that his politics had come to naught and he had lived his revolutionary commitments as failure. It is possible to understand why Labadie would feel as he did, but it is not possible to read this book, or explore the Labadie collection, and not come to different conclusions. The past does not always lead to the present we would like, but without pasts such as those of Jo Labadie, our prospects for the future would be dim indeed. I imagine Ms. Anderson found this book a labour of love. She can be proud of her grandfather, as well as her considerable efforts in bringing him back to life.

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Alex Kershaw, *Jack London: A Life* (New York: St. Martin's Press 1997)

THE LIFE DESCRIBED in Alex Kershaw's *Jack London: A Life* would be unbelievable if the book were not a biography of the legendary author. Although not a scholarly monograph, this volume should interest labour historians on a personal and professional level.

Born into poverty on 12 January 1876, Jack London grew up in Oakland and San Francisco. As a schoolboy London sold newspapers to help support his family. After the eighth grade he worked full-time in a cannery. At the age of 15 he abandoned the factory for life as an oyster pirate. During the next ten years, London captured poachers for the Fish Patrol, sailed on a sealing vessel, toiled in a laundry, laboured in a mill, slaved as a coal-passer, tramped across America, prospected for gold in the Klondike, and agitated for the Socialist Labour Party. At the age of 23, London won fame and fortune as a best-selling author. London died on 22 November 1916, perhaps a suicide but probably of a morphine overdose while trying to kill the pain of illnesses caused by alcoholism.

Best known for his Klondike stories, especially *The Call of the Wild*, London published 200 short stories, 400 essays, and 20 novels in just 18 years. Since he explored a plethora of subjects it is often forgotten that London was America's first, most popular, and arguably best, proletarian author. London not only wrote about the working class, but labourers around the world eagerly read his books depicting their daily struggles. According to Kershaw,

> Jack London embodied the promise of socialism. He exposed capitalism's evils; its decimation of the work force through ruthless profit making. In some of his most powerful prose, he showed how expendable people are to the process of increasing a governing elite's wealth. To his last breath he championed the underdog. He did more to increase class-consciousness than any other writer of his time. (xxiv)

Written by a journalist for a mass audience, Kershaw's book does not offer any groundbreaking contributions to historical scholarship. Academics may find the historical context of key events in London's life insufficient or simplistic since Kershaw relies on popular histories. For example, the context for the Klondike gold rush is derived from Pierre Berton's *Klondike Fever*. The best treatment of the political and social background of Jack's life remains his daughter Joan London's *Jack London and His Times: An Unconventional Biography*, however, Kershaw's historical discussions will satisfy general readers.

Historians should be careful not to dismiss the book entirely. Kershaw recognizes that London lived during a time of tremendous change. London witnessed "the arrival of the lightbulb, the electric tram, the telephone, radio, motion picture, skyscraper, automobile and aeroplane." (xxiv) London also witnessed, and participated in, the rise of socialism in America. Of special interest to labour historians, Kershaw explores how, despite London's poverty and exploitative jobs, it took time for Jack to embrace socialism. Even while tramping towards Washington, DC in 1894 with Jacob Coxey's unemployed army, London viewed the march more as an adventure than as a political statement. The eighteen-year old Jack even got into trouble for racing ahead of the other marchers to steal donations of food and clothing.

Even as he expressed his unbridled individualism, London experienced a socialist awakening. During the march London met men who had been cast aside by the capitalist system because of age, poor health, or changing technology. Others contributed to his education when they discussed unions, working-class solidarity, and *The Communist Manifesto*. After abandoning the march, a 30 day jail sentence for vagrancy reinforced these lessons and awakened London's class-consciousness. These experiences on the road taught London two things: that it would be preferable to live by his brain instead of his brawn and that there was something fundamentally wrong with a system that destroyed so many men. The birth of London's desire to become a writer and his interest in socialism were directly linked. As a result, his art and politics intertwined throughout his career.

In 1896, London joined Oakland's chapter of the Socialist Labor Party, his callused hands a rarity among the hundred other members, most of whom were middle-class intellectuals. Kershaw's biography does a good job examining the disputes between London and Socialist Party leaders that reflect the divisions within the Party. London rejected the compromise of gradual political change and embraced the idea of class struggle. When London published his 1908 novel *The Iron Heel*, socialist and middle-class critics attacked him for advocating the use of bullets instead of ballots. Despite the poor reviews, the book proved extremely popular with workers. The socialist press also roasted London for acting like a capitalist when he spent tens of thousands of dollars building a yacht and the opulent "Wolf House" on his vast California ranch.

London's racist beliefs are another blemish that Kershaw does not shy away from exploring. Despite being a socialist, London openly expressed his belief in the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race. Unfortunately, the author only mentions, and does not sufficiently explore, the origins of London's racism, mainly the influence of his mother and growing up in California during the height of anti-Chinese agitation. London's racism influenced his decisions to support America's intervention in Mexico in 1914 and to press for US involvement in World War I. These positions strained his relationship with the Socialist Party to the breaking point. When London resigned in March 1916 he blamed the Party for neglecting class struggle and its lack of revolutionary spirit.

Overall, the quality of Kershaw's writing is excellent, but it is not without flaws. The opening chapter, a fictionalized account of a typical day near the end of London's life supposedly revealing Jack's thoughts as he suffered from depression and ill-health is an awkward start. Thankfully, the technique is not employed throughout the book. Also problematic is the author's habit of supplying detailed plot summaries of London's works. Either the reader will be familiar with the book and find the synopsis unnecessary, or worse, the reader will be horrified to have the ending ruined.

Readers accustomed to historical citation methods will find the absence of footnote numbers in the text's body frustrating. Instead of numbers in the body, key phrases are repeated in the endnotes. A well researched book, Kershaw relies on the three published volumes of London's letters and the London collections held at various California libraries. These are the same sources used by previous London biographers. In fact, Kershaw acknowledges fifteen authors for helping to blaze the trail he followed, but makes no real attempt to justify another biography of London. Regardless of the aforementioned quibbles, *Jack London: A Life* is an informative and entertaining biography of one of America's great literary and socialist figures. Ultimately, Kershaw's efforts will prove worthwhile if they encourage people familiar only with London's Klondike stories to explore some of his equally exciting and provocative socialist writing.

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Robert H. Zieger, *The CIO, 1935-1955* (Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press 1995)

IT WOULD BE hard to exaggerate the need for a book on the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). The CIO was the dynamic new centre of union organizing that transformed the North American labour movement in the 1930s and 1940s and brought thousands of workers into stable collective bargaining relationships with employers in the key industries of the industrial economy. Yet, in the four decades since it dissolved back into a unified House of Labour with the American Federation of Labor, there has never been a full-scale, scholarly study of the organization. Many years ago, Robert Zieger decided to tackle the daunting tasks of wading through voluminous archival material, carefully integrating all the local and industrial studies that have appeared, including several of his own, and negotiating the minefield of debate over this organization. The result is a masterful synthesis that finally charts the CIO's remarkable history with clarity and confidence.

The essentials of the story are familiar to most labour historians: the struggles inside the crusty old American Federation of Labor to launch a serious organizing drive in US mass-production factories in 1935; the new organizing committees that were created in several industries to guide and inspire the widening militancy among industrial workers; the support of the American government's new labour legislation, known as the Wagner Act; the wartime expansion and postwar consolidation of the new unions; the fierce internal battles in the late 1940s to drive out Communists and, if necessary, the unions they led; and finally the merger with the AFL in 1955. Zieger covers all these developments thoroughly and fills in a good deal of new information along the way, particularly on the final phase, between the anti-Communist purges and the merger, where he reveals how stagnant the organization had become at the centre. He is particularly sensitive to the role of African Americans in the organization. The book is thus the most comprehensive overview of CIO history available.

Almost all previous versions of this story have recognized that CIO unions had a remarkable record of laying down solid foundations of unionism in the heartland of North American industry where none had existed in the mid-1930s, and then bringing to their members a higher standard of living than they had ever known. There has been much more controversy over whether or not the bureaucratic and legalistic form of unionism imposed by the leadership of these new unions was a debilitating constraint on potentially more expansive working-class struggle. In particular, union leaders have been charged with demobilizing militancy and combatting radicalism, while tying this workers' movement to the inevitably limited political horizons of the Democratic Party.

