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“Colonialism” and The Fourth World: Notes on Variations in Colonial Situations

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Article abstract

This paper argues that the increasing use of “colonial” terminology to describe the situation of the peoples anthropologists study has been constructive but has neglected important differences in outcomes of the process of Western colonial expansion. The main section suggests a way of thinking about differences between “external” and “internal” colonies of different types, by focussing on the colonizing power’s changing demands for land and labour, the changing nature of the state, and the role of ideologies defining appropriate treatment of the colonized. The final section speculates on the significance of changing social science terminology in defining the people we study.

'Colonialism' and The Fourth World: Notes on Variations in Colonial Situations

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This paper argues that the increasing use of 'colonial' terminology to describe the situation of the peoples anthropologists study has been constructive but has neglected important differences in outcomes of the process of Western colonial expansion. The main section suggests a way of thinking about differences between "external" and "internal" colonies of different types, by focussing on the colonizing power's changing demands for land and labour, the changing nature of the state, and the role of ideologies defining appropriate treatment of the colonized. The final section speculates on the significance of changing social science terminology in defining the people we study.

Cet article démontre que l'usage croissant d'une terminologie 'coloniale' au service des peuples minoritaires, bien que constructif, néglige de prendre en considération des différences importantes créées par le processus d'expansion coloniale occidentale.

Le thème central de cette analyse suggère une toute autre approche entre les colonies 'externes' et 'internes' de types variés. L'accent porte, ici, sur les demandes changeantes de terre et de force de travail imposées par le pouvoir colonial, sur la nature changeante de l'état ainsi que sur le rôle des idéologies afin de présenter un traitement plus approprié des peuples colonisés.

Dans sa partie finale, l'article s'interroge sur l'importance qu'ont les changements de terminologie au sein des sciences sociales dans l'exploration de ces populations étudiées.

... Their land, as indeed the lands of all Native Americans, have been colonized and, in principle, the Dene and all Native Americans possess a right to decolonization no less legitimate than that of the original peoples of Africa and Asia ... But ... we the recent settlers of North America are not about to condemn our own presence on this continent, much less pack up and leave. Furthermore, we share with those colonists who settled in Australia, New Zealand, and Latin America, a factor unique among colonials; we are now the vast and powerful majority. (Asch, 1979: 350)

Although the era of great overseas colonial empires controlled from European capitals has now faded, use of the appellation 'colonial' has shown no parallel decline. Instead, social commentators and social scientists have devised variant terms that are increasingly used to refer to ongoing contemporary situations. We have been going through a phase during which situations previously thought of as diverse have been lumped together under some form of 'colonial' rubric. This paper has two objectives: 1) to suggest a way of distinguishing some crucial differences among colonial situations, while still preserving a sense of common historical roots; and 2) in the final section, to speculate on the significance of this shift in social science terminology, samples of which are cited here.¹

Colonial imagery is now common in discussions of contemporary Canadian Indians (e.g. Asch, *ibid.*; Carstens, 1971; Frideres, 1983; 294-323; Watkins, 1977). Gonzalez-Casanova (1965) and Stavenhagen (1965) applied the term 'internal colonialism' to the specific case of Mexico. Others extended it to such diverse situations as Colombia (Havens and Flinn, 1970), South Africa (Wolpe, 1975), Northern Ireland (Hechter, 1975), the Torres Straits Islands of Australia (Beckett, 1982), U.S. Indians (Bee and Gingerich, 1977) black ghettos (Blauner, 1969, 1972), and Palestinians in Israel (Zureik, 1979). Some variant forms include 'domestic colonialism' used by Carter, Karis and Stultz (1967) for South Africa and 'domestic dependency' adopted by Joseph Jorgensen (1978: 5) for the situation of U.S. Indians. 'Welfare colonialism' was used by Paine (1977) for the Canadian Arctic, a usage adopted since by others.

Despite the critiques of Adam and Giliomee (1979: 54-55), Wolpe (1975), Gonzalez (1974), Chaloult and Chaloult (1979) and others, 'internal colonialism' continues to be overstretched to apply to very different situations. In recent years the notion has taken on a new emphasis in the pages of the journal *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, which since 1978 has published nine articles applying an internal colony model to Croatia, Austria-Hungary, Southern Italy, Eastern Finland, Quebec, Brittany and Chicanos in America. Even the relations between working class people and others have been referred to as a kind of "hidden colonialism" (Thomas, 1966/67: 43). No wonder Bee and Gingerich commented some years ago "We fear... that the colonial concept is in danger of being overextended into situations where it loses much of its analytical value and at the same time obscures the dynamics of structures of a different sort" (1977: 70). Yet since then, Beidelman has suggested "colonialism is not dead in Africa if, by colonialism, we mean cultural domination with enforced social changes" (1982: 2).

Some anthropologists have added to this terminological stew another term, 'Fourth World', to facilitate comparative studies of changing relations between indigenous, ethnically distinct, small minorities and the nation-states that encapsulate them (Dyck, 1985; Graburn, 1981; cf. Manuel and Posluns, 1974).² The cases to which this new usage has been applied overlap with those labelled as 'internal' and 'welfare' colonialism; Graburn uses 'internal colonialism' in clarifying the meaning he attaches to 'Fourth World,' but others who have adopted the latter term appear to avoid 'colonial' language, leaving the relationship

between this new notion and 'colonial' models somewhat unclear.

The social science usages quoted above suggest a desire to emphasize the shared "colonial" nature of very diverse phenomena. To reduce this muddle we need first a clear conception of what colonialism is and is not, and second a framework for comparative analysis that acknowledges common historical origins of diverse outcomes while directing attention to crucial differences. This paper poses the question: how do those situations now labelled 'internal colonialism', 'welfare colonialism' and 'fourth world' merit the 'colonial' appellation when they differ in important respects from the classic overseas colonial empires of Asia and Africa? Both Asch's (1979) emphasis on population proportions and the way in which 'internal colony' language highlights the bounding of colonizers and colonized within one political/geographical unit capture important aspects of these differences. However, we need to look systematically not only at these factors but also at the nature of the colonizing state, the ideologies used to govern, and the kind of economy that has developed. A useful index of the latter will be the changing needs of the colonizing power for resources of the occupied territory: the labour and/or the land of the colonized.

