

Virtues Suffice for Argument Evaluation

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Andrew Aberdein

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Résumé de l'article

Les vertus et les vices de l'argumentation font désormais partie intégrante de la théorie de l'argumentation. Ils ont contribué à attirer l'attention sur des aspects jusqu'ici négligés de notre façon d'avancer des arguments. Cependant, la question de savoir si une théorie de la vertu peut contribuer à certaines des questions centrales de la théorie de l'argumentation reste controversée. Harvey Siegel se demande notamment si les « arguments au sens propositionnel abstrait » peuvent être évalués de manière significative dans le cadre d'une théorie de la vertu. Cet article explore les possibilités de fonder une analyse de l'évaluation des arguments sur les vertus et les vices des argumentateurs en examinant un débat correspondant dans l'éthique de la vertu : une éthique de la vertu peut-elle guider nos actions ? On avance ainsi qu'une réponse affirmative est possible : les vertus suffisent pour évaluer les arguments.

Virtues Suffice for Argument Evaluation

ANDREW ABERDEIN

*School of Arts and Communication
Florida Institute of Technology
150 West University Boulevard
Melbourne, FL 32901-6975, U.S.A.
aberdein@fit.edu*

Abstract: The virtues and vices of argument are now an established part of argumentation theory. They have helped direct attention to hitherto neglected aspects of how we argue. However, it remains controversial whether a virtue theory can contribute to some of the central questions of argumentation theory. Notably, Harvey Siegel disputes whether what he calls ‘arguments in the abstract propositional sense’ can be evaluated meaningfully within a virtue theory. This paper explores the prospects for grounding an account of argument evaluation in arguers’ virtues and vices by examination of a corresponding debate in virtue ethics: Can an ethics of virtue guide our actions? It is thereby argued that an affirmative answer is possible: virtues suffice for argument evaluation.

Résumé: Les vertus et les vices de l’argumentation font désormais partie intégrante de la théorie de l’argumentation. Ils ont contribué à attirer l’attention sur des aspects jusqu’ici négligés de notre façon d’avancer des arguments. Cependant, la question de savoir si une théorie de la vertu peut contribuer à certaines des questions centrales de la théorie de l’argumentation reste controversée. Harvey Siegel se demande notamment si les « arguments au sens propositionnel abstrait » peuvent être évalués de manière significative dans le cadre d’une théorie de la vertu. Cet article explore les possibilités de fonder une analyse de l’évaluation des arguments sur les vertus et les vices des argumentateurs en examinant un débat correspondant dans l’éthique de la vertu : une éthique de la vertu peut-elle guider nos actions ? On avance ainsi qu’une réponse affirmative est possible : les vertus suffisent pour évaluer les arguments.

Keywords: argument evaluation, argumentative norms, v-rules, virtue argumentation theory

1. Introduction

Virtue theories have, in recent years, become an established part of argumentation theory. This is in no small part a credit to the excellences of their opponents. The virtue programme has benefitted immeasurably from the critique of prominent argumentation theorists who do not necessarily endorse its conclusions, including Tracy Bowell and Justine Kingsbury, David Godden, Geoff Goddu, and Fabio Paglieri (Bowell and Kingsbury, 2013; Godden, 2016; Goddu, 2016; Paglieri, 2015). Harvey Siegel's latest article presents perhaps the most sophisticated challenge to a virtue approach to argumentation yet—but also perhaps the most fruitful opportunity for constructive engagement. I cannot hope in this brief reply to address all of the issues that it raises in the detail they deserve, but I will indicate some of the main avenues of response available to the virtue theorist. In particular, I will address Siegel's contention that virtues cannot provide an adequate account of argument evaluation.

Siegel rightly observes that 'argument' is a multiply ambiguous term and that argumentation theorists cannot always be trusted to distinguish its different senses. In a helpful act of conceptual clarification, he proposes the following fourfold distinction:

- (a) arguments in the abstract propositional sense
- (b) arguments in the complex speech act sense, which may or may not constitute instances of argumentation
- (c) arguments as communicative activities involving arguments in either or both of the first two senses, which activities themselves constitute instances of argumentation
- (d) extended episodes of argumentative interaction (Siegel 2023, p. 474).

