EN:

This paper proposes to grasp the main issues of Canadian foreign policy in the eighties by using an analysis framework based on the concepts of fragmentation, continentalism and diversification, considered as the intervening variables in the process of explaining Canada's international behaviour. Emphasizing the explanatory variables of the three phenomena (fragmentation, continentalism, diversification), the study demonstrates their complexity, namely the multiplicity of their causes, and underlines some of their basic characteristics, such as the structural sources of Canadian fragmentation in foreign policy - closely relate d to the nature of the country's economy and its links with the United States -, the ambiguity and shortcomings of the continentalist option, and the contradictions of the diversification policies. Beyond that, the paper attempts to indicate the interrelation of the three phenomena, their constant and circular interaction, and their future directions. Finally, the text deals with the question of a general theoretical framework for the study of these main issues in Canadian foreign policy.

EN:

This paper's objective is to bring forth some elements which confirm the following hypothesis : Canada is consigned to continentalism, namely to economic and cultural integration with the United States though this fact is shrouded in a Canadian nationalism of sorts. The continentalist mentality is rooted in the history of British North America, inhabited mostly by refugees from America who have remained inherently "Yankees" in spite of their anti-americanism. The Confederation itself is based on a sort of complicity with the United States. More recently there were talks of a "North American nationality", and continentalism both cultural and economic has come to be seen as a 'force of nature" which the governments, at the most, put into a chanelling process. Still, it is possible for Canadian nationalism to exist provided it does not go beyond the threshold whence it would run headlong into the continental mentality. Canada has defined itself through an international or non-national perspective far too long for today's nationalism not to remain weak and poorly established.

But the Americans whose "manifest destiny" has succeeded in spreading over Canada without even their having tried to hoist their flag there find it to their advantage to maintain some form of Canadian sovereignty. Canada as a "friendly nation" can be of use to Washington. That is why there are almost as many advocates for Canada's independence in the United States as there are north of the border. Canadian nationalism can thus further the interests of some Canadian elites without seriously prejudicing continental integration which can very well afford not to be set up into formalized structures.

EN:

The year 1982 marked the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, creating the EEC, and the tenth anniversary of Canada s Third Option, which aimed in part at using the new Europe as a counterweight to American influence. This article attempts, first to set the last ten year s of Canada s European policy in the context of postwar economic and strategic relationships and, secondly, to evaluate the European aspect of the Third Option and its prospects for the 1980s.

Canada s image of, and policy towards, Western Europe, has always had two distinct elements — economic and strategic - whose interplay describes various phases of the relationship. Until about 1957, the two images were roughly congruent and Canada s economic and military policies mutually reinforcing. A multilateral Atlantic economic community was seen as the underpinning of collective defence. The next fifteen years or so saw the breakup of this patte m, with the emergence of the Community, continued British attempts to join from 1961 on, and the decline in Canadian support for NATO.

The birth of the Third Option and the pursuit of the Framework Agreement with the Community saw the gradual revival of Canada's military relationship with Europe, this time in the service of economic diversification and growth. A variety of factors, however - global, European, North American and domestic Canadian - hampered the development of the new link with the Community. Many of these, especially the structural ones underlying the crisis of the world economy and the stagnation of European integration - are likely to persist through the 1980 s. For the next few year s, then, the European option will probably be (a) less communautaire, (b) a less important focus in trade policy relative to other areas, and (c) once more in the service of military and political ends.

EN:

No more than any other geographical region has East Asia ever really been a priority in the Canadian foreign policy. The rapid economic growth of this sub-continent has stirred Canadian interest in East Asia. This interest, expressed mainly in terms of the economy - commerce and investments - meets with numerous barriers, some specific to the region, others related to the constraints resulting from the international economic competition. In a y et more obvious way, the diplomacy of the government in Ottawa meets with internal obstacles particular to the Canadian society which, by tradition and inclination, usually has a tendency to turn more towards the Atlantic ocean. The objective of this study is therefore to identify those constraints while at the same time underlining the new efforts deployed by the Federal government to build up an increased interest in that region. This paper tries also to pinpoint the way in which the Asian policy is incapable of elaborating corrective measures to the problems still present to-day, but which have long been well indentified.

EN:

In 1970, Canada decided to develop its relations with Latin America, especially in the economic sector. Adhesion to the Interamerican Bank of Development and the status of observator in the Organisation of American States was a good institutional basis for increasing these relations. However, the absence of objectives on refugee and immigration questions prevented adoption of a clear policy towards Chilian and Haitian refugees. Generally Canada had met the 1970 objectives. Trade increased substantially, partly as a result of Canadian policies, but also because of the development of the main countries: Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela and the increase in oil prices. It could be more important if vigourous policies were implemented. Canada has important investments in Latin America, especially in Brazil. In percentage of total Canadian aid, aid to Latin America declined from 1970. Relations with Latin America will increase during the 1980's, but they would be more important if Canada adopted a more coherent policy.

EN:

While in the past, Canada has earned a fairly liberal reputation as it developed political relations with African countries, the trend for the 1980s has been to concentrate on promoting trade and investment. In particular, the interest in expanding markets for Canadian manufactured exports has led to the co-ordination of the Export Development Corporation (EDC) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) to encourage and support the private sector. As a result, exports to Africa have tripled in the past five years and North Africa (especially Algeria) is becoming a region of major importance for Canadian exporter s. Although in the past the Canadian government has been ambiguous about its approach to promoting trade and investment in white-ruled Southern Africa, it has strengthened its inclination to leave the private sector alone, regardless of the support which Canadian companies are giving to the apartheid system. The before, in the 1980s, Canada's relations with Africa are being increasingly governed by economic imperatives as the government attempts to come to grips with the problems emerging from the economic recession.