In this paper, 'colonialism' will be interpreted narrowly; formal political control of a territory and population by a state, usually through some form of specialized administrative apparatus, with an ideology justifying such control. This ideology includes a definition of the dominated population as distinct from and inferior to the dominators, and is often expressed in a "racial" idiom. As a result of the superior power of the dominant state, the resources provided by the dominated territory and population are available for the use of the dominant power as and when the latter needs them.

Colonial expansionary processes meeting this definition have been going on for much of human history. While non-European expansion, such as the Bantu migrations in Africa, has been important, it seems indisputable that the most significant process shaping our contemporary world has been the domination of most of the non-European world by western European nations in the last four to five centuries. Many of the situations anthropologists are labelling 'colonial' are an outcome of that process, therefore attempts at clarification should start, but not end, with it. The process of Western European expansion, however, is so vast that a short paper can do little more than suggest a way of thinking about differences.³ To outline this way of thinking, this paper resorts, as a first approxima-

tion, to the unsatisfactory device of a typology that can help to organize the diversity of colonial processes and outcomes into broad categories. These categories facilitate comparison of the basic elements of those outcomes we today label 'internal colonialism', 'welfare colonialism', etc., with corresponding elements of the classic patterns of overseas colonial possessions.

The present paper focusses especially on classic patterns exemplified by African colonies to highlight the ways in which those types of colonization process differed from the temperate settler category, especially as exemplified by Canada, the U.S.A., Australia and New Zealand. The final section of the paper returns to the question of terminology. Extension of the analysis to other areas and substantive comparative work are tasks for further papers.

Basic Elements of the Colonizing Process

An adequate account of Western colonial expansion would need to examine the interaction between metropolitan needs and colonial resources, as the former moved from early to late mercantilism to industrial capitalism. One would

need to consider the form and scale of penetration, the prevailing level of competition among European powers, and ideologies of rule, all in relation to the colony: its location, ecological conditions, population size, forms of production, scale of social organization and ability to offer effective resistance. For present purposes, two central factors offer a key to organizing the diversity of outcomes: the changing needs of the dominant power for control of 1) the colony's land, and 2) the labour of the colonized population. Both of these dimensions were affected by the extent of settlement by incoming colonizers, and the form of new economic activities. As a first step in analysis, outcomes can be organized into a typology using as axes the sources of productive labour and proportion of colonizers to indigenes. The labels, I-IV and A-D, represent points on continua rather than discrete categories, for intermediate cases abound. Figure 1 illustrates the placement of some examples. Colonies, however, changed over time. A small military/trading post could expand into a "colony of administration" phase before incursion of European settlers transformed it into either a tropical or temperate settler colony. These temporal changes cannot easily be fitted into one two-dimensional table.

Figure 1. SOURCE OF PRODUCTIVE LABOUR.

		I INDIGENOUS	II IMPORTED SERVILE	III "MIXED"	IV IMPORTED FREE EUROPEAN
P O P U L A T I O N	TERRITORY LIMITED				
	A no/few settlers	West African slave trading posts — 16th to 18th century		Goa	
	TERRITORY EXTENSIVE				
	B colony of administration (no/few settlers)	Uganda, West Africa Philippines	Fiji	British Guiana	
P R O P O R T I O N S	C settler colony, tropical pattern (settler minority)	Kenya Southern Rhodesia	Jamaica ^a early Brazil		Mexico Brazil
			South Africa (Natal Indians)		
	D settler colony temperate climate (many settlers)				Chile Colombia "White" dominions U.S.A., Argentina

NOTES

- a. Jamaica and probably other Caribbean colonies during the heyday of the planting class must be considered a settler colony; after the displacement of that class by corporate interests (Wolf 1982: 316-317) it moved towards a more typical 'colony of administration.'

Listing of colonies and nations on the chart is intended only as illustration, in no way exhaustive.

Colonies on Line A represent historically important but unusual situations where colonizers were concerned more about strategic location rather than extent of territory. The West African slave trade depots are examples of very high demand for labour (as a result of colonial penetration elsewhere) without need to control the territory from which the human commodity was procured; demand for land remained low until changing metropolitan conditions led to the scramble for more acquisitions in the nineteenth century.

Establishment of direct domination over a relatively extensive territory almost always involved three kinds of metropolitan representatives: a colonial administration responsible to the metropolis, backed by force; traders representing metropolitan economic interests; and missionaries. In early phases of some situations, the chartered company device fused administrative and trading functions, but even in these cases a separate colonial state later emerged. We shall focus on the differing responsibilities of these colonial states, concentrating especially on examples from Columns I and IV (*Fig. 1*).

In all types of colonies, the emerging administration had certain basic tasks; claims to sovereignty over territory had to be enforced against competitors; indigenous populations had to be subdued; indigenous state structures, if present, had to be subordinated and often put to use as lower-level control structures; indigenous forms of production had to be 'cracked open' and their resources harnessed for metropolitan use. A surplus had to be extracted to help support the new administrative structures and the armed force that backed them, to allow construction of essential infrastructure such as roads or ports, and in many cases for export to the metropolis.

The combination of indigenous land and labour in new economic enterprises to create the needed surplus took several different forms, with differing implications for the colonial state. Both the development of smallholder cash crop production and the use of indigenes as collectors of desired products required the development of a trading infrastructure, a task sometimes carried on by immigrant middlemen minorities such as the Asians of East Africa or the Chinese of southeast Asia (Bonacich, 1973). However, neither the importation of large amounts of capital nor the takeover of extensive land areas were necessary. Although the state might claim ultimate title, as long as land remained under indigenous control subsistence production could support and subsidize production of the desired commodities, with

minimal need for the intervention of capital in the production process. As long as the subsistence base remained viable, however, producers could opt out of commodity production; thus, this form faced colonial administrations with difficult tasks of balancing pressures for more production with attempts (often futile in the long run) to protect the subsistence base. This developmental form required relatively few administrators and hence is to be found in "colonies of administration" (*Fig. 1, B.I.*).

Other colonies of administration opted for large-scale development using external capital. In such cases, the colonial states had to attract the capital and to supply legal title to land unencumbered by native users. Above all, it had the task of facilitating steady supplies of native labour, whether for plantations or for mines. Often this was accomplished through partial rather than full proletarianization of a section of the indigenous population; migrant labour systems, as has often been noted, transfer the social costs of reproduction and maintenance of the labour force to the subsistence sector (*e.g.* Meillassoux, 1981).