Zierger enters onto this terrain calmly and carefully. His central message seems to be that it was never so simple. From the outset, it is clear that the central dilemma facing any historian attempting to understand the CIO is the dual process involved in its creation — one, a series of bureaucratic maneuvers within the AFL, led by the charismatic John L. Lewis and other well-established union leaders, to create new structures for organizing all-inclusive industrial unions; the other, the mass response by male wage-earners in factories throughout heavy industry, symbolized by the sit-down strikes in the auto plants. Zieger never denies that the leaders of the new CIO affiliates were concerned to impose order and discipline on their new membership, that they rarely considered flexing labour's industrial power for political ends and were more comfortable channelling industrial conflict away from the streets and shop floor (in the well-established tradition of AFL unions), or that they never developed a strategy for reaching beyond their core membership of white male, increasingly well-paid mass-production workers to other groups of wage-earners, notably African Americans and women. But he wants us to understand how crucial their efforts were for the initial breakthroughs in union recognition in mass-production industries and for the ongoing survival of industrial unionism. He argues that Lewis's interventions into negotiations at key moments in the turbulent strikes of the 1930s brought agreements with corporations that the strikers alone could not have won. The new CIO unions were highly centralized, he admits, but in the early years they often used their resources to fund organizing drives in many sectors (without the United Mine Workers' huge subsidies of CIO activities in particular, the central organization and its brand-new affiliates might never have survived). He argues in particular for the importance of the CIO's alliance with the Democratic Party, first as part of the liberal coalition behind Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal, and then during World War II, when complete commitment to the war effort brought some security in the face of serious challenges.

His case rests heavily on three conclusions. First, he establishes fairly convincingly that the CIO was not as strong an organization as it generally looked from the outside. At the outbreak of the war, the Congress and its leading affiliates still had a limited base of support and an uncertain bargaining relationship with many corporate employers. During the war, the rising political animus against the new unions, the corporations' more sophisticated welfarism, and the resurgent AFL were serious threats. His careful study of the inner circles of power and intrigue within the CIO reveals how badly positioned it often was to respond. The sober, statesmanlike restraint and the friendly ties to Democratic administrations, he concludes (less convincingly) were therefore essential. At what cost? To be sure, the unions survived, although state regulation got more severe, culminating in the draconian Taft-Hartley Act of 1947. The political program of labour made no appreciable impact on national or state politics, and labour leaders were reduced to being cheerleaders for a weak version of Keynesian economic policies and US Cold-War overseas adventures.

Second, he contends that, in the heady early days of CIO organizing, America's industrial working class was not a seething revolutionary mass, but clusters of cautious and skeptical workers who were not necessarily at all sure that the CIO offered a realistic path to betterment. This part of the argument is more contentious, especially since a good deal rests on the results of opinion polls, whose findings are reported with little critical appreciation of their inherent problems as a source. To note correctly that, after years of corporate union-bashing, workers were circumspect about this new organizing project is not necessarily to say that the CIO approach to mobilizing workers was the most appropriate. Labour historians have long been aware that working-class willingness to join resistance struggles on the job or in their communities ebbs and flows in highly unpredictable ways. Workers can never be seen as an inherently "conservative" or "radical" lump or mass — the question is one of open-ended potential to be won over to particular organizational strategies and ideological possibilities. In that light, it is unfortunate that he devotes so little attention to the small army of unpaid union stewards and local executives who formed the backbone of the new labour movement. It was the transformation of their expectations and determination that was so vital to the creation and ongoing life of the CIO. The mass union membership might give middle-class pollsters knocking at their doors one answer about their worldview, but on a daily basis might simultaneously accept the shop-floor leadership of militants with a much more expansive ideological vision. It is too simple to try to align mass opinion and the views of CIO President Phil Murray. What is missing here is much sensitivity to the fluid dynamics of culture and identity in working-class America.

Third, Zieger gently but persistently dismisses criticism from the left in the 1930s and 1940s as unrealistic and, more important, tainted by association with international Communism — a perspective he repeatedly refers to as "pro-Soviet" (sometimes "Stalinoid"). He acknowledges that these activists often made telling points about alternative paths for labour, but repeatedly argues that the CIO leadership was right not to follow them because of the risks to the victories already won. The role of Communists in building and sustaining the CIO is admitted (especially their commitment to effective, democratic unionism and their exemplary anti-racist policies) but never explored in any detail. It is not necessary to be an uncritical supporter of the erratic and often blinkered Communist approaches to foreign policy to see much more that is positive in their contribution to the CIO story. Nor is it necessary to choose sides as sharply as Zieger does in the great Cold War debates and subsequent purges that erupted in the late

1940s. Was Communist support of Stalin's atrocities so much worse that the CIO leadership's uncritical backing of the American government's toleration of blatant racism in the South or its violently interventionist foreign policy of that period? Zieger believes that it was. His account of the CIO's flagrantly undemocratic, anti-red house-cleaning — surely one of the blackest moments in modern labour history — lacks the fervour of his anti-Stalinist commentary.

In the end, perhaps the most disturbing aspect of this powerful, if not entirely convincing, study is the elusive use of the term "CIO." As Canadian readers have known since Irving Abella's work appeared in the early 1970s, the organization's name had a "magical" quality that was far more powerful than its organizational structure, mundane bargaining goals, or political statements. However limited in scope, it was a social movement that captivated many working-class communities, who identified with a much larger project of mobilization. Zieger conveys some of that flavour in the stories of the founding of the CIO's leading affiliates, but he loses the thread as the organization matures through the 1940s. In particular, he tells us little about the evolving relationship between local organizations (union locals or labour councils) and the national offices. How much was lost (or gained) in the drive to centralize in dealing with the leading industrial corporations and with the federal government? Readers of this journal will find such insensitivity in the recent reminiscences of a Hamilton unionist, Alfred Edwards.

And then there is the ambiguity about what the "CIO" was nationally. At the beginning, John L. Lewis provided a central focus, but, as each of the so-called "Organizing Committees" spun off into independent, often mutually suspicious unions (of steelworkers, rubber workers, textile workers, and so on) that gave little effective power to the CIO headquarters beyond political activity, the saga of the CIO fragmented into several different national stories. Much of what he discusses as CIO accomplishments was the fruit of specific struggles by the highly autonomous "international" unions, not the CIO itself, which never played a central role in co-ordinating bargaining goals. We learn too little about how this fragmentation affected the central organization. What role did it play in mediating tensions between the dominant unions, especially steel and auto? What alternative possibilities were sacrificed in this model of independent union fiefdoms (for example, an all-inclusive regionally based framework of organization, rather than grouping workers by industry)? Was the CIO somewhat less than the sum of its parts? Only in a footnote in the conclusion does Zieger start to consider these ambiguities.

Zieger's CIO nonetheless sparkles with insights that cannot be easily swept aside. They reflect the years of careful research and thoughtful reflection that lie behind the book. And, with its well-crafted sketches of people and events, it makes a good, lively read. Despite the predominantly institutional focus and some weaknesses in its interpretive framework, the book will rightly remain the central text on this period of American labour history for years to come.

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James B. Atleson, *Labor and the Wartime State: Labor Relations and Law during World War II* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press 1998)

JAMES ATLESON HAS a keen eye for continuities. Government regulation of wartime industrial relations, he argues, was not a temporary detour in the larger trajectory of New Deal industrial relations. Instead, it was in World War II that government regulators developed principles that would also guide labour relations after the war. Atleson's general characterization of the postwar capital-labour accord, while more nuanced than most, will be familiar from other critics of "the institutionalization of industrial conflict." His own contributions are twofold: he traces important elements of what we call "the New Deal system" to wartime government policies, and he shows how the war's influence was conveyed through the law, broadly defined. There are three key components of the capital-labour accord where Atleson finds that the war mattered. First, unions assumed much of the responsibility for disciplining rank and file unrest. Second, the resolution of disputes was both centralized and bureaucratized, moving control away from the shop floor. Third, a wide array of economic decisions, from the choice of production techniques to the investment of capital, were deemed to be the non-negotiable prerogatives of management. Each of these tenets, of course, appear well before the 1930s. Turn of the century trade agreements in the metal trades, for example, explicitly included all three principles. But only with the New Deal system did they become widely implemented, and Atleson's task is to isolate the independent contribution of World War II to this development. His argument is that prewar labour law, including the Wagner Act, did not in fact consolidate this system or even put unionism itself on a secure footing. Wartime labour policies, by contrast, did. Most important were policies of the War Labor Board concerning strikes, union security, dispute resolution, and management rights.

