

Collective Bargaining Perspectives La négociation collective : quelques perspectives

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Résumé de l'article

INTRODUCTION

Nous tenterons, dans le présent article de faire ressortir ce que nous considérons les facteurs importants dans notre système de négociation collective, facteurs pertinents à la discussion des structures syndicales.

LE CONTEXTE SOCIO-ÉCONOMIQUE

- L'implication de plus en plus grande du public dans l'établissement des buts de la société ;
- La société canadienne en est une d'opulence;
- Nous vivons dans une société caractérisée par de rapides changements dans la technologie, l'économique et l'édifice social de notre nation ;
- Depuis six ans, nous avons connu une période de prospérité sans précédent accompagnée d'augmentation des prix et des coûts ;
- Notre système de sécurité sociale représente un mêli-mélo de programmes publics et privés.

LES PARTIS DANS LE SYSTÈME DE NÉGOCIATION COLLECTIVE

Même si la CSN semble exercer un plus grand contrôle sur ses affiliés que le CTC, on peut se demander si chacune de ces organisations agit sur et au nom de leurs affiliés de façon suffisante pour influencer la direction et l'implantation des politiques et des programmes nationaux dans une société comme la nôtre.

Du côté patronal, on doit noter au départ l'absence d'une organisation nationale représentative de tous les employeurs. Il est alors difficile pour eux de s'exprimer sur la définition des buts dans notre société.

Les 11 gouvernements canadiens ont des idéologies différentes quant au rôle qu'ils doivent jouer dans la négociation collective. Ceci n'est pas sans compliquer la situation d'autant plus que nous faisons face à 11 législations du travail différentes.

LE PROCESSUS DE NÉGOCIATION COLLECTIVE

a) La structure des unités de négociation

Nous définissons unité de négociation comme étant l'unité de prise de décisions qui négocie des changements en termes de conventions collectives ou de nombre de conventions collectives.

Suite à une foule de statistiques, il est possible de conclure qu'il y a peu de négociations collectives impliquant plusieurs syndicats au Canada.

b) Etapes favorables aux ententes

On peut tirer quelques tendances :

- on tend de moins en moins à être d'accord au niveau de la simple négociation ;
- on tend de plus en plus à signer les ententes au niveau de l'intervention du conciliateur et de moins en moins au niveau du « conciliation board ».

c) La durée des conventions

La durée moyenne des conventions collectives a passé de 18.1 mois en 1953 à 28.5 mois en 1966. Cela serait dû aux causes suivantes :

- les employeurs croient à la plus grande probabilité de paix industrielle avec un accord de plus longue durée et peuvent établir avec plus de précision les coûts du facteur travail ;
- les négociations sont devenues tellement complexes que les parties préfèrent les distancer le plus possible ;
- les augmentations de salaires sont plus en plus réparties également sur toute la durée de la convention ;
- après avoir réglé les problèmes tels la sécurité syndicale et les droits de la direction, les parties passent à des accords de plus longue durée.

LES RESULTATS DU SYSTÈME DE NEGOCIATION COLLECTIVE

On remarque des changements substantiels dans les clauses de conventions collectives touchant les salaires, les heures de travail, les congés payés, les jours fériés et les changements technologiques.

CONCLUSION

Résumons les changements que nous considérons comme nécessaires dans notre système de négociation collective.

- Une définition plus explicite de nos objectifs économiques et sociaux et une meilleure organisation pour les atteindre ;
- Un système national de négociation collective doit être conçu et reconnu pour nos industries essentielles nationales ;
- Le nombre des syndicats devrait être réduit graduellement afin de former des syndicats industriels forts ;
- La négociation basée sur la productivité deviendra dominante dans l'avenir.

Collective Bargaining Perspectives

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and

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After an examination of the socio-economic environment within which collective bargaining functions, the authors study the parties involved, the structures of negotiating units, the procedures for resolving conflicting interest disputes. They also present some of the major outputs of the collective bargaining system and formulate a few suggestions about the future functioning of collective bargaining and the role and structures of union and other groups within the system.

Introduction *

« Collective bargaining perspectives » is a very broad and all-encompassing topic which could in itself be the major theme for a two-day conference of this type. Since our paper is to serve as a background paper for an intensive analysis of union structure, we shall attempt, therefore, in a modest way to highlight what we believe to be some of the major factors in our collective bargaining system which have relevance to a discussion of union structure.

We propose to proceed by discussing the following factors :

- 1) the current socio-economic environment within which collective bargaining functions;

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- 2) the parties involved in the collective bargaining process;
- 3) the structure of negotiating units and the procedures for resolving conflicting interest disputes;
- 4) some of the major outputs of the collective bargaining system for which we have empirical data, and;
- 5) some suggestions of a speculative nature about the future functioning of collective bargaining and the role and structure of unions and other groups within the system.