In tropical settler colonies, the colonial state had similar tasks of making available land and especially a supply of labour (Berman and Lonsdale, 1980). The intent of the settlers to establish a permanent stake in the colony, however, led to other political demands and tensions (*ibid.*; Emmanuel, 1972). In tropical settler colonies, the state had added to its other tasks the need to control obstreperous settlers demanding a voice in government.

Wherever the economy of the colony became dependent on production based on plantation, mining or settler farm activity, the colonial state had to provide the preconditions for such production while at the same time restraining short-sighted abuses of indigenous labour that could threaten the stability of the whole. A colonial state, like any other state, had as its most fundamental task the reproduction of the system over time. All these systems depended on native labour, and this very dependence introduced broad constraints: if the system was to continue, the colonized must at least maintain living standards sufficient to reproduce their own labour power. In the short-term rush for accumulation, this constraint was not always recognized.

The record of Western expansion provides glaring examples of profligate and destructive use of indigenous peoples. But the historical record suggests that it has been the state, whether metropolitan or colonial, that has intervened and attempted to impose rules to protect the labour

resource, in response both to long-term needs of the colonial system and to the outcries of missionaries, aboriginal protection societies and others of what Brett (1973: 59-62) has called the "humanitarian lobby".

In summary, for Column I, the colonial state had first the basic need to maintain domination, then to facilitate accumulation and the activities of those with capital, while at the same time trying to prevent overexploitation that could threaten the long-term viability of the system. It had to manage the contradictions inherent in attempting to harness or "articulate" indigenous modes of production to the capitalist market, whether through commodity production by indigenes or the preservation of a subsistence sector to subsidize production of labour for capitalist mines and plantations.

The state also had to forestall the emergence of political consciousness among the colonized, while at the same time permitting enough Western education to meet increasing needs for skilled manpower. In addition, in colonies with a significant population of settlers (C.I.) they had to manage these contradictions while coping with the vociferous demands of settlers for social and political, as well as economic, privileges. Where capital investment took corporate form, pressures were usually less vocal and obvious, but probably even harder to resist.

Ideology and Power

Calculating economic rationality is not the only relevant level of analysis, however. All of these colonizing powers had ideologies of rule and standards for the handling of indigenous labour.⁴ That these standards often were not lived up to, nor effectively enforced by colonial administrations, does not negate the reality of the ideology on which they were based. Missionaries have been central to the process of developing such standards. Missionaries, who complained to the metropole of local atrocities that went unpunished, were operating in terms of a moral system not derived from the local colonial economic structure. The processes of ideological struggle involved missionaries on the spot in the colonies, religious organizations, aboriginal protection societies and other elements of the "humanitarian lobbies" in the metropole, acting to pressure metropolitan states to issue directives to their colonies. These struggles are too complex to go into here; the crucial point is that the currents of ideological change in the metropolises, broadly towards greater protection of the indigenes as human beings, albeit inferior ones, were moving

in the same direction as the logic of accumulation regarding the conservation of labour supplies. Once the slave trade had been abolished, as capitalism matured in the 19th and 20th centuries, there was no fundamental disjunction between beliefs about proper treatment of the colonized as human beings—even if seen as "the child races" whose moral development was a sacred trust of the more evolved nations—and the long-term needs of colonial systems for the reproduction of a secure supply of labour and a subsistence base to subsidize it.

It is difficult to assess the effect of the "humanitarian lobbies" who used reports of maltreatment in the colonies to create a fuss in the metropole. Such tactics required liberal democratic institutions and at least the potential of appealing to metropolitan public opinion. But even in Great Britain, where the "humanitarian lobbies" were probably most developed, public concern with remote colonies was slight. Although the efficacy of humanitarian lobbies in restraining actions of the colonial states cannot be dismissed entirely, the potential power in the hands of the colonized may well have been far more significant.

Adams, in his treatment of social power, reminds us that in a power relationship, the less dominant still have some ability to affect the environment of the dominant elements, and hence retain some reciprocal power (1975: 20-29). Colonial states were frequently weak and chronically short-staffed (Jan Jorgenson, 1981: 135) and coercive measures were costly. Once the stage of forcible conquest or "pacification" had passed and domination had been consolidated, states often attempted to avoid policies that would provoke opposition on a scale requiring aid from outside the colony to suppress it. In colonies based on smallholder production of cash crops, peasants could, as long as the subsistence base remained viable, opt to withdraw from cash crop production if conditions became too unfavourable. Thus, we find colonial rulers combining coercive measures, such as compulsory taxation and minimum acreages, mixed in differing proportions at different times with the lure of new goods and price incentives. In all these colonies, compulsion, backed by force, was basic, but much of day-to-day rule involved assessment of the limits beyond which the colonized could not be pushed without provoking active resistance, expensive to put down. Administrators were well aware of the potential power of numbers held by the colonized, but this power could be made effective only if aggregated, and only if its possessors recognized their potential. Thus, the colonial state also had the task of preventing

effective organization of the colonized. The skillful administration would be alert enough to signs of disaffection to make sufficient concessions in time to maintain passive acquiescence and prevent the spread of recognition of their potential power among the colonized.

Decolonization and Internal Colonies

The processes by which the colonized did actualize their power and struggle for political independence need not concern us here. For present purposes, we need only to distinguish between two forms of decolonization: the post-1945 wave during which power was taken over by elements of the indigenous⁵ or descendants of imported servile populations, and the earlier process during which dominant elements of the settler (*Fig. 1*, D.IV) or “mixed” (C.III) populations gained power. The examples now labelled ‘internal colonialism’ are outcomes of this latter decolonization process—those below the dotted line of *Fig. 1*.

As a label, ‘internal colonialism’ points only to one dimension: the fact that a subjugated indigenous population and a dominant population originating elsewhere are contained within one state apparatus that controls one unified territory. In this sense it marks off a category of cases distinct from the classic overseas or “external” colonies. However, the label does not direct attention to the ratio of colonized to dominant populations, the way in which the resources of the colonized territory and people have been appropriated, the nature of the state and other crucial aspects. It has been fruitfully applied in case studies of Mexico (Gonzalez-Casanova, 1965; Stavenhagen, 1965), Colombia (Havens and Flinn, 1970); South Africa (Wolpe, 1975), the U.S.A. (Bee and Gingerich, 1977) and Australia (Beckett, 1982). But to move from case studies to fruitful comparison, we need a means of sorting out similarities and differences within the processes of internal colonialism. A glance at the few examples cited on *Fig. 1* below the dotted line gives some indication of the range. The next section of this paper will concentrate only on the trajectory followed by temperate settler forms which became liberal democratic states, and attempt a preliminary comparison with it and typical overseas colonial patterns.