Atleson reminds us that wartime economic conditions and military needs gave workers enormous clout. Under these conditions, unions's voluntary "no strike pledge" represented a considerable sacrifice, motivated in part by patriotism and in part by alarm over draconian legislative proposals to fight strikes. The pledge, and the WLB's insistence that unions abide by it, committed union executives to the task of internal discipline. One legacy was institutional: organizational measures adopted by unions to curb unauthorized strikes were retained after the war. A second legacy was ideological. The view of strikers as treasonous saboteurs reappears after the armistice, when strikers are depicted relying on force rather than reason to impose their selfish interests on a helpless nation.

High on workers' list of priorities in the early 1940s was the closed shop, and given employers' refusal to recognize unions, conflict over union security might have seriously disrupted war production. The WLB's compromise "maintenance of membership" award protected current union rosters (and dues) while allowing companies to employ non-unionists. But government officials also recognized that to keep war workers on the job required strong unions, and maintenance of membership was one way to achieve this. Atleson emphasizes that this measure was far more important than the Wagner Act for consolidating mass production unionism. It also came with strings attached. In exchange for union security, WLB officials expected AFL and CIO leaders to act "responsibly." And while maintenance of membership clauses did not outlast the war, both their effects (including added union bureaucracy) and their underlying assumptions (that the union shop was a *quid pro quo* for responsible behavior) did.

The WLB also recognized that if unions's right to strike was abridged, employers had to accept alternative methods for resolving workplace conflict. Despite the war emergency, the WLB's preferred alternative was voluntary agreements incorporating multi-tiered grievance procedures. If these failed, the WLB stood ready to decide disputes — a practice that did not, of course, survive the war. But the normal approach to resolving disputes after the war continued to rely on voluntary arbitration. And as they had learned to do under the WLB, union, company, and NLRB officials made a sharp distinction between disputes over new contract terms (where strikes had some legitimacy) and disputes over the interpretation of existing contracts (where arbitration, not strikes, were to be the last resort). As it had during the war, the system required that unions limit autonomous action by their members and develop the bureaucratic means to handle successive levels of dispute settlement. Reinforcing the system, finally, were court decisions (echoing WLB principles) that the very existence of arbitration provisions in collective-bargaining agreements implied a union commitment to forgo strikes during the life of the contract.

Finally, the WLB was careful to guard "management rights" from union incursions during the war. Atleson is sensitive to the obvious counterargument: management prerogatives would have been amply safeguarded without the WLB's assistance. But he argues that the WLB helped define those prerogatives broadly. Atleson also traces to WLB rulings the basic postwar principle that in all matters *not* reserved to management's unilateral discretion, management still retained the right of initiative and unions enjoyed *only* the right to appeal — and even then, only on the grounds that a decision violated the terms of the contract. Atleson adds that procedures had substantive consequences. The whole approach to conflict resolution championed by the WLB, with its centralizing of disputes and its aggregation of employee grievances, tended to filter out issues relating to the control of production. And that approach, too, continued well past the war's end.

Continuities, of course, are not necessarily causal links. One of the virtues of Atleson's book is his careful attention to the *means* by which the WLB influenced postwar labour relations. They did so in large part through the law, broadly defined. In some areas, legislative measures or court decisions directly reproduced wartime policies. Judicial curbs on wildcat strikes (presumably protected by the Wagner Act), for example, recapitulated the WLB's reasoning that contract disputes could only be resolved through arbitration. In other areas, the underlying assumptions or rhetoric of wartime policy guided postwar industrial relations, even if particular statutes differed. For example, the very organization of the WLB, with its tripartite representation, helped differentiate a "public interest" apart from (and superior to) the "special interests" of labour and capital. And Atleson notes that the WLB's influence was also conveyed by personnel. The WLB's fleet of labour regulators became the academicians and arbitrators who developed and implemented industrial pluralism in the 1950s. While Atleson gives us an impressive list of personalities active in both periods, this particular link between war policies and postwar industrial relations is not investigated as thoroughly as are laws and legal assumptions.

In the last few chapters of *Labor and the Wartime State*, Atleson traces the legacies of WWII beyond the 1950s and 1960s. In our own era of union avoidance, some have rediscovered the virtues of union security and collective bargaining under the New Deal system. Atleson acknowledges these advantages. But he reminds us that it is precisely the underlying assumptions of the New Deal system that made it vulnerable to collapse. Above all, the insistence that employee rights are matters to be settled "privately," with contracts in effect ratifying the relative balance of power between workers and employers, afford labour few protections when capital opts out of collective bargaining altogether.

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Michael D. Grimes and Joan M. Morris, *Caught in the Middle: Contradictions in the Lives of Sociologists from Working-Class Backgrounds* (Westport: Praeger Publishers 1997)

THE THESIS of this book is "that class continues to be an important structural variable affecting the material, social, ideological and psychological life circumstances of Americans ...." More specifically, the object was to explore the differences of class as experienced by several American sociologists, born and raised in the working class but pursuing their lives in the university, a decidedly middle-class milieu. These sociologists were "caught in the middle," as the authors put it, caught between the differing values, expectations, and ways of being of the class they had left and the one they had "joined." The "upward mobility" that had brought them "success" held the unhappy irony of leaving them in a social limbo, unable to "return" to their class roots yet "marginalized" in their new class position.

The book raises the important question of social class and its implications in America, issues that American sociologists have long downplayed or even ignored. For this reason alone, the book is worthwhile, but the focus is narrow and the discussion rather limited, as the authors themselves admit.

The first chapter consists in part of an overview of theories of class in America. It provides an adequate survey for the purposes of this study; it makes brief references to Marx, Weber, E.O. Wright, and more particularly P. Bourdieu. The review is brief and accurate enough as far as it goes, but it is not a critical assessment. Its shortcoming lies in the fact that very little of it informs the research itself. The chapter also contains a brief examination of the changing structure of the American working class after World War II, but it is not well developed or connected to the main thesis. If nothing else, however, the chapter does remind us that class remains an important factor in American life and that the "American Dream" marked by "upwardly mobility" and meritocracy is just that, a dream.

The second chapter outlines the "research design," and here is where the problems begin to become clear. First, the focus of the study is on the experience of a certain number of sociologists of working class-background who "moved" into a professional strata of the "middle-class." The issue, then, is not the structural reasons for "upward mobility" but how the class shift was experienced by those who made the journey. And the revelations of the study in this regard are not much different than those that appear in many other studies of class mobility.

To arrive at their conclusions the authors employ three "data-gathering instruments" which include "an essay guide," a questionnaire, and a curriculum vitae. They organize the discussion of their findings from these three sources into four "areas" of experience, namely, childhood and early educational life, graduate school, professional careers, and their personal relationships. These also serve as the main topics for the remaining chapters of the book. Here it can be seen that the very design of the research precludes much beyond analysis of the subjective experience of the sociologists in question; the objective institutional structures and political economy that makes for classes and keeps them distinct is not addressed in any significant way.

We also learn in this chapter that the number of subjects who completed all three "instruments" numbered 45. This number, moreover, does not represent a coherent group of subjects; there are nine full professors, nine associate, six assistant, five lecturers, five researchers, two administrators, and nine students. The authors do point out that this does not represent a random sample, but they do not sufficiently stress the limitations of such a small number, let alone of the significance of the relative disparity of these statuses. The most obvious issue is the difficulty of generalizing from the research findings.

The one finding common to the subjects is that they all agree that the reasons for their success rested mainly on three factors: the high grades achieved in school, the encouragement received from family and teachers, and their value of hard work. This explanation for their success, repeated in several places and shared by the authors, would appear to be the result of the focus on the individuals and not the political economy of American class structure. To be sure, early academic success would be essential to an academic career, but nowhere do the authors discuss just what academic proficiency means or what happens to many others who must have been equally successful. The implication left is that our subjects succeeded in part because they were more intelligent than the others. Similarly, the notion that their success was partially due to their shared ethic of hard work implies that those who did not succeed were not hard workers, or worse, that the working class as a whole is not hard working. The fact that they got encouragement to succeed academically, that is, social confirmation of a goal, is the only part of their analysis of the reasons for their success that appears supportable.

