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arms and untrained, rebellion was not a sensible option. As long as hope for survival through submission could be maintained, then submission was more reasonable than suicidal revolt. Military action became an option only after the mass deportations of 1942, when there were left in the Ghetto very few women, almost no old people or children, few of the weak and sick, against whom reprisals would have been directed earlier. It occurred when no other policy made sense. Moreover, it could only have come about when the ground for it had been prepared. Claiming otherwise, as Gutman shows, is to misunderstand the political, military, and psychological developments that precede the declaration of war. In this respect as in so many others, Warsaw's Jews were human.

Yet another fiction laid to rest by Gutman is that the Ghetto inmates received substantial aid and encouragement from friendly Polish gentiles. There was wide knowledge in Warsaw and elsewhere in Poland of the extraordinary suffering of the Jews; and there was much that could have been done to help. Only a few bothered to try. Many Poles actually abetted the Germans' efforts. In the early days of the occupation the Polish Welfare Council supplied a list of Jews converted to Catholicism to the authorities sealing their fate. Once the deportations began, it was not uncommon for Poles to deliver letters allegedly from the deportees to their relatives in the Ghetto, and to receive money and supplies which they promised to deliver to the deportees, whom they knew to be dead. During the preparations for the Ghetto uprising, the Polish underground movements were not forthcoming with arms or very helpful in training the Jewish recruits. (The Communists were an exception, but they were still weak and ill supplied themselves and had little to share. Moreover, they were seeking to relieve the German pressure on Russia; and the Ghetto was a potential "second front.") Once the revolt began and the needs of the rebels became clear, the Home Army, the largest and best equipped of the underground groups, relented. Out of its arsenal of some 25,000 rifles, 6,000 revolvers, 30,000 grenades, and an unspecified number of heavy weapons, the Army turned over to the Jewish Fighting Organization 59 revolvers and a quantity of grenades and explosive materials. Gutman was able to find no proof that the Polish groups ever gave serious thought to the task of defending the Ghetto or of rescuing its survivors. Even during the revolt popular opinion in "Aryan" Warsaw remained largely unsympathetic — even antipathetic — towards the Jews. In point of fact, the Germans appeared to be fulfilling the aims of the pre-war Polish government, which had sought the exclusion of Jews from the country's economic, social, and political life. Not a few Poles were doubly pleased by the uprising in the Ghetto. The hated Germans got a comeuppance; and, at the same time, the Jewish presence in Warsaw was eliminated.

*The Jews of Warsaw* is well written and smoothly translated, the occasional, inevitable lapse notwithstanding. It is surprisingly easy to keep the many unfamiliar names of

people and organizations straight, although an explanation in English of the various groups listed in the abbreviations table would be welcome. The sober prose and the cold analysis of events and documents evokes surprising passion and anger in the reader, leaving one more knowledgeable but no more comprehending. One is left, too, with nostalgic longing for an era when people could believe, as did so many of Warsaw's Jews, even in 1942, that mass murder was unimaginable, especially in the midst of a major metropolitan centre in the heartland of western "civilization."

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The origins of *Structure and Mobility: The Men and Women of Marseille 1820-1870* lie in a brilliant insight by William Sewell nearly twenty years ago. While doing research in Marseille concerning workers' involvement in the Revolution of 1848, he recognized that one source he consulted, *the actes de mariage* opened the possibility of a whole other project — a quantitative analysis of the social structure of Marseille during a period of rapid economic, demographic, and social change. *The actes de mariage*, which many other historians had cited but not exploited, list the names, ages, addresses, and birthplaces of the bride and groom, as well as the names, occupations, and addresses of their fathers and of the four witnesses. Moreover, the spouses and witnesses signed the document, if they were capable of signing — the basic test of literacy. Sewell supplemented these unique documents with census records and a wide range of secondary materials, but the original insight was crucial. The result is an exquisite social portrait of an urban society over a half-century. The approach is unabashedly historical but one informed by the latest social scientific models, quantitative methods, urban history, and Sewell's own related publications concerning workers' organisations and *mentalités*. The footnotes and bibliography attest to the wide learning the author brings to bear.

