Abstracts
Abstract
The scholarship on deep disagreements presents us with a considerable number of seemingly disparate characterizations concerning the nature of these disputes. This paper is motivated by the desire to grasp what these characterizations are. An answer is provided through the method of reconstructive analysis. Two ideal and paradigmatic models of deep disagreements are defined initially. Then, individual characterizations found in the scholarship are examined against the background of such models. Special attention is given to Fogelin’s paper, the work that initiates modern discussion on deep disagreements. According to the interpretation provided in the following paper, both models inadvertently coexist in this seminal work.
Keywords:
- beliefs systems,
- deep disagreements,
- Fogelin,
- Models of deep disagreements,
- ultimate beliefs
Résumé
Les études sur les désaccords profonds nous présentent un nombre considérable de propriétés apparemment disparates concernant la nature de ces conflits. La rédaction de cet article est motivée par le désir de comprendre quelles sont ces propriétés. Une réponse est fournie par la méthode de l'analyse reconstructive. Deux modèles idéaux et paradigmatiques des désaccords profonds sont d'abord définis. Ensuite, les propriétés individuelles trouvées dans les études sont examinées dans le contexte de ces modèles. Une attention particulière est accordée à l'article de Fogelin, l'ouvrage qui initie la discussion moderne sur les désaccords profonds. Selon l'interprétation fournie dans l'article suivant, les deux modèles coexistent par inadvertance dans cet ouvrage fondateur.
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Appendices
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