EN:

The young field of strategic studies has difficulties establishing a solid consensus on its purpose, basic philosophy and main concepts, because the definitions and meanings given to the nature of research in that field are largely controversial. Strategists have serious problems in addressing the criticisms that are made of the fundamental assumptions and theories that underline strategic studies. This paper explores the causes and implications of a crisis which now permeates heavily the development of the field.

EN:

Western writers and thinkers can be divided into two categories : those who are hedgehogs and emphasize one central vision and unity of the world, and those who are foxes who emphasize diversity, separateness and uniqueness. My argument in this article is that much of the debate about the proper place of strategic studies in the larger field of international relations stems from this major distinction. The strategists tend to be hedgehogs who take one paradigm, one set of applications and one set of political commitments and make a great deal out of it. I will argue that there is also merit to understanding that there are foxes as well, who would place the central vision of the strategists in a larger context of other truths, other applications, and broader commitments.

EN:

In this article, the authors try to define the general conceptual framework of classical strategic thought in order to assess its relevance for the development of contemporary Strategic Studies. Our argument brings out the fact that classical strategic scholars tended to conceptualize strategy as the scientific study of conflictual actions between unitary actors, omitting by this very fact to study the sociopolitical dimensions of conflicts, the impact of military technology or the influence of organizational and decisional processes on the conduct of war. Nevertheless, classical strategic thought still offers an invaluable body of literature to understand the evolution of ideas on war, and a possible way of enriching strategic studies through the use of its distinctive comparative historical perspective.

EN:

This article deals with two general arguments about how nuclear weapons might produce or prevent war, both based on themes present in pre-nuclear eras. The first debate is over whether traditional military policies increase or decrease the likelihood of war, whether a policy relying on implicit or explicit threats deter or provoke. The second debate centers on how nuclear weapons are brought into the framework of force and threats, and how deterrence can be mode most effective, through a posture of deterrence by denial versus deterrence by punishment. Involved in these arguments are disputes over international politics, the nature and intentions of the Soviet Union, and the changes brought about by nuclear weapons.

EN:

The purpose of this article is to concentrate on the conventional strategy of Europe in order to bring to light its new trends, all the while demonstrating the principal role that new technology maintains within this evolutionary process. Emphasis will be placed upon the recent changes in Western doctrines, in order to distinguish the differences between the doctrines of Air Land Battle and Follow-on-Forces Attack (FOFA), and those which preceded them. An attempt will then be made to compare the recent developments in the conceptual models of War of Attrition and War of Maneuver, so as to determine whether these new doctrines correspond to either the first or second model. This analysis should thus permit a better understanding of the debate which encompasses the conventional strategy of Europe.

EN:

The theory of the Cult of the Offensive clearly stands out among the most recent works being conducted in Strategic Studies. The aim of this article is to better understand this new theoretical contribution by looking at its strengths and weaknesses, and by applying it to the case of the evolving American naval strategy. The central elements of this approach will be analysed in order to explain the significant growth that the American Navy has experienced since the start of the 1980s. In this manner, it will be possible to perceive as much the applicability of this theory as the relevance of the case study, to show the value of strategic studies as a field which seeks a greater understanding of strategic choices.

EN:

The time has come to discuss military doctrine. We have, for much too long now, been discussing separate weapon Systems, sometimes singly, sometimes combined, and not the underlying rational. This article spells out alternative security policies in the fields of military and foreign policies. The reader will find a layman's guide to military doctrine, beginning with a basic distinction made between offensive and defensive postures, a distinction based on capability and not on intention. We will show that the division into military and political motivations is far from sharp, and needs to be better understood in order to discuss and assess the implications of alternative doctrines for Europe.

EN:

Arms control, as developed by American civilian strategists in the late 1950s, sought to maintain the equilibrium upon which mutual deterrence was dependent, and strove to prevent direct conflict between the two nuclear protagonists. Has it exhausted its virtuality and will there be a return to the tradition of general and total disarmament? One comes to ask within the framework of this analysis, whether the Washington treaty of december 1987 introduces a new element to arms control, or whether it closely follows the methods used in former agreements. In an effort to better comprehend this question, the past experiences in arms control will be examined before making any conjectures on its anticipated evolution, all the while taking into consideration the new approaches used in the American-Soviet relations, the problems created by technological innovation, and the intentions of both the small and medium States.

EN:

If Strategic Studies are to progress and remain relevant as a fîeld of social sciences and a sub-field of international relations, they have to be more pluralistic, interdisciplinary and innovative. If there is no work at these three levels, strategic thought may become more and more marginalized This short paper defines ten ways by which the "new strategist" may reform and help the cause of strategic Studies.