Significant Socio-Economic Environmental Considerations

Since collective bargaining functions within the framework of a complex socio-economic environmental, it is necessary that we discuss some of the major environmental factors affecting the operation of our collective bargaining system. One of the more fundamental environmental factors which will increasingly affect collective bargaining is the growing public commitment to a goal-setting society. The goals of full employment, a high rate of economic growth, reasonable price stability, a viable balance of payments and equitable distribution of rising incomes have become subjects of increasing public discussion and commitment since they were first articulated by the Economic Council of Canada.

The extreme difficulties of harmonizing the policies and coordinating the programs for the attainment of these goals are generally well recognized. Our future progress in achieving our goals will depend in very large measure on our ability to innovate new processes, structures and institutions for creative decision-making. This will involve labour, management and governments in complex inter-relationships that confront, clarify and resolve multi-dimensional conflicts of interest, rights and expectations.

Second, Canadian society has become an affluence-oriented one. We have high aspirations and expectations. This reflects, in part, the demands of a younger and more mobile generation which has grown up in the midst of prosperity and which has not been subject to the hardships of a major depression and the discipline of military service

during a major war. Ours is a society which very reluctantly subordinates individual needs and aspirations to national needs and aspirations.

In this kind of society, there is a need to assert the public interest and to assert it more vigorously in the reconciliation that must take place between public and private interests. There is a need to articulate our social goals at least as clearly as our economic goals, and to get the widespread acceptance, understanding and support for them that is required for effective collaboration between governmental and non-governmental organizations.

Third, we are living in a society characterized by rapid changes in technology, economics, and the social fabric of our nation. Our Institutions, structures and processes, on the other hand, tend to function in the more traditional ways and face a serious challenge to adapt to changing functions. Since we have control over these, we are challenged to create new ones to meet new needs and to adapt to change quickly and decisively. There is also the present challenge to make decentralized decision-making serve national goals, while maintaining the satisfaction of individual freedom and the advantages of local autonomy.

Fourth, during the past six years or so we have experienced an unprecedented period of prosperity accompanied by increasing prices and costs. In order to compete in international markets, particularly as the Kennedy round tariff changes progressively go into effect, we must improve our productive efficiency and keep our prices and costs under control in order to maintain the competitive advantages that we now enjoy. Finance Minister Benson, speaking in Montreal recently, termed inflation as Canada's major problem and proposed a wage-price review board as part of the solution to the problem. He stated that the board's opinions would also serve as a « guide to the direction of future tariff or tax changes. »¹

Finally, our social security system comprises a patchwork of overlapping public and private programs. Consequently, a change in any public program has a significant impact on our collective bargaining system. You will recall the problems which arose over negotiated pension plans when the Canada Pension Plan was introduced.

These are but a few of the many important environmental factors which have affected, and which will continue to affect, our collective

(1) FRANK HOWARD, « Benson Terms Inflation Canada's Major Problems », *Globe and Mail*, May 25, 1968, p. B1.

bargaining system. Let us now turn to a discussion of the parties in collective bargaining.

The Parties in the Collective Bargaining System

The major parties in any collective bargaining system are labour, management, and governments — the latter representing the public interest. We shall look at each of these but briefly.

At the beginning of 1967, union membership in Canada stood at 1,921,000; this represented 32.3 percent of the non-agricultural paid workers in Canada and 26.1 percent of the total labour force. Membership in unions affiliated with the CLC totalled 1,451,000 and there were 198,000 in CNTU affiliates. A recent estimate by our Labour Organizations Division suggests that if teachers, nurses, provincial civil servants, and police (all of whom are engaged in some form of collective bargaining) are added, the total would currently be about 2.4 million. This would represent about 40 percent of the non-agricultural paid workers and 33 percent of the overall labour force. With this degree of organization, trade unionism represents a significant potent force in our country.

Union membership figures do not tell the whole story, however. Equally important — if not more so — is the structure of unions which is the main theme of this two-day conference. There are 110 international unions in Canada, 93 of which are affiliated with the CLC. In addition, there are 55 national unions, 20 of which are affiliated with the CLC and 13 with the CNTU. The affiliates of both central labour bodies are fairly autonomous organizations. Although the CNTU appears to exercise more control over its affiliates than does the CLC, a crucial question is whether either of the two central bodies speaks for, and exercise sufficient control over its affiliates to influence the direction and implementation of national policies and programs in a goal-setting society. The problem may be further compounded by the fact that most of the CLC affiliates are parts of international unions with headquarters in the United States. In addition, the local unions of international unions operating in Canada exercise considerable autonomy.

For example, if the federal government should proceed with what Mr. Benson calls a «selective prices and incomes policy,»² what functions can and will labour organizations play in setting the precise

(2) *Ibid.*

goals for this policy and assisting in its implementation? Assuming that the central labour bodies, along with management and government, can agree upon a policy, do the central labour bodies have sufficient authority over their affiliates and the thousands of local unions across Canada to implement such a policy? We have no ready answer to this question, but we do suggest that compliance with such a policy must be based more on rewards than on sanctions. If workers are going to be asked to be restrained in their money wage demands, they will need other compensations or assurances with respect to their real income gains.