The reasons for "upward mobility" in the academic sphere should be little different in general from those in other spheres, and these are principally the structural imperatives of the property relations that determine the configurations of the class system. And to this one should add the element of chance: being in the right "category" in the right place in the right time. To give but one example: with few exceptions no amount of "intelligence" or "hard work" a few decades ago would have opened doors for women to the university or to any of the professions.

The authors are aware of many of the limitations of their study and discuss them, but there are other limitations and implications that they do not draw out. First, because the focus was on the individuals who "made it" and not on the structures that made it possible there is an emphasis on their particular qualities. Explanations of success that rest largely on *individual characteristics*, however, are no different in principle from those of social Darwinism. Second, and related to the first, the meaning of social mobility is never adequately developed, yet this phenomenon which is social and not individual is central to the study. Third, and also related, is the fact that the political economy of class is not explored. There is no discussion of the changing mode of production, of the tax or wage structures, of the nature of employment, unemployment, medical care, housing, food distribution, or welfare. It is in these questions that the real explanation of class structure, its relative rigidity or mobility, are to be found.

Without addressing any of these issues it is not possible to understand the reasons for social mobility or the unhappy dilemmas of those caught between "worlds." Despite such shortcomings, however, the book does open the door to further examination of the questions of class and its implications in American life in a time of more or less rapid "downward mobility."

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Jean L. Potuchek, *Who Supports the Family? Gender and Breadwinning in Dual-earner Marriages* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press 1997)

THIS BOOK STARTS off in a fascinating way. In her introduction Jean Potuchek recounts an experience with a class of college students who had been assigned to study their peers' expectations about future work and family lives while paying particular attention to the effects of gender. This student research showed that young college men and women shared rather egalitarian gender expectations of a future in which both husband and wife would combine a family and a career. However, if they would earn a sufficient income themselves, would they expect their spouse to work? While the majority of the male students left this for their future wives to decide, nearly all of the female students expected their future spouse to work regardless of their own incomes. Despite their own involvement in the labour market these young women continued to place the primary responsibility for breadwinning with their husbands. Potucheck rightly concludes that the unyielding position of these young women about their husbands's work can only be understood by separating employment and breadwinning.

This striking result is the starting point for a sociological study into the continuing association between male employment and breadwinning amongst present day dual-earner families in the USA. Potuchek's study is based on extensive interviews with 153 randomly sampled dual-earner couples living in Lewiston-Auburn, an urban industrial center in south-central Maine. Potuchek explicitly aims at her sample being representative for dual-earner couples throughout the United States. Nevertheless, the sample contains a one hundred per cent over-representation of professionally occupied women, which probably results from the self-selection process involved in the sampling procedure. It is not difficult to see that professionally occupied women would be more willing and interested in cooperating in a study on breadwinning patterns. In addition, the specific ethnic composition of the sample is rather divergent from national averages as a result of the large representation of Franco-Americans (Americans of French-Canadian ancestry). Other ethnic or racial groups are completely absent, so that the sample may perhaps say something about the lives of white working and middle-class Americans. However, to what extent and in which way these two forms of bias may have influenced results remains obscure. Finally, 2 of the 5 empirical chapters are based on a subsample of 50 couples (creating a frighteningly small N) who were traced again 5 years after the original interview to examine the development of constructions of breadwinning over time. Potuchek readily admits the bias involved in this second selection process which has probably lead to an overrepresentation of couples who have, over time, reached agreement on breadwinning as a gender boundary.

Potuchek situates her research questions within the well-defined theoretical framework of gender construction theory. In a clearly-written second chapter, she sets out the major elements of this theoretical orientation. The advantage of gender construction theory is that it allows contradictions between behaviour and attitudes, and is therefore well-suited to study the gendered links between employment and breadwinning. A central concept within this theoretical framework is the concept of "gender boundaries" which is defined by Potuchek as "anything that marks, and thereby constructs, the difference between 'real men' and 'real women.'" (27) Gender boundaries in that sense are central to the process through which human beings are divided into two sharply distinct categories of opposing gender. This process takes place within a context of unequal power and institutionalized male hegemony. Gender boundaries, like breadwinning and mothering, therefore also define the relations between the two groups to help create and continue the gender system of inequality.

The core of the book consists of 5 empirical chapters in which Potuchek sets out to show us how the breadwinning boundary is used in interpersonal interaction amongst her 135 dual-earner couples and what factors shape its construction. Every chapter begins with some general observations and results on the sample or subsets of it, after which the author presents in considerable detail a number of case studies. In the first part of her analysis Potuchek looks at the extent to which respectively the employed wives and the dual-earner husbands construct breadwinning as a gender boundary, i.e. the extent to which they regard breadwinning as something that distinguishes "real men" from "real women." On the basis of their scores on both behavioural (e.g. what is the interpretation of the wife's employment) and normative dimensions of breadwinning (e.g. should the husband be the sole provider) Potuchek divides all husbands and wives up in a number of approaches to breadwinning. It is clear that these dual-earner couples operate within culture in which male breadwinning is still regarded as an important gender boundary. A large majority of husbands conform in some ways to norms and behaviour belonging to the male breadwinner model; even amongst their employed wives there is considerable support for either behavioural or normative orientations on male breadwinning. The next three chapters are by far the most interesting part of the book. Here Potuchek first deals with cases in which husband and wife disagree about their respective constructions of breadwinning and how these constructions evolve over time in response to a couple's changing circumstances. And disagreement abounds: only 54 per cent of the couples is in complete or substantial agreement on the issue of breadwinning. What is both intriguing and illuminating is the extent to which norms and attitudes may actually diverge, both within one and the same individual and between husband and wife. Moreover, Potuchek is able to show how norms and attitudes are used in a process of negotiation between marital partners in order to ease tensions or to come to grips with a daily practice that is different from one's beliefs. Breadwinning, as a gender boundary, is strongly related to mothering, another primary marker of gender divisions. In a separate chapter Potuchek uncovers some interesting dynamics between these two markers of gender.

In her conclusions Potuchek returns to her original question. Why has breadwinning as a gender boundary persisted despite the massive entry of women in the labour force? I find her answers somewhat disappointing. Potuchek points first of all at the structure of paid work: most occupations require enormous commitments in time and energy and are therefore difficult to combine with domestic responsibilities. In addition, she mentions occupational segregation, which defines jobs that are easier to combine with family responsibilities as women's jobs, and the gender wage gap, which leaves nearly all of the wives earning far less than their husbands, as factors that help continue the male breadwinning model. However, the gendered structure of the labour market serves as the social-structural underpinning of the male breadwinner model and should therefore be seen as being part of this very model. Potuchek therefore argues within the concept that she seeks to understand. (For an elaboration of such a point of view see: Angélique Janssens ed. *The Rise and Decline of the Male Breadwinner Family?* Cambridge 1998, 11-12). Her book offers sufficient evidence for alternative lines of argumentation which might for instance look more to the interests of men as men. To understand and explain male breadwinning as a social phenomenon is not the primary strength of Potuchek's book. Jean Potuchek first of all shows how, within the confinements of a declining male breadwinner model, marital partners define, argue, negotiate, balance, and accommodate their respective aspirations and frustrations regarding breadwinning and mothering. In this goal she has succeeded very well.

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John Macnicol, *The Politics of Retirement in Britain 1878-1948* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1998)

IN HIS VERY SUBSTANTIAL and impressive study John Macnicol presents the historical development of the politics of retirement in Britain from the end of the 19th century until the Beveridge Report of the 1940s in all its dimensions. He begins with the conservative and radical origins of the Old Age Pension Act of 1908. At the end of the 19th century structural economic changes had led to a marginalization of old people on the labour market. A great number of elderly poor had to be supported by outdoor relief as it was impossible to find new jobs and earn a living. Conservative debates were dominated by a concern about the effectiveness of the Poor Law of 1834. According to conservative reformers the former strictness of the Law had to be restored to discipline the able-bodied young workers who were considered to be the "key to the revitalization of British capitalism in the new era of international competition." (40) An important group of the Poor Law clientele and arousing most public sympathy, the aged were seen as an obstacle which had to be removed in the way of this reform. Considering the high proportion of old women among them (between 1905-09 three-quarters of the recipients of outdoor relief were women), tax funded old age pensions seemed an appropriate solution because they did not exclude women as beneficiaries as a scheme based on contributions and insurance would have done. Thus the Old Age Pensions Act was highly "gender-blind," women benefitted disproportionately, and was potentially radical. Once the aged were removed from outdoor relief this form of public assistance could be entirely abolished and the workhouses for the able-bodied made more punitive.