Temperate Settler Colonies: the “Liberal Democratic” Trajectory

The historical processes by which the U.S.A. and the “white” dominions have evolved from their

colonial origins are both complex and well chronicled elsewhere. Despite many differences, one shared characteristic of the developmental trajectory is represented by Column IV in *Fig. 1*: over time, the incoming European settlers have come to provide their own labour force. The productive capacities of indigenous populations were either never effectively harnessed, or else, with changing conditions, have become increasingly redundant. This point has been made before (e.g. Upton, 1973: 51; Bee and Gingerich, 1977: 74-75) but its implications for the tasks to be carried out by the state, the nature of power relations between state and indigenes, and the role of ideology are not often made explicit.

It is temptingly simple to say that these ex-colonial nations represent cases where the demand for land has been greater than colonizers’ demands for indigenous labour and/or products. While this has been the long-term trend, such an approach ignores historically significant indigenous contributions. To take a Canadian example, the fur trade long provided a mainstay of the early colonial economy. But as colonization progressed, production by native Americans declined in significance. Upton says, “By 1830 the British Empire no longer needed the Indians of the two Canadas” (1973: 51). They became redundant in the western prairies in the 1860s. As the demand for agricultural production grew, the frontiers of settlement pushed the fur trade to more and more remote areas, for which few alternative uses were then available.

In addition, although Indians have not provided the core of Canada’s labour force, they have been, in some places at certain times, an important source of *supplementary* wage labour. The decline of both wage labour and independent production to the present high levels of unemployment and welfare dependency in many areas has been gradual and uneven, as Knight (1978) has documented for British Columbia.

These changes in the economic base involved new responsibilities for the state. In the fur trade period, the tasks of a state were few and simple: to ensure some degree of law and order and the pre-conditions necessary for trade. But once a commitment was made to agricultural production through European settlement, new tasks were posed. Willing settlers had to be found and transported and land made available, implying a system of allocating and recording claims to land. Large areas had to be cleared of any remaining indigenes and physical protection provided to settlers against any remaining troublesome natives who objected to the disruption of their previous land use. Unlike colonial administrations in the other types of

colonies, these states did not have to cope with the task of converting indigenes into a disciplined labour force; in contrast to the tropical pattern, settlers were expected to be more or less self-sufficient as regards labour.

Bradby commented, in another context:

If capital's main interest... is in the land and raw materials, then there is no reason why it should have any interest in what happens to Indians, as long as they get out of the way. There are two ways of getting them out of the way: one is the process (of) ... destruction of an ancient culture; the other is fast accomplished and consists in the physical extermination of Indians such as has been happening in Brazil (1975: 160).

Direct physical extermination provides a "final solution" to the problem of freeing desirable land of remnant indigenes whose labour is not needed; through such a policy, the state can avoid the costs of continued policing and administration. Direct extermination may take the form of individual or company initiative in frontier situations as in contemporary Paraguay (Arens, 1976) and Brazil (Davis, 1977) or through organized state campaigns as in 19th century Argentina (Bodley, 1982: 48-50). Small groups may be wiped out, without deliberate genocidal policies, through a combination of disease and settler violence, as seems to have happened to the aborigines of Tasmania and the Beothuks of Newfoundland. While we now find such genocidal processes deeply shocking, we should perhaps be surprised that the combination of high demand for land with absence of demand for the labour of its indigenous occupants, has not more frequently led to physical extermination. Therefore, following Kuper (1981: 187-188), we may find it more useful to ask, not why genocide of indigenous minorities occurs, but what conditions prevent it from occurring when the process of expansion has reached a stage when the indigenes are no longer needed by the colonizing power. What conditions make direct physical extermination so costly that other methods are adopted as more expedient ways of getting the "natives" out of the way?

Answers to this question require historical analysis of specific cases, but will be found mostly in the realm of ideology and the changing nature of the state. Even capitalist expansion takes place in a cultural context. For example, in the temperate settler colonies spawned by British colonization, the ideologies prevalent in government circles by the 19th century could no longer condone wholesale extermination of other human beings. "Indian wars" and "Maori wars" to put down violations of "law and order" were permissible, and individual

violence by frontier Whites against indigenes was not strenuously punished (Bodley, 1982, Chap. 2). But indigenes who survived the wars and the ravages of new diseases encountered various forms of custodial/assimilative policies, often harsh in consequences, but based on the premise of protecting the persons of the remaining native population. The Canadian form of custodial care involved controls on movement and behaviour much stricter than those imposed on British African colonies, where the colonized formed the massive, working majority. By the time the reserve policy was imposed, genocide had become ideologically unacceptable and politically too costly, no matter how economically rational it might be.⁶

Thus, these evolving types of colonial situations differ fundamentally from those in which the colonized population forms the core of the labour force. It was argued above that in the latter case, moral premises of humane treatment were not identical to, but moving in the same direction as, the logic of capital insofar as the latter concerned the need for reproduction of labour. Once the violent phase of consolidating colonial power had given way to the tasks of administering an established system, it was relatively easy for colonial administrations to wrap expedient policies towards their native peoples in outer garments of high moral purpose, and to see only the outer wrappings. But in the temperate pattern, prevalent ideologies in the liberal democratic countries have operated in sharp disjunction with the logic of expanding capital. This disjunction poses severe dilemmas for the state: expected to clear the land of indigenes, yet ideologically constrained from summarily disposing of those defined as human beings albeit savage ones, and fiscally constrained to keep expenditure of public money to a minimum.⁷ Consequently, this temperate pattern contains inherent contradictions not present in colonial situations of other types. One would expect, therefore, that "native policy" over time would reveal more vacillations and inconsistencies than in other colonial situations, as governments strive to find some compromise between the contradictory demands of economic development and their society's changing sense of morally acceptable behaviour. As Dyck says, "...the distinctive aboriginal communities that make up the Fourth World are perennially on the edge of extinction, assimilation and crisis..." (1985: 239). Their very lives hang on a moral premise, a shaky support in a world of *Realpolitik* and the cold logic of capital.