Let us now turn to the two other parties in our collective bargaining system management and government. As you know, there is no one management organization in Canada which speaks for all employers. We have the Canadian Chamber of Commerce, the Canadian Manufacturers Association and numerous industry associations, but none of these speaks authoritatively for all employers. If Professor John Porter's claim that our « political system leaves the definition of major goals — and therefore the power — to the corporate elite. »³ certainly « the corporate elite » does not define our major goals through any central organization. While the theme of this conference is on union structure, we should realize that the structure of management is relevant to an adequate examination of union structure. Experience in countries as diverse in their labour and management structures as Canada and Sweden indicates that the structure of one is largely a mirror of the other.

Finally, on the government side, we have eleven political jurisdictions in Canada which greatly influence the shape of, and create extensive diversity in, our collective bargaining system. Specification of what constitutes the proper role of government in collective bargaining varies according to the ideological orientations of the various governments, and it is not at all uncommon to find different public policy approaches to the same problem. It is our contention that this diversity complicates collective bargaining in our major national industries such as steel, pulp and paper, and meat packing, and gives rise to many problems which we would not have in the absence of such legislative and administrative diversity.

(3) *Maclean's*, June 1968, p. 54.

The last time that constitutional jurisdiction over labour-management relations received serious attention at the political level was in 1946. Since that time our economy has become more highly diversified and interdependent, both of which are essential for efficiency, growth and viability. As our politicians proceed with their discussions on revising our constitution, we would hope that they will once more give this subject serious consideration. We suggest this because of the major and increasing responsibility that the federal government has for other aspects of our national economic life, and also because of our knowledge of what is *de facto* taking place in multi-provincial bargaining in industries which presently fall under provincial jurisdiction for collective bargaining purposes.

Let us now turn to a discussion of the process of collective bargaining.

The Process of Collective Bargaining

This part of our paper is based on some of the data from our « Structure of Collective Bargaining » study which includes all negotiating units (excluding those in the construction industry) covering 500 or more employees for the period 1953 to the 2nd quarter of 1966. This study has been underway for several years now and we hope to complete it this summer.

The first thing we would like to discuss in this context is the structure of negotiating units. We define the negotiating unit as the decision-making unit which negotiates changes in the terms of a collective agreement or a number of collective agreements. As you will see from Tables 1 and 2, we use a typology including eight types. Table 1 gives a percentage breakdown by type while Table 2 gives the percentage of employees covered by each type for any given year.

Comparing Tables 1 and 2, we find that the single establishment-single union type comprise about 55 percent of all negotiating units, but covers only about a third of the employees in our study. The multi establishment-single union type accounts for approximately 20 percent of all negotiating units and just slightly less than 20 percent of the employees. Although single company negotiating units comprise slightly over 80 percent of all negotiating units, they include only about 60 percent of all employees covered by the study.

While multi company-multi union negotiating units comprise about 1 percent of the negotiating units, they currently include about 14 percent of the employees. The drop from 30 percent to 14 percent of employees covered by this type between 1953 and 1965 is explained largely by decreasing employment on the railroads which are included in this category. While the employer association-single union category accounts for about 11 percent of all negotiating units, it includes about 15 percent of all employees. On the whole, the tables show that multi employer and employer association bargaining account for 20 percent of negotiating units and cover about 40 percent of the employees in the study.

The tables also indicate that there is little multi union bargaining in Canada. The most notable exceptions to this general statement include the railways and the pulp and paper industry.

We now turn to another aspect of the collective process, namely the stages at which settlements were reached. Table 3 gives a breakdown by percentage distribution of employees for the years 1953 — 2nd quarter 1966. While the figures vary somewhat from year to year, there appears to be a number of emerging trends. First, there appears to be a decreasing tendency to settle at the bargaining stage. Second, there appears to be an increasing tendency to settle at the conciliation officer stage and a decreasing tendency to reach a settlement at the conciliation board stage. The latter development probably reflects in part the de-emphasizing of conciliation boards in some of the provinces. Post-conciliation settlements have increased and settlements reached during the course of strikes show a modest upward trend.

Let us now take a look at the duration of agreements. Table 4 gives the average length of agreements weighted by employees, and indicates that on the average the length of agreements has increased from 18.1 months in 1953 to 28.5 months in the first half of 1966. Table 5 shows some interesting developments by employee coverage. For example, in 1953 the 1-year agreement covered about 63 percent of the employees in the study, whereas the 3-year agreement covered only a little over 1 percent of the employees. In 1965, however, only 15 percent of employees were covered by 1-year agreements while about 39 percent of employees were covered by collective agreements of 3 years or more. The 2-year agreement reached a peak in 1964 and has subsequently declined as the 3-year agreement has become more predominant. The last column of Table 5 shows that the percentage of employees covered

by multi-year agreements increased from 36.1 percent in 1953 to nearly 85 percent in 1965.