For Siegel, it is the first of these senses, let us say 'a-argument,' that counts as an argument *tout court*. To resist ambiguity, he maintains, we should refer to b-arguments as (acts of) *arguing*; to c-arguments as *argumentation*; and to d-arguments as *argumentative episodes*. I have elsewhere referred to a-arguments as *argument traces*, directed graphs where the nodes represent propositions and the edges logical support of some kind (Aberdein 2019,

p. 828). An argument trace is thus an abstract object which approximates the structure of the corresponding (c-)argument. But, in pursuit of a neutral terminology, let us at least temporarily adhere to the ugly but unambiguous jargon of a-, b-, c-, and d-arguments.

Siegel indicts virtue theorists of argumentation, as well as pragma-dialecticians and adherents of the rhetorical theory, of neglecting to distinguish the four senses of ‘argument’ he identifies. We “either fail to honor these distinctions, or insightfully treat one sense of the term but illicitly extend [our] analyses to other senses of it” (Siegel 2023, p. 474). Importantly, this is not merely a matter of terminology but one of conceptual priority. I have no quarrel with Siegel’s account of this distinction. However, as he notes, I take argument to be “intrinsically dialectical” (Aberdein 2010, p. 175). As a result, I take c-argument to be the primary sense of ‘argument’ and the other senses, including a-argument, to be derivative. Although not all virtue theorists of argumentation endorse this intrinsically dialectical (or dialogical) understanding of argument, it has received significant support from other quarters (for a useful recent survey, see Mendonça 2023, §2). For example, Mathieu Marion defends a dialogical account of logic by appeal to the inferentialist theory of meaning proposed by Robert Brandom (Marion 2009). And, as Siegel notes, Catarina Dutilh Novaes has a book-length genealogical argument for the dialectical origins of deduction, and by extension, other forms of argumentation (Dutilh Novaes 2021). Siegel expresses scepticism about genealogical arguments in general and questions whether Dutilh Novaes should be understood as making a case for the conceptual priority of dialectical aspects of argumentation (Siegel 2023, p. 486, n. 24). Without seeking to litigate the latter point, I note that she identifies “the main hypothesis” of her book as “deductive reasoning is essentially a dialogical phenomenon” (Dutilh Novaes 2021, p. 29). Dutilh Novaes also supplies an answer to perhaps the most initially compelling of Siegel’s arguments for the priority of a-arguments over c-arguments: that many of the most familiar arguments, whether from logic textbooks, philosophy classes, or mathematical proofs, seem to not be dialogical in form. However, as she points out, such arguments may nonetheless be understood as

prover–sceptic dialogues, but dialogues in which the sceptic role has been “internalized” (Dutilh Novaes 2021, p. 70). In particular, if the “proof is correctly formulated according to the precepts of the deductive method” (*ibid.*) then the sceptic would have nothing to do beyond silently assenting to each step. It should thus be unsurprising that a valid syllogism or a proof from Euclid should lack a dialogical surface form.

Siegel denies that a-arguments can be evaluated meaningfully within a virtue theory. I defend the contrary thesis that virtues are sufficient to evaluate arguments (in all four senses). My defence of this thesis is intended to be independent of the priority question addressed in this section. Here is how the rest of the paper breaks down. In the next section, I will lay out what I take to be Siegel’s principal arguments against the thesis I am advancing. I will then introduce some ideas from virtue ethics and show how they can cross over into argumentation. Then we will see how the original arguments stand up in the light of these considerations.

2. Three problems

Siegel advances several distinct points against virtue theories of argument, some of which have also been raised by earlier critics. One of the most familiar is that “a vicious arguer can put forward an excellent argument ... a virtuous arguer a terrible one” (Siegel 2023, p. 494). José Gascón, an advocate of a more cautious approach to virtue argumentation in which virtues do not have a role in the evaluation of arguments, has made this point in very similar terms: “a virtuous arguer can put forward a bad argument and a vicious arguer can put forward a cogent argument” (Gascón 2018, p. 168). The problem here is that the virtues (or vices) of arguers do not seem to reliably coincide with the quality of their arguments. Let us call this the *alignment problem*.

Siegel also denies that “argumentative virtues and vices can determine the epistemic quality of arguments.” And he asserts that “the character of the arguer is irrelevant to the epistemic strength of the argument” (Siegel 2023, p. 494). This comprises a separate argument which he develops at greater length:

It is difficult to see how a virtue theory of argumentation might shed light on the normative evaluation of arguments (in the abstract propositional sense). It seems to be committed to something like the view that an argument is good—epistemically good, such that its premises/reasons provide support for its conclusion—*because* it has been argued for virtuously. This seems at best a *non sequitur*, since the quality of an argument (in the abstract propositional sense) hinges entirely on the support for the conclusion offered by its premises (*ibid.*, p. 488).