Non-genocidal ideologies, however, are only one of the crucial factors. To understand why

survival has been possible in some places, and why moral premises of human worth have even given some indigenes access to a strange and limited kind of power in some situations, we need to look more closely at the kind of states involved in these differing colonial situations. These can be divided broadly into three: the colonial state that administered overseas or "external colonies" as the agent of a metropolitan power, prior to the recent phase of political decolonization; the advanced capitalist state, and the so-called Third World state.

Recent Marxist theorizing on the state in capitalist societies has advanced far beyond earlier simplistic notions about pliant committees of the ruling class.⁸ This work suggests that the state in these societies is both intimately tied to capitalist production, inevitably involved in securing the preconditions for accumulation, yet required to "stand above" somewhat remote from any specific fraction of capital. It must act as a factor of cohesion for the society as a whole, and in modern democratic states, must both facilitate accumulation while maintaining social order and its own legitimacy as serving the broad social good. The struggle to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of those ruled entails some responsiveness to their demands, and consideration of their perceptions. Practical politics therefore must take account of "public opinion." Mechanisms exist whereby cumulative violations of prevalent conceptions of proper behaviour can incur political costs. While disagreements on specific policies may be intense, the legitimacy of the system of government is extremely high and certain core premises unquestioned by almost everyone.

On the other hand, the colonial state, a semi-autonomous structure ultimately responsible to a metropolitan state, had to worry much less about maintaining legitimacy *in the eyes of the people it ruled*. It, of course, had to justify its actions to the powerful at home and to established interests within the colony; it also had to reconcile actions with the dominant ideologies of rule that legitimated their presence to the men who manned the colonial state (Gartrell, 1979). The colonial state, however, had neither the institutional apparatus nor the need to attempt to convince the populace as a whole of the rightness of its actions.⁹ Political calculus usually centred on evaluating the extent to which policies could be imposed without disrupting passive acquiescence in colonial rule. This was especially true in the many cases where available force was weak. The prevalent ideology of rule and the moral premises of state officials provided further constraints on some types of action. Aggrieved individuals or groups of colonized could

petition for redress of specific grievances, and occasionally succeed by showing the powerful that specific actions were incompatible with their professed ideology. But grievances could quickly lead to questioning the system as a whole, for almost by definition imposed colonial systems did not possess legitimacy; ruler and ruled were separated by vast cultural gaps.

The distinction is especially important if we want to understand the power relations and the forms of political action involved. A colonized population that provides the core of the labour force (and correlatively the majority of the population) stands in a very different power relation to the rulers than does a tiny economically irrelevant encapsulated group. The labouring colonized, whether peasants in Uganda, mine-workers in Northern Rhodesia or South Africa, have available to them both more and different kinds of countervailing or reciprocal power (*cf.* Adams, 1975: 20-29). They may, at certain stages of political struggle, opt for petitions and appeals to the humanitarian lobbies in the metropolis or elsewhere, playing the politics of embarrassment. But they have available, to back up these appeals to the moral premises of their rulers, more direct means of physically affecting the environment of the powerful: non-delivery of crops, slowdowns, boycotts, strikes, sabotage, riots and so on. The threat of these material sanctions, of the overwhelming weight of numbers, always hangs in the background of relations between colonizers and colonized, whenever the latter is the overwhelming majority.

Tiny encapsulated remnant populations, of course, have access to few material sanctions. Their major base of power is the need mentioned above, of modern democratic capitalist states to maintain their legitimacy in the eyes, not of the colonized, but of the majority in the encapsulating state. We thus find here political processes fundamentally different from the political struggles in other kinds of colonial situations. The major political asset of the colonized group becomes the ideology of the colonizers and the colonizeds' own skill in manipulating the symbols of their dominators; the threat of material sanctions is replaced by the threat of political embarrassment, through pointing up discrepancies between professed ideology and actual behaviour. To those accustomed to the more brutal world of the classic colonial situations (or South Africa), where struggle is based on the threat and often the use of force, this seems a strange kind of politics, whose substance seems to consist solely of the insubstantial stuff of rhetoric. What power can a tiny minority wield? Unable to exert material

control over the environment of the powerful, it can only challenge the self-concepts of both bureaucratic and political office-holders and the citizens of the nation, and appeal to the legal rights institutionalized in an earlier phase. The resulting power is tenuous and fluctuating, for it is based on ideologies themselves changing, and it depends on the receptivity of some audience—elements in the wider society willing to listen to the message being sent by the dominated group. Why audiences in recent years have begun to pay a little more attention to the messages of minorities, who for generations they had ignored, needs much more investigation. In Canada, the controversy over the 1969 White Paper has clearly been central (Dyck, 1981), but the greater receptivity is not merely a Canadian phenomenon.¹⁰

The changing consciousness of both dominant and dominated groups comes at a time of renewed demand for capitalist expansion into the previously unwanted hinterlands, so the state is once again faced with demands for removal of remaining aboriginal claims to land. The dilemmas this task poses for advanced capitalist states cannot be fully appreciated if we think of ideology as merely epiphenomenal or unconnected with more basic economic processes. In the 19th century, the relevant ideology involved such moral premises as "Thou shalt not kill" and beliefs in the sacred responsibility of the civilized to act as trustees for the less developed (Upton, 1973; Berkhofer, 1978; Chamberlin, 1975). But during the recent expansionist wave into the northern hinterlands, the indigenous people have been able to make use of ideological premises of another kind to defend themselves: the primacy of the rule of law, the sanctity of property relations, the inviolability of contracts. All these are essential to modern advanced capitalism. This kind of state cannot lightly abrogate such premises, even in the short-term service of specific capitalist demand for the resources of a hinterland claimed by a few indigenes.

