Abstracts
Abstract
Interconnectedness among insurers and reinsurers at a global level is not well understood and may pose a significant risk to the sector, with implications for the macroeconomy. Models of the complex interactions among reinsurers and with other participants in the financial system and the real economy are at a very early stage of development. Parts of the market remain opaque to both regulators and market participants, particularly the counterparty arrangements among reinsurers through retrocession agreements. The authors create several plausible networks to model these relationships, each consistent with the financial statement data of the reinsurer. These networks are stress-tested under a series of severe but plausible catastrophic-loss scenarios. This analysis contributes to the literature by (i) applying a network-model approach common in the banking literature to the insurance industry; (ii) assessing the interconnections among reinsurers through potential claims rather than premiums; and (iii) investigating the most opaque part of the global insurance market, namely, counterparty arrangements among global reinsurers (retrocession). The authors find that contagion in the global reinsurance market is plausible and that the size of the potential market disruption is sensitive to (i) the distribution of risk among counterparties, (ii) the trigger for financial distress, (iii) the time horizon for claims resolution and (iv) the degree of loss netting. The findings suggest that further study of industry practices in these four areas would improve our ability to assess risk in the insurance sector and promote financial stability.
Keywords:
- Bank classification,
- Financial stability,
- Financial system regulation and policies,
- Financial institutions,
- Financial services
Résumé
L’interdépendance entre assureurs et réassureurs à l’échelle mondiale n’est pas bien comprise, peut présenter un risque important pour le secteur et avoir des incidences macroéconomiques. Les modèles des relations complexes qui existent entre les réassureurs et d’autres acteurs du système financier et de l’économie réelle en sont aux balbutiements. Des segments du marché demeurent opaques pour les autorités de réglementation et les participants. C’est en particulier le cas des accords de contrepartie qui, chez les réassureurs, prennent la forme de contrats de rétrocession. Pour modéliser ces relations complexes, les auteurs créent plusieurs réseaux plausibles, chacun étant cohérent avec les données des états financiers des réassureurs. Ces réseaux sont soumis à des tests de résistance fondés sur des scénarios de pertes extrêmes mais vraisemblables. L’apport de cette analyse au corps de travaux existants est triple : a) elle applique à l’industrie de l’assurance la méthode des modèles de réseau communément utilisée dans les recherches sur le secteur bancaire ; b) elle évalue la présence de liens croisés entre réassureurs non à l’aide des primes mais des réclamations potentielles ; c) l’attention est portée sur le segment le plus opaque du marché mondial de l’assurance, à savoir les accords de contrepartie entre réassureurs internationaux (rétrocession). Les auteurs font deux constats : la contagion est plausible au sein du marché mondial de la réassurance, et l’ampleur des pertes en cas de perturbation dépend a) de la distribution des risques parmi les contreparties ; b) de l’événement déclencheur de difficultés financières ; c) du délai de règlement des réclamations et d) du degré de compensation multilatérale des expositions. Ces constats tendent à montrer qu’une étude approfondie des pratiques sectorielles dans ces quatre domaines permettrait d’améliorer l’évaluation des risques dans le secteur de l’assurance et de favoriser la stabilité financière.
Mots-clés :
- Classification de la Banque,
- Stabilité financière,
- Réglementation et politiques relatives au système financier,
- Institutions financières,
- Services financiers
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Appendices
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