The book is divided into two parts. The first, which is the more general, may be of greater interest to those urban historians who have only a passing interest in France. That section discusses demographic, economic, occupational, and neighbourhood patterns of Marseille; it concentrates on the period 1820-1870 but puts that period into the historical setting of the evolution of the city and also compares the development of Marseille to that of other European cities of the time. The second part analyses in great detail migration

patterns into Marseille and mobility within it. It compares patterns of mobility between city-born and among a variety of occupational and status groups, and examines crime and literacy statistics for the different groups. Each chapter deserves more careful attention than a short review can indicate.

Any book as ambitious, imaginative, and innovative as *Structure and Mobility* is, will engender some controversy. Although I regard it as one of the most important books ever published concerning an urban society, I have serious reservations about some of the conclusions. The first has simply to do with a tone. Why use Chevalier as a straw man thirty years after the fact? Both historians and social scientists have demonstrated that Chevalier's notion of pathological disorder resulting from migration was an exaggerated one. Yet Sewell himself discovers high urban mortality, higher crime rates among immigrants, and increasing social tension as Marseille experienced sudden growth (as Paris had earlier). Those findings are not inconsistent with Chevalier's more moderate points.

Far more important is the decision about what statistical procedures to pursue. Sewell's purpose is admirable: "to convey to my reader these vivid details of social experience [rather] than make a precise test of causal hypotheses". But one can employ sophisticated statistical methods, even formulae as Sewell does on occasion (p. 355, fn. 4), without letting them intrude on clear prose.

Although the book is statistically sound, it is not statistically sophisticated. We encounter firm numbers, reasonable adjustments for vagaries in the evidence (data are seldom perfect), percentages (notably in chapter 8) that are based on a handful of cases and statistically insignificant (9% may be three times 3% but that difference is meaningless for six cases versus two within what is already a sample). These appear in tables as if they had the same significance. Whatever cautions are mentioned, they are easily forgotten amidst the plethora of tables. Statistical formulae could have helped assess the relative strengths of occupation, literacy, birthplace, etc. Without such assessment the separate tables based on a single factor have diminished authority. Most worrisome about the lack of sophisticated statistical methods (like log-linear models for mobility) is that generalizations about

particular groups depend on samples that retain little or no statistical significance. Methodological choices affect some of Sewell's conclusions. For example, the description of mobility patterns for particular groups and some of the differences described for natives and immigrants, based on a small number of cases, might not be sustained under vigorous statistical examination. Despite the tables, the evidence is often impressionistic. A major conclusion is that mobility in Marseille occurred because of changes in the macrostructure rather than because of equalization of opportunity. But there is no evaluation of the relative chances of different groups (as in J.H. Goldthorpe, *Social Mobility and Class Structure in Modern Britain*). Although the author (p. 268) shows that literacy of immigrants was the most important factor until 1850 and that the macrostructure was crucial only after 1850, in other places (pp. 10-11) he mentions only the macrostructure.

Despite my reservations about one or another interpretation, *Structure and Mobility* is a powerful book. With the possible exception of Stephen Thernstrom's *The Other Bostonians: Poverty and Progress in the American Metropolis 1880-1970*, no other book has analysed an urban society so thoroughly and so well. Professor Sewell demonstrates conclusively that the macrostructure provided more possibilities for mobility than did any democratization of society, that Marseille became more and more subject to the national economy, that migratory patterns increased in both volume and distance, that women's mobility, achievable only by marriage for nearly all, was greater than men's, and that mobility was common. Marseille was a fluid society, with people attempting to hold on to the past but also accommodating rather well to new social-economic circumstances.

Professor Sewell has written a model of urban social structure. His focus is Marseille of 1820-1870, but his insights should be of value to scholars from many disciplines. It is one of those rare books that will both inform the profession and encourage it to ask new questions.

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