There are a number of factors which may account for the increasing length of agreements. First, long-term agreements may give the employer some assurance of « labour peace » for the duration of the agreement and allow him to budget for labour costs with greater precision. Secondly, there are so many items now covered by collective agreements that both parties may prefer to undertake negotiations less frequently than they did when agreements were relatively simple documents. Third, earlier long-term agreements provided for the major part of wage increases in the first year of the agreement whereas in recent years, wage increases are spread more evenly over the life of the agreement. This, we suggest, offers a greater incentive for employees to accept long-term agreements. Finally, in the early stages of a bargaining relationship, there are many conflicts over principles and rights, including union security and management's rights. Only after these basic issues are resolved or satisfactory accommodations are made, will the parties to the bargaining relationship move toward longer term agreements.

With this brief discussion of the process of our collective bargaining system, let us now turn to a brief discussion of a few of the outputs of the system.

The Outputs of the Collective Bargaining System

First, let us examine briefly the behaviour of wages over the period 1953 — 1st quarter 1968. Table 6 presents average annual percentage changes in *base rates* for all negotiating units covering 500 or more employees by signing quarter and by signing year. The table shows that the first peak occurred in 1957 when the annual rate was 6.7 percent. This peak was not exceeded until 1966 and 1967 when average annual percentage changes were 8.0 and 8.6 percent respectively.

The highest average rate occurred in 1967 at a time when the economy was undergoing mild adjustments. The third and fourth quarter figures for 1967 and the first quarter figure for 1968 suggest that we might well be entering a period of lower wage increases in the months ahead.

The figures in Table 6 also indicate that wages tend to lag behind fluctuations in business activity. This was true, for example, in 1957

which was a recession year but also a year in which average annual base rate increases reached a peak, following the boom years of 1955-56. Also, during the present prolonged expansion, wage increases lagged well behind the upturn in business activity.

Over the 13½ years, the average base rate in Canada for those covered by the study increased by 63.8 percent for an average yearly increase of 4.7 percent. During the same period, the consumer price index rose by 25.5 percent or 1.9 percent per year. Real average annual base rates increased, therefore, by approximately 39 percent, or about 3 percent annually which approximates the average annual increase in productivity over the period.

The figures in Table 6, which show an annual increase of 8 percent in 1966, also indicate quite clearly that the so-called « Pearson formula » of 30 percent over two years in 1966 did not set a pattern which spread uniformly throughout the economy. In fact, settlements in 1966 ranged from 5 percent to 71 percent over the life of the contract. While the seaway settlement may have influenced some subsequent settlements, there is no way of measuring precisely its impact on the economy as a whole. The evidence we do have suggests that it had comparatively little influence.

Another point that should be made is that negotiated wage increases from 1961 to 1965 were relatively moderate in comparison to those of the last two years. For example, those who signed 3-year agreements in 1965 received less than those who signed in 1966 and 1967. Consequently, we should not be too surprised if there are a few instances where rather high demands are made this year. When the 3-year agreements negotiated in 1965 come up for renewal this year, the unions involved and their members may attempt to « catch up » with those who obtained the larger increases in 1966 and 1967.

Although we have not included tables on wage changes by region or by industry, our tables do indicate that over the 13-year period, all regions, with the exception of British Columbia, show remarkably similar increases. This is explained largely by the industrial mix included in our study. However, our preliminary analysis suggests that there may be little uniformity among industries. But, in the automobile, can, steel, logging, meat packing and pulp and paper industries, key settlements within each of these industries tend to form a pattern for the industry as a whole. In some industries, such as pulp and paper, there are two patterns — one in the East and one in the West.

Turning now to hours of work, we find that for Canada as a whole, there has been little change in the average standard work-day, the figure decreasing from 8.2 hours in 1953 to 8.0 hours in 1966. Average hours per week decreased slightly from 41.2 in 1953 to 40.1 in 1966.

Vacation provisions have changed substantially since 1953. Longer vacations with less service requirements have developed progressively over the years. In 1953, for example, about 45 percent of the employees covered by our study had provision for three weeks' vacation whereas 87 percent had such provision in 1966. In 1953, about 12 percent of the employees covered in the study had provision for four weeks' vacation while in 1966 about 70 percent had such provision. While only 2.1 percent of employees had provision for a 5-week vacation in 1953, about 13.6 percent were eligible for 5-weeks in 1966. The service requirements for these vacation provisions will be discussed in our « structure of collective bargaining » study.

More leisure time, therefore, in terms of more paid holidays and improved vacations has been a continuing development in agreements negotiated during the period 1953-1966.