I will call this the *relevance problem*. Siegel links this point to the distinction between a- and c-arguments discussed in the previous section:

It seems also to conflate *arguments*—in the primary sense of the term (as argued above and below), abstract objects whose premises support (or not) their conclusions—and *argumentation*, the social, communicative activity of giving, analyzing, criticizing and evaluating arguments, which can be evaluated in terms of epistemic strength, rhetorical or persuasive force or effect, ability to bring about consensus, aesthetic properties, or along yet other dimensions (*ibid.*).

It is understandable that, from Siegel's perspective, wherein a-arguments are conceptually prior to c-arguments, the evaluation of a-arguments should be the more fundamental. But, by similar reasoning, if we take c-arguments as foundational, then it is their evaluation that should have priority.

Siegel also presents a distinct and important counterargument, familiar from other contexts as a Euthyphronic contrast:

It may be true that good arguments (in the abstract propositional sense) share two features: they are good because of their epistemic merits . . . and that when they are advanced in argumentative exchanges those merits are “manifest in the actions of the arguers who put them forward (and are otherwise engaged in them)” [(Aberdein 2018, p. 128)]. But their being so manifest is not what makes them good; rather, their goodness is strictly a reflection of their epistemic merits. That the merits are manifest in virtuous exchanges is only derivatively (if at all) a mark of an argument's

quality. The manifestation is in effect an epiphenomenon of the epistemic features of the argument: it is those features—not the fact that they are reflected in virtuous argumentative exchanges—that make the argument good. Those features are independent of who (if anyone) puts them forward and of how they are put forward, and remain so even if the argument is never put forward, virtuously or otherwise (Siegel 2023, pp. 491–492).

What we may call the *Euthyphro problem* concerns the explanatory priority of arguers' virtues and epistemic merits. Siegel is prepared to concede that good arguments are arguments that a virtuous arguer arguing virtuously would make, but so far as he is concerned, that is because those arguments would be the ones with the appropriate epistemic merits, rather than *vice versa*.

In summary, Siegel proposes three distinct problems for the position that I wish to defend:

Alignment problem: How can virtuous arguers produce bad arguments or vicious arguers produce good arguments?

Relevance problem: How are virtues relevant to the normative evaluation of abstract propositional arguments?

Euthyphro problem: Are arguments virtuous because of epistemic merits or epistemically meritorious because of virtues?

These are the three problems that I must address if I am to defend my title thesis from Siegel's critique.

3. Hursthouse's v-rules

As the youngest member of a well-established family, virtue argumentation can turn to its older siblings for help: Many of the problems it confronts have already been addressed in another context. With that in mind, let us turn to virtue ethics, and specifically Rosalind Hursthouse's discussion of 'the application problem':

During the 1980s, virtue ethics seemed vulnerable to "the application problem" – the objection that it can't provide action guidance

or be applied and is hence unable to do what a normative ethical theory is pre-eminently supposed to do. The objection was based on the premise that the only guidance virtue ethics could come up with was that you should do what the virtuous agent would do in the circumstances, and it is true that the earlier virtue ethics literature offered little more (Hursthouse 2006, p. 106).

Hursthouse's way out of this was, as she put it, to make use of "an obvious way to elaborate on 'The right action is what a virtuous person would do (in the circumstances)' which completely blocked this form of the application problem" (*ibid.*). This elaboration begins with the following biconditional: "An action is right iff it is what a virtuous agent would, characteristically, (i.e. acting in character) do in the circumstances" (*ibid.*). This directly addresses the alignment problem. Elsewhere I have used biconditionals very similar to the one that Hursthouse uses here to state that the practical measure of argument quality available to the virtue theorist is whether an arguer is arguing as a virtuous arguer would characteristically argue (Aberdein 2018, p. 128; 2023, p. 274). Godden (2016) suggests a similar definition that I am happy to accept:¹

Good Argument (arguer) An argument is a good argument if and only if it is one that a virtuous arguer arguing virtuously would use.

(Unfortunately, Godden then shifts his condition for argument goodness to "having-been-argued-by-a-virtuous-arguer-arguing-virtuously" [Godden 2016, p. 351], rather than, as this definition implies, *would-be-argued-by-a-virtuous-arguer-arguing-virtuously*. This undercuts much of the force of his subsequent critique.)