The demand for tax-funded old age pensions was taken up by the labour movement, which considered it a moral obligation of the state to provide old age pensions. Encouraging old workers to withdraw from employment would reduce the reserve army on the labour market and improve the situation of the working-class in general. Furthermore, state-funded pensions were seen as a means to redistribute wealth in British society by putting the fiscal burden on the wealthy and consequently breaking their power in the long run. The non-contributory system of 1908 was claimed as a victory by the labour movement though it showed several flaws: the coverage was limited because of exclusion clauses, means tests and a high qualifying age of 70.

The next important step in retirement legislation was the Widows's, Orphans's, and Old Age Contributory Pensions Act of 1925. The inflation of the war years had made the payment of supplementary allowances for pensioners necessary, the Old Age Pensions Amendment Bill of 1919 had finally raised the level of pensions, pensioner associations and the labour movement campaigned for a removal of the thrift disqualification. Both Conservative and Labour governments were more and more concerned with the rising costs caused by state-funded pensions and started to favour a contributory system financed by workers' and employers' contributions thus taking the financial burden off the Treasury. Complete and immediate substitution of the Pensions Act seemed to be politically impossible as the act was very popular. Furthermore, the majority of elderly women would have been left without coverage by an overall introduction of a contributory scheme. The solution adopted in 1925 was a mixture of both: a limited contributory system for those aged between 65 and 70 and the maintenance of the old system for those over 70. The new act was also seen as an efficient measure in the struggle against rising unemployment. Pensioners would leave their jobs and create work opportunities for the "most tragic victims" of economic crisis: the young male workers. To achieve this aim, however, pensions had to be high enough to guarantee a reasonable material comfort or they had to be complemented by a retirement condition forcing pensioners to stop working. These debates marked the whole decade of the 1930s. For women the new legislation has to be interpreted as a retrograde step: the number of female claimants declined after 1925 as women more rarely held full-time jobs where contributions had to be paid.

During the 1930s British society experienced an increased militancy of pensioners themselves. In 1938, the National Federation of Old Age Pensions Association was founded, a loose union of local pensioners' self-help bodies, pressure groups, and clubs. It was a predominantly working-class movement adopting an extra-parliamentary strategy to achieve an increase in basic pensions. By 1938, pensions were well below the means-tested unemployment assistance. All this created an enormous concern in Whitehall — by 1939, pensions had become an all-party issue. After two half-hearted reforms in 1940 and 1941 the problem was finally handed over to the Beveridge Committee which was working on a general plan for post-war reconstruction. During this period discussions focused on the key issues of universality, subsistence, and retirement. The National Insurance Act finally passed by a Labour Government in 1946 completed the process by establishing a dual state pension scheme: a universal pension at a rather low level combined with the possibility to claim for means-tested National Assistance.

An ever returning topic in all the debates was the insistence on economic constraints forcing governments to adopt less radical changes than demanded by the public. All discussions ended in calculating costs and rejecting "expensive" proposals. This led to the highly ambiguous role played by the Labour Party. Supporting radical demands in times of opposition, Labour politicians regularly changed their position as soon as they took over governmental responsibility. Already in 1924, radicals had hoped that a completely tax-funded and universal scheme without means test and income limits would be introduced by the minority Labour Government. But the desire to govern "responsibly" made the government reject these plans supported by radical backbenchers of the Labour Party. This attitude remained a predominant characteristic of Labour Party government participation. Nevertheless, it has to be stressed that the labour movement campaigned hardest for an adequate pension and that their influence was crucial during this decisive era of the emergence of the welfare state in Britain.

One merit of Macnicol's study is that he continuously analyzes the impact the legislation had on women. The Pensions Act of 1908 had considerably improved the situation of old and poor women, but the shift to schemes based on contributions tended to exclude more and more women from benefitting from the system. The highly gendered debates focused on the worn-out male industrial worker whose labour market value was diminishing. The transition to contributory pensions made women dependant on their husbands' insurance contributions and thus reinforced the existing balance of power in families.

Macnicol presents his analysis in a chronological way: from the origins of pension plans at the end of the 19th century to the debates on contributory and retirement pensions in the 1920s and 1930s and finally to the "Beveridge revolution" of the 1940s. Using original research the author favours a qualitative approach concentrating on debates and reports initiated by old age poverty. Thus he draws a complete and interesting picture of all the positions held on the issue presenting supporters of as well as opponents to the various projects under consideration. His study reveals a typically British way in the creation of old age pensions differing from the German and the French systems. His study makes a valuable contribution to the history of old age pensions in Britain and although the subject seems rather dry it is a pleasure to read the book.

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John Vidal, *McLibel: Burger Culture on Trial* (New York: New Press, 1997).

IN 1986 THE LONDON GREENPEACE GROUP, a small anarchist dominated group unaffiliated with Greenpeace groups elsewhere in the world, produced a pamphlet entitled "What's Wrong with McDonald's?" The pamphlet targeted McDonald's for often heard criticisms claiming that McDonald's is not good for the environment, exploits small children, and is a lousy place to work. From October 1989 to the spring 1991, suspicious new people started to appear at the Greenpeace meetings. It later turned out that they were spies paid for by McDonald's. One of the McDonald's vice presidents in the United Kingdom, Sidney Nicholson, had worked for the Metropolitan Police earlier in his career and had the cooperation of the Special Branch, the arm of the police that monitors subversives and international crime operations. In September 1990 the legal book was thrown at five of the Greepeace members. McDonald's lodged a complaint in the British courts, claiming "that McDonald's has been 'greatly damaged in its trading reputation,' and has 'been brought into public scandal, odium and contempt' by a 'fact sheet' which has libelously alleged that, among other things, McDonald's causes the evictions of small farmers in the Third World, destroys rainforests, lies about its use of recycled paper, misleads the public about the nutritional value of their food, sells food high in sugar and salt to encourage an addiction to it, uses gimmicks to cover up that the food is of low quality, targets most of their advertising at children, are responsible for the inhumane treatment of animals, sells hamburgers likely to cause food poisoning, pay bad wages, are only interested in cheap labour etc. etc. ... all of which are vigorously denied by the corporation." (2)

The advice the targeted activists got from a sympathetic lawyer was to just say you are sorry and back off. English libel law is archaic, confusing, and often is counter-intuitive, which presents a particular challenge for lay people. However, two of the group, Helen Steel and Dave Morris, refused to apologize. Eleven years since the original distribution of the leaflet and many millions of dollars in legal fees later, McDonald's made history. They had what one news service called "the most expensive and disastrous public relations exercise ever mounted by a multinational company." In June 1997, the McLibel Trial — which the supporters of the defendants claim was the longest running trial in English history — concluded, after two and one half years of testimony. It represented a battle between the fast food giant and the two North London people, Helen Steel and Dave Morris representing themselves. The two had not even written the pamphlet in question, but had only helped distribute it. They were estimated to earn at most £7,500 a year between them, while the daily cost of the McDonald's team was said to average in the region of £6,000 a day. (8)

The verdict in the McLibel trail was significant. McDonald's won the court battle, but lost the public relations war. Due to the technical intricacies of British libel law, the defendants had to prove not only that the fact sheet was true — multinationals and the food industry do not promote health, but that McDonald's itself directly causes rainforest destruction and hunger in the Third World. Despite this handicap, which meant that the pamphlet had to be treated as statements of fact which had to be proven by primary sources of evidence, the McLibel two did quite well. The Judge found as fact that McDonald's exploits children through their advertising and that they are "culpably responsible" for cruelty to animals. The food was also found to not have the positive nutritional benefit claimed in advertisements, promotions, and brochures. Although the defendants, according to the judge, Mr. Justice Bell, failed to prove that McDonald's have a policy of preventing unionization by getting rid of pro-union workers, the evidence of McDonald's officials was damming. For example, a senior US vice president of McDonald's described how McDonald's set up a flying squad of experienced managers in the 1970s who were dispatched to a store when word came of an attempt to organize it. Testimony at the trial of ex-employees documented the unethical, illegal, and oppressive working practices they observed. Since the book was written, there have been two successful union organizing drives in Canada, in franchised restaurants. The Teamsters organized a restaurant near Montréal in the winter of 1998, but the restaurant closed its doors before the certification was approved by the labour commissioner. The second drive in Squamish, BC was with the Canadian Auto Workers and it was successful. Squamish now boasts the only unionized McDonald's in North America.