These structural and ideological conditions of capitalist democratic states provided the basis for the emergence of what Paine (1977) has called welfare colonialism: recognizably colonial, yet fundamentally unlike any other colonial situation seen before. The flow of benefits has been reversed. In classic colonial situations, a surplus was drawn from a colonized population that laboured on the land and extracted its resources. In this new form, the land has been taken over by incoming colonizers who labour on it and develop its resources, while the state redistributes a small share of the proceeds to both the indigenes and the

rest of the population in the form of welfare and social service payments. Where pockets of indigenes have become heavily dependent, provision of welfare and other services to them may provide an important economic activity for nearby communities of the dominant society. Thus in this form, the presence of enclaves of indigenes, can lead to segments of the dominant society having an economic interest, not in appropriating labour from them but in providing services to them. The indigenes receive benefits whether they work or not. In no other colonial situation did the indigenous population receive more from the state than it provided directly in the form of taxes and the appropriated proceeds of their labour. This form is found only in a few comparatively wealthy, economically developed states with very small colonized minorities; no others could afford it. It seems to represent an anomalous transitional form, perhaps the dying phase of colonialism. Indigenes can lay claim to payments both in their newly acquired rights as citizens, and in their old status as indigenes eligible for special benefits not open to other citizens. Thus, this form cannot be fully comprehended within an internal colony model; that approach must be supplemented by attention to the class relations involved (cf. Bee and Gingerich, 1977). One needs to ask about the social functions of welfare as a means of controlling the poor and forestalling social unrest in a class-structured society (cf. Pivin and Cloward, 1971; Finkel, 1977) and to see the extension of benefits to indigenes as a special case of this broad postwar strategy of stabilizing advanced capitalism. Killing them off has become unthinkable, so pay them off, for the land must be cleared. Unlike the colonial administrations discussed above, governments show little or no concern to protect subsistence production where it remains important; perhaps the opportunity costs of subsistence uses of the land are perceived to be too high. The demand for indigenous labour becomes increasingly marginal. As Bee and Gingerich have commented for the U.S.A., make-work projects and special provisions for employment of indigenes on resource development projects are best understood as a result of the more general federal policy of appeasement.

The policy of stabilization and appeasement, of which "welfare colonialism" has been but one part, is now under heavy attack. It remains to be seen what the future holds for the indigenous minorities of these advanced capitalist countries as we move into a new phase of capitalism, characterized by greatly reduced demand for unskilled labour and governmental fiscal crises leading to cutbacks in welfare spending.

In summary, this section has argued that some of the dynamics of the “internal colonial” relations of indigenous minorities within modern liberal democracies can be highlighted by comparing the trajectory of their development with the differing patterns of classic overseas, especially African, colonies. At a bare minimum, comparison must specify the changing patterns of economic relations between colonizers and colonized, represented here by changing demands for land and labour, the very different roles of ideology, the different kinds of power available to the colonized, hence the different patterns of state-colonized dynamics, leading to political decolonization in the one case, and an indefinite future of encapsulation or assimilation in the other.

What's in a Name? The Significance of Social Science Terminology

The recent trend of aggregating into one broad category of “colonialism” situations previously thought of as diverse has been both intellectually and politically significant. Eric Wolf says, “The ability to bestow meanings — to ‘name’ things, acts, and ideas—is a source of power. Control of communication allows the managers of ideology to lay down the categories through which reality is to be perceived” (1982: 388). The acts of “naming” performed by social scientists—especially in works intended for a broader public—thus may contribute to the shaping of new ideological orientations. Even a cursory look at changing social science terminology shows us that the influence is not one way; such common terms in social science discourse as ‘Third World’, ‘Fourth World’ and ‘colonialism’ all originated in the polemic of political combatants. Fieldhouse reminds us that ‘colonialism’ in its present sense of the subjection—political, economic and intellectual—of a non-European people by an alien European or European-derived state acquired this meaning only in the 1950s, as part of the polemic of decolonization. The term was developed and used almost entirely by opponents of colonial rule in the struggle to end it, and hence was necessarily emotive (1981: 6-7).

The introduction of ‘internal colonialism’ into the social science vocabulary in the 1960s needs to be seen in the context of widespread acceptance of the then pejorative connotations of ‘colonialism’. The two Mexicans who first used the term—Gonzalez-Casanova (1965) and Stavenhagen (1965)—were both explicitly critical of the situation they so “named.” Likewise, adoption of ‘colonial’ terminology to label Canadians’ relations to their own indigenous minority has had the effect of

telling us that colonialism is not just a term for something rather nasty the British and French did in Africa and Asia, about which we can feel morally superior, but applies equally to something we did and are still doing in Canada. This process of naming, thus emphasizing similarities inevitably imbues the newly recategorized situation with the negative connotations that had come to be attached to recently ended colonial empires. Changing social science usage, I suggest, has been both a product of, and in its own small way has fed back into, the changing ideological climate noted in previous sections.

However, this emphasis on similarities has gone so far that ‘colonial’ terminology is losing both polemical effect and analytic utility. Can we not preserve the sense of common historical roots, yet pay greater attention to differences in outcomes?

Wolf, in his recent study (1982) of Western expansion, avoids ‘colonial’ terminology altogether. Perhaps social scientists should follow his example. If, on the other hand, the ‘colonial’ rubric fills a need for a general term highlighting the common origins of certain situations, a framework such as the one sketched here may help spell out differences more specifically.

Handling the primary phases of colonizing processes—those where a Western power maintains formal political control over a geographically separate dependency—poses few terminological problems. The modification suggested here of categories presently in scholarly use—entrepôts/military bases, colonies of administration, settler colonies/tropical pattern and settler colonies/temperate—appear to cover all or almost all cases. The distinction between the latter two is not only one of latitude; it depends mainly on the source of labour: indigenous and/or imported in the first case, provided by settlers themselves in the second.

Terminology becomes more problematic when we are dealing with situations that remain somehow ‘colonial’ yet are contained within an independent nation-state. The internal colonialism rubric has not only been grossly over-extended, but also obscures critical differences. As for the over-extension, Wolpe (1975), Bee and Gingerich (1977) and Beckett (1982) have attempted to restore some rigor to the concept. Beckett (ibid.: 132) defines an internal colony as “a region or enclave which is exploited and controlled from without through a set of distinctive institutions. One of these institutions is a body of doctrines stating the difference between the colonized and the colonizers, usually in terms of ethnicity or race, but also by reference to religion or cultivation.” Presumably his “distinctive institutions” correspond to the “colonial structures”

which Bee and Gingerich insist must be present to merit the appellation 'internal colonialism'. That is, they wish to restrict the term to situations where a geographically defined region or regions with a population defined as markedly different from the "colonizers" is administered through distinct specialized institutions, such as departments of "native affairs".