Hursthouse's application problem encompasses not only the alignment problem but also the relevance problem. This may be addressed by what she calls the "most interesting part" of her view—turning virtues (and vices) into rules:

¹ Slightly paraphrased here: Godden (2016, p. 349) presents this definition in terms of argument₁, following the distinction of Daniel O'Keefe (1977, p. 121). However, I concur with Siegel that the argument₁/argument₂ distinction essentially subdivides c-argument.

By and large, we do not need to find a virtuous agent, because in one way, we know what she does and would do. She does, and would do, what is virtuous, not vicious; that is, she does what is courageous, just, honest, charitable, loyal, kind, generous – and does not do what is cowardly or reckless, unjust, dishonest, un-charitable, malevolent, disloyal, unkind, stingy. So each virtue generates a prescription – “Do what is courageous, just, etc.” – and every vice a prohibition – “Do not do what is cowardly or reckless, unjust, etc.” – and in order to do what the virtuous agent would do in the circumstances, one acts in accordance with these, which I have called ‘v-rules’ (Hursthouse 2006, p. 106).

How can we apply this to argumentation? If virtues may be understood in terms of v-rules, we can restate the above definition of a ‘good argument’ in terms of v-rules too:

Good Argument (rules) An argument is a good argument if and only if it is in accordance with appropriate argumentative v-rules.

All that remains to answer the relevance problem is to state what the appropriate argumentative v-rules comprise.

Table 1: Wenzel’s Perspectives

	Rhetorical perspective focuses on “arguing” as process	Dialectical perspective focuses on “argumentation” as procedure	Logical perspective focuses on “argument” as product
Practical purpose	Persuasion	Criticism	Judgment
Theoretical purpose	To understand conditions for effective arguing	To explain conditions for candid and critical argumentation	To establish standards for sound argument
Situation	Natural rhetorical situations	Contrived arenas of discourse	Fields of argument
Rules	Tacit social rules	Explicit procedural rules	Explicit inferential rules
Standards	Effectiveness	Candidness	Soundness
Speaker	Naive social actor	Conscious advocate	Impersonal explicator
Listeners	Particular audience	Particular striving for universality	Universal audience

In a now classic paper, Joseph Wenzel framed the familiar threefold distinction between rhetoric, dialectic, and logic as being between three co-equal perspectives on argument—arguing, argumentation, and argument, as he puts it.² Table 1 **Error! Reference source not found.** summarizes how he understands these perspectives to diverge (Wenzel 1980, p. 124). While I would not defend every aspect of Wenzel’s account, Wenzel’s application of this distinction to rules is notable and persuasive. Each of his perspectives comes with its rules, whether tacit social rules, explicit procedural rules, or explicit inferential rules. In each case, we could make up any rules we please, but if they are to have any kind of grip, they should come with normative force. Understood as v-rules, that normative force comes from virtues. If we can find v-rules for each perspective, then we will have answered the relevance problem.

Much of this work has already been done, notably by Juli Thorson (2016). She was the first person to propose an application of v-rules for argumentation and she also employs the familiar threefold distinction. Here is her list of v-rules for the rhetorical perspective:

- Don’t argue fallaciously.
- Listen sympathetically to your coarguer.
- Work to understand your coarguers’ argumentative perspective.
- Attempt to respond to the major objections with a satisfying response to your coarguer.
- Present your argument in a way that respectfully responds to your coarguer’s background (Thorson 2016, p. 364).

She also provides v-rules for the dialectical perspective:

- Be respectful of your coarguer’s humanity.
- Seek truth as opposed to seeking to win the argument.
- Don’t coerce assent.
- Don’t use seduction to gain assent.
- Be motivated by an open exchange of ideas.

² Wenzel’s use of these terms may not coincide exactly with Siegel’s!

- Don't seek arguments that are for the sole benefit of one of the parties (*ibid.*).

The individual examples are open to dispute, but they serve to demonstrate the viability of the overall approach. Thorson does not provide a comparable list for the logical perspective, referring only to “the baseline skill of producing cogent arguments” (Thorson 2016, p. 363). This seems right as far as it goes but is in need of considerable reinforcement if it is to serve the purpose I have suggested for it.