Another layer of questions emerged in the course of trial that had to do with civil liberties. Is it right that corporations can sue individuals? Is justice for sale only to those who can afford it? Why should individuals stand to lose everything to express genuine criticisms of a corporation? Steel and Morris used the trial to raise the largest issue of all: what kind of society do people really want — a world ruled by the cash nexus and profit, or human needs? Even more significant than the trial verdict was the worldwide interest stimulated by the trial. An Internet website (www.mcspotlight.org) was accessed over 24 million times in the first 18 months of its existence. And throughout the world, action days against McDonald's were planned.

The story is a compelling one. McDonald's is symbolic of how society has deteriorated in the late 20th century, or depending on how one looks at it, of the triumph of capitalist society and values. The plot includes human interest (the defendants and their lives), intrigue (McDonald's hired spies to infiltrate the North London Greenpeace group), and a great deal of information about Mcdonald's activities. Most importantly, Dave Morris and Helen Steel fighting the Goliath let us know that this corporation, despite its power, is far from invincible.

The book? John Vidal is a journalist for the *Guardian*, and wrote this book in six weeks, pulling together, with the help of research assistants, voluminous amounts of material generated by the trial. He did a good job, and the book is a good read. However, it is not a great book. Mixing the personal interest stories to give a flavour of the trial, and introducing the substantive issues through anecdotal accounts grabs the readers attention. The frame for the book — two opposing belief systems, that of McDonald's and what the defendants represented — was too general for my taste (pardon the pun). Trying to play with the commonality of Ray Kroc's (the founder of Mcdonald's) Eastern European background with Dave Morris's Jewish East European ancestry was contrived. Same comment on using the common geographical location of neo-conservative thought at the University of Chicago, and the home of Mcdonald's U, where McDonald's has their head office. I came away feeling that there something slapdash in how the information was put together. One jumped too abruptly from philosophical issues, the nature of society, economic analysis, a quick introduction to neo-conservative thought, to human interest e.g. Morris picking up his little boy from day care.

However, it remains a very informed source for critical material about various aspects of McDonald's. In the end, it was information about a very significant trial rather than the thought provoking, mind stretching material from a more demanding analytical framework that makes this book valuable.

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D.S. Parker, *The Idea of the Middle Class: White Collar Workers and Peruvian Society 1900-1950* (University Park Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State Press 1998)

THE IDEA OF THE MIDDLE CLASS focuses on the complex interaction between ideas and structure, between the self-image of white collar workers and how state regulations reinforced and articulated that self-image. White collar workers (*empleados*) saw themselves as an elite segment of society, distinct and superior to the blue collar masses (*obreros*). The ideology of this middle class was not a universal or hegemonic discourse seeking to remake Peru in its own image in a democratic bourgeois revolution. Instead the goal of the *empleados* was to defend their privileges and hence their social distinction through political action. Thus, the idea of the middle class led to a struggle to use the state to reinforce, articulate, and enshrine privilege, rather than form an alliance with the despised masses to overthrow the oligarchy.

The genesis of this self-image lay in colonial distinction between the *gente decente*, the respectable people, and the *gente de pueblo*, the unwashed masses. (24) The distinction did not indicate a difference in transitory economic status; instead, the difference was meant to indicate a different ascriptive moral worth. Superior status was displayed through a notable family heritage, a good education, a light complexion, and proper dress. (26) Parker nicely catches the ambiguity of race in defining social position in Peru, where, unlike the United States, racial identity indicates social status rather than ascriptively defining it. In Peru, white and *mestizo* (of mixed Indian and white ancestry), are less definitions of racial origin, than they are a description of assimilation and position within the social hierarchy. Thus, you have the phenomena of *mestizo empleados* being defined as white for the census, because *empleado* status indicated respectability and hence led to the expectation that the subjects were white.(42)

The distinction between *empleados* and *obreros* begins with their relationship to the elites. *Empleados* were the permanent clerks in the import-export commercial houses that dominated Peru's economy, as well as the permanent clerks who staffed other retail and wholesale enterprises. Their positions required literacy and numeracy, as well as a respectable demeanour for interaction with the public. As a class, their aspirations were to move up the hierarchy gradually, hoping to eventually join the elites as partners in the firm. These clerks tended to be lifelong employees of one firm, who held positions of trust and worked alongside the proprietors. *Obreros*, in contrast, were regarded as temporary, unskilled workers, easily replaced, and without contact with the owners of the business. (18) The original distinction in job stability, connections to the owners, and the need for respectability became a concrete set of expectations and, latterly, political demands, as the distinctions became the definition and mark of *empleados* social status.

The social position of *empleados* led to specific consumption needs, which justified demands for preferential treatment. To be an *impleado* required proper dress and diet, and one had to maintain one's status by living at a proper address. One's wife should not have to engage in paid work: in fact a maid was required. Children had to be educated in the proper private school. This need for conspicuous consumption meant that the middle class felt inflation more severely than the *obreros*, at least in its own mind.

Status good needs led to political demands, which were articulated as Law 4916 in 1924. *Empleados*, and only *empleados*, were guaranteed three months severance in cases of dismissal without notice, and an *indemnizacion* of two weeks salary for every year worked, on retirement or voluntary departure. Employers were to provide *empleados* with life insurance and disability pensions. (105) Only *empleados* were covered by this legislation, and the reasons for their preferential treatment articulate the ideology of the middle class. Heavy severance payments were justified because *empleados* formed a personal bond of trust with their employers and faced greater difficulties finding new employment than *obreros*, whose jobs were expected to be temporary in any case. (105) *Empleados* job tenure, which according to their own ideology should be more secure because of their personal connection to employers, became, through legislation, in fact more secure. Thus *empleado* identity, first expressed through ideas, became reality (or articulated) through state action.

The preferential labour code then led individual *obreros* to seek gains by being reclassified as an *empleado*. But while *empleado* status did bring material gains, reclassification mainly marked an improvement in one's status. Status, in Peru's status conscious society, mattered more than wage rates, as Parker shows by the unwillingness of high school students to even consider blue collar employment no matter what the wages. (132)

Politically, the idea of a threatened and exploited middle class was translated into *support* for APRA. APRA appealed to the *empleados* for two reasons: nationalism and racism. Haya de la Torre's white skin and upper-middle-class background appealed to *empleado* self-image as *gente decente*, while Sanchez Cerro's *mestizo* looks and populist manners did not. (172-173) APRA's nationalist campaigns against the employment of foreigners by multi-nationals reflected *empleado resentiment*. *Empleados* career aspirations were frustrated, because the best and most highly paid positions were reserved for foreign nationals. By denouncing the lot of the underpaid and exploited *empleado*, APRA garnered their support as well as reinforced the ideology of the middle class.

Overall, D.S. Parker's *The Idea of the Middle Class* provides us with a fascinating view of the construction of a different kind of middle class, one founded on retaining difference rather than overcoming inequality. The weaknesses of this work lie in its lack of broader theoretical linkages, from being framed within historiography, rather than framed from within either political science or sociology. Parker's discussion of the consumption habits of the *empleados* could have been more readily understood from within Weber's understanding of a status group as opposed to Marx's notion of class. According to Weber, consumption, rather than one's relationship to the ownership of the means of production, is usually the basis of group identity. Status goods mark one's position in society: who you socialize with and who you marry. The status group identification of the *empleados* would have been further reinforced by the Latin American custom of *conexiones*, loosely translated as connections. In Peru, life chances are determined by who you know, who you can do favours for, and who will feel obligated to find you positions, apartments, and spouses. Given this reality, the *empleados* defence of their social connections to their bosses appears as less an anachronistic longing for status and self-importance, than a realistic defence of personal life chances.