Even when restricted in this manner, however, the 'internal colony' concept still lumps together cases, such as South Africa, where the "internally colonized" population provides an essential part of the labour force for the national economy, and those where indigenous labour has become redundant. This lumping together obscures the nature of exploitation. 'Colonialism' and 'exploitation' have become so linked in everyday thought that it seems a contradiction in terms to suggest that ongoing exploitation is not inherent in all forms of internal colonialism. However, if 'exploitation' is to have its classic meaning of the appropriation of surplus either in the production process (as with wage labour) or in the sphere of circulation (as with peasantized producers), then internal minorities that have become surplus to the labour force are no longer exploited *in this sense*. Ironically, as the productive economic activities of a remnant encapsulated population decline and their *relative* impoverishment increases, their rate of exploitation in this sense also declines. The results of labour exploitation and labour redundancy may sometimes look the same—relative poverty—but the processes should not be confused. Exploitation through appropriation of the indigenes' land, whether by treaty or direct seizure, is a different process requiring different tasks from the colonizing state, with different consequences for the colonized. If 'exploitation' is to be used with analytic rather than emotive intent, these forms should be carefully distinguished. Failure to do so is one major reason why models drawn from the colonial experience of Africa and Asia fit poorly when applied to small enclaves of remnant indigenes within modern capitalist welfare states.

'Internal colonialism', by failing to distinguish differing economic relations between colonizers and colonized, also fails to point to significant differences in the tasks faced by the state. Control of a numerically large and economically essential indigenous labour force, whether it be involved in wage-labour or peasant production, differs greatly from the custodial/assimilative tasks needed for a tiny under-or unemployed remnant within a modern capitalist state. For this reason, it is especially misleading to treat South Africa as a typical situation of internal colonialism. South

Africa's dependence on the African majority to provide labour for both its farms and its advanced capitalist sector makes it a unique intermediate form, with features of both the tropical and temperate settler patterns. Its African population has available the power of numbers and the potential for sabotage, boycott and violence, as had their now independent fellow Africans to the north. The 'internal' adjective highlights the absence of a metropolitan state imposing itself between settlers and colonized, as happened in Algeria and Kenya. But, as Adam and Giliomee have argued (1979: 50-56), the colony/decolonization trajectory followed by other tropical settler colonies cannot be repeated in South Africa.

'Internal colonialism' shares with 'Fourth World' (see below) a weakness common to all categorizations based primarily on ethnicity: the tendency to obscure class differentiation *within* the ethnic categorization (*cf.* Wolpe 1975) and the relation of this class differentiation to interaction with elements of the dominant society. With care, however, this tendency can be offset by explicit attention to the interaction of class and ethnicity, as Wolpe (*ibid.*), Stavenhagen (1965), Bee and Gingerich (1977) and Beckett (1982) have in different ways argued.

The 'internal colonialism' concept also fails to direct our attention to differences in the nature of the state. Dyck (1985) demonstrates that fruitful generalizations can be made about the dynamics of relations between tiny encapsulated aboriginal minorities and liberal democratic capitalist states, but he says these generalizations may not hold true for states of other kinds. At the level of supra-national relations among indigenous peoples, Sanders has reported that at the founding congress of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, the experience of Indian delegates from Latin America was found to be remarkably uniform but, in many respects, quite different from that of indigenous peoples within liberal democracies (quoted in Dyck, *ibid.*: 23).

Clearly, 'internal colonialism' is too loose a concept for fruitful comparative work. 'Fourth World' has emerged as a rubric for generalizations about a narrower range of situations which may (or may not) fall within the broad internal colonialism category. The range of the new term is not yet clear, and two of its main proponents have recommended rather different strategies for its use. Graburn says "... it applies to all forms of internal colonialism of autochthonous people—usually minorities—who still exist without political autonomy within modern nation-states" (1981: 67). He recognizes that 'Fourth World' has spread into

anthropology from the political discourse of such minorities, but wants to define it precisely for use as a scholarly category. His recommended defining features include: minority status, relative powerlessness, a special, often a spiritual relationship to their traditional lands, from which they have not been (far) removed, an emically perceived “ethnic” difference between the minority group and the majority of the nation, and a special socio-economic relationship to the modern nation in which they are a part (ibid.: 69-70). Substantively, Graburn includes in his Fourth World category the Indians and Eskimos of Canada and the U.S.A., the Maori, the Australian aborigines, the Lapps and some Africans plus the Ainu, tribal groups in India, the Indian peoples of Central and South America, the minorities of the USSR and some of the people of New Guinea. Graburn’s listing usefully highlights the fact that the process of Western overseas expansion, to which the present paper has been restricted, is not the only expansionary process to encapsulate aboriginal minorities. It is a thoroughly “etic” approach, delineating a category into which outside analysts can place peoples whether or not they or their leaders have even heard the term. But, as he recognizes, there is inevitable ambiguity over cases falling at the classificatory boundary. Are the Welsh Fourth World? How about tribal peoples in Taiwan and China? Which Africans and why? Only time and more work can show whether this categorization will yield fruitful generalizations spanning, say, tribal peoples in India, minorities in the USSR and aboriginal peoples within liberal democracies. In addition, Graburn’s usage competes with an alternative meaning that seems to be gaining ground—Fourth World as the poorest of the poor Third World nations—which compounds rather than clarifies overlapping terminology.

Dyck, on the other hand, prefers to treat ‘Fourth World’ as limited in both space and time (1985: 21-24). “It is not a term that should be either discarded or employed uncritically as an analytic category. Instead, we should be concerned with the practical use made of it by... [t]he people who today describe themselves as being of the Fourth World.... To our mind, the more interesting question is not, then, who ought to be classified as belonging to the Fourth World but rather, what is being accomplished by whom by means of this operational category?” He suggests it is “a concept produced by a particular historical moment, ...an artifact of the form of welfare colonialism that developed in Western liberal democracies following the Second World War” (ibid.: 23). The notion, he says, involves not so much specified aboriginal societies as complex patterns of *relations* between modern

nation-states and certain categories of people. It appears that he would restrict the term to those situations where at least some of the actors involved use ‘Fourth World’ language. He and his collaborators¹¹ start from a concern with certain kinds of political processes in Canada, Australia and Norway. By focussing on one phase of these political processes, Dyck avoids some of the problems inherent in Graburn’s taxonomic approach but at the cost of leaving us without a clear term by which to group such state-minority relations *prior* the emergence of a Fourth World consciousness. He resorts to the unhelpful phrase ‘quasi-colonial systems’ (ibid.: 9) for this earlier period. Once again, ‘colonial’ language seems both unavoidable, yet unsatisfactory without modification.