Finally, we wish to discuss collective agreement provisions which provide for adjustment to technological change. In 1967, the Collective Bargaining Division of the Economics and Research Branch conducted a survey of 471 collective agreements, excluding railroads and the construction industry, which made *explicit* reference to technological change. ⁴ Of the 471 agreements, 133 or 28 percent contained explicit technological change clauses. On the average, each agreement contained slightly more than two explicit clauses. The clauses were grouped into five types and were distributed approximately as follows :

	<i>Percent</i>
Advance notice	19
Income maintenance	40
Worker adaptation	19
Employment sharing	2
Joint union-management procedures	20

Income maintenance clauses (which included guaranteed income for specified periods plus severance pay) were the most common. Advance notice of layoff, workers adaptation (which included retraining

(4) Collective Bargaining Division, Economics and Research Branch, Canada Department of Labour, « Response to Technological Change — A Study of Technological Change Provisions Contained in Major Collective Agreements Effective in Canadian Industries », 1967.

and relocation provisions) and joint union-management procedures (which included consultation and negotiation) each represented about 20 percent of the provisions. Employment sharing (which included the reduced work week and early retirement) represented only about 2 percent of the provisions.

Table 7, which is taken from this study, shows a breakdown by industry and number of employees. The wood products industry including pulp and paper had by far the largest number of agreements with explicit technological change provisions. It is our understanding that these provisions were written into the pulp and paper agreements only within the last couple of years, and that the joint agreement on this subject by the Nova Scotia Joint Labour-Management Committee acted as a catalyst for the spread of these provisions in the Eastern part of the industry. It is of interest also that substantially the same kinds of provisions have been included in the pulp and paper agreements on the West coast.

The 133 agreements which make *explicit* reference to technological change provisions understate the many ways in which adjustment to technological change takes place. While such provisions as SUB plans, pension plans, seniority arrangements, etc. were not designed originally to cushion the impact of technological change, there is scattered evidence to suggest that these provisions are being modified and used for this purpose. What we find of interest in the study referred to above, however, is that labour and management in these cases have verbalized their growing concern with the impact of technological change on employees. We would predict that a similar study conducted several years from now would show greater *explicit* reference to technological change provisions.

Some Concluding Observations

In concluding, we would like to state in summary form what we see as some of the major emerging and/or necessary changes in our collective bargaining system.

First, there is need for a more explicit definition of our national economic and social goals and better organization to achieve them. While governments must play a leading role in this development, there is also an essential role for labour, management, consumers and other groups in defining our goals more precisely and in the development or restructuring of their organizations to assist in the implementation of

our national objectives. This will require stronger organizations and a genuine willingness to work together for the good of the whole country. It might also require a shift in the distribution of power to the federal government to give it sufficient authority to plan employment, production and equitable income distribution on a long-term basis.

Second, national systems of collective bargaining must be developed and recognized for our essential national industries. This may require a re-distribution of legislative authority in the industrial relations field. Already multi-provincial bargaining exists in such industries as pulp and paper, meat packing, automobile manufacturing and steel. Present jurisdictional barriers may have to be removed so that in these and other basic industries collective bargaining can take place on a national or multi-provincial basis.

Third, we believe that the number of unions should be reduced gradually to form strong industrial unions. This would require highly responsible and responsive union leaders to protect and safeguard the rights of the various occupational groups within these industrial unions. If such unions did not set up internal procedures to safeguard the democratic rights of their members, then the public authorities might be required to do so. The U.S. Landrum-Griffin Act is a good example of what the public authorities will do where they believe that there has been an abuse of private power. We also believe that stronger national associations of employers are needed for the evolution of improved national policies for the management of industrial and personnel relations. This kind of restructuring would facilitate the development of strong and responsible national systems of collective bargaining which, we believe, would be in the national interest.

Finally, we suggest that productivity bargaining may well become more prevalent in the future. Productivity has always been a factor at the bargaining table, although sometimes inconspicuously. It has been an explicit factor in collective bargaining in the steel industry for years, both in terms of national comparisons and comparisons with the U.S. steel industry. Recently, as you know, it has been an issue in bargaining in the automobile and farm implements industry. The plumbers in Victoria signed an agreement in November 1967 which tied wage increases to increases in the cost of living and in productivity. Canadair in Montreal also signed a « productivity agreement » in 1967. These agreements and the desire on the part of unions to reduce or eliminate geographical differentials in national and international industries will no doubt bring emphasis to productivity bargaining in the years ahead.