While Parker's work describes *empleado* identity, it also raises important issues for dependency theory. Parker notes in passing that the shopkeepers and small businessmen did not define the values of the middle class because the petit bourgeoisie were of foreign extraction and hence unlikely to organize.(18) The consequences and causes of the political, economic, and social weakness of this group needs to be further explored. Does the dependent nature of Peru's economy, with its lack of industrialization, help explain the dominance of the *empleado* within the middle class? Did the demand for prestigious foreign goods prevent industrialization, and, hence, maintain dependency? Does the ethos of commercial enterprise create and reinforce the empleado mindset? Do bankers make bad democrats? *The Idea of the Middle Class* does provide us with an important research resource, a fruitful beginning from which we can begin to understand the social construction of dependency and the politics of Peru.

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James W. McGuire, *Peronism Without Peron: Unions, Parties, and Democracy in Argentina* (Stanford University Press: Stanford, CA 1997)

JAMES W. McGUIRE observes, as any reasonably-informed observer must, that present-day Argentine democracy is a precarious enterprise. (He would perhaps describe it as "unconsolidated.") Although the country returned to electoral democracy in 1983 after a horrific period of military dictatorship and state terrorism (the "dirty war"), the two elected presidents since then, the Radical Raúl Alfonsín and particularly the Peronist Carlos S. Menem, have presided over regimes that could be described only with reservations as democratic. Both men were obliged, by the threat of further military meddling in politics, to permit the military authors of the dirty war to escape punishment for their many crimes. Menem, elected in 1989 (and inaugurated early because of the collapse of Alfonsín's credibility as chief executive), promptly embarked on a full-scale neoliberal revolution (by now nearly consummated), thereby egregiously betraying a Peronist constituency that still lived by the Peronist principles of economic independence, national sovereignty, and social justice. He extended his incumbency beyond the constitutional six years by altering the constitutional one-term limit. His nine years of rule have been marked by spectacular scandals; severe anti-Semitic violence has occurred, apparently with the collusion of the security forces. And yet *peronismo* bestrides the centre of Argentine politics, and barring economic catastrophe is likely to continue to do so.

Professor McGuire believes that a principal determinant of this curious state of affairs is — curiously — the weak institutionalization of the Peronist Party. His study "examines the origins of Peronism's weak party institutionalization, explores why Peronism continued to be weakly institutionalized as a party after Perón was overthrown in 1955, and suggests some ways in which this weak party institutionalization may have impeded the consolidation of Argentine democracy." (1) His first historical chapter, "Sectoral Elites and Political Parties Before Perón," emphasizes the importance of the de-linking in the early 20th century of sectoral elites (landowners, industrialists, labour leaders) from conventional political parties — the two former groups because their small natural constituencies offered little chance of broad electoral victories, the latter because of the profound syndicalist strain in labourist thinking and praxis. In consequence, Argentina has lacked credible national conservative and socialist parties and alternative paths to power have beckoned. Undoubtedly McGuire has here identified major historical determinants. He might also have considered the importance of the decay and slide into irrelevance of the parliamentary system in the "década infame" of the 1930s. By 1943 the road to power lay around Congress, not through it.

Between 1943 and 1955 Colonel Juan D. Perón created a mass personalist movement responsible for "a large and sudden increase in the wealth, power, and status of the urban working class." (50) He appropriated and implemented the social justice program that had been the rhetorical mainstay of left parties for many years, as well as the nationalist symbols dear to the hearts of a decaying rightist elite too contemptuous (or fearful) of the working classes ever seriously to attempt to incorporate them into their own small but noisy movements. Because so many upper-status Argentines, civilians, and *militares* alike instinctively rejected Perón's revolution (for it *was* a revolution), Perón was able to hold centre stage in the perceptions of the Peronist faithful. In such circumstances, little institutionalization took place; hence, once in power (from 1946 to 1955) *peronismo* suffered from the ineptitude, cronyism, cynicism, and disarray that typically afflict a *movement* that comes to power — but it did not seem to matter. It did not seem to matter either during Perón's eighteen years of exile following his ouster by his former comrades-in-arms in 1955, or during his tumultuous return to power (1973-1974), which ended with his death.

In densely argued and densely detailed chapters, McGuire deploys much political science theory to support his argument that Argentine democracy would have been better served if institutionalization *had* taken place. He describes unsuccessful attempts by Augusto Vándor in the 1960s and Juan Cafiero in the 1980s to impose structure on *peronismo*. For obvious reasons Juan Perón, then in exile, was having none of it in the former case; in the latter, Carlos Menem would emerge as Perón's successor and the movement's second *caudillo*. And — for all his image problems — arguably a more successful *caudillo* than even *El Lider* himself.

It is a commonplace that personalist bosses (not to mention tyrants) cast a poisonous shadow. Nonentities and disorder may thrive in the shadow of a Perón or Menem (or a Trudeau or Fidel Castro); talent does not. But that is only a partial explanation of the travails of Argentine democracy. For the fact is that *menemismo*, like the *peronismo* of which it is the bastard offspring, owes much of its historical success to the repeated failure of its opponents to deliver the vote or the goods. Those opponents have included not only hapless would-be military technocrats but also the reasonably well-organized and institutionalized Radicals: Arturo Frondizi failed disastrously to provide a democratic alternative to *peronismo* from 1958 to 1962, as did Alfonsín in the 1980s. To repeat: undoubtedly, Argentine democracy is still a fragile plant. But responsibility for this lies across a broad spectrum of political factors. To isolate and analyze in numbing detail one of those factors (and that the political movement with the most scalps on its belt) comes very close, in this reviewer's view, to falling into the classic fallacy of misplaced concreteness. Readers will learn a lot of political history from Professor McGuire's book, but I do not think they will learn the answer.

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Marcia Pripstein Posusney, *Labor and the State in Egypt: Workers, Unions, and Economic Reconstruction* (New York: Columbia University Press 1997)

LABOR AND THE STATE IN EGYPT is at once history, map, and guide. The history recounts the actions of union leaders, workers, and politicians that shaped the political economy of Egypt from 1952 to 1996. The map outlines probable motivations for those actions. The guide suggests the economic views behind Egyptian workers' protests. In all three capacities, the book casts light on the situation of workers outside, as well as within, the Middle East.

As history, *Labor and the State in Egypt* encompasses Egypt's turns from capitalism to Arab socialism and back. When in 1954 Gamal Abdel Nasser took control of Egypt's two-year-old military government, he began in effect to construct a system of social benefits and reciprocal responsibilities. The labour confederation established in 1957 with Nasser's blessing formed part of this system.

From 1961 to 1964 Nasser built up Arab Socialism, nationalizing large enterprises and establishing a corporatist structure. Almost at once, however, the economy began to falter under the weight of social programs, a vast payroll, and lack of foreign markets. From then on, but especially after the opening to foreign capital that President Anwar Sadat promoted after Nasser's death in 1970, Egyptian governments sought to cut payrolls and benefits in public enterprises. Now, workers facing privatization demand restoration of their right to strike.

The foregoing outline may be useful to anyone unfamiliar with recent Egyptian labour history. At the same time, its reduction of labour-state relations suggests the importance of the book's functions as map and guide. As map, *Labor and the State in Egypt* is deftly drawn. Posusney disaggregates state, parties, and unions, analyzing the changing balances of will and capacity that led to specific decisions by politicians, unionists, and workers. She emphasizes the different roles of the confederation under different leaders and in different situations, from a potential instrument of mobilization to a brake on action on local issues to an apologist for government pay cuts. Throughout, she maintains the clarity of her main lines of thought despite the close distinctions she draws.

In its third function, as a theoretical guide to the motivations of Egyptian workers, *Labor and the State in Egypt* is carefully organized, but its line of argument is less clear. Posusney has two aims here. At some length, she seeks to establish moral economy, rather than class struggle or rational choice, as the best explanation of Egyptian workers' protests.

Although Posusney rests this argument on a thorough examination of empirical evidence, her establishment of an Egyptian ground for moral economy is sketchy and her presentation of the competing analyses blurred. Arguing that Nasser established a moral economy of mutual obligations between workers and state, she barely nods to the agrarian and Islamic backgrounds that might have prepared workers to accept this outlook. She does establish moral economy as a more convincing explanation of protests than "traditional Marxist or some neo-Marxist perspectives" and "stylized versions of rational choice," but carries those views to extremes in order to do so.

