Abstracts
Résumé
Dans cet article, je considère l’influence possible des recherches récentes sur les attitudes en psychologie sociale, principalement dans le paradigme des théories des processus duaux [dual process theories], sur notre compréhension de la responsabilité. La thèse que je soutiens est que certaines révisions à notre façon de comprendre la responsabilité et nos pratiques d’attribution de la responsabilité pourraient être justifiées par ces travaux. Avant de présenter les révisions que j’introduis, je décris les grandes lignes du paradigme que j’utiliserai, soit celui des théories processus duaux tel qu’appliqué aux attitudes. Puis, m’inspirant de Vargas (2004, 2005), je présente les différentes formes que peuvent prendre le révisionnisme. Parce que ces révisions s’appliquent à des notions qui sont utilisées à la fois par le commun des mortels et par les philosophes (qui tentent soit de les reconstruire rationnellement, soit de les modifier), je présente ce que l’on présume que pense chacun des groupes sur la question. Finalement, je présente trois révisions, plutôt « locales », que ces travaux pourraient inspirer.
Abstract
In this paper, I want to consider the possible influence of recent research in social psychology about attitudes — more precisely in the dual process paradigm — on our comprehension of responsibility. The thesis I want to defend is that this body of work could inspire a certain number of revisions to our way of understanding responsibility. Before introducing these revisions, I describe, in broad strokes, the empirical paradigm of dual process as applied to attitudes. Then, in order to be clear about the kind of revisions that I will propose, I present Vargas’ taxonomy of revisionism (2004, 2005). Because revisions are applied to notions that are used both by folks and philosophers (that present their theories as reconstructions of common sense), I present what each group thinks of responsibility. Finally, I present three revisions — mostly local revisions —that theories of dual attitudes could inspire.
Appendices
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