TABLE 1

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF NEGOTIATING UNITS ^(a) BY TYPE :
CANADA 1953-1966

<i>Type of Negotiation Unit</i>	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966
Single Company														
Single Establishment,														
Single Union	55.3	54.3	54.4	53.8	55.3	57.4	53.8	54.7	56.4	55.8	56.3	56.2	56.1	58.2
Single Establishment,														
Multi-Union	3.4	2.6	4.4	4.9	4.6	4.6	5.4	5.3	5.1	4.4	4.4	4.5	3.7	5.4
Multi-Establishment,														
Single Union	21.2	22.2	20.8	20.5	20.4	18.4	18.1	19.2	18.9	18.5	17.7	18.4	18.5	15.2
Multi-Establishment,														
Multi-Union	1.9	1.7	3.7	3.6	2.5	2.6	3.1	2.2	2.4	2.3	2.9	2.9	2.9	2.5
Multi Company														
Single Union	3.4	3.4	3.7	4.2	4.3	3.9	5.9	6.4	5.9	6.4	5.9	6.2	6.1	5.7
Multi-Union	1.9	2.6	1.5	1.6	1.2	1.0	0.9	0.6	0.8	1.0	0.7	0.5	0.7	0.3
Employer Association														
Single Union	11.5	12.0	10.6	10.4	10.8	11.2	11.9	10.8	9.8	10.5	11.1	10.5	11.2	11.7
Multi-Union	1.4	1.3	1.1	1.0	0.9	1.0	0.9	0.8	0.8	1.0	1.0	0.8	0.7	0.9
TOTAL ^(b)	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

^(a) Figures are expressed as a percentage of negotiations which have taken place and where the agreements arrived at are in existence on December 31st of each year.

^(b) Column may not add up to 100% due to rounding.

TABLE 2

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYEES ^(a) ACCORDING TO TYPE NEGOTIATING UNIT :
CANADA, 1953-1966

<i>Type of Negotiating Unit</i>	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966
Single Company														
Single Establishment, Single Union	30.8	30.5	32.5	33.2	32.4	33.0	34.3	35.1	34.2	34.3	34.0	33.9	34.3	38.3
Single Establishment, Multi-Union	1.1	1.1	1.1	2.2	2.1	2.1	2.4	2.5	2.4	2.5	2.4	2.7	2.9	4.3
Multi-Establishment, Single Union	19.6	19.4	18.6	20.4	21.2	21.8	20.9	20.0	20.2	21.3	21.8	23.6	22.2	24.1
Multi-Establishment, Multi-Union	1.6	2.0	2.4	2.9	2.7	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.5	2.5	2.7	2.7	3.6	4.2
Multi-Company														
Single Union	1.3	1.3	1.8	2.5	2.5	2.7	4.0	5.5	6.4	6.6	5.6	5.6	5.9	6.8
Multi-Union	29.9	30.0	28.6	24.3	24.3	22.6	19.9	18.0	17.7	16.3	15.9	14.1	14.1	1.1
Employer Association														
Single Union	14.4	14.5	13.8	13.2	13.5	14.2	14.7	15.1	15.0	15.0	16.0	15.8	15.6	19.1
Multi-Union	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.4	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.5	2.0
TOTAL ^(b)	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

^(a) Figures are expressed as a percentage of employees who are covered by collective agreements arrived at by the type of negotiating unit indicated. The agreements are these in existence as of December 31st of each year and arise from negotiation involving 500 or more employees.

^(b) Columns may not add up to 100% due to rounding.

TABLE 3

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYEES ACCORDING TO THE STAGE AT WHICH THEIR
NEGOTIATIONS ENDED : CANADA 1953-1966

<i>Stage</i>	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966
	(a)													
Bargaining	61.6	38.7	62.5	52.1	62.8	30.6	50.3	67.4	32.7	38.2	64.9	27.7	41.7	38.1
Conciliation Officer	2.9	10.0	2.8	2.4	0.9	10.9	9.2	12.7	20.9	16.2	9.2	25.2	22.0	10.3
Conciliation Board	26.6	15.3	28.7	14.0	27.0	19.9	13.2	15.6	8.8	32.4	9.3	8.4	13.3	26.5
Post-Conciliation Bargaining	5.3	1.1	1.5	25.9	2.0	33.5	8.6	2.3	36.4	5.8	11.8	29.3	11.3	10.8
Arbitration	—	30.9	—	—	—	—	0.2	—	—	2.1	1.0	0.9	0.8	0.9
Post-Arbitration Bargaining	—	—	—	—	—	0.1	—	—	—	—	0.2	—	—	—
Strike	1.8	2.6	3.8	5.4	6.8	4.3	9.4	2.0	0.9	4.9	3.6	8.7	9.9	13.5
Post-Strike Bargaining	—	—	0.5	—	—	0.4	9.0	—	—	0.4	—	—	0.7	—
Not Recorded	1.9	1.3	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.2	—	—	0.3	—	—	—	0.3	—

(a) Columns may not add up to 100% due to rounding.

TABLE 4
WEIGHTED AVERAGE LENGTH OF CONTRACTS

<i>Signing Year</i>	<i>Average Length of Contract (months)</i>	<i>Total Number of Employees (^{'000})</i>
1953	18.1	329
1954	18.8	473
1955	16.1	331
1956	23.0	574
1957	18.6	266
1958	21.9	435
1959	22.7	370
1960	21.5	272
1961	22.2	443
1962	24.2	461
1963	25.4	281
1964	25.1	408
1965	27.9	289
1966 *	28.5	139

* To the end of the second quarter of 1966.