The problems here are not merely terminological but reflect anthropologists’ differing struggles to situate adequately the micro-populations we study in the context of the historical processes by which they have become part of the contemporary world-system. Whether the approach suggested here, by highlighting certain key dimensions of variation, could facilitate comparative work remains to be seen. It may help to situate the results of narrower “controlled comparisons” (e.g. Dyck, 1985; Muraturio, 1984) on a wider canvas. This framework was started in an attempt to make sense of both the underlying similarities and the profound differences among my own work on colonialism in East Africa, my colleagues’ work in South Africa and Indian-state relations in Canada, and graduate students’ work in Latin America and on state policies towards the San of Botswana (Watts, 1984). For teaching, the approach has made it possible to show students that the apparently disparate images they see on television—for example, the RCMP gently arresting Haida elders using civil disobedience in the struggle for control of Lyell Island in British Columbia and the police turning whips and guns on rioting young Blacks in South Africa—are linked; these scenes are different consequences of a common process of colonization that became internal colonization, and the differences can be explained.

This approach is *not* an attempt to recommend new terminology. To distinguish the situation of native peoples in Chile as an “outcome of a settler colony/temperate pattern with authoritarian state” and that of native peoples in Canada, the U.S.A. and Australia as “the result of settler colony/temperate pattern with liberal democratic states” may be precise but is certainly clumsy, and is unlikely to catch on. Clearer terms will only emerge as a result of felt needs by those actively struggling

to deepen understanding of the wider relations enveloping those we study.

Summary

The proliferation of 'colonial' terminology within anthropology during the last thirty years seems to represent one attempt to come to grips with the broader interconnections of our units of study. While this period of aggregation of diverse situations under 'colonial' rubrics has been useful, further advance requires greater concern for differentiation of outcomes. One way of approaching that goal has been suggested here. Ultimately we need to go beyond the Western expansion to which this paper has been limited, and attempt to include within our analytic frameworks other expansionary processes as well.¹²

We could, at the same time, reflect on the broader implications of the sources, adoption and spread of categorizations within social science (cf. Barnett and Silverman, 1979). This is not a plea for development of a rarified, purely scholarly language uncontaminated by ideological overtones; in my view such a language is not only undesirable but impossible. Whether we as individuals take part in their struggles, as anthropologists studying colonized or once-colonized peoples, we are simultaneously observers of the social drama (or tragedy) of their lives, and very minor contributors to the scripts. By our acts of 'naming' we are helping in a small way to shape how others perceive the peoples we study. We cannot escape this ideological role; we can be self-reflexive about it.

NOTES

1. This paper is the response of an Africanist to symposia organized by Noel Dyck on the "politics of representation of the fourth world." An earlier version was delivered in the symposium, "The fourth world: relations between minority indigenous peoples and nation-states" at the International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences, Vancouver, B.C., August 1983. I am grateful for the intellectual stimulus of discussions with participants at all three symposia, to Noel Dyck for his encouragement, and to him, Heribert Adam and George Speck for helpful comments on earlier drafts. Research on the colonial experience of Uganda was supported by a doctoral fellowship from the (former) Canada Council and by a President's Research Grant from Simon Fraser University.

2. Unfortunately this usage, to refer to indigenous minorities within nation-states, is in competition with 'Fourth World' used by Horowitz (1982: 3-6, 68) and others to distinguish extremely poor, under-developed states from other "Third World" states.

3. For a comprehensive account by an anthropologist, see Wolf (1982). Fieldhouse (1966), an earlier, more orthodox survey, remains useful.

4. For a general review, see Thornton (1965). Hanke (1949) remains useful for early Spanish ideology. Studies continue to multiply on changing patterns of European beliefs about those they colonized; for a sampling, see Curtin (1964) on Africa, Hutchins (1967) on India, Berkhofer (1978) and Chamberlin (1975) on North America.

5. A number of these "successor states" that emerged as a result of the decolonization process also encapsulate indigenous distinct minorities, e.g. the San of Botswana, Pygmies in Zaire, tribal peoples in India. Interestingly, it is not customary to apply 'internal colony' terminology to such relations within so-called "Third World" states.

6. Dyck has pointed out that even economic rationality needs to be qualified because the fur trade created social and economic interests in Indian survival that continued to be influential until very recent times.

7. These dilemmas, and the moral and political impossibility within Canadian conditions of resolving them through a "final solution," are summed up in a "joke" that became a minor political *faux pas*. Senator Richard Donahoe reportedly remarked to a Newfoundland colleague during Senate committee hearings into a proposed constitutional amendment on aboriginal rights, "Wouldn't it be simpler if they did just what they did in Newfoundland and shot them all?". Senator Donahoe later told reporters he was teasing his Newfoundland friend and of course he meant the remark as a joke. The Minister for Indian Affairs condemned the remark, but did not ask for the senator's resignation as deputy chairman of the committee (Vancouver Sun, September 21 and 22, 1983).

8. For useful reviews of the debate, see Jessop (1977); Holloway and Picciotto (1978). Ziemann and Lanzendorfer (1977) discuss the debate about the colonial and post-colonial state in peripheral societies. On the colonial state, my thinking has been influenced by Berman and Lonsdale (1980) and unpublished papers by Bruce Berman.

9. Considerable attempts were made, through education, imperial pomp and public rituals, and the award of honours, to convert chiefs, colonial employees of the state and the emerging educated elements into loyal subjects of the Empire. However, these attempts could not effectively reach the vast mass of rural colonized.

10. See the case studies in Dyck (1985). Paine's concept (1985) of 'ethnodrama' is especially apposite to recent Canadian events.

11. Harvey Feit, Basil Sansom, Jeremy Beckett, Sally Weaver, Douglas Sanders, Robert Paine.

12. Ideally, further work would also eliminate the need for such crude heuristic devices as Fig. 1. Such static typologies are of limited value for handling what are essentially processes in time.

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