Thorson's approach has received little attention from virtue theorists of argumentation; a notable exception is Khameiel Al Tamimi. She expands on Thorson's approach to generate a much longer list of rules, summarized here:

- Intellectual courage (six rules), e.g. be willing to be criticized and challenged
- Good listening (four rules), e.g. listen carefully
- Intellectual empathy (two rules), e.g. see things from another perspective by trying to reason from their point of view
- Fair-mindedness (four rules), e.g. interpret with charity
- Intellectual perseverance (three rules), e.g. exercise care in trying to understand and interpret another's perspective
- Critical trust (three rules), e.g. be mindful and critical of what you trust
- Fair intention (four rules), e.g. give the interlocutor a fair hearing
- Respect (three rules), e.g. respect the opinions and arguments of [the] interlocutor (Al Tamimi 2017, pp. 148–150).

Al Tamimi's presentation of multiple v-rules for each virtue makes one important point clear: v-rules can be stated with greater or lesser degrees of generality. But, although she does not explicitly follow Thorson's division of v-rules by perspective, all Al Tamimi's rules are either rhetorical or dialectical. To fully address the relevance problem, we need v-rules for all three perspectives.

4. V-rules for the logical perspective

Existing work on v-rules for argumentation is of limited help in supplying v-rules for the logical perspective, but other resources are available. In an earlier paper, I discussed the application of virtue epistemology to a debate on the normativity of logic (Aberdein 2020). My point of departure was Britt Brogaard's account of 'eudaimonistic epistemology.' She proposes these three norms of intellectual flourishing for belief, assertion, and action:

Intellectual flourishing (belief): "You should believe p only if believing p does not hinder intellectual flourishing"

Intellectual flourishing (assertion): "You should assert p only if asserting p does not hinder intellectual flourishing"

Intellectual flourishing (action): "You should treat p as a reason for action only if treating p as a reason for action does not hinder intellectual flourishing" (Brogaard 2014, p. 15).

I suggested that these norms could be generalized to reasons:

Intellectual flourishing (reasons): "You should treat p as a reason for accepting q only if treating p as a reason for accepting q does not hinder intellectual flourishing" (Aberdein 2020, p. 103).

This may be understood as a very general v-rule for the logical perspective. For practical application, it would need to be supplied with subordinate v-rules. A full specification of such rules would be a substantial task, but we should expect many of them to be very familiar from existing systems of argumentation. One might argue, for example, that (a suitable paraphrase of) modus ponens should be a v-rule.

Despite my own preferences, it is not essential to the virtue approach that arguments should be understood dialectically. However, in the rest of this section, I will briefly sketch how v-rules for the logical perspective might be set out on the assumption that arguments are essentially dialectical. The central question of the normativity of logic debate concerns how to get to normative claims about what one ought to believe from facts about logic. A very general answer is that there needs to be some sort of bridge principle linking these together. In a frequently cited but famously unpublished paper, John MacFarlane proposes a general definition

of a bridge principle, where some abstract argument of the form $A, B \models C$ obtains:

Bridge principle: “If $A, B \models C$, then (normative claim about believing A, B , and C)” (MacFarlane 2004, p. 6).

MacFarlane surveys many different ways in which a “normative claim about believing A, B , and C ” might be fleshed out. Dutilh Novaes has further developed this work to offer a dialogical bridge principle, again assuming that $A, B \models C$:

Proponent: “If opponent has granted A and B , then proponent may put forward C (and require opponent to grant it)”

Opponent: “Opponent ought to see to it that, if he has granted A and B and proponent puts forward C , then he will either grant C , or retract his endorsement to A or B ” (Dutilh Novaes 2015 pp. 604, 606).

As discussed above, Dutilh Novaes has defended a prover–sceptic or proponent–opponent dialogue approach to the foundations of logic at some length. In my earlier paper, I suggested that we can infer an analogous eudaimonistic bridge principle (where the argument $p_1, \dots, p_n \models q$ is valid, or informally cogent, or otherwise meets the appropriate standard):

Intellectual flourishing (proponent): If opponent has granted p_1, \dots, p_n , then proponent should put forward q (and require opponent to grant it) only if doing so does not hinder intellectual flourishing.

Intellectual flourishing (opponent): If opponent has granted p_1, \dots, p_n , and proponent puts forward q , then opponent should either grant q or retract his endorsement of at least one of p_1, \dots, p_n , depending on which hinders intellectual flourishing the least (Aberdein 2020, p. 103).

These norms could be understood as very general dialectical v-rules for the logical perspective, from which more specific v-rules could be derived. One of the merits of this approach is that it is highly flexible with respect to the choice of formal system.