TABLE 5
EMPLOYEES COVERED BY NEGOTIATIONS RESULTING IN COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS
CLASSIFIED BY DURATION AND YEAR OF SIGNING
('000)

<i>Year of Signing</i>	<i>Less than 11 Months</i>		<i>11-13 Months</i>		<i>14-22 Months</i>		<i>23-25 Months</i>		<i>26-34 Months</i>		<i>35-37 Months</i>		<i>Greater than 37 Months</i>		<i>Total Employees Covered</i>	<i>Percentage of Employees Covered by Negotiations Resulting in Multi-year Agreements</i>
	<i>No</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>%</i>		
1953	2	0.7	209	63.4	29	8.8	79	23.9	6	1.9	4	1.1	1	0.2	330	36.1
1954	16	3.4	192	40.6	25	5.3	229	48.5	1	0.2	9	1.9	—	—	472	55.9
1955	15	4.5	196	59.2	27	8.2	82	24.8	3	0.8	8	2.5	—	—	331	36.3
1956	9	1.5	116	20.1	47	8.2	320	55.7	27	4.7	44	7.7	11	2.0	574	78.2
1957	7	2.6	139	52.4	11	4.1	84	31.6	3	1.0	15	5.5	7	2.7	266	45.1
1958	6	1.3	105	24.1	36	8.3	231	53.1	7	1.5	41	9.4	10	2.3	436	74.5
1959	4	1.0	82	22.1	43	11.5	174	47.0	12	3.4	44	11.9	12	3.2	371	76.8
1960	1	0.3	97	35.6	9	3.4	121	44.3	11	4.0	27	10.0	7	2.4	273	64.1
1961	1	0.2	132	29.7	19	4.3	213	48.1	12	2.7	60	13.6	6	1.4	443	70.0
1962	1	0.3	87	18.8	5	1.1	273	59.2	16	3.3	65	14.1	14	3.1	461	80.9
1963	4	1.5	46	16.2	13	4.7	128	45.3	6	2.0	79	28.1	6	2.2	282	82.3
1964	1	0.3	47	11.6	14	3.5	249	61.1	34	8.4	57	14.0	5	1.1	407	88.2
1965	1	0.3	44	15.0	13	4.6	81	28.0	36	12.6	104	35.9	10	3.6	289	84.4
1966	1	0.5	17	11.9	6	4.1	42	29.9	8	6.0	64	46.1	2	1.5	140	87.1

TABLE 6

AVERAGE ANNUAL PERCENTAGE CHANGES IN BASE RATES OVER THE LIFE OF THE COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS FOR ALL NEGOTIATING UNITS OF 500 OR MORE EMPLOYEES COMPLETED IN ANY GIVEN QUARTER

<i>Year</i>		<i>Quarterly</i>	<i>Annual</i>	<i>Year</i>		<i>Quarterly</i>	<i>Annual</i>
1953	1	6.7		1961	1	6.3	
	2	4.5	3.9		2	3.8	
	3	3.8			3	1.9	3.5
	4	2.9			4	3.6	
1954	1	5.2		1962	1	3.1	
	2	4.7			2	4.2	
	3	1.6	3.3		3	3.6	3.7
	4	2.7			4	3.5	
1955	1	3.8		1963	1	4.4	
	2	3.1			2	3.0	
	3	4.0	4.0		3	3.3	3.3
	4	5.7			4	3.2	
1956	1	5.2		1964	1	4.7	
	2	5.6			2	4.5	
	3	5.5	5.4		3	5.2	4.9
	4	5.2			4	4.8	
1957	1	6.3		1965	1	4.4	
	2	6.7			2	5.0	
	3	7.0	6.7		3	6.1	5.6
	4	6.3			4	6.4	
1958	1	5.0		1966	1	7.5	
	2	4.9			2	9.3	
	3	4.2	4.0		3	7.5	8.0
	4	3.2			4	7.9	
1959	1	3.4		1967	1	8.9	
	2	3.8			2	9.2	
	3	4.4	4.2		3	7.9	8.6
	4	5.2			4	8.6	
1960	1	4.5		1968	1	7.4	
	2	5.0					
	3	4.9	4.6				
	4	3.9					

TABLE 7

NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF AGREEMENTS CONTAINING TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE PROVISIONS BY SECTOR AND INDUSTRY AND EMPLOYEES COVERED

NOTE—Caution should be exercised in the interpretation of this table. The survey included only agreements covering 500 or more workers. Therefore, to the extent that some industries are composed of a proportionately great number of firms with less than 500 workers, they will not be adequately represented in the survey.

