Abstracts
Abstract
The virtues and vices of argument are now an established part of argumentation theory. They have helped direct attention to hitherto neglected aspects of how we argue. However, it remains controversial whether a virtue theory can contribute to some of the central questions of argumentation theory. Notably, Harvey Siegel disputes whether what he calls ‘arguments in the abstract propositional sense’ can be evaluated meaningfully within a virtue theory. This paper explores the prospects for grounding an account of argument evaluation in arguers’ virtues and vices by examination of a corresponding debate in virtue ethics: Can an ethics of virtue guide our actions? It is thereby argued that an affirmative answer is possible: virtues suffice for argument evaluation.
Keywords:
- argument evaluation,
- argumentative norms,
- v-rules,
- virtue argumentation theory
Résumé
Les vertus et les vices de l’argumentation font désormais partie intégrante de la théorie de l’argumentation. Ils ont contribué à attirer l’attention sur des aspects jusqu’ici négligés de notre façon d’avancer des arguments. Cependant, la question de savoir si une théorie de la vertu peut contribuer à certaines des questions centrales de la théorie de l’argumentation reste controversée. Harvey Siegel se demande notamment si les « arguments au sens propositionnel abstrait » peuvent être évalués de manière significative dans le cadre d’une théorie de la vertu. Cet article explore les possibilités de fonder une analyse de l’évaluation des arguments sur les vertus et les vices des argumentateurs en examinant un débat correspondant dans l’éthique de la vertu : une éthique de la vertu peut-elle guider nos actions ? On avance ainsi qu’une réponse affirmative est possible : les vertus suffisent pour évaluer les arguments.
Appendices
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