Posusney's argument rests on analyses of the nature and aims, union involvement, and macro-economic conditions of known protests in relation to her own touchstones for each theory. To discredit Marxism, she notes that Egyptian workers' protests did not steadily increase (indicating growing class solidarity), nor was their goal to change the economic system or (as rational choice analysts might maintain) to make gains in good times. Rather, her evidence shows that Egyptian workers were most likely to protest when state or employer threatened existing rights or living standards. A Marxist, however, need not insist that workers will arise to overthrow the state at the first whiff of exploitation, nor can one discredit the rational choice view simply by noting that workers have scant access to labour market statistics. Anger at breach of a moral economy is not the only imaginable motive for resisting pay cuts or job losses.

Posusney's argument is too complex to depend on an all-out assault on the competing theories; she strongly emphasizes points of commonality between moral economy and the contemporary rational choice and Marxist analyses which she finds congenial. Nowhere, however, does she clearly distinguish the views she opposes from those she finds compatible with her own.

Although her argument about workers' economic views occupies considerable space, Posusney is far clearer in expressing her second theoretical point: the endurance of workers' agency. She vigorously rejects strains of cultural analysis that consider workers incapable of resisting state propaganda even when it contradicts their material experience. She also rebuts the statist assertion that Egyptian workers were powerless and supine, arguing that they influenced leaders through "voice" in policy-making bodies and "veto" of policy by protest. Using their own power and differences among their adversaries, she insists, workers even in repressive states can affect policy.

As history, as map, or as guide, *Labor and the State in Egypt* is a useful book. The history of Egyptian workers' journey from private to state economy and back illuminates the situation of workers in other times and places, including public employees in North America today. Posusney expertly demonstrates dissection of such aggregates as "labour" and "the state." Her analyses of Egyptian workers' protests and of their effects on policy are in general firmly drawn from empirical evidence, despite the blurred lines around the supposedly competing perspectives.

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Sudipta Sen, *Empire of Free Trade: The East India Company and the Making of the Colonial Marketplace* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 1998)

CONFLICTS BETWEEN INDIAN and British conceptions of the marketplace profoundly affected the economy and society of colonial India. Concentrating on the 1770-1820 period in eastern India (Bengal and Bihar), Sudipta Sen examines such conflicts and their results with remarkable deftness and insight, grounded in his strong control over the relevant primary source material. Rather than deploying an economic or statistical analysis, Sen elucidates indigenous cultural constructions of the marketplace, as well as British misperceptions and violations of those constructs. He then examines contemporary British theories of political economy, which largely advocated "free trade" within a sovereign's domain. He concludes with discussion of some consequences of the contradictions between the East India Company's commitment to "free trade" theory and its mercantilist, monopolistic, and imperialist practices.

The political, economic, and social transitions of 18th century north India have proven highly controversial. Many commentators from that time whom Sen cites — including Islamic aristocrats and service gentry and British merchants and administrators — regarded it a period of disorder. The Mughal Empire, which had imposed its patrimonial-bureaucratic order on north India for nearly two centuries, fragmented over the 18th century, giving way to numerous regionally-based successor states. These "relatively hastily assembled polities" (32) contained diffuse, overlapping, and inconsistent levels of authority. Marketplaces consequently stood as the sites of complex and often conflicting domains, as local landholders, religious institutions, administrators, merchants, and others each asserted their disparate rights over aspects of economic exchange. Sen argues this political fragmentation eventuated in monopolies over certain prestigious commodities as well as in numerous local tax and customs agents — each imposing a wide variety of tolls and tariffs, assessed according to the status of the merchant and the commodity. All of these combined to constrict trade. Sen stresses the East India Company's economic and administrative innovations which determined to sweep away these barriers to "free trade" by introducing administrative reforms within a centralized state.

Sen differs from recent revisionist historiography that regards the 18th century not as a time of disorder but of vibrant economic upsurges by newly emergent social groups. Christopher Bayly in *Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars: North Indian Society in the Age of British Expansion, 1770-1870* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1983) and Kumkum Chatterjee in *Merchants, Politics and Society in Early Modern India, Bihar: 1733-1820* (Leiden: E. J. Brill 1996), among others, argue that the

Mughal Empire, which had hitherto harnessed this economic dynamism, lost control over it by the early 18th century. Rising social groups first supported Indian regional powers but eventually *shifted into alliance with the British.* Thus, the East India Company was the main beneficiary, but not the primary source, of economic innovation.

Sen's understanding of these economic changes also contrasts with Indian nationalist views. Sen sees as sincere the Company's commitment to "freeing the commerce of northern India from the shackles of inequality and despotsim." (119) Sen finds it "anomalous" (119) that this idealistic goal led to a highly constricting and exploitative colonial economy. Nationalists moralizing about the evils of European imperialism have condemned the British for having more malicious motives and intentions.

Further, Sen disputes with some Marxist/Neo-Marxist scholars the relevance of capitalism to the pre-colonial Indian marketplace. Some such scholars perceive proto-capitalism or Indian-capitalism within the pre-colonial economy. Sen argues the pre-colonial basis for exchange in India "might not be readily explained by economic laws that work in the context of *market-dominated* societies" (1) but rather were driven by cultural systems of honour, privilege, and obligation. He assesses the indigenous classification of goods — the "grammar" and the "etymological indices of social practice" (21) — *which, for example, designated some* products (salt, betel nut, and tobacco) as "merchandise of honor, objects endowed with distinctive values and signs." (82) Sen's concentration on the cultural meanings of goods means that he only occasionally considers the disruptive effects of European industrial products on indigenous systems of production (154) or the monetary imbalances in India caused by changing international trade patterns.

Sen, by stressing British actions and innovations, leaves little room for Indian agency in the new colonial order, except through opposition to it. Claiming authority from the European doctrine of "free trade," the British cut across and disrupted the existing cultural and economic systems, turning a "gift economy" into a *"traffic in privileges" (68,13), acts of in*subordination against Indian authorities that inevitably led to war. To suppress resistance by the conquered peoples, the British turned to coercion. They established a centralized state with a monopoly over the legal use of force, eradicating indigenous bases of authority. They indoctrinated their Indian subordinates into British cultural conceptions of the marketplace. To enforce all this, the Company established extensive systems of surveillance over the colonized, which eventuated, *ironically, in new barriers to* "free trade." Sen argues that after decades of conflict and the use of military force and police power, the British successfully established control over the marketplace. Other scholars, including the Subaltern Studies Collective, see popular resistance to British hegemony persisting until Indian independence in 1947.

In his own conceptualization of the marketplace, Sen includes the circulation and exchange of goods throughout the region and their cultural relationship to authority. He explicitly excludes agricultural production and revenue from his analysis, but he also implicitly excludes the sale of labour, although many of the sites which Sen studies also served as labour markets. For analysis of the military labour market, for example, readers should consider Dirk H. A. Kolff, *Naukar, Rajput, and Sepoy: the Ethnohistory of the Military Labour Market in Hindustan, 1450-1850* (Cambridge: Cambridge Unviersity Press, 1990), and Seema Alavi, *Sepoys and the Company: Tradition and Transition in Northern India, 1770-1830* (Delhi: Oxford University Press 1995). Similarly, these marketplaces provided services, such as information and communications, as analyzed by Christopher Bayly in *Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and*

Social Communication in India, 1780-1870 (New York: Cambridge University Press 1996).

The qualities of Sen's primary sources necessarily shape his project. On one hand, he has carefully drawn upon indigenous histories and literature in Persian, Bengali, and Urdu to elucidate Indian conceptions of the marketplace. Most of these sources reflect the aristocratic and service elite perspective of their authors, rather than the viewpoint of producers, merchants, or conveyors of goods. These sources also tend to address broader moral trends rather than provide quantitative data or accounts of specific practices. On the other hand, the colonial archive, which Sen mines extensively, supplies many details about indigenous practices but also, as he argues, is distorted by the perceptions of its British creators. While Sen contrasts Indian practice with European theory, he is careful to avoid implying that British theory accorded with actual practice in Britain.

Overall, Sen's skillful use of rich detail and his clear and thoughtful analysis of larger patterns about the exchange of goods makes this book a major advance in our understanding of the 18th century in north India, for its own sake and as a case study in the transition from pre-colonial to colonial modes of market exchange in South Asia.

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