<i>Sector and Industry</i>	<i>Agreements</i>		<i>Employees</i>	
	<i>No.</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>No.</i>	<i>%</i>
PRIMARY :				
Logging	9	2	6,300	1
Dairy	2	*	2,350	*
Mining	2	*	2,170	*
MANUFACTURING :				
Food & Beverages	3	*	1,920	*
Tobacco & Products	5	1	4,105	*
Textiles & Apparel	9	2	21,917	3
Wood Products including Pulp & Paper	36	8	56,685	8
Printing, Publishing & Allied Industries	6	1	5,420	*
Metal Processing & Fabricating	8	2	12,360	2
Machinery & Transportation Equipment	16	4	42,187	6
Non-metal Mineral Processing & Fabricating	4	*	3,238	*
Chemicals	1	*	1,200	*
TRANSPORTATION, STORAGE, COMMUNICATION & UTILITIES :				
Air Transport & Airports	2	*	2,133	*
Bus & Coach Transport	1	*	640	*
Urban & Suburban Transport	2	*	5,950	*
Truck Transport	3	*	10,000	1
Water Transport & Related Services	3	*	3,694	*
Grain Elevators	1	*	1,000	*
Radio & T.V. Broadcasting	3	*	5,600	*
Electric Power	6	1	15,905	2
TRADE	1	*	2,900	*
PUBLIC SERVICE :	10	2	17,699	2
TOTAL	133	28	225,373	32

* Less than 1% of total.

LA NÉGOCIATION COLLECTIVE : QUESQUES PERSPECTIVES

INTRODUCTION

Nous tenterons, dans le présent article de faire ressortir ce que nous considérons les facteurs importants dans notre système de négociation collective, facteurs pertinents à la discussion des structures syndicales.

LE CONTEXTE SOCIO-ÉCONOMIQUE

- a) L'implication de plus en plus grande du public dans l'établissement des buts de la société ;
- b) La société canadienne en est une d'opulence ;
- c) Nous vivons dans une société caractérisée par de rapides changements dans la technologie, l'économique et l'édifice social de notre nation ;
- d) Depuis six ans, nous avons connu une période de prospérité sans précédent accompagnée d'augmentation des prix et des coûts ;
- e) Notre système de sécurité sociale représente un méli-mélo de programmes publics et privés.

LES PARTIS DANS LE SYSTÈME DE NÉGOCIATION COLLECTIVE

Même si la CSN semble exercer un plus grand contrôle sur ses affiliés que le CTC, on peut se demander si chacune de ces organisations agit sur et au nom de leurs affiliés de façon suffisante pour influencer la direction et l'implantation des politiques et des programmes nationaux dans une société comme la nôtre.

Du côté patronal, on doit noter au départ l'absence d'une organisation nationale représentative de tous les employeurs. Il est alors difficile pour eux de s'exprimer sur la définition des buts dans notre société.

Les 11 gouvernements canadiens ont des idéologies différentes quant au rôle qu'ils doivent jouer dans la négociation collective. Ceci n'est pas sans compliquer la situation d'autant plus que nous faisons face à 11 législations du travail différentes.

LE PROCESSUS DE NÉGOCIATION COLLECTIVE

a) *La structure des unités de négociation*

Nous définissons unité de négociation comme étant l'unité de prise de décisions qui négocie des changements en termes de conventions collectives ou de nombre de conventions collectives.

Suite à une foule de statistiques, il est possible de conclure qu'il y a peu de négociations collectives impliquant plusieurs syndicats au Canada.

b) *Etapas favorables aux ententes*

On peut tirer quelques tendances :

- 1.—on tend de moins en moins à être d'accord au niveau de la simple négociation ;
- 2.—on tend de plus en plus à signer les ententes au niveau de l'intervention du conciliateur et de moins en moins au niveau du « conciliation board ».

c) *La durée des conventions*

La durée moyenne des conventions collectives a passé de 18.1 mois en 1953 à 28.5 mois en 1966. Cela serait dû aux causes suivantes :

- 1.—les employeurs croient à la plus grande probabilité de paix industrielle avec un accord de plus longue durée et peuvent établir avec plus de précision les coûts du facteur travail ;
- 2.—les négociations sont devenues tellement complexes que les parties préfèrent les distancer le plus possible ;
- 3.—les augmentations de salaires sont plus en plus réparties également sur toute la durée de la convention ;
- 4.—après avoir réglé les problèmes tels la sécurité syndicale et les droits de la direction, les parties passent à des accords de plus longue durée.

LES RÉSULTATS DU SYSTÈME DE NÉGOCIATION COLLECTIVE

On remarque des changements substantiels dans les clauses de conventions collectives touchant les salaires, les heures de travail, les congés payés, les jours fériés et les changements technologiques.

CONCLUSION

Résumons les changements que nous considérons comme nécessaires dans notre système de négociation collective.

- 1.—Une définition plus explicite de nos objectifs économiques et sociaux et une meilleure organisation pour les atteindre ;
- 2.—Un système national de négociation collective doit être conçu et reconnu pour nos industries essentielles nationales ;
- 3.—Le nombre des syndicats devrait être réduit graduellement afin de former des syndicats industriels forts ;
- 4.—La négociation basée sur la productivité deviendra dominante dans l'avenir.