Dialogical logic, and the theory of formal dialogues more generally, provides one strategy for supplying the required detail. In the 1960s, German logicians Paul Lorenzen and Kuno Lorenz established that both intuitionistic and classical deductive logics can be presented in terms of formal dialogues, a result subsequently generalized to many other non-classical logics (Marion 2009, p. 6). Of course, argumentation theorists do not necessarily expect all arguments to be formalizable within some system of deductive logic. Formal dialogue systems for argumentation in general have also been proposed by multiple scholars, notably Douglas Walton and Erik C. W. Krabbe, both severally and jointly, such as their **PPD** and **RPD** systems (for permissive and rigorous persuasion dialogues, respectively) (Walton and Krabbe 1995). Each of these systems comprise a series of rules. With some degree of paraphrase, these rules could be understood as fleshing out the norms indicated above.

5. The Euthyphro problem

The hardest of the three problems is the Euthyphro problem. But, as with the other two problems, virtue argumentation theorists may look for help from virtue theorists who have already addressed the matter in another context. For example, Jason Kawall confronts the dilemma that

Intuitively, either the actions (or approvals and disapprovals) of virtuous agents follow some set of independent standards of rightness or goodness (in which case these are fundamental, not the attitudes of virtuous agents), or else the actions and approvals of the virtuous are simply arbitrary (which, in turn, makes such an ethics arbitrary and not worthy of our concern) (2009, p. 17).

Kawall's response is that virtuous agents will be disposed to seek a reflective equilibrium (since consistency is virtuous), which will in turn be shaped by their other virtues. Hence, "the reactions of the virtuous are regular and consistent (avoiding the second horn), but are not the result of following ... some prior set of rules or goodness (avoiding the first horn)" (Kawall 2009, p. 19). This remedy

would seem to be just as efficacious for the dilemma that Siegel presents to the virtue argumentation theorist.

Kawall also stresses the importance of disambiguating questions such as “Why is this action wrong?” He notes that the

virtue theorist can at once say both that actions of harming puppies are wrong because of the suffering caused (this will be what concerns the virtuous and causes them not to approve of such actions), and because the virtuous would respond negatively to the action (where this latter can be understood as both a normative or a metaethical claim) (Kawall 2009, pp. 14–15).

This responds to the challenge that virtue ethics has no place for ethically essential features such as suffering. We can see that a similar answer can be given to Siegel’s concern that the virtue argumentation theorist must ignore epistemically essential features of arguments, such as premisses providing good reasons for believing a conclusion. Soundness, cogency, inductive strength, and similar properties are good answers to the question “Why is this argument good?” in what Kawall calls the instantiation sense, but unsatisfactory answers to the same question understood normatively. To answer that question, we need a normative theory. The normative theory I have proposed is expressed in terms of virtues.

6. Conclusions

Harvey Siegel (2023) identified three problems for the view that virtues suffice for argument evaluation, which I termed the alignment problem, the relevance problem, and the Euthyphro problem. The alignment problem is that virtuous arguers can occasionally make vicious arguments and vicious arguers can occasionally make virtuous arguments. Carefully specifying the principle that we are relying on in defining argument quality virtuously undercuts this as a problem. Good arguments are not just what virtuous arguers do, but what virtuous arguers do *characteristically* when they are acting as virtuous arguers. That qualification is sufficient to fix the alignment problem, the least serious of these problems. The second more substantial problem is the relevance problem. We can address it by providing v-rules for the evaluation

of arguments. Most of the work that has been done on v-rules for argumentation is restricted to the dialectical and rhetorical perspectives. For many virtue argumentation theorists, such as Gascón, that is enough: that is the contribution that virtue argumentation makes. I agree that this is an enormously worthwhile project, but we do not need to limit ourselves that way. We have seen that v-rules can also be provided for the logical perspective. The last problem is the Euthyphro problem. This problem has been raised in other contexts, including virtue ethics, and the remedies that have been suggested are also applicable to argumentation. In particular, I can agree with Siegel that arguments are good because of their epistemic merits as a practical matter, and I expect that we would go about the evaluation of individual a-arguments in very similar ways; where we differ is on the normative question of why our shared method of evaluation should be used.

Fabio Paglieri has recently characterized my approach to virtue argumentation as radical—I preferred his earlier designation of me as an “ambitious moderate” (2015, p. 77). However, in some respects, I am actually conservative: I am conserving quite standard approaches to argument evaluation. A radical could defend some entirely novel, bold approach to the analysis of arguments on virtue-based terms. However, that is not my project. The rules themselves need not be novel. I am just proposing a novel account of what makes them normative; of why we should follow the rules we follow. The virtues give